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In Laurent de Premierfait’s 1409 retelling of the story of Cadmus, king of Thebes, 
the king’s family members play a central role in his downfall.1  The first disruptive 
episode in Cadmus’ life involved his daughter.  As Laurent told the story,  
while the women of Thebes were, according to their custom, performing the 
festival of Bacchus, Agane, daughter of the said Cadmus, became insane 
(forsennee) and went to the court as if enraged (enraigee) against her son 
Pantheus, whom she had had with Echion her husband, a noble and powerful man.  
And Agane struck and murdered her son Pantheus who had mocked the sacrifices 
that were done to Bacchus, the god of wine, and as some people say she murdered 
him with a javelin or a club while the said Pantheus was not thinking of anything; 
thus as Agane, returning to her senses (sens), afterward heard it told.2
 
Agane, becoming forsennee and enraigee, created ruptures within her family, and 
attacked those she would normally hold dear.  Pantheus had mocked the sacrifices of the 
Bacchanal, which placed Agane’s act in the context of a challenge to her religious 
                                                 
1 This was Laurent de Premierfait’s second translation of Giovanni Boccacio’s De Casibus Virorum 
Illustrium (The Fall of Noble Men).  In 1400, he translated the work directly, but in 1409 he revised the 
original, returning to the classical sources and expanding considerably on Boccaccio’s original.  The story 
of Cadmus in both Boccaccio and Laurent de Premierfait was drawn from Euripides’ play, The Bacchae.  
See Giovanni Boccaccio, De Casibus Illustrium Virorum: A Facsimile Reproduction of the Paris Edition of 
1520 (Gainesville: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1962), 31; Euripides, The Bacchae, trans. Hebert 
Golder (New York: Applause Theatre & Cinema Books, 2001).   
2 Patricia May Gathercole, ed., Laurent de Premierfait’s Des cas des nobles hommes et femmes, book 1, 
translated from Boccaccio, Studies in the Romance languages and literatures no. 74 (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 123-124: “tandiz que les femmes de Thebes faisoient selon leur 
coustume les festes de Bachus, Agane fille du dit Cadmus devint forsennee et s’en vint le cours comme 
enraigee contre son filz Pantheus lequel elle avoit eu de Echion son mari, noble et puissant homme.  Et 
Agane frapa et murtry son filz Pantheus qui se moquoit des sacrifices que l’en faisoit a Bachus, le dieu du 
vin, et comme aucuns dient elle le murtri d’un javelot ou d’une massue tandiz que le dit Pantheus pensoit 
en riens, ainsi comme Agane retournee en son sens oy aprés racompter.”   
  1  
community.  While in ordinary circumstances Pantheus’ challenge would not have led his 
mother to such a violent anger, the impetus of the ritual of the Bacchanal pushed her 
beyond her normal behavior, making her “enraged.”  The pathos of the passage is 
highlighted through both the emphasis on Pantheus’ identity as Agane’s legitimate son 
and Pantheus’ lack of fear or concern when his mother appeared.  Significantly, Agane 
lost her memory of her own actions while she was “insane,” requiring others to tell her 
about her own deeds when she returned “to her senses.”  Her memory loss further 
confirmed the altered state in which she had murdered her child, and created a need for a 
narrative reconstruction of events that allowed Agane and her family to explain and 
comprehend the horror of her son’s death.   
Agane’s actions were not the only violent episode in Cadmus’ family.  In a 
second occurrence, the husband of another of Cadmus’ daughters also attacked his 
children.3  Laurent explained 
Athamas, son-in-law of Cadmus, who was already called king of Thebes and to 
whom the people did honor as if he were already king, became enraged (enraigié) 
and crazy (sot), to such an extent that Athamas, believing that his wife Ynoe, 
daughter of the said Cadmus, was a lioness and that his two small children were 
two lions, gave a great cry.  And afterwards, by force, he grabbed Learcus, their 
son together, out of the arms of Ynoe, and knocked and broke [the child] with all 
his effort against a hard rock.  But immediately Ynoe, the mother of Learcus, 
upset at his death, fearing for Meleatrix, another of her sons, and fleeing Athamas, 
her husband, who followed her, maddened (forseneux) and enraged (enraigié); 
she threw herself, with her said son Meleatrix, off the crest of a mountain into the 
Ionean Sea, and because of this she and her son were swallowed up and died in 
that sea.4
                                                 
3 This story was drawn from Ovid’s Metamorphoses.  See Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. Charles Martin 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 140-146.  Note that, although madness ran in the family here, it was not 
being attributed to heredity, since Agane and Athamas were not related by blood, only by marriage. 
4 Gathercole, ed., Laurent de Premierfait’s Des cas des nobles hommes et femmes, 124: “Athamas, gendre 
de Cadmus, que l’en surnommoit ja roy de Thebes et auquel le peuple fasoit honneurs comme se il feust ja 
roy devint enraigié et sot, en tant que Athamas, cuidant sa femme Ynoe fille du dit Cadmus feust une 
leonnesse et que ses deux petis enfans feussent deux leonceaux, fist un grant cri.  Et aprés par force il 
arracha de entre les bras de Ynoe Learcus leur commun filz, et le quoti et froissa de tout son effort contre 
une dure roche.  Mais tandiz que Ynoe la mere de Learcus courroucee de sa mort doubtoit de Meleatrix un 
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These two moments of violence have clear parallels, as both Agane and Athamas destroy 
the next generation, erasing Cadmus’ lineage as well as their own.  The terminology 
Laurent de Premierfait used to describe this madness, these mental states in which such 
violent actions were possible, carries over from one event to the other.  Athamas, like 
Agane, was described as enraigié and forseneux.  Their mental states were not identical: 
Athamas was also described as sot, and his behavior manifested itself in terms of visions, 
rather than religious ecstasy.  Nevertheless, in both cases the focus was on a 
transformation of the normal into the frighteningly strange, both for the sufferer him- or 
herself and for the family members who did not expect to be the target of his or her 
aggression.  These literary representations constructed a dichotomy between the expected 
behavior and the actual behavior of the subject, who destroyed communal and familial 
relationships by attacking the very people that he or she logically should protect.   
 Laurent de Premierfait was translating, and expanding upon, Giovanni 
Boccaccio’s De Casibus Illustrium Virorum, making it available to a French audience in 
the vernacular.  Boccaccio’s treatment of Cadmus’ violent and mentally unstable relatives 
was truncated, and used less varied and evocative language.  In his Latin version, Agane 
was “furiis agitata” when she killed her son, and Athamus “in furorem lapsus.”5  Laurent 
de Premierfait’s translation moved beyond the image of fury, seeking multiple terms to 
describe Agane’s and Athamas’ madness.  These vernacular French terms suggested 
particular contexts within which these moments of mental instability could be 
understood. 
                                                                                                                                                 
sien autre filz et fuyoit Athamas son mary qui la poursuivoit forseneux et enraigié, elle avec son dit filz 
Meleatrix se trebucha de la creste d’une montaigne en la mer Yonie, et par ainsi elle avec son filz fut 
transgloutie, et mourut en celle mer.”   
5 Boccaccio, De Casibus Illustrium Virorum, 31. 
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In 1409, stories about madness, kingship, family and community such as Laurent 
de Premierfait’s would have had a particular resonance for French readers.  Charles VI, 
the French king, had turned on his own men in 1392, in an episode that his 
contemporaries believed was caused by a mental disturbance, and the king continued to 
suffer unpredictable relapses.  Indeed, as one scholar has argued, citing the illustrations in 
the manuscript tradition, “the De casibus narratives of the fallen figures of mythology, 
the Bible, antiquity, and recent history appear to have been used in France to comment on 
the political events of the present.”6  Laurent de Premierfait had a number of connections 
with the French court.  He was active in the humanist circles that included several royal 
notaries, and had engaged in correspondence with them while he was living in Avignon 
at the papal court.  When he moved to Paris, he worked as a clerk for one of the king’s 
secretaries, which would have brought him into closer contact with the royal court.  In 
1409, when he finished his second, expanded version of Des Cas des Nobles Hommes et 
Femmes, he was working as secretary to Jean, duke of Berry, uncle to King Charles VI 
and patron of a number of important works of literature and art.7  Ducal patronage 
widened Laurent’s audience beyond his own humanist circles to the court itself, where 
his treatment of the madness of kings and princes would probably have been read in the 
light of the potential tragedies inherent in Charles VI’s own illness. 
 This dissertation uses narratives about madness to situate mad people within their 
larger communities, covering the years between the beginning of Charles V’s reign in 
                                                 
6 Nigel Mortimer, John Lydgate’s Fall of Princes: Narrative Tragedy in its Literary and Political Contexts 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 34.  He points out that one manuscript version includes an image of 
Charles VII presiding over the trial of Jean, duke of Alençon, accused of conspiracy with the English and 
executed. 
7 For more on Laurent de Premierfait’s life and works, see the essays collected in Carla Bozzolo, ed., Un 
traducteur et un humaniste de l'époque de Charles V: Laurent de Premierfait (Paris: Publications de la 
Sorbonne, 2004). 
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1364 and the end of Charles VIII’s in 1498.  It should be noted at the outset that mentally 
ill people do not always make it into the historical record, and those that do often appear 
due to particularly unusual circumstances.  Thus, while the mental instability of a poor 
person who had no chance of inheriting property and never appeared violent or 
threatening to any observers would generally not leave any marks in the archives, that of 
a wealthy person who owned or was heir to property or of any individual who became 
violent would appear in legal documents.  As a result, the many documents that narrate 
the acts of the mentally disturbed king Charles VI allow for an exploration of the 
relationship between madness, kingship, and royal authority.  Because the king’s illness 
was cyclical, he was able to govern the kingdom during his periods of sanity, and his 
close relatives took on the role of regents during his crises.  By returning to the regency 
that had governed during his minority, the king’s relatives were following law codes that 
assigned guardians to minors and the mad.  Issues of inheritance and legal controls over 
the mentally disturbed were dealt with in Roman law, which influenced the development 
of medieval canon law and French customary law.  Indeed, the records of criminal 
procedure, and particularly of the kings’ remissions for crime, provide the richest 
evidence of the mentally ill and their interactions with other people.  Medieval narratives 
about madness, like those of Laurent de Premierfait, described it as a threat to the bonds 
of kinship and community in both philosophical and practical ways.  However, instead of 
seeking to alleviate this threat by expelling them, these narratives presented idealized 
communities that reconstructed themselves around the figure of the mad person.  The 
mental illness of an individual thus became an occasion for communities to reaffirm the 
boundaries of acceptable behavior, to confirm ties of consanguinity and affinity, to 
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acknowledge structures of authority and jurisdiction, and ultimately to reintegrate 
disruptive members. 
Madness has often been imagined as an isolating condition, in terms of both the 
nature of the condition itself and the way the mentally ill have historically been treated.  
The kinds of intellectual histories that have been written about insanity in the Middle 
Ages tend to support this view, but, due to the sources they use, they generally ignore the 
wider social significance of the disease.8  Medieval concepts of social identity are often 
defined in terms of membership in multiple layers of communities.9  Thus, the 
communities examined in this dissertation range from the vastness of Christendom as a 
whole and the French realm, down to local villages and particular kin groups.  My 
sources include chronicles, sermons, political treatises, law codes, and remission letters.  
All of these different records simultaneously reflected and informed the ways people 
thought about madness and interacted with those whom they believed to be mad.  In these 
texts, mental illness was not at all isolating.  Rather than being marginalized, these people 
became central to narratives which sought to ameliorate the damage they had done.     
 I have chosen to use madness as an overarching term in this dissertation in an 
effort to access broader linguistic, social, cultural and political meanings.  There was no 
single term for madness in this period, and many texts use descriptive phrases, such as 
the French phrase hors de son sens (“out of their senses”) rather than just one word, as we 
                                                 
8 See particularly Penelope Doob, Nebuchadnezzar’s Children: Conventions in Madness in Middle English 
Literature (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Jean-Marie Fritz, Le discours du fou au Moyen Age: 
XIIe-XIIIe siècles (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992); Muriel Laharie, La Folie au Moyen Âge: 
XIe-XIIIe siècles (Paris: Le Léopard d'Or, 1991); Judith Neaman, Suggestion of the Devil: The Origins of 
Madness (New York: Anchor Books, 1975). 
9 Caroline Walker Bynum, “Did the Twelfth Century Discover the Individual?," in Jesus as Mother: 
Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 82-
109; Diane Watt, “Introduction: Medieval Women in their Communities," in Medieval Women in their 
Communities, ed. Diane Watt (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 1-19.   
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still do in modern discourse when we refer to people who are “out of their minds” or who 
“come back to their senses.”  Modern terminology includes some of the same range of 
possibilities as medieval terminology, and the large scope of the term “madness” allows 
for this expanse.  “Madness” also avoids enforcing modern anachronistic understandings 
that were not present in the vast array of terms used in medieval texts to describe this 
condition.  Insanity insists on an interpretation that pairs madness as the opposite of 
sanity, or health, and mental illness is equally focused on diseases of the mind.  While 
both of these concepts existed in the Middle Ages, there were also a number of 
alternative ways of thinking about what madness was and what it meant, as there are 
now.  The ideas of “not sane,” “foolish,” “mentally ill,” and “mentally disturbed” do have 
their place within the greater conceptualization of madness.  Therefore, I will use all 
these terms according to context, with “madness” as an umbrella under which the others 
can be found.  The term madness, rather than limiting my focus to a single lens, allows 
the engagement of a range of interpretive frameworks. 
 
I.  Vocabularies of Madness 
The text of a legal document from 1424 will allow for a first foray into the range 
of terms and concepts available in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century France for addressing 
madness and the mad.  According to Jehannecte Troppé’s relatives, in October, more than 
two weeks before she killed her husband, Jehannecte had begun seeing visions that 
caused her to become “merancolie.”  The next day, she acted as if she were 
“demoniacle,” and her husband recognized that her actions came from “frenaisie et 
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merencolie,” or possibly from “mal du saint,”10 and did not punish her for them, hoping 
that soon she would return to her “bon sens et advis.”  Unfortunately, she did not, and her 
relatives indicated that she was still, two months later, “comme demoniacle,” and due to 
her “maladie” should not be punished for her crime, adding that she should be released 
from prison, not only for her own health but for the health of the child she was carrying.  
Finally, they cited the customary laws of Normandy, asserting that, if released from 
prison, Jehannecte would be kept in chains or otherwise securely guarded so that she 
would not harm anyone else in future.11   
This story has been recovered from a remission letter, written to the king of 
France, and reveals the variety of terms available to describe a mental disturbance that 
could lead to violence.12  The range of words and phrases used in describing Jehannecte 
Troppé suggest some of the complexities and confusions involved in describing an 
internal state that could be recognized through behavioral signs.  When medieval people, 
to whom control was a sign of reason and sanity, were faced with someone who was not 
able to control him or herself, what vocabulary did they use to describe that condition?  
Terms such as frenaisie and merancolie gesture towards a medical discourse, whereas 
demoniacle and mal du saint suggest supernatural intervention.  The concept that 
                                                 
10 “Mal du saint” could be understood as an illness visited on someone as punishment for offending a saint.  
See Robin Briggs, Communities of Belief: Cultural and Social Tension in Early Modern France (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), 24. 
11 Archives Nationales Series JJ book 173 folio 33v number 63 (henceforth abbreviated as AN JJ 173 fo 
33v no 63).  Edited in Paul Le Cacheux, ed., Actes de la chancellerie d’Henri VI concernant la Normandie 
sous la domination anglaise (1422-1435), extraits des registres du Trésor des chartes aux Archives 
nationales (Rouen: A. Lestringant, 1907-1908), vol. 1, 181-183.  The customary law of Normandy does 
call for the chaining or guarding of the mad to prevent their harming themselves or others.  See my further 
discussion of the law in chapter 3, and William Lawrence de Gruchy, ed., L'ancienne coutume de 
Normandie (Jersey: C. LeFeuvre, 1881), 184 LXXIX. 
12 For more on these documents, see Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their 
Tellers in Sixteenth-century France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 7-25; Claude 
Gauvard, "De Grace Especial": Crime, état et société en France à la fin du Moyen Age (Paris: Publications 
de la Sorbonne, 1991), 2 vols., vol. 1, 59-110. 
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Jehannecte needed to return to her bon sens focused on a definition of her condition as 
mental disturbance, since she was out of her good senses.  A further exploration of 
language can help shed some light on the ways medieval people understood mental 
illness.13     
The most prevalent terminology used in medieval French to indicate a mentally 
unstable condition centered on words that described a lack of sense, understanding, 
comprehension, or knowledge, as was the case with Agane who “returned to her senses” 
after attacking her son.14  Jean-Marie Fritz, in an examination of the terminology for 
madness in medieval romance, notes that  
the mad person is a being from outside, out of all civilized or socialized space, out 
of himself, out of his senses, and thus some of the expressions which habitually 
designate the frenetic in our romances are those such as hors du sen, hors de son 
mimoire, issir del sen, and not fol.15   
 
These expressions imagined madness as somehow outside of normal modes of 
comprehension and knowledge.  The imagery placed the mad mentally outside the 
bounds of human thought processes, suggesting that their behavior would be equally 
outside expected social norms.     
Phrases and terms such as hors du sens, non sens, or insensible negated the 
positive valence of the term sens.  In a phrase that makes the distinction between positive 
                                                 
13 In this study of the vernacular French vocabularies of madness, I am inspired in part by Helmut Puff’s 
proviso that what is significant “is not language in its abstraction” but instead “the ways in which historical 
actors, magistrates, officials, translators, redactors, experts, or defendants used language.”  Helmut Puff, 
Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003), 3. 
14 For just a few examples, see AN JJ 78 fo 145 no 262 (in 1350); AN JJ 114 fo 116v no 236 (in 1379); AN 
JJ 115 fo 34 no 75 (in 1379); AN JJ 158 fo 11 no 20 (in 1403); AN JJ 171 fo 292 no 520 (in 1422); AN JJ 
181 fo 67v no 123 (in 1452); AN JJ 188 fo 81 no 160 (in 1459); and AN JJ 220 fo 52v no 90 (in 1489). 
15 Fritz, Le discours du fou, 16: “le fou est un être du dehors, hors de tout espace civilisé ou socialisé, hors 
de soi, hors du sens, et ce sont bien des expressions comme hors du sens, hors de son mimoire, issir del 
sen, et non fol, qui habituellement désignent dans nos romans le frénétique.” 
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and negative meanings even clearer, some people were described as hors de bon sens.16  
In using such phrases, authors were drawing on a long tradition of understanding sens as 
an essential component of comprehension, understanding, and knowledge, and the 
opposite of sens, or a lack of sens as a negative condition that led to mental incoherence.  
Such usage was common in twelfth- and thirteenth-century vernacular literature, where 
the mentally unstable were described as “hors du sens” or as having their “sens dervé.”17  
The verb derver or desver indicated a raving madness, often connected in romances to 
anger or to particularly grave wounds.18  Like sens, entendement was used to indicate 
mental comprehension and cognition.19  Similarly, memoire often appeared in 
conjunction with sens to indicate a troubled mental state.  For example, in Chrétien de 
Troyes’ romance Yvain, when Yvain was healed he returned to “son san et son 
memoire.”20  In Benoit de Sainte-Maure’s Roman de Troie all three terms are used 
together, when an “ome desvé senz escïent, Qui rien ne set ne rien n’entent, Rameinent 
tot en son memoire” (“insane man without wisdom, Who knows nothing and understands 
nothing, Is quickly returned to his memory”).21  Thus, the text actively defined a person 
who was desvé as one “without wisdom, who knows nothing and understands nothing,” 
and presented recovery as a return to “memory.”     
This concept of madness as a negation of cognitive ability drew upon medieval 
medicine and natural philosophy.  What did it mean to be hors du sens, hors 
                                                 
16 For examples, see AN JJ 115 fo 52 no 114 (1379); AN JJ 130 fo 159 no 282 (1387); AN JJ 146 fo 7 no 
14 (1394); AN JJ 174 fo 7 no 17 (1427); AN JJ 220 fo 52v no 90 (1489). 
17 Adolf Tobler and Erhard Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch: Adolf Toblers nachgelassene 
Materialien bearbeitet und mit Unterstützung der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: 
Weidmann, 1925-), 11 vols., vol. 9, 456-465.  For more hors du sens see also the entry for hors in Tobler 
and Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch, vol. 4, pt. 2, 1180. 
18 Tobler and Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch, vol. 2, 1813-1816. 
19 Ibid., vol. 3, pt. 1, 570-571. 
20 Cited in Ibid., vol. 5, 1378. 
21 Cited in Ibid., vol. 5, 1382. 
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d’entendement, or hors du memoire?  Medicine and philosophy had multiple ways of 
understanding the functions of the mind, and indeed where the mind was located in the 
body.  While physicians believed that the mind was located in the brain, philosophers 
believed it was in the heart.  There were a number of divergent arguments about the 
treatment of the mentally ill because of these distinctions.  As Ruth Harvey notes,  
because of the ambiguous nature of the bodily spirits, which both partook of the 
physical constitution of the body, and provided the link by which the mind 
communicated with the bodily organs, the doctors were led to the treatment of 
disordered reason almost as though it were a purely physical function; whereas 
the philosophers insisted that reason as such fell outside medical control.22   
 
Avicenna attempted to reconcile these two theories by positing that the bodily spirits had 
their ultimate source in the heart, but that their immediate source was in the brain.  Thus, 
medical practitioners could continue to treat mental disturbance.23  The Galenic 
explanation of cognitive processes that Avicenna was working within offered a tripartite 
model of the brain, where imagination (imagination) was in the warm and dry front, 
reason (raison) in the warm and moist middle, and memory (memoire) in the cold and dry 
back.24  Thus, the areas of the brain also correspond to three of the four humors (only 
phlegm is left out), with imagination associated with choler, reason associated with blood 
(a sanguine nature), and memory associated with melancholy.  Isidore of Seville, in his 
sixth-century Etymologies, used the tripartite model of the brain to provide a model of 
mental illness under the heading of Chronic Diseases, dividing the general category of 
madness into three specific types: epilepsy, mania, and melancholy, which arise from 
                                                 
22 E. Ruth Harvey, The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance 
(London: Warburg Institute, University of London, 1975), 8. 
23 Ibid., 22-23. 
24 See Ibid., 35; Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in 
the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art (London: Nelson, 1964), 68-69. 
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imagination, reason, and memory, respectively.25  This division based on models of the 
brain allowed for a more complicated reading of behavior to explain disturbances 
believed to be caused by madness.  Problems with the imagination generally produced 
visions, problems with the memory caused forgetfulness, and problems with the reason 
caused people to do irrational things.26   
A lack of knowledge could also be used to describe a mental disturbance.  Savoir 
most often appeared in the phrase peu sachant (little knowing) or in cases where a person 
acted ne savoit qu’il faisoit (without knowing what he was doing).  The term sachamment 
(knowingly) was used in a particularly interesting way in the late fourteenth-century text, 
Le Ménagier de Paris.  In discussing confession, the author recommended that the sinner 
explain whether he committed the sin “knowingly” or “ignorantly”: “doit le pecheur dire 
la condicïon du pechié…; s’il le fist sachamment ou ygnorament” (“the sinner must tell 
the condition of the sin…; whether he did it knowingly or ignorantly”).27  In this sense, 
then, savoir was connected to intent, implying that actions done sachamment were 
different from those done when a person “did not know (ne savoit) what he (or she) was 
doing (faisoit).”  Although the term conoissance can also be translated as “knowledge,” it 
differs from savoir, in that it implies knowledge of people, places or things.  For 
example, a figure in one of the fabliaux declared, “[h]ors sui de mon päis et de ma 
connoissance” (“I am outside of my country and of my knowledge”).28  Thus, to describe 
                                                 
25Isidore of Seville, Etymologies, ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911), IV.7; Isidore 
of Seville, The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, trans. Stephen A. Barney et al (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 111. 
26 Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy, 93.  See also the chart of the Aristotelian 
division of souls in Katharine Park, “The organic soul," in The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 464-484, 466. 
27 Cited in Tobler and Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch, vol. 9, 262. 
28 Cited in Ibid., vol. 2, 702. 
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people as having lost all conoissance suggested that they had lost the kind of intimate 
knowledge of and familiarity with people and places close to them. 
Raison, or reason, was also applied to mental capacity and incapacity.  The 
allegorical persona of Raison was a common figure in medieval literature.29  Reason was 
something that people returned to when they recovered from insanity, as well.  For 
example, the medieval French translation of Ovid’s Remedia Amores notes, “quant il est 
hors de s’irour Et appaisiés de sa furour…, lors est il plus raisonnables Et ses maulx plus 
medicinables” (“when he is outside his anger And appeased of his fury…, then is he more 
reasonable And his ills more curable”).30  Ovid’s poem explained here some of the 
dangers of excessive emotions, such as anger (irour) and fury (furour), establishing that 
when a man is no longer emotional he is more reasonable.  The link between the 
language of emotion and that of mental disturbance is particularly strong.  Many of the 
terms for mental illness can also be used to describe emotional states. 
This evocative imagery of people existing outside their sense, understanding, 
memory, and reason stems in part from the biblical concept of the mad person, who lacks 
spiritual knowledge and fails to recognize God, as the opposite of the wise person.  This 
kind of foolishness held up as the inverse of wisdom is particularly prevalent in the Old 
Testament and especially in the Book of Proverbs.31  In Latin, the most common term 
                                                 
29 The personification of Reason played a central role as the Foolish Lover’s guide in the Roman de la 
Rose, for example.  Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun, Le Roman de la Rose: Édition d'après les 
manuscrits BN 12786 et BN 378, ed. Armand Strubel (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 1992).  For more 
on the Roman de la Rose and royal notaries, see the discussion in chapter four. 
30 Cited in Tobler and Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch, vol. 8, 224. 
31 Several French translations of parts of the Bible were circulating in this period.  Samuel Berger, La Bible 
française au moyen âge (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1884; reprint, Genève, Slatkine Reprints, 1967).  
These stories also circulated in vernacular sermons.  For more on sermons, see Michel Zink, La prédication 
en langue Romane avant 1300 (Paris: Editions Honoré Champion, 1976). 
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used for this type of madness is stultus,32 although fatuus33 and insipiens34 also appear.  
In a French translation of the psalms, stultus was generally translated as fol, while 
insipiens was translated sometimes as fol and other times as sot.35  However, folly in the 
world was not always understood negatively in the Bible.  Through the figure of 
inversion, the same terms used to describe the opposite of wise action could also be 
understood as the positive state of soothsayers and prophets,36 or the way Jesus was 
perceived by unbelievers.37  The idea that a fool in the world could be wise in the eyes of 
God was picked up by a number of medieval saints, most notably St. Francis of Assisi.38  
In Christian understanding, then, these terms had multiple and varied significations.  In 
interpreting these Biblical cases and trying to understand their significance in more 
general terms, medieval theological texts treated madness as a loss of human reason.  As 
Jean-Marie Fritz argues, Latin theological terms for madness taken from the Bible, such 
as insipiens, insania, and dementia, imply this lack.39   
                                                 
32 The Latin Biblical citations come from Robert Weber, ed., Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam Versionem 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1969).  See First Kings 25:25, Job 5:2, Psalms 48:11, Psalms 91:7, 
Proverbs 7:22, Proverbs 9:13, Proverbs 10:1-25, Proverbs 11:29, Proverbs 12:15, Proverbs 13:16-20, 
Proverbs 14:3-29, Proverbs 15:2-21, Proverbs 17:2-28, Proverbs 18:2-13, Proverbs 19:3-29, Proverbs 24:7-
9 and 30, Proverbs 26:1-12, Proverbs 27:3 and 22, Proverbs 28:26, Proverbs 29:9-11 and 20, Proverbs 
30:22 and 32, Ecclesiastes 2:12-19, Ecclesiastes 4:5, 13 and 17, Ecclesiastes 6:8, Ecclesiastes 7:5-11, 18 
and 26, Ecclesiastes 10:1-6, 13-15, Ecclesiastes 18:18, Ecclesiastes 21:22 and 26-28, Ecclesiastes 22:9-22, 
Ecclesiastes 27:12, Isaias 32:4-6, Jeremias 10:14, Luke 12:20, and First Corinthians 3:18-19. 
33 See Proverbs 12:16, Proverbs 13:16, Proverbs 14:24, Proverbs 15:2, Proverbs 17:12 and 21, Ecclesiastes 
19:11, Ecclesiastes 20:13, 17 and 22, Ecclesiastes 21:17-30, Ecclesiastes 22:7-23, Ecclesiastes 25:4, 
Ecclesiastes 33:5, Isaias 32:6 and Matthew 5:22. 
34 Insipiens gets used both in terms of folly and in terms of insanity, as these concepts are used in the Bible.  
See Psalm 13:1, Psalm 38:9, Psalm 52:1, Proverbs 10:18, Proverbs 14:1, Proverbs 26:8, Ecclesiastes 10:12, 
Ecclesiastes 20:14 and 33, and Isaias 32:5 for insipiens as the inverse of sapiens.  See Psalm 48:11 and 13, 
Psalm 91:7, Luke 6:11, 2 Peter 2:16 for insipiens as insanity. 
35 Both of these are the terms used for madness in the Psalms.  See François Bonnardot, ed., Le Psautier de 
Metz: Texte du xive siècle (Paris: F. Vieweg, 1884), 41, 117, 143, 153, 262. 
36 Fourth Book of Kings 9:11 and 19:28 (insanus); Prophecy of Isaias 44:25 (furor). 
37 Gospel of Mark 3:21 (furor); Gospel of John 10:20 (insanus); Acts of the Apostles 12:15 and 26:24 
(insanus); First Corinthians 14:23 (insanus). 
38 John Saward, Perfect Fools: Folly for Christ's Sake in Catholic and Orthodox Spirituality (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1980), 84-89. 
39 Fritz, Le discours du fou, 7. 
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Vocabularies of madness did not solely involve descriptive phrases suggesting 
mental incapacity.  As is clear even in the brief discussion of medical theory and biblical 
madness above, there were a number of nouns and adjectives that could be used to 
indicate madness as well.  While the words fou and folie often indicated behavior similar 
to that described by the English terms “fool” and “folly,” defined in the Oxford English 
Dictionary as “one deficient in judgment or sense, one who acts or behaves stupidly, a 
silly person, a simpleton,”40 sometimes they were used as part of the array of possible 
terms to describe a more violent form of madness.41  Fol actually has a number of diverse 
meanings according to the texts collected in the Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch.  It could 
indicate foolish stupidity, thoughtless foolishness, ignorance, madness, infatuation or 
lovesickness, and even prostitution.42  As noted above, French versions of the psalms 
translated both stultus and insipiens as fol.  The word sot was sometimes used as a 
translation for the Latin word stultus in religious texts varying from Li Sermon saint 
Bernart to La Vie de saint Thomas le martyr, generally as an alternative form of fol or 
forsené.  It also appeared in Romances such as Li Roman d’Alixandre and Fabliaux.43  
Both stultus and insipiens were most often used in the Bible to describe a foolish lack of 
faith. 
                                                 
40 See for example AN JJ 223 fo 24v no 41 (in 1492), where a drunken man is described as “foul”; AN JJ 
209 fo 55 no 93 (in 1480), where a drunken man uses the term “foulx” as an insult; AN JJ 155 fo 5 no 11 
(in 1400), where a young man steals from “folie”; and AN JJ 155 fo 188 no 309 (in 1400), where young 
men commit gang rape through their “folie jeunnesse.” 
41 See AN JJ 114 fo 106v no 212 (in 1378), where a woman kills her child “dans un acces de folie.” 
42 Tobler and Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch, vol. 3, pt. 2, 1998-2003.  Interestingly, many of 
the uses of folle fame to refer to prostitutes appeared in texts requiring them to be turned out.  For example, 
Robert de Clary’s thirteenth-century text La Prise de Constantinople, describes the treatment of prostitutes 
traveling with the army: “et quemanda on que on quesist et que on ostast toutes les foles femmes de l’ost et 
que on les envoiast bien loins ensus de l’ost; et on si fist, que on les mist toutes en une nef, si les envoia on 
bien loins de l’ost.”  And in Jean sire de Joinville’s fourteenth-century Histoire de Saint Louis, Saint Louis 
cleaned up the city: “que les foles femmes soient boutees hors des maisons, et qui c’onques louera maison a 
fole femme, il rendra au prevost ou au baillif le loier de la maison d’un an.” 
43 Ibid., vol. 9, 979-981. 
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The slipperiness of meaning for the term fol, ranging from stupidity to violent 
madness to infatuation, exemplifies the complexities and shades of meaning of all the 
terms for mental incapacity.  In an early twentieth-century compilation of medieval 
French proverbs, thirty-seven begin “fous est.”44  Many of these proverbial phrases refer 
to fools as the inverse of the wise, much like Biblical treatments of folly.  For example, 
“[f]ous est qui ne croit consoill,” (“a fool is one who does not believe counsel”),45 which 
suggests that fools would not engage with the community in order to come to 
conclusions, but would act on his or her own.  The proverbs reflect the linkages between 
madness and mental cognition.  In one, folly is a defined as a lack of memory, since 
“[f]ous est qui se oublie” (“a fool is one who forgets himself”).46  However, this is a 
particular kind of memory: memory of the self, which offers a profoundly disturbing 
image of folly as a loss of self knowledge.  Proverbs also reveal the skewed vision of the 
mad, since “[f]ous ne voit en sa folie se sen non” (“the fool does not see the nonsense in 
his folly”), and “[f]ous qui ne foloie si pert sa seson” (“a fool who does not do foolish 
things loses his season”).47  Both these proverbs provide an interesting take on the 
circularity of folly.  The fool is unaware of his own foolishness, but a fool ought always 
to act foolishly or he loses the appropriate moment.  However, one proverb notes the 
fundamentally changeable nature of folly, since “[f]ous voit au vespre et sage au matin” 
                                                 
44 Joseph Morawski, ed., Proverbes français antérieurs au xve siècle (Paris: Librairie ancienne Édouard 
Champion, 1925), 28-29.  Morawski compiled 2500 proverbs in total.  Proverbs may very well have been 
the site of a convergence of knowledge between “elite” and “popular” cultures.  Natalie Zemon Davis, 
“Proverbial Wisdom and Popular Errors," in Society and Culture in Early Modern France: Eight Essays 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), 227-270.  See also Marie-Luce Launay, “Les 'miettes' du 
sens: La folie dans les proverbes français antérieurs au xviie siècle," in La folie et le corps, ed. Jean Céard, 
Pierre Naudin, and Michel Simonin (Paris: Presses de l'école normale supérieure, 1985), 31-48. 
45 Morawski, ed., Proverbes français antérieurs au xve siècle, 28. 
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid.  
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(“a fool seen at vespers and a sage in the morning”).48  Perhaps the most interesting 
proverbial lesson is “[f]ous va a cort sanz mander” (“fools go to court without being 
summoned”),49 a phrase that is especially evocative given that some legal cases cite the 
criminal’s willingness to turn him or herself in as proof of madness.50  The multiple, and 
in some cases contradictory, understandings of folly in these proverbs point also to the 
singularity of the fool or mad person.  These figures are not interacting appropriately with 
their fellows: they ignore advice, cannot see their own folly, and take unnecessary 
actions. 
The proverbial fools threaten their neighbors through their ignorance or avoidance 
of social rules.  Some types of madness, like that suffered by Agane and Athamus, were 
more directly threatening to the welfare of other people.  The Latin biblical terminology 
for a more violent kind of madness uses the terms insania, furor, amentia, and dementia 
as well as occasionally insipiens.51  Deuteronomy 28:28, for example, reads “percutiat te 
Dominus amentia et caecitate ac furore mentis” (“the Lord strike thee with madness and 
blindness and fury of mind”).52  The French term fureur similarly gets used to describe a 
violent kind of madness, though like the modern English word “fury” it could also 
indicate violent anger.53  The connection between emotions, particularly anger, and 
madness occurs in other words as well.  Both Agane and Athamus were described as 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 29. 
49 Ibid.  
50 See especially AN JJ 188 fo 81 no 160 (in 1459). 
51 Deuteronomy 28:28 (amentia and furore mentis); Prophecy of Isaias 24:6 (insanie); Prophecy of 
Jeremias 25:16 (insanie); Prophecy of Zacharias 12:4 (amentia) Book of Wisdom 14:21-31 (insaniae) 
Gospel of Luke 6:11 (inspientia).  In the French translation of the psalms, furor was translated as fureur, 
insensate as insensible, and fatuus as fatuite.  See Bonnardot, ed., Le Psautier de Metz: Texte du xive siècle, 
41, 117, 143, 153, 262. 
52 Deuteronomy 28:28. 
53 See Tobler and Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch, vol. 3, pt. 2, 2360.  So, for example, in 
Brunetto Latini’s thirteenth-century Li Livres dou tresor, he notes that “l’om(e), quant il met son cors en 
peril par ire et par furor, il n’est mie fors; mais cil qui se met en peril par droite conoissance, est fors.” 
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enragie in Laurent de Premierfait’s work.  This was a common term for violent actions 
that were undertaken in ways that appeared unreasonable.  It could refer to a type of rage 
that was acceptable due to an insupportable grief, but even in those cases it was a 
dangerous state that threatened the person’s mental stability and could lead to violence.54  
Similarly, desesperee referred to an extreme despair that could in certain cases turn into 
madness.  For example, Philippe de Navarre’s Les quatre Ages de l’homme explains how 
guilt works, noting “qu’il ne soit amandé ou laissié de pechié, sa conscience le remort, et 
en est en grant bataille en son cuer, se il n’est fous ou desesperez” (“that if he is not 
amended or prevented from sinning, his conscience has remorse, and there is a great 
battle in his heart, if he is not mad or despairing”).55  The term forsené was often used in 
legal texts to indicate mental instability, particularly of a threatening nature.56  It was also 
used in many medieval literary texts.57  For example, in the Roman de la Rose the figure 
of Reason described love as a paradox: “C’est reson toute forsenable / C’est forcenerie 
resnable” (“It is reason completely mad / It is madness reasonable”), and “C’est fol sans, 
c’est sage folie” (“It is mad sense, it is sage folly.”).58  In both these formulations, the 
author was drawing upon two possible understandings of madness.  First, madness was 
presented as a corruption of reason, and a loss of sense or wisdom.  At the same time, the 
text developed the Biblical inversion, where folly could appear as reason and wisdom, 
and vice versa. 
As noted above, according to humoral theory, madness, like any other disease, 
was caused by an imbalance of the humors, but particularly an extreme excess of any one 
                                                 
54 See the references to duel in Ibid., vol. 2, 490-491. 
55 Cited in Ibid., vol. 2, 1574. 
56 See the further discussion of legal texts in chapter 3. 
57 Tobler and Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch, vol. 3, pt. 2, 2146-2149. 
58 Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun, Le Roman de la Rose, 282, ll. 4296-4297 and l. 4320. 
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of them.  Thus, madness could result from an increasingly serious case of another 
disease.  In this sense, the illness was understood to be physiological.  Although madness 
was concentrated in the brain, where they believed the mind was located, physicians also 
saw it as a disease that affected the entire body of the individual.  Medical texts divided 
madness into four distinct types: frenzy, mania, melancholy, and lethargy.  Each category 
of madness corresponded to an excess in one of the humors.59  Frenesie appears in the 
earliest vernacular health treatise, the thirteenth-century Le Régime du corps by 
Aldobrandino of Siena.  He warns against sleeping on one’s back “por ce qu’il fait 
maintes maladies venir, si com apoplesie, frenesie, fantosme” (“because it makes many 
illnesses come, such as apoplexy, frenzy, phantasm”).60  The word appears in a number 
of non-medical texts as well.  For example, in Gautier de Coincy’s Les Miracles de la 
sainte Vierge, he lists “li frenetiques, Li fors du sens, li enragiez” together, indicating that 
medical and literary vocabularies were not mutually exclusive in religious texts, and 
suggesting a larger pattern of cross-pollination.61  Indeed, frenesie also appears in literary 
texts.  In Adenés li Roi’s Li Roumans de Cleomadès, he explains that torment and illness 
“l’assaillirent si Que en frenesie chëi” (“assail him such that he falls into frenzy”).62  This 
language of “falling into frenzy” created an image of madness as a descent.  In contrast, 
use of the term melancholie often involves “fullness,” suggesting a surfeit of black bile or 
                                                 
59 According to Hippocrates’ De Morbo Sacro, which Jean-Marie Fritz argues was influential for thinking 
about madness in the Middle Ages, frenzy and lethargy included fever, while mania and melancholia did 
not.  This instability, according to Fritz, made mania and, especially, melancholia the focus of medical 
discourse in a way that frenzy and lethargy were not.  Fritz, Le discours du fou, 133-138.  However, more 
recently Julie Laskaris has suggested that it was not in fact known in the Middle Ages, noting “there is no 
evidence that On the Sacred Disease was translated into Latin, so its transmission into the medieval 
tradition is obviously in doubt.  Its reception in the Renaissance and later seemed to center not on the 
rational premises it brought to medicine but, ironically, on the high degree of proper religious sentiment it 
proved that Hippocrates had expressed.”  See Julie Laskaris, The Art is Long: On the Sacred Disease and 
the Scientific Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 60. 
60 Cited in Tobler and Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch, vol. 3, pt. 2, 2236. 
61 Ibid., vol. 3, pt. 2, 2236. 
62 Cited in Ibid., vol. 3, pt. 2, 2236. 
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an excess of melancholic emotions.  In the late thirteenth-century romance, Sone de 
Nausay, for example, one character laments, “Je suis sans sens, sans vaillandie, Et plains 
de grant melancolie” (“I am without senses, without valor, and full of great 
melancholy”).63  In Chrétien de Troyes’ Chevalier au lyon, Yvain is helped out of his 
melancholy through the power of massage: “Tant li froia au chaut soloil Les tanples et 
trestot le cors Que cel cervel li issi fors La rage et la melancolie” (“She rubbed so well in 
that hot sun His temples and his whole body That from his brain issued all The rage and 
the melancholy”).64  Again, there is a suggestion of fullness, where the melancholy and 
rage filled his brain and must therefore be removed in order that he return to his balanced 
state, and a connection between mental disturbance and emotion, as rage and melancholy 
were both also associated with the passions. 
Madness could also be associated with stupidity.  The term idiot, for example, 
could be used in multiple contexts with very different meanings.  In legal texts the term 
was generally used for people considered mad due to natural causes.  In Philippe de 
Beaumanoir’s Coutumes de Beavaisis, for example, he refers to “li ediote a qui il apert 
qu’il n’ëussent pas de bone memore ou pregnent viellece, ou par sotie naturele, ou par 
autre maladie, par quoi il sunt hors de lor ancienne memore” (“the idiot, of whom it 
appears that he does not have good memory either because of age, or through natural 
madness, or through another illness, by which he is out of his previous memory”).65  The 
evocative phrase “lor ancienne memore” suggests the possibility that the ediote might 
have his or her own version of memore that is not compatible with a previous, or older, 
memore.  However, idiot could also be used to refer simply to someone who was 
                                                 
63 Cited in Ibid., vol. 5, 1353. 
64 Cited in Ibid., vol. 5, 1353. 
65 Cited in Ibid. 
  20  
illiterate.66  Simple often appears in texts alongside the term idiot to suggest a negative, 
and in some cases dangerous, kind of ignorance or stupidity.  For example, in Gautier de 
Coincy’s Miracles de la sainte Vierge, the devil explains that “Un vilain simple, un 
ydïote, Aime assez mieux, c’en est la somme, C’un soutil clerc ne c’un sage homme” (“A 
simple peasant, an idiot, Loves even better, this is the sum, Than a subtle cleric or than a 
wise man”).67  Similarly, in Henri de Mondeville’s Chirurgie, he complained “il est 
aucuns d’iceus, aussi comme ydiotes, simples et ignorans…, disans que il ont l’oeuvre de 
cyrurgie” (“there are some of these, like idiots, simple and ignorant…, saying that they 
have the work of surgery”).68  Simple is an interesting term for ignorant stupidity because 
of its positive valences in other contexts.69
There are other terms, like simple, that only indicate madness in context, when 
used with other terms that suggest a mental disturbance.  Esmouvance, for example, 
which can be translated generally as movement, can indicate madness when it is used in 
certain phrases.  Le Ménagier de Paris describes a “fol esmouvement” that could cause 
errors in judgment.70  The word cervel, which generally meant the brain, also could be 
used in a phrase denoting madness as a brain injury.  In Chrétien de Troyes’ Le Chevalier 
de la Charette, where a knight insults Lancelot by calling him “tant a folie et orguel / Et 
de cervel la teste vuide” (“so foolish and proud / And with a head empty of brain”), the 
brain is described as missing, rather than injured, making a link between folie and 
“empty-headedness.”71  Estonne generally referred to a stunning blow, but in the context 
                                                 
66 For example, in Henri Mondeville’s Chirurgie, cited in Tobler and Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches 
Wörterbuch, vol. 4, pt. 2, 1276. 
67 Cited in Ibid. 
68 Cited in Ibid. 
69 See Ibid., vol. 9, 662-665. 
70 Cited in Ibid., vol. 3, pt. 1, 1130. 
71 Cited in Ibid., vol. 3, pt. 2,  137. 
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of other terms it could be used to refer to a temporary madness.72  Similarly, estourdi 
could often indicate someone who was stunned or bewildered.73  However, when used 
with phrases such as “avoit perdu quasi toute cognoissance” (“had lost almost all 
knowledge”) or with the words foulx, or frenesie it suggests a blow to the head that was 
sufficiently serious to cause temporary mental incapacity.74   
The term lunatique or lunage evokes the perceived connection between madness 
and the cycles of the moon, and refers to the belief that the disease was cyclical.  The 
Lapidaire of Modena explained the powers of the herb celandine, which “ouevre par 
grant mervelle: De cel mal, passïon lunage, Garist, n’ert ja de tel ëage; Ces gens malades 
hors del sens Refait venir a lor buens sens” (“works by a great marvel: Of this evil, 
passionate lunacy, it heals, of whatever age they be; These sick people, out of their senses 
Are brought back to their good sense”).75  Many sufferers were believed to have episodes 
of madness, recover their sanity (either through such remedies as celandine or through the 
natural waning of the disease), then relapse into madness again.  Although for some 
people, these patterns followed the cycle of the moon, not all were so conveniently 
predictable.  Relapses were often described through the phrase surprins par maladie, 
suggesting that madness “surprised” or “overtook” the person.76  Similarly, people could 
be surprins by other illnesses, or even par boire, or drunkenness.77  Just as frenaisie 
                                                 
72 See Ibid., vol. 3, pt. 2, 1407-1408. 
73 See Ibid., vol. 3, pt. 2, 1416. 
74 AN JJ 221 fo 118 no 204 (in 1490); AN JJ 209 fo 55 no 93 (in 1480); and AN JJ 172 fo 113v no 221 (in 
1422). 
75 Cited in Tobler and Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch, vol. 5, 731. 
76 AN JJ 114 fo 106v no 212 (in 1378); AN JJ 208 fo 11 no 20 (in 1480). 
77 For illness, see AN JJ 171 fo 94v no 156 (in 1421); AN JJ 188 fo 81 no 160 (in 1459).  For being 
surprins de vin or de boire, see AN JJ 146 fo 24 no 55 (in 1394); AN JJ 155 fo 168 no 276 (in 1400); AN JJ 
220 fo 64 no 113 (in 1489). 
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might be fallen into and melancholie might fill a person up, so illness or drunkenness 
might come as a surprising and threatening force from outside to “take over.”     
The external force that caused madness was in some instances identified as the 
Devil.  In the document with which this section began, for example, Jehannecte Troppé’s 
behavior was described as demoniacle and comme demoniacle, drawing on a tradition 
that linked the behavioral patterns of demonic possession with those of physiological 
madness.78  The question of possession came to prominence in this period, as Jean 
Gerson and other theologians began to create rules for discerning divine possession from 
demonic possession from natural madness.79  As Jean-Claude Schmitt argues, 
“demoniacs are masters neither of their desire nor of their gestures.”80  This troubling 
supernatural state mirrored a state of mental disturbance. 
                                                 
78 The term comes from Latin and was not often used in French.  The Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch only 
provides three instances of the word demoniaque in French.  One is Péan Gatineau’s late thirteenth-century 
life of St. Martin of Tours, one is from a collection of contes and fabliaux, and the third comes from the 
clerc de Troyes’ fourteenth-century redaction of the Roman du Renard.  See Tobler and Lommatzsch, 
Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch, vol. 2, 1378. 
79 See Nancy Caciola, Discerning Spirits: Divine and Demonic Possession in the Middle Ages (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003); Nancy Caciola, “Mystics, Demoniacs, and the Physiology of Spirit 
Possession in Medieval Europe," Comparative Studies in Society and History 42, no. 2 (2000): 268-306; 
Jean Gerson, “On Distinguishing True from False Revelations," in Jean Gerson: Early Works, ed. Brian 
Patrick McGuire (New York: Paulist Press, 1998), 334-364. 
80 Jean-Claude Schmitt, La raison des gestes dans l'Occident médiéval (Paris: Gallimard, 1990), 127: “les 
démoniaques ne sont maîtres ni de leur volonté ni de leurs gestes.” 
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sens 64 77 raison 4 4 
fol 46 47 desesperee 4 4 
malade 30 30 lunatique 2 2 
fureur 24 29 enragie 2 2 
entendement 26 27 altere 2 2 
frenaisie 18 18 aliene 2 2 
memoire 16 16 caduque 2 2 
simple 15 15 sot 2 2 
savoir 10 10 cervel 2 2 
melancholie 10 10 estonne 2 2 
forcenez 8 8 affoible 1 1 
idiot 7 7 fatuite 1 1 
ignorance 6 6 esmouvance 1 1 
estourdi 6 6 insane 1 1 
cognoissance 5 5 teste 1 1 
demoniacle 5 5 dyable 1 1 
Table 1: Terms for Madness Used in Remission Letters.  Note that the total number of 
letters examined is 145. 
 
Remission letters like Jehannecte Troppé’s can be used in aggregate to move 
towards a vernacular lexicon of madness, to consider how this multiplicity of terms could 
be used in conjunction with one another, and to reveal some of the complexity of thought 
involved in describing this condition.  Composers of remission letters often used negative 
language implying a loss of some cognitive ability, or the more complicated idea of being 
“outside” it.  Most often the loss or externality referred to the sens, entendement, 
memoire, or savoir.  Indeed, thirteen of the twenty-seven examples of entendement in 
remission letters included the word sens, and fourteen of the sixteen letters that described 
a mad person as hors de memoire or as having perdu son memoire used memoire in 
conjunction with sens.  Several letters described people as “troublee de son sens et 
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entendement” (“troubled in his sense and understanding”).81  This idea of having a 
“troubled” mind differs from being outside it or missing it, and suggests some of the 
confusion and concern raised by people whose actions appear “troubling.”  Four 
remission letters described people who acted without raison or, as one letter put it, 
“oultre les termes de raison” (“outside the terms of reason”).82  The composers of 
remission letters appear to have had a particular image of the relationship between the 
parts of the brain and madness.  Mad people were described as outside of, impaired in, or 
troubled in their sense, understanding, or memory.  Significantly, although some of the 
mad are described as seeing visions, they were never said to be outside of or impaired in 
their imagination.  It seems that the composers of remission letters believed, 
metaphorically at least, that mad people were living almost exclusively in their 
imaginations, which therefore caused them to act in unpredictable ways.  For example, in 
Jehannecte Troppé’s case, she was considered to have lost her “bon sens,” leaving her 
prone to visions and voices in her head that presented an alternative reality and made her 
believe that her husband had left her bed, even though he was lying next to her.83
The composers could also choose from a wide range of adjectives or nouns, 
including frenaisie, fureur, melancholie, demoniacle, and fol.  Since the royal notaries 
were trained in law84 and remission letters were part of the greater legal system in 
                                                 
81 For example, AN JJ 190 fo 33 no 64 (in 1460); AN JJ 199 fo 276 no 441 (in 1464); AN JJ 227 fo 32 no 
62 (in 1496). 
82 AN JJ 187 fo 138v no no 252 (in 1455). 
83 AN JJ 173 fo 33v no 63.  Edited in Le Cacheux, ed., Actes de la chancellerie d’Henri VI, 181-183. 
84 Mireille Desjardins, in a discussion of royal notaries in the fifteenth century, notes that “Outre la langue 
et l’écriture latine et française, ils doivent connaître les droits coutumiers et romain, les ordonnances 
royales et la jurisprudence qui s’appliquent au royaume afin de comprendre les consequences légales des 
documents qu’ils rédigent.” Mireille Desjardins, “Les savoirs des notaires et secrétaires du roi et la 
géographie de la france d'après le manuel d'Odart Morchesne et un index de chancellerie," in Écrit et 
pouvoir dans les chancelleries médiévales: Espace français, espace anglais, ed. Kouky Fianu and DeLloyd 
J. Guth (Louvain-la-neuve: Collège Cardinal Mercier, 1997), 87-97, 88.  See also the list of notaries with 
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France, legal questions about madness were clearly central to their construction.  
However, the legal terms forsené and idiot seldom appear in the letters in comparison to 
other terms.85  One remission letter describes an “esmouvance de teste” (“movement of 
the head”), physically locating a type of mental shifting.  Similarly, another letter refers 
to someone who was “affoible de teste” (“feeble-headed”), and a third refers to a person 
who was “legier de teste” (“light-headed”).86  The brain itself could be cited as a locus 
for mental disturbance, for example if someone were “blecie du cervel” (“wounded in the 
brain”).87  In one letter, estonna la teste (stunned in the head) appears alongside ydiot, 
perdi son sens et sa memoire and insensible,88 and in the other it was used with the 
phrase “ne savoit quil faisoit ne ou il estoit” (“not knowing what he was doing nor where 
he was”) to indicate that the person was out of his mind while stunned.89  On average, the 
letters used two different terms, but some included as many as seven, suggesting that the 
composers were aware of the range of terminology available to describe what they 
perceived as mad behavior.  The terms sens, fol, fureur, and entendement were sometimes 
involved repeatedly in a single letter, perhaps indicating that they were especially 
resonant words, while other terms appear in only one letter (see Table 1).  
As we have seen, in their attempts to find a conceptual vocabulary about madness, 
the composers of remission letters had a number of different cultural resources from 
which to draw.  The language used to describe madness in remission letters varied 
widely, using multiple discourses in many different constellations and creating a fluid 
                                                                                                                                                 
legal degrees in André Lapeyre and Rémy Scheurer, Les notaires et secrétaires du roi sous les règnes de 
Louis XI, Charles VIII et Louis XII (1461-1515) (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1978), vol. 1. 
85 “Forcenez” is used eight times, and “idiot” seven. 
86 AN JJ 155 fo 230 no 382 (in 1400); AN JJ 107 fo 193v no 377 (in 1375); AN JJ 171, fol 244v no 429 (in 
1421). 
87 AN JJ 182 fo 51v no 86 (in 1453). 
88 AN JJ 160 fo 70v no 91 (in 1405). 
89 AN JJ 221 fo 124v no 215 (in 1490). 
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vision of what madness was.  Most of the supplicants for remission described themselves 
as poor manual laborers and were most likely illiterate.  The royal notaries, in contrast, 
were not only literate, but active in literary circles and a few were members of the French 
humanist movement.  Indeed, Laurent de Premierfait was active in the humanist circles 
that included several royal notaries, and engaged in correspondence with them while he 
was living in Avignon at the papal court.90  It was thus in the interstices of discourse that 
the remission letters were composed.  The language used is often vague and repetitious, 
but these iterations signal different contexts for understanding madness.   
The notaries and supplicants who composed remission letters engaged in the 
process of constructing their concepts of madness through language.91  The fluidity of 
possible terminology and definitions allowed for different levels of madness to emerge 
within and between remission letters.  This spectrum of madness ranged from foolishness 
or stupidity all the way to insanity or murderous rage.  Remission letters used a number 
of terms to discuss madness.  Because madness is a contested state that is so often 
defined in oppositional terms, it opens up discursive possibilities by forcing writers to 
consider the human capacity for reason, the danger of the melancholic temperament, or 
the mental and physical capabilities necessary to interact with others in acceptable ways.   
 
                                                 
90 R.C. Famiglietti, “Laurent de Premierfait: The Career of a Humanist in Early Fifteenth-Century Paris," in 
Un traducteur et un humaniste de l'époque de Charles V: Laurent de Premierfait, ed. Carla Bozzolo (Paris: 
Publications de la Sorbonne, 2004), 31-51, 34.  There is a more detailed discussion of the notaries and the 
remission supplicants in chapter 4. 
91 There has been an increasing interest in the ways that notaries in this period were shaping the ways that 
people defined things, through the writing of wills, contracts, and other legal documents like remission 
letters.  As Daniel Smail notes, “by the mid-fourteenth century few people, certainly few propertied people, 
went through life without encountering the notaries in some official capacity on one or more occasions….  
Despite this contact, notaries are not credited, as are the clergy, with a role in the shaping of western 
European culture and society.” Daniel Lord Smail, Imaginary Cartographies: Possession and Identity in 
Late Medieval Marseille (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 23. 
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II. Histories of Mental Disturbance   
As this discussion of terminology has demonstrated, the French language in the 
Middle Ages had a multiplicity of terms and phrases to describe madness.  My 
exploration has considered the ways that a variety of authors and texts sought to establish 
the meaning of the elusive condition of mental disturbance.  Indeed, as a condition that 
was recognized through behavioral patterns, that was described in terms of a rupture of 
communal expectations, and that infringed upon many social concerns, madness was 
peculiarly suited to linguistic exchange.  The languages of the law, of medicine, of 
religion, and of literature each borrowed extensively from one another in efforts to depict 
the state of madness. 
Since the 1980s, the “linguistic turn” in history writing has made historians more 
conscious of how language shapes the writing of history in multiple and complex ways.92  
Historians have been reminded that their documents, as well as their own historical 
narratives, have been shaped by discourse, narrative, and literary conventions.  
Subsequently, the profession has become more critical of the ability of texts to reflect 
what actually happened in the past.  As John Toews claims in a 1987 review essay, at the 
very least historians  
seem ready to concede that language can no longer be construed as simply a 
medium, relatively or potentially transparent, for the representation or expression 
of a reality outside of itself and are willing to entertain seriously some form of 
semiological theory in which language is conceived of as a self-contained system 
of ‘signs’ whose meanings are determined by their relations to each other, rather 
than by their relation to some ‘transcendental’ or extralinguistic object or 
subject.93
                                                 
92 The phrase “linguistic turn” was first used in the title of a collection of essays in 1967, Richard Rorty, 
ed., The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1967).   
93 John E. Toews, “Review: Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and 
the Irreducibility of Experience," The American Historical Review 92, no. 4 (1987): 879-907, 881-882. 
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This focus on semiotics was part of a movement towards interdisciplinarity, or at least 
towards mining other disciplines, including philosophy, literary studies, and cultural 
anthropology, for useful theoretical tools.  For example, in 1981, Natalie Zemon Davis 
pointed out the increasing use of the works of anthropologists such as Mary Douglas, E. 
E. Evans-Pritchard, Clifford Geertz, and Victor Turner, especially among medieval and 
early modern historians who were seeking a way to comprehend events that had 
previously “been defined by historians as irrational or superstitious, or as an arbitrary 
cover for real and serious social and political conflicts.”  Where historians attempted to 
dismiss descriptions of such events as spirit possession and witchcraft accusations, 
anthropologists “have such events at the center of their observation.”94  Anthropological 
works have thus allowed historians to take certain phenomena or descriptions seriously, 
considering the meanings that contemporaries saw in these events.   
Davis also stressed the relevance of literary theory in her 1987 book on remission 
letters (or pardon tales), provocatively entitled Fiction in the Archives.  She encouraged 
historians to confront the particular way that their sources are informed by narrative 
construction.  Her focus is on the “fictional” aspects of the documents, by which she 
explains she “do[es] not mean their feigned elements, but rather, using the other and 
broader sense of the root word fingere, their forming, shaping, and molding elements: the 
crafting of a narrative.”95  This awareness of and, more significantly, valuation of 
narrative provides much richer analytical possibilities than the discarding of narrative 
elements in search of a hidden “truth” common in historicist practice.  Davis reveals the 
                                                 
94 Natalie Zemon Davis, “The Possibilities of the Past: Anthropology and History," Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 12, no. 2, The New History: The 1980s and Beyond (II) (1981): 267-275, 268. 
95 Davis, Fiction in the Archives, 3. 
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ways “information, values, and language habits could flow across lines of class and 
culture,” arguing that supplicants, listeners, and pardoners “were all implicated in a 
common discourse about violence and its pacification.”96  Her project provides a model 
for thinking about narratives like those addressed in this dissertation.  How were stories 
about madness constructed, and what distinguishes them from other narratives? 
In the 1990s, gender historians above all took on the challenge of thinking 
through the implications of linguistic concerns for history as a discipline, in particular the 
suggestion that language “not only shapes experienced reality but constitutes it.”97  In 
what has emerged as a classical formulation, Joan Scott’s 1991 essay argues that 
historians “need to attend to the historical processes that, through discourse, position 
subjects and produce their experiences.  It is not individuals who have experience, but 
subjects who are constituted through experience.”98  As Gabrielle Spiegel notes in her 
introduction to a 2005 reprinting of Scott’s essay, however, many historians prefer “to 
see language as the place where experience is made meaningful via a creative 
appropriation of the conditions of daily life, rather than created.”99   
Indeed, in her own work, Spiegel has grappled with the relationship between 
language and experience, proposing a “middle ground” that attempts to mediate between 
                                                 
96 Ibid., 112. 
97 Toews, “Review: Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn,” 882.  Many historians have been 
troubled by the implications of this theory, objecting to the more radical interpretations that deny any 
reality in the past.  See Richard J. Evans, In Defense of History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999). 
98 Joan Scott, “The Evidence of Experience," in Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing 
after the Linguistic Turn, ed. Gabrielle Spiegel (New York: Routledge, 2005), 199-216, 203.  In her critical 
response, Kathleen Canning contends that Scott ignores the mutually constitutive nature of experience and 
language.  Canning posits that the key to “analyzing how discourses change, how subjects contest power in 
its discursive form, and how their desires and discontents transform or explode discursive systems is the 
concept of agency.”  Kathleen Canning, Gender History in Practice: Historical Perspectives on Bodies, 
Class, and Citizenship (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 76. 
99 Gabrielle Spiegel, ed., Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn 
(New York: Routledge, 2005), 200. 
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acknowledging the importance of language and discourse and the historians’ desire for 
empirical research.100  She posited in 1997 that  
the power and the meaning of any given set of representations derive in large part 
from their social context and their relation to the social and political networks in 
which they are elaborated.  Even if one accepts the poststructuralist argument that 
language constitutes the social world of meaning, it is possible to maintain that 
language itself acquires meaning and authority only within specific social and 
historical settings.101
 
This need to examine what Spiegel calls the “social logic of the text” rests on a 
recognition of language as constituted as well as constitutive.  It focuses attention not 
only on how texts are discursively inscribed but also on how they are embedded within 
particular social contexts.  This interest in language and discourse is particularly useful 
for discussions of madness, in part because mad historical actors so seldom speak for 
themselves.  In determining how to cope with a mad king, in considering whether mad 
people can engage with communal concerns such as witness testimony or contractual 
agreements such as marriage, and in facing the aftermath of a crime committed by a mad 
person, people came to terms with madness as a social, not just individual, phenomenon.   
The impetus to consider the linguistic and narrative nature of the texts that 
historians use equally opens into questions about historical narratives as shaped and 
constructed by historians.102  What role does the historian now play in relation to her 
documents?  John Arnold, in his work on the Inquisition in southern France, responds to 
this question by challenging the historian’s “desire to establish whether or not we can 
                                                 
100 Gabrielle Spiegel, The Past as Text: The Theory and Practice of Medieval Historiography (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 44-56. 
101 Ibid., 53. 
102 Hayden White considers the problem posed by the fact that the historian’s own construction of historical 
narratives is equally embedded in language.  See Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative 
Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).   
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‘trust’ the sources.”103  He suggests, rather, that the power relationships that led to the 
creation of these particular documents be brought to the fore, not to deconstruct them and 
reveal the underlying “truths,” but rather for what these power relationships can tell us 
about themselves.104  Cordelia Beattie, who uses legal documents to talk about the lives 
of women, also refuses to discard the structures that brought these documents into being.  
She notes that “the petition and the answer do not allow access to unmediated voices, that 
the structure and language of the petition and the answer were affected by the 
involvement of lawyers and the nature of the court” and suggests that “recognition of the 
limitations of the evidence is not to give up on historical subjects but rather a refusal to 
simplify their lives, which were lived within discursive systems.”105  As Sarah Maza 
notes in her discussion of crime narratives in pre-Revolutionary France, “[s]tories give us 
both an individual and a collective sense of identity and purpose; they can undermine our 
world just as easily as they order and confirm it.”106  My own approach to texts about 
madness and my efforts to form them into a historical narrative have been informed by 
these scholars.  In this dissertation, a focus on discourse and language seeks to capture 
the process by which people identified, reacted to, and told stories about madness, as well 
as their engagement with the varied lexicon of madness.   
                                                 
103 John H. Arnold, Inquisition and Power: Catharism and the Confessing Subject in Medieval Languedoc 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 7. 
104 Rather than following in the footsteps of Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie, in attempting to remove the 
Inquisitorial lens to uncover the “direct testimony of peasants” providing “an extraordinarily detailed and 
vivid picture of their everyday life” (Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie, Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error, 
trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Random House, 1978), vii), Arnold “tr[ies] to examine and 
understand…the conditions that brought about the possibility of this history.”  Arnold, Inquisition and 
Power, 3. 
105 Cordelia Beattie, “Single Women, Work, and Family: The Chancery Dispute of Jane Wynde and 
Margaret Clerk," in Voices from the Bench: The Narratives of Lesser Folk in Medieval Trials, ed. Michael 
Goodich (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 177-202, 193. 
106 Sarah C. Maza, Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Célèbres of Prerevolutionary France 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 17. 
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Perhaps the most influential work on madness to appear in the past fifty years is 
Michel Foucault’s Histoire de la folie à l’age classique, published in 1961.107  Foucault’s 
discussion of the discourse of madness remains compelling, even several decades after its 
initial publication.  Ultimately Foucault’s main focus is on the development of a system 
of confinement as part of his larger interest in the creation of institutional control as a 
force of modernity.  He considers the Middle Ages as the starting point from which his 
history of the medicalization of madness develops, but his desire to create a coherent 
narrative of change figured as a rupture leads him to idealize the status of the medieval 
mad as involved in an open “conversation” with the sane.  As he notes in his preface,  
[i]n the Middle Ages, and up until the Renaissance, the debate between man and 
madness was a dramatic debate that confronted man with the dark powers of the 
world; and the experience of madness was absorbed in images that spoke of the 
Fall and the End of All Things, of the Beast, of Metamorphosis, and of all the 
marvellous secrets of Knowledge.  In our time, the experience of madness is made 
in the calm of a knowledge which, through knowing it too much, passes it over.108
   
Despite his romanticism, the section of Foucault’s book that deals with the Middle Ages 
makes a number of important points about the symbolic value of madness in medieval 
society, even though his application of that symbolism to real mad people falls short.   
Foucault focuses particularly on Sebastian Brant’s 1494 Narrenschiff, or Ship of 
Fools,109 arguing that “among these satirical and novelistic ships, the Narrenschiff alone 
had a genuine existence, for they really did exist, these boats that drifted from one town 
to another with their senseless cargo.”110  He elaborates on the literary trope of these 
ships that “with a crew of imaginary heroes, moral models or carefully defined social 
                                                 
107 Michel Foucault, Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique. Suivi de Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu et La folie, 
l’absence d’œuvre. (Paris: Gallimard, 1972); Michel Foucault, History of Madness, trans. Jean Khalfa and 
Jonathan Murphy (London: Routledge, 2006).  
108 Foucault, History of Madness, xxxiii-xxxiv. 
109 Sebastian Brant, The Ship of Fools, ed. Edwin H. Zeydel, trans. Edwin H. Zeydel (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1962). 
110 Foucault, History of Madness, 9. 
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types set out on a great symbolic voyage that brought them, if not fortune, at the very 
least, the figure of their destiny or of their truth.”111  Foucault here establishes the 
symbolic power of the mad as one among many figures that loomed large in the 
imagination of the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance.  In Foucault’s analysis, these 
literary fools represented actual mad people who, especially in Germany, were expelled 
from towns and set afloat together on ships or sent out on pilgrimages in large groups, 
becoming “quite a common sight” on the roads and waterways of their contemporaries.112   
Foucault acknowledges that some mad people were not expelled, but taken to a 
“special place reserved for the detention of the mad,” noting that “only foreign madmen 
were expelled, and that each town only took responsibility for its own citizens who had 
lost their wits.”113  Both of these treatments of the mad combine in his depiction of the 
symbolic value of placing the mad in a liminal social and physical space: 
[t]his enforced navigation is both rigorous division and absolute Passage, serving 
to underline in real and imaginary terms the liminal situation of the mad in 
medieval society.  It was a highly symbolic role, made clear by the mental 
geography involved, where the madman was confined at the gates of the cities.  
His exclusion was his confinement, and if he had no prison other than the 
threshold itself he was still detained at this place of passage.114
 
His image of the mad as simultaneously mentally and physically “liminal” figures offers 
a compelling interpretation, suggesting a linkage between the mad person’s mental state 
and his or her social treatment.  Indeed, Foucault’s ability to elucidate particularly 
powerful symbols and extrapolate meanings from them provides his most useful legacy.  
However, since the abridged version of Histoire de la folie was first translated into 
English in 1965, Foucault’s work has been both criticized and praised in the Anglophone 
                                                 
111 Ibid., 8. 
112 Ibid., 9. 
113 Ibid.  
114 Italics in original. Ibid., 11. 
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academy.  Many critics argue that he does not provide sufficient evidence to support 
some of his claims, especially those that cover a wider geographical area.115  Erik 
Midelfort, one of the most careful critics of Foucault’s historical evidence, notes that 
there is only one recorded instance of an actual ship of fools, and even in that case 
suggests that Foucault’s symbolic interpretation did not hold true, since according to 
Midelfort’s reading, the passengers were intended to drown, not to travel the 
waterways.116   
Foucault’s defenders have cited his much longer and much more heavily-
footnoted original French publication to deflect such critiques, arguing that many of the 
problems other scholars found in his work stem from faulty translation and an inability on 
their part to read French.117  Finally, in 2006, Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa 
translated the full version, making it more widely available to English-speaking 
academics.  This translation is very conscious of the debate, including all Foucault’s 
original footnotes and carefully translating particularly controversial phrases to provide a 
defense in translation.118  To cite one especially pertinent example about the Middle 
                                                 
115 H.C. Erik Midelfort, “Madness and Civilization in Early Modern Europe: A Reappraisal of Michel 
Foucault," in After the Reformation: Essays in Honor of J.H. Hexter, ed. Barbara Malament (Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1980), 247-265; Andrew Scull, “A Failure to Communicate? On the 
Reception of Foucault's Histore de la folie by Anglo-American Historians," in Rewriting the History of 
Madness: Studies in Foucault's Histoire de la folie, ed. Arthur Still and Irving Velody (London: Routledge, 
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116 Midelfort, “Madness and Civilization in Early Modern Europe: A Reappraisal of Michel Foucault,"   
117 Colin Gordon, “Histoire de la folie: An Unknown Book by Michel Foucault," in Rewriting the History 
of Madness: Studies in Foucault's Histoire de la folie, ed. Arthur Still and Irving Velody (London: 
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Ages, Foucault asserted that “Les fous alors avaient une existence facilement errante.”119  
Richard Howard, in the 1965 abridged English edition, translated this as “Madmen then 
led an easy wandering existence.”120  Colin Gordon, in an essay defending Foucault 
published in 1992, suggested it might be better translated as “the existence of the mad at 
that time could easily be a wandering one.”121  The new translation offers another, 
similar, but even more defensive, version by removing the dangerous connotations of 
“easy” or “easily” entirely: “An itinerant existence was often the lot of the mad.”122  New 
translations notwithstanding, the statement is still a problematic one.  As Midelfort notes, 
Foucault’s itinerant mad people, traveling from town to town in ships or on the roads, do 
not appear “often” in medieval records.123   
What Foucault missed in his focus on mad people who were expelled from towns, 
is the significance of the fact that they were sent home.  Those mad people who traveled 
on pilgrimages were generally taken there by their families, not sent in large groups of 
other mad people.  Indeed, while some of the literary mad were expelled from society, the 
literal mad were often cared for in the family home and reincorporated into their previous 
lives and livelihoods when they were believed to have recovered their sanity.  Scholars 
considering madness in the Middle Ages have followed Foucault’s focus on discourse, 
working to categorize the multiple forms of intellectual discussion about madness.  In 
doing so, they have separated the strands of theoretical knowledge, focusing on each one 
individually.   
                                                 
119 Foucault, Histoire de la folie, 19. 
120 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans. Richard 
Howard (New York: Random House, 1965), 8. 
121 Gordon, “Histoire de la folie: An Unknown Book by Michel Foucault," 33. 
122 Foucault, History of Madness, 9. 
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Madness is not a subject that has been studied extensively by medieval historians, 
perhaps because it is a topic that covers so many fields of inquiry.  In 1974, Penelope 
Doob came out with Nebuchadnezzar’s Children, and a year later Judith Neaman 
published Suggestion of the Devil.124  As is clear from their titles, both books considered 
medieval religious ideas about madness particularly influential.  Doob’s study focused 
strongly on literary texts about madness, while Neaman’s concentrated on the various 
intellectual traditions.  Clearly influenced by Foucault’s linkage of leprosy and madness, 
Neaman argued that “[l]epers and madmen, who fell into one social and moral group, 
were reflections of their diseases, which were either tests of martyrdom, purgations or 
punishments for sin.”125  The two authors cover medieval England, with some forays into 
French sources, particularly Froissart’s chronicle with his account of the madness of 
Charles VI of France.  Carole Rawcliffe, in her overview of medieval English medicine, 
follows Doob’s moral analysis of madness, asserting that “the insane aroused particular 
fear and unease because (in theory, at least) their sins seemed so terrible and their 
punishment so extreme.”126   
More recently, Jean-Marie Fritz and Muriel Laharie have both argued that in 
medieval France, ideas about madness were polymorphic.  Fritz has analyzed medical, 
theological and juridical discourses about madness, as well as literary treatments of the 
mad.  He is heavily influenced by Foucault, positing that “the Foucauldian approach is 
perfectly suited to the Middle Ages.”127  The literary focus of Doob and Fritz is 
unsurprising, given the number of medieval literary figures who exhibit symptoms of 
                                                 
124 Doob, Nebuchadnezzar's Children ; Neaman, Suggestion of the Devil.  
125 Neaman, Suggestion of the Devil, 112. 
126 Carole Rawcliffe, Medicine and Society in Later Medieval England (London: Sandpiper Books, 1995), 
10. 
127 Fritz, Le discours du fou, 4: “l’approche foucaldienne convient parfaitement à l’âge médiéval.” 
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mental disturbance, and it is certainly true that the descriptive languages about madness 
were similar in literary and other texts.  However, Stephen Harper may be overstating the 
case with his contention that “[r]eal lunatics behaved like literary madmen.”128  Indeed, 
Muriel Laharie falls into this assumption as well.  She sees the treatment of the mad as 
part of the growth in the persecution of marginal figures in the twelfth century, describing 
negative attitudes towards and violence perpetrated against mad people.  However, the 
sources that she uses to demonstrate violent acts against the mad are exclusively literary 
texts from twelfth-century France.129  As Sylvia Huot argues, the audience is granted a 
double perspective on the insane hero in medieval romances: “[w]hen the madman has a 
character and a personal history, his treatment can be judged as just or unjust.”130  Thus, 
the mad figure in romance may be represented as debased and treated violently 
specifically because of the contrast with his previous exalted state.   
Through these works, the literary, theological, medical, and legal frameworks for 
understanding madness in the high Middle Ages have been elaborated.  However, the 
types of sources studied have not allowed for an exploration of the social ramifications of 
madness.  The texts considered in this dissertation have pointed to a more fluid 
categorization process in dealing with individual cases than medieval discourses imply.  
The notaries who were responsible for recording the stories of the mad did not force a 
case to fit into a specific framework, but instead allowed the behavior to be explained 
with multiple possible reference points.  These individuals could be simultaneously 
                                                 
128 Stephen Harper, Insanity, Individuals, and Society in Late-Medieval English Literature: The Subject of 
Madness (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2003), 62. 
129 Laharie, La Folie au Moyen Âge, 241-266.  She is drawing on the “persecuting society” posited by R. I. 
Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950-1250 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). 
130 Sylvia Huot, Madness in Medieval French Literature: Identities Found and Lost (Oxford: Oxford 
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described as acting “like” or “as though” they were out of their “bonne sens” or “bonne 
memoire,” frenetic or melancholic, or even possessed.  By approaching madness from a 
variety of texts with social ramifications, my dissertation calls into question the neat 
boundaries created by intellectual historians.  In practice, the definition of and the need to 
cope with the mad caused medieval people to embrace a large number of potentially 
conflicting frameworks in order to understand them and arrive at pragmatic solutions.  
People whose behavior did not fit into expected patterns, often through violent or 
excessive manifestations, could be considered mad, but that was not the only possible 
interpretation of their behavior.  On the level of theologians and physicians, such 
concepts as melancholy, frenzy, possession, witchcraft, and folly were mutually 
exclusive.  However, when faced with unusual, inexplicable behavior, medieval people 
often used many combinations of these terms to try to explain the problem.  Madness as a 
category, much like today, could cover anything from making a foolish decision to a 
frenetic fury leading to murder.  
While social histories of madness have not always fully embraced the analytical 
possibilities offered by the “linguistic turn” in historical studies, they have been heavily 
influenced by the sociological approach of “labeling theory,” which similarly focuses on 
the importance of language as a tool of social construction.  This theory stresses the role 
of the observer in identifying, comprehending, and describing behavior.  The sociologist 
Erving Goffman, studying asylums in the 1960s, explained how he saw social 
construction at work: 
[p]ersons who become mental hospital patients vary widely in the kind and degree 
of illness that a psychiatrist would impute to them, and in the attributes by which 
laymen would describe them.  But once started on the way, they are confronted by 
some importantly similar circumstances and respond to these in some importantly 
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similar ways.  Since those similarities do not come from mental illness, they 
would seem to occur in spite of it.  It is thus a tribute to the power of social forces 
that the uniform status of mental patient can not only assure an aggregate of 
persons a common fate and eventually, because of this, a common character, but 
that this social reworking can be done upon what is perhaps the most obstinate 
diversity of human materials that can be brought together by society.131
 
Interestingly, Goffman examines the way that these social forces work through narrative.  
The mental patients he studied created “an image of [their] life course – past, present, and 
future – which selects, abstracts, and distorts in such a way as to provide [them] with a 
view of [themselves] that [they] can usefully expound in current situations.”132  However, 
these life narratives were consistently deconstructed by the employees of the institution, 
ranging from nurses to psychiatrists, who challenged the mental patient’s interpretation 
by reasserting the “truth.”   
Historians have found Goffman’s work compelling for the ways that it allows 
them to engage with the social construction found in their narrative sources.  Much of the 
scholarly work on the social history of madness has focused on the early modern period, 
roughly from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century.  The prolific Roy Porter, Michael 
MacDonald and Andrew Scull, among others, have studied England, while Erik 
                                                 
131 Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and other Inmates 
(Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1962), 129.  For more on labeling theory, see Thomas J. Scheff, Being mentally 
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132 Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and other Inmates, 150. 
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Midelfort’s work has focused on Germany.133  Michael MacDonald’s analysis of Richard 
Napier’s voluminous case books, in which the physician/astrologer recorded details about 
his patients and their treatments, is particularly useful for thinking about how madness 
was understood on a social level.  His observations about the crimes committed by mad 
people are revealing: 
[t]he peculiar nature of much mad crime was that it menaced or destroyed people 
and property that ought to have been dear to the lunatic.  Unreasonable 
lawbreaking imperiled one's social identity because it attacked the relationships 
and material objects that situated one in the village community of households and 
the wider social hierarchy.134
   
Crimes, and indeed legal questions in general, provide much of the available evidence 
about madness in popular culture, and the nexus between particular criminal actions and 
madness is significant.  As we shall see, this pattern of perceiving the targets of mad 
crime as inappropriate precisely because they threaten the mad person’s membership in 
the community holds true for medieval France just as it did for early modern England. 
In some ways, considerations of the social construction of madness have 
influenced and in turn have been influenced by new research in disability studies.  
Whereas the modern understanding of disability as a politically manifested social 
identity, like other modern identities, cannot and should not be forcibly laid on the 
medieval past, it is fruitful and revealing to use these concepts to think, not about who 
people were, but about what people did, and, especially in the context of disability, what 
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they were able to do, what they were allowed to do, and what they were prevented from 
doing.  Mental illness is not always categorized as a disability in current discourse or in 
historical accounts.  For example, in the medieval section of his History of Disability, 
Henri-Jacques Stiker likens the disabled to the mentally ill, but distinguishes between the 
two. He sees the disabled, like the fool, as the “cared-for, integrated marginalized,” and 
traces a Foucauldian trajectory towards confinement, but he does not address the question 
of madness as a disability.135  A recent book by Irina Metzler uses religious and medical 
texts as well as accounts from saints’ shrines to examine the treatment of the disabled in 
medieval culture.  Using theories from modern disability studies, she makes a distinction 
in her book between “impairment,” which she defines as “a ‘real’, physiological 
condition” and “disability,” which she calls “a socially constructed or cultural condition.”  
In the end, she argues, “there were very few medieval disabled people.”136  She suggests 
that they were economically liminal figures, but she also demonstrates the mechanisms 
that were put in place, ranging from prostheses like crutches to the cooperation of fellow-
travelers, to aid the impaired in reaching their goal of accessing saints’ shrines.137  She 
specifically chooses not to discuss mental illness or to address legal aspects of disability, 
not because she does not see mental illness as part of the larger category, but because she 
feels that, like leprosy, madness had its own layers of symbolic meaning in the Middle 
                                                 
135 See Henri-Jacques Stiker, A History of Disability, trans. William Sayers (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1999).  In current discourse, there is still an uneasy relationship between the physically and 
the mentally impaired, as addressed by Peter Beresford, in an article published in Disability and Society, 
highlighting in particular the need for inclusion.  See Peter Beresford, “What Have Madness and 
Psychiatric System Survivors Got to Do with Disability and Disability Studies?," Disability and Society 15, 
no. 1 (2000): 167-172. 
136 Irina Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe: Thinking about Physical Impairment during the High 
Middle Ages, c. 1100-1400 (London: Routledge, 2006), 6. 
137 See Ibid.  For other work on disability, see Richard Neugebauer, “Mental Handicap in Medieval and 
Early Modern England: Criteria, Measurement and Care," in From Idiocy to Mental Deficiency: Historical 
Perspectives on People with Learning Disabilities, ed. David Wright and Anne Digby (London: Routledge, 
1996); Stiker, A History of Disability ; Wendy Turner, "Living with Mental Incapacity in Late Medieval 
England," in International Medieval Congress (Leeds, UK: Unpublished Conference Paper, 2005). 
  42  
Ages, distinct from other impairments.138  Other scholars, particularly working on 
medieval England where royal wardship cases provide extensive documentation about 
how madness was defined and how mad people were cared for, have argued that madness 
can be considered as a disability in this period.139  This category of disability also leads to 
questions of social perception and participation.  How was madness defined and 
determined?  In what circumstances were people considered mad allowed to interact with 
others, and in what ways were they socially limited by their perceived illness? 
Historical records showing how people identified madness and sought to 
understand and respond to it particularly lend themselves to considering social 
construction.  As we shall see, the texts used for this dissertation, ranging from chronicles 
to legal documents, describe social interactions and the ways they were interpreted by 
participants, observers, and particular authors.  These interactions are necessarily 
mediated, and may tell us very little about the “reality” of the mental illness depicted.  
Nevertheless, the texts provide a great deal of information about how certain behaviors 
could lead to labeling, who was involved in providing the label, what kinds of and how 
many “proofs” were expected in order to confirm such a label, and what mechanisms 
were available for treating or coping with a person who had been identified as mad. 
 
III. Chapter Summary 
 As noted above, this dissertation covers the period from Charles V to Charles VIII 
(1364-1498).  Charles VI’s reign, from 1380 to 1422 is particularly interesting for any 
consideration of the significance of madness in this period, since from 1392 to his death 
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he suffered from episodes of mental disturbance.  Chronicles, sermons, and political 
treatises all struggled to interpret and respond to the king’s illness.  Chapter two 
examines the particular case of the king, discussing the way this crisis was used by 
chroniclers to construct images of the unity of the realm.  In this chapter, the king’s 
illness is compared to biblical models of madness, to consider the disruptive potential of 
royal mental disturbance.  Members of the court, religious leaders, and others sought 
medical and supernatural solutions to try to fix the body of the realm so as to aid the king 
as its head.  Charles VI’s illness spurred a new focus on behavioral reforms, as the king 
passed anti-blasphemy laws to try to create a more Christian realm.   
Laws were not solely concerned with trying to alleviate the king’s mental 
problems, however.  Legal discourse about madness engaged with questions of 
responsibility, governance, culpability, and punishment.  Chapter three discusses legal 
constructions and understandings of mental capacity and incapacity, using law codes to 
consider the ways in which Roman law, canon law, and French customary law treated the 
mad.  Legal texts conceived of mental illness as an inability to comprehend, and therefore 
a propensity to infringe upon, the rules governing social and legal interactions.  The 
threat to order that mad people represented was therefore twofold: they could not be 
trusted to care for themselves or their own property, and they might not respect other 
people’s lives or properties.  Because the mad did not understand what they did, they 
were not held responsible for any contracts into which they entered.  However, law codes 
reveal an uncertainty about mad criminals.  Although all the legal texts agreed that the 
mad should not be punished for crimes, the explanations for their immunity differed, 
often within a single text.  This ambiguity may have contributed to a need for royal 
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intervention into such cases, which manifested in the form of the king’s remission for 
crime. 
Chapters four and five concentrate on remission letters about madness.  Between 
1364 and 1498, the king’s chancery filled one hundred and thirty-four registers, 
containing 52,622 acts, of which 38,860 are letters of remission, or seventy-four percent 
of the total.140  From this large base, I selected a sampling of thirty-five registers to 
search, around a quarter of the total, containing 13,671 acts, 9,852 of which are remission 
letters.  In addition, I gleaned a few other letters from the regional indices and editions 
available.141  My sampling garnered one hundred forty-five letters that mention madness, 
comprising one percent of the total letters read.  These letters are scattered throughout the 
registers, not clustered around particular dates, suggesting that mental illness was not a 
common trope in the genre but a relatively unusual manifestation for the royal notaries 
who recorded and helped to compose these letters.    
 There were many ways to write a letter of remission in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries.  There was no need to prove a lack of guilt in remission letters, 
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although many did strive to do so, and it was certainly not necessary to invent 
circumstances that would exculpate the accused.  Even if an attempt was made to provide 
extenuating circumstances for the crime, generally the letters were focused on the bad 
reputation of the victim or the crime was explained as an accident.  The invocation of 
madness was not necessary and, in some cases, could lead to further difficulties, since 
some letters included a caveat requiring the person to be kept under guard as a condition 
for pardon.142  Indeed, claims of mental disturbance appear in the archives rarely, but 
consistently, over the one hundred fifty year period under examination here.  On average, 
letters about madness appear in one percent of the total remission letters in a book, and in 
the books that were fully examined they never exceeded three percent.  On the other 
hand, only two of the thirty-five books searched yielded no references to mental illness.  
Thus, the choice to mention madness appears to have been a conscious one, and there is 
little likelihood that the notaries developed a standard form for writing about it, the way 
they appear to have for writing about tavern brawls.  Instead, the choice to explain a 
crime in terms of mental disturbance was a difficult and potentially damaging one.     
Chapter four begins the discussion of remission letters, looking closely at the 
cooperation between the family and the royal notary.  This chapter examines the 
narratives in remission letters to consider how the family advocated for the mad person 
by constructing stories about the crime, but also about the person’s entire life.  The 
evidence provided for mental illness earlier in the person’s life was often idiosyncratic, 
and sometimes the narratives provided logical linkages between the earlier behavior and 
the ultimate crime of the mad person.  These individual narratives provide a wide 
spectrum of beliefs about what caused madness and what kinds of behaviors were coded 
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as mad.  The remission letters also often seek to tell the story from the perspective of the 
criminal, thereby encouraging the family members and the notary composing the letter to 
attempt to rationalize the insanity, creating an alternative understanding of reality through 
which the mad person’s crime was comprehensible.  Chapter five discusses the kinds of 
crimes committed by the insane and the evidence in these letters for community and 
family actions, examining the networks available to help or hinder the mad.  The crimes 
of the mentally ill most often targeted their kin and communal ties, rupturing the identity 
of the criminal.  Through the medium of remission letters, these ties were reformed, and 
connections were reconstructed.  The family and the community simultaneously wished 
to aid the mad and feared the possible consequences of insanity.  The mentally ill were 
sometimes taken to saints’ shrines to seek cures, but often they were kept in chains or 
otherwise guarded.   
As we shall see, madness was generally determined through acts that were 
identified and labeled by other people, and generally disrupted expectations of kin and 
communal rights and responsibilities.  The disease was not marked on the body, and the 
mad did not make up minority communities within the larger whole.  Insanity could 
appear at any point during an individual’s lifespan, and could happen to any person, 
including the king himself.  It could be cyclical, as people who were mad for a time could 
suddenly become sane and vice versa.  Yet, rather than being expelled, the mentally ill 
were often reincorporated into these networks they had ruptured.  During periods of 
sanity, most people were allowed to resume their normal lives and engage in their usual 
activities and duties.  The very instability of the mad identity and the investment of the 
community make these narratives about madness particularly rich and compelling.  
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Despite the ways in which madness was imagined in terms of interiority and 
individuality, in the end all these discussions returned to the implications of madness: 
how the singular mad person affected and was affected by the larger community.  





Madness and the Community of the Realm 
 
 On December 2, 1419, Philippe, duke of Burgundy, arranged a treaty with the 
English king, Henry V, in the wake of Henry’s successful military campaign through 
northern France.  According to the terms of the treaty, Charles VI would disinherit his 
son, the dauphin Charles, and recognize Henry V of England as heir to the French realm.1  
Henry would immediately be granted the power of regent in France because “his cousin 
of France is very often taken and impeded by a contrary illness, which is grievous to say, 
in such a way that he himself cannot conveniently understand or attend to the needs of the 
realm.”2  The admission within the proposed treaty that Charles VI was incapable of 
governing his realm because of his illness created a convenient precedent for objections 
to the treaty on the same grounds.  If the king was not fit to govern because he lacked 
sufficient understanding, then how much less was he capable of signing a treaty that 
would disinherit his son?  Charles VI of France had been suffering periodic attacks of 
madness for over twenty-six years by the time this treaty was arranged.  Although he had 
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been allowed to govern when he was considered well, during his “absences”3 the French 
realm had been governed by a series of regents.  In the context of the proposed treaty 
with England, his madness and its consequences were openly debated and discussed in 
political circles.  For the first time, the concept of the rex inutilis was raised, and Charles 
VI’s right to govern was questioned.4  Why was such an extreme act required to initiate 
questions about Charles VI’s competence?  In political treatises on the proposed treaty, 
the king’s madness was simultaneously considered the root cause of the disintegration of 
the French realm and a buttress for French sentiment, as they sought to deny his ability to 
alienate his lands.  In order to understand the complex relationship between the king’s 
madness and his realm, this chapter traces the escalation of the dual deployment of 
Charles VI’s illness to its culmination in the discourse around the Treaty of Troyes in 
1420.   
 Charles VI’s madness was a difficult and potentially dangerous problem for 
France from the moment of his first problematic episode until his death in 1422.  The 
Hundred Years War, the Papal Schism, and a civil war caused by conflict over the 
regency of the realm during the king’s frequent illnesses were among the political 
challenges faced during his reign.  The chroniclers who recorded the king’s reign 
depicted an entire kingdom grappling with the difficulties of government when the king 
was incapacitated, but they also used the king as a rallying point in efforts to resolve 
these conflicts.  The king’s madness brought into direct confrontation medieval images of 
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Yale University Press, 1970).  See also Bernard Guenée’s lengthy exploration of the history of the concept 
in Bernard Guenée, La folie de Charles VI: Roi Bien-Aimé (Paris: Perrin, 2004), 211-223. 
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the mad and of kingship, and posited the question of the relationship between the mad 
and his or her community in striking ways.   
 Using four moments of political violence, this chapter explores the ways in which 
Charles VI’s madness simultaneously disrupted and reinforced the “imagined 
community” of the French realm.5  Although chroniclers and other writers cited the 
king’s madness as a causal force for moments of dangerous rupture within the realm, they 
also imagined that the king’s illness might serve to reconstruct the realm into a cohesive 
whole.  In the first of these four violent acts, Olivier de Clisson, constable of France, was 
attacked by Pierre de Craon, who had been recently stripped of his position as the king’s 
chamberlain.  Charles VI’s military response to this event, which he viewed as an assault 
on the realm, dissolved into his initial episode of madness, challenging his command of a 
marching army which had been summoned to display the strength of the French king.  In 
the second, a procession that sought God’s aid in returning the king to health, produced, 
instead of healing, rupture within the realm, as Charles of Savoisy, one of the king’s 
chamberlains, attacked the University of Paris.  The third, the murder of the king’s 
brother, Louis of Orléans, by his cousin Jean sans Peur, the Duke of Burgundy, revealed 
and exacerbated fault lines within the Princes of the Blood, the uncles, brothers, and 
cousins of the king of France.  The fourth, another murder, this time of Duke Jean of 
Burgundy by the dauphin Charles, led to the Treaty of Troyes and the passing of the 
French crown to an English king, which brings the chapter full circle and allows us to 
reinterpret the political treatises debating the treaty in the context of the king’s long 
illness.  In describing each of these events, chroniclers, preachers, and authors of political 
                                                 
5 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1983). 
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treatises inscribed their own visions of popular concerns about the king’s madness as a 
means to refocus and restore the realm. 
 By fracturing the king’s identity, Charles’ illness targeted the coherence of the 
“imagined community” that was the kingdom of France.  Benedict Anderson explains his 
theory of an “imagined community” by noting that “the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, 
yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”6  Though Anderson sees 
the development of the “imagined community” of the nation as requiring printing 
technology to spread it, it is clear that the concept of a community on a larger scale was 
already being employed by royal chroniclers and other authors before the invention of the 
printing press.7  While their impact may not have been widespread, these writers were 
constructing the concept of a realm that not only owed allegiance to the king, but also 
was threatened by the disintegration of the king’s identity.8  Yet authors writing about his 
reign imagined the realm of France unifying specifically for the purpose of countering 
this threatened loss of identity.  As Bernard Guenée argues, “the madness of Charles VI 
was not a personal affair.  All the French were responsible for it.  Curing the king 
therefore required a collective effort.”9  Despite their many disagreements and 
differences, the people of the French realm could be brought together in their prayers and 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 6.  
7 Benedict Anderson’s oversimplified vision of the Middle Ages suggests that medieval Christians “had no 
conception of history as an end-less chain of cause and effect or of radical separations between past and 
present” and thus were incapable of “thinking a nation.”  Ibid., 23-36.  This view has been challenged by 
medievalists.  See especially the essays collected in Simon Forde, Lesley Johnson, and Alan V. Murray, 
eds., Concepts of National Identity in the Middle Ages (Leeds: University Printing Service at the University 
of Leeds, 1995). 
8 Indeed, this supports Anderson’s theory that under monarchical rule, “loyalties were necessarily 
hierarchical and centripetal because the ruler, like the sacred script, was a node of access to being and 
inherent in it.”  Nevertheless, the realm was “imagined” and constructed through these works just as much 
as the nation has been.  Anderson, Imagined Communities, 40. 
9 Guenée, La folie de Charles VI, 151: “la folie de Charles VI n’était pas une affaire personnelle.  Tous les 
Français en étaient responsables.  Guérir le roi exigeait donc une effort collectif.” 
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through their concern for their mad king, Charles, “le Bien-Aimé” (“the well-loved”).  
These texts created a paradox, of the mentally unstable, absent king whose government 
was capable of functioning without him, but who was nevertheless central to 
constructions of French sentiment.10   
 
I.  The King’s Fury   
 The king’s first public episode of mad behavior occurred shortly after he declared 
war on the duke of Brittany.  Because of the public and unexpected nature of the event, 
this moment was described in far more detail than any of the king’s other periods of 
madness, and so requires more attention here.  Before considering the three chronicles 
that described the onset of the king’s madness, it is necessary to understand the sequence 
of events that led the king to the forest of Mans.  On June 13, 1392, while walking home 
with a small contingent of guards after a dinner with King Charles VI, Olivier de Clisson, 
Constable of France, was attacked by Pierre de Craon, who reportedly believed that the 
constable was behind his fall from the position of king’s chamberlain.  The failed attempt 
to murder the Constable of France, and the repercussions stemming from that event, 
constituted the first major political crisis that Charles VI approached without the advice 
of his uncles, who had governed the kingdom during his minority.  The young king was 
angry when he heard of the attack, considering it a treasonous offense against the crown.  
Although Clisson was left for dead, his wounds were superficial and he recovered within 
a few weeks.   
                                                 
10 Guenée calls attention to this paradox in his book, calling Charles “un roi inutile et indispensable.”  Ibid., 
199. 
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Pierre de Craon, meanwhile, escaped his pursuers and sought refuge in Brittany 
with the duke, Jean IV.  The relationship between Jean IV of Brittany and the French 
kings had been tense for many years, as he vacillated between allying himself with 
France and with England.  Jean also had a particularly fraught personal and political 
relationship with Olivier de Clisson.11  The Duke of Brittany assured the king that Pierre 
de Craon had passed through Brittany after committing the crime, but he had already 
departed.  The young king refused to accept this explanation, particularly since, 
according to one chronicler, Charles “firmly believed that the duke was an accomplice in 
the crime.”12  Encouraged by his favored advisors, the Marmousets, Charles decided to 
go to war against the Duke, calling up his liege men and their armies.  For the first time, 
the king had made a decision without the consultation of his uncles, the Princes of the 
Blood.  According to the chronicle accounts, the Duke of Burgundy and the Duke of 
Berry were both displeased at Charles’ decision.  Although they brought their armies to 
join the king at Le Mans, they took their time arriving, delaying the king as a 
demonstration of their disapproval.13  Charles VI’s decision to take an army into Brittany 
                                                 
11 Olivier de Clisson and Jean IV of Brittany were both exiles in England during their youths.  While Jean 
IV was able to recover his dukedom, Olivier de Clisson had trouble reaquiring his ancestral lands in 
Brittany.  Jean IV continued to have diplomatic relations with England, calling in English troops whenever 
he felt threatened by French interests.  Olivier de Clisson, in contrast, conceived a hatred for the English 
and considered Jean IV to have violated his vows of fealty to the French king.  For an entire book and an 
article on the subject of the Breton dukedom and Olivier de Clisson, see John Bell Henneman, Olivier de 
Clisson and Political Society in France Under Charles V and Charles VI (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996); John Bell Henneman, “Reassessing the Career of Olivier de Clisson, Constable 
of France," in Law, Custom, and the Social Fabric in Medieval Europe: Essays in Honor of Bryce Lyon, ed. 
Bernard S. Bachrach and David Nicholas, Studies in Medieval Culture, XXVIII (Kalamazoo: Western 
Michigan University Press, 1990), 211-234. 
12 M. L. Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, contenant le règne de Charles VI, de 1380 
à 1422, Éditions du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques (Paris: L'imprimerie de Crapelet, 1842; 
reprint, 1994), 6 vols., vol. 2, 10: “qui conscius sceleris perpetrati…firmiter credebatur.” 
13 For more details about the political situation, see Françoise Autrand, Charles VI: La folie du roi (Paris: 
Fayard, 1986), 271-328; Henneman, Olivier de Clisson  
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was thus the result of a crime that he considered treasonous, and as we shall see some of 
the chroniclers viewed the king’s madness as an escalation of paranoia.     
 It was in the context of this great gathering of force that Charles VI’s madness 
erupted.  The three contemporary chroniclers who addressed this event constructed a 
performance of madness layered within a performance of the martial power of the French 
kingdom.  The onset of the king’s madness occurred in public, and the assembled army 
witnessed his distressing actions.  The march of the army was a formalized and ritualized 
event, in which the king led the aggregate forces of his lords towards the enemy.  After 
the long delay in Le Mans, the king could at last demonstrate his power.  His frenetic 
behavior disrupted this procession, ultimately forcing the troops to return to Le Mans.  
Whereas the king’s later episodes of madness were generally played out in the confines 
of the palace, this first event was spectacular, not least because of the ritual performance 
that it impinged upon.  The movement of the army can be imagined in terms of a 
procession, much like a king’s entry into a city.14  Indeed, this may have been why the 
absence of some of the armies of the Princes of the Blood resonated so strongly, and 
worked so well as a delay.  Until the full complement of troops was present, the 
movement of the armies could reveal weakness rather than demonstrating unity and 
strength.  When the armies finally began to march, the king led the way with his pages, 
carrying his weapons and his helm, following behind him.       
 In retrospect, the three chroniclers who described the king’s deployment of his 
armies found signs that this elaboration of the king’s strength was doomed to fail.  
                                                 
14 For more on the processionals that took place at king’s entries, see Margot Fassler, “Adventus at 
Chartres: Ritual Models for Major Processions," in Ceremonial Culture in Pre-modern Europe, ed. 
Nicholas Howe (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 13-62; Bernard Guenée and 
Françoise Lehoux, Les entrées royales françaises de 1328 à 1515 (Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la 
recherche scientifique, 1968). 
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Although the basic story was the same, there are several details on which they differed, 
each providing his own narrative to explain why the king attacked his own men.  Michel 
Pintoin, the monk who composed the Chronicle of St. Denis, wrote his account in the 
context of his roles as a monk and as the official royal historian.15  Jean Froissart, with 
patronage ties to the English court and the Count of Foix and a friendship with Bureau de 
la Rivière, one of the Marmousets who had fallen from power when the king’s uncles 
took over as a result of his madness, had different priorities.16  The goals of the 
anonymous author of the Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois are less clear, but since 
he ended his account with the recovery of the king, it seems he sought to create a 
triumphal conclusion that could alleviate the concerns raised by a king’s madness.17
Michel Pintoin noted that he was present with the armies in his capacity as the 
official royal historian.  It was unusual for the chronicler to refer to himself, but in order 
to describe this particularly troubling event, he deemed it necessary to assert his physical 
presence.  He established his authority as an eyewitness to many of the events he 
described, while for those he did not see himself he had access to the immediate 
testimony of people who had.18  He recalled that the king had shown signs of being “not 
of sound mind” (“non sane mentis”) for several days before he ordered his armies to 
depart Le Mans.  As evidence, the monk referred to the king’s “fatuous words and 
                                                 
15 For the attribution of this chronicle to Michel Pintoin, see Bernard Guenée, Un Roi et son historien: 
Vingt études sur le règne de Charles VI et la Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denis (Paris: Académie des 
Inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1999), 33-78. 
16 See Peter Ainsworth, Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History: Truth, Myth, and Fiction in the 
Chroniques (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), esp. 192-197. 
17 Chronique des quatre premiers Valois (1327-1393), ed. Siméon  Luce, Société de l’histoire de France 
(Paris: J. Renouard, 1862). 
18 There is a tradition of privileging eye-witness testimony in medieval historiography.  For just one 
example, note the medieval evaluation of Homer, who was born too late to be an eyewitness of the Trojan 
War, versus Dares Phrygius and Dictys Cretensis, who were believed to have been there.  For these 
references in medieval texts about Troy, see the collected works in R.K. Gordon, ed., The Story of Troilus 
as told by Benoît de Sainte-Maure, Giovanni Boccaccio, Geoffrey Chaucer, Robert Henryson (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1978). 
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gestures unbecoming to royal majesty.”19  Michel Pintoin did not describe these gestures 
in detail, but it is clear that to him madness had earlier manifested itself in that tainting of 
the royal image.  Charles’ madness was specifically the madness of a king, since his 
disruptive behaviors departed from expected royal majesty.   
Michel Pintoin also attempted to explain the tragedy of the king’s madness on a 
wider scale by seeking portents behind the actions of the king.  Unsurprisingly, the monk 
looked to the realm of religion, connecting rumors of miraculous events to the illness of 
the king.  He explained that 
this deplorable accident had been announced by signs and precursors.  Thus a 
small statue of the blessed Virgin Mary, which makes up part of the precious 
jewels of the church of Saint-Julien in Mans, had, they say, turned by herself 
during about a half an hour’s time, without anyone touching it; as this prodigy had 
already happened before, they had predicted that a grand calamity was about to 
strike in the realm.  Without doubt they did not know about the illness of the 
king.20
 
The miraculous statue of the Virgin acted as an even stronger portent for Michel Pintoin 
than the king’s words and gestures.  He sought signs of the impending disaster outside the 
body of the king himself, gazing into the realm as a whole.  The turning of the Virgin’s 
statue foreshadowed the turning of the king, who would shortly attack his own men.  This 
emphasis on disaster that would befall the realm of France, not just the body of the king, 
shifted focus from the king’s personal illness to the effect that illness would have on 
France as a whole.  Indeed, as the “Most Christian King,” the king of France had a major 
role in protecting Christendom as a whole.  The miracle of the Virgin’s statue represented 
                                                 
19 Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, vol. 2, 18: “verbis fatuis utendo, gestus eciam 
majestatem regiam dedecentes exercuerat.” 
20 Ibid.: “infortunium hoc dolendum non contigit sine precedenti signo.  Nam reffertur inter preciosa jocalia 
ecclesie sancti Juliani Cenomanensis sigillum beate Marie Virginis contineri; quod quia tunc sine tactu 
cujuscunque se volubile reddidit fere per mediam horam, ut alias experti fuerant, vaticinaverunt scandallum 
in regno proxime affuturum; statum sane incolumitatis regis ignorabant.” 
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the extent of the disaster that, through the king of France, would strike even beyond his 
realm to the community of Christendom. 
Jean Froissart also sought foreshadowings of the king’s madness, but he focused 
on the king’s internal physical state, rather than his external actions or miraculous events 
in local churches.  Unlike the monk of Saint Denis, Froissart was not present for the 
king’s aborted campaign.  Based on internal evidence it seems that he relied on the 
account of his friend, the lord of Coucy, who was riding with the king.21  Froissart noted 
that,   
[i]n the city of Mans the lords stayed for more than three weeks, because the king 
was not capable of riding, and was very feverish.  And his doctors said to his 
brother and his uncles: “One makes the king travel; but certainly he should not do 
it, because he is not in a good state for riding.  Resting will go much better for 
him, because since he left Amiens where the parlements were, he has not been in 
such a good state as he was before.”22
 
In Froissart’s description of events, Charles VI’s eruption into madness should not have 
surprised anyone.  He noted that it was a hot day in mid-August and that the king was 
wearing heavy armor, suggesting that physical discomfort and over-heating caused the 
king’s previous illness to erupt into madness.23  The king’s physicians had expressed 
serious concerns about his ability to travel, warning the king’s close family members to 
guard him from overexertion, but these warnings were not sufficiently heeded.   
                                                 
21 See footnote 12 in R.C. Famiglietti, Royal Intrigue: Crisis at the Court of Charles VI, 1392-1420 (New 
York: AMS Press, 1986), 207. 
22 Jean Froissart, Les Chroniques de Sire Jean Froissart ed. J.A.C. Buchon (Paris: A Desrez, 1835), vol. 2, 
156: “En la cité du Mans séjournèrent les seigneurs plus de trois semaines, car le roi n'étoit pas en point de 
chevaucher, et étoit tout fièvreux.  Et disoient ses médecins à son frère et à ses oncles: ‘On fait le roi 
traveller; mais certainement il n'en eut que faire, car il n'étoit pas en état pour chevaucher.  Le repos lui 
vuadroit mieux assez, car depuis qu'il se départit d'Amiens où les parlemens furent, il ne fut en si bon état 
comme il étoit au devant.’”  
23 Ibid., 159. 
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 Despite his focus on the physical causes of the king’s illness, Froissart also made 
a direct link between Charles VI’s madness and the madness of the biblical king 
Nebuchadnezzar.  Indeed, he interrupted his description of this first episode by observing,  
we have seen in the Old Testament and the New many figures and examples of 
this.  Do we not have Nebuchadnezzar, king of the Assyrians, who reigned for a 
time in such power that above him there was news of no other; and suddenly, in 
his greatest strength and reign, the sovereign king, God, lord of the heavens and 
of the earth, and maker and ordainer of all things changed him such that he lost 
his senses and his reign, and he was for seven years in such a state; and he lived 
on acorns and wild apples, and had the taste and the appetite of a pig; and when 
he had become penitent, God returned his memory to him; and then he said to 
Daniel the prophet that above the God of Israel there is no other God.24
 
This intervention into the main narrative of Charles’ failed campaign against the duke of 
Brittany allowed Froissart to suggest obliquely that the king was driven mad as a 
punishment for his hubris.  Nebuchadnezzar’s pride had threatened the integrity of the 
religious and political community, and only by recognizing the supreme power of the 
God of Israel was he able to return to the fold.  This is a particularly interesting analogy 
given that Froissart, unlike Michel Pintoin, focused considerably more attention on the 
king’s physicians than on divine will as the source of the king’s illness.  Thus, his brief 
foray into the supernatural gains significance, as Froissart appears to be using the biblical 
link to criticize the king’s actions in terms of the integrity of not only the French realm, 
but of Christendom as a whole.25  In general, the Bible treated madness in a negative 
light, specifically as an impediment to true belief, although the New Testament also 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 160: “on a vu en l'ancien testament et nouvel moult de figures et d'exemples.  N'avons-nous pas de 
Nabuchodonosor, roi des Assyriens, lequel régna un temps en telle puissance que dessus lui il n'étoit 
nouvelle de nul autre; et soudainement, en sa greigneur force et règne, le souverain roi, Dieu, sire du ciel et 
de la terre, et formeur et ordonneur de toutes choses l'appareilla tel que il perdit sens et règne, le et fut sept 
ans en cel état; et vivoit de glans et des pommes sauvages, et avoit le goût et l'appétit d'un pourcel; et quand 
il eut fait pénitence, Dieu lui rendit sa mémoire; et adonc dit-il à Daniel le prophète; que dessus le Dieu de 
Israël il n'étoit nul autre Dieu.” 
25 Froissart’s ties to England may to some degree explain why he, unlike the king’s official historian, felt 
comfortable criticizing Charles VI.  See the essays in J.J.N. Palmer, ed., Froissart: Historian (Woodbridge: 
Boydell Press, 1981). 
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included some references that reversed the usual perspective, introducing the concept of 
the Holy Fool.  All of these interpretations of madness would have been well-known to 
Charles VI’s chroniclers and his subjects, as they tried to comprehend the king’s 
madness.  It is worth considering these biblical referents in detail here. 
The story of Nebuchadnezzar was also about regal power interrupted at its height, 
and moralized by focusing on the need to reaffirm God’s supreme power in order to 
recover.  King Nebuchadnezzar’s achievements in his realm and his construction of the 
palace of Babylon led to him to fall into the sin of pride.  Nebuchadnezzar believed 
himself to be God’s equal, and God punished him accordingly.  In fulfillment of his own 
prophetic dream, the king “was driven away from among men, and did eat grass like an 
ox, and his body was wet with the dew of heaven: till his hairs grew like the feathers of 
eagles, and his nails like birds' claws.”26  This description of madness as bestial behavior, 
and indeed as the antithesis of courtliness, often recurs in medieval romances,27 although 
it was not common to describe mad people as having their hearts changed into that of a 
beast.28  Interestingly, the association of this state with madness comes not in the 
description of his punishment, but in the words given to Nebuchadnezzar himself when 
his atonement is completed:  
                                                 
26 All English translations of the Bible come from Richard Challoner, ed., The Holy Bible, Translated from 
the Latin Vulgate; Diligently Compared with the Hebrew, Greek, and other Editions in Divers Languages. 
The Old Testament First Published by the English College at Douay, A.D. 1609, and the New Testament 
First Published by the English College at Rheims, A.D. 1582. (Rockford, Ill: Tan Books and Publishers, 
1971).  The Latin comes from Robert Weber, ed., Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam Versionem (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1969). Daniel 4:30.  “ex hominibus abiectus est et foenum ut bos comedit et 
rore caeli corpus eius infectum est donec capilli eius in similitudinem aquilarum crescerent et ungues eius 
quasi avium.” 
27 See especially Chrétien de Troyes, Le Chevalier au Lion; ou le Roman d'Yvain: Édition critique d'après 
le manuscrit B.N. fr. 1433, ed. David F. Hult, trans. David F. Hult (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 
1994). 
28 Daniel 4:13: “cor eius ab humano commutetur et cor ferae detur ei.” 
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[n]ow at the end of the days, I Nebuchadnezzar lifted up my eyes to heaven, and 
my sense was restored to me: and I blessed the most High, and I praised and 
glorified him that liveth for ever …..  At the same time my sense returned to me, 
and I came to the honour and glory of my kingdom: and my shape returned to me: 
and my nobles, and my magistrates sought for me, and I was restored to my 
kingdom: and greater majesty was added to me.29
 
By describing his release as the return of his senses, he categorizes his earlier behavior as 
an absence of sense, or madness.  Medieval exegesis interpreted Nebuchadnezzar’s 
madness as a punishment from God for his hubris, but he was given the opportunity to 
come back to himself, recognize his sins, and seek forgiveness.30  His return to his senses 
allowed for his reintegration into the community of the faithful, as well as the 
reinvestment of his royal powers.  Froissart’s reference to Nebuchadnezzar suggested a 
critique of Charles VI’s pride.  Perhaps it is unsurprising that, despite his religious 
calling, the monk of St. Denis, as the king’s official chronicler, did not choose to make 
the same connection.   
Prophecies of Treason 
These chroniclers’ retrospective efforts to find some unheeded warning that the 
king was going to go mad culminated in the tale of the prophetic beggar, who interrupted 
the king’s procession in order to warn him to beware of treachery in the ranks.  The 
identity of the beggar varies in each of the three chronicle accounts.  In Michel Pintoin’s 
narrative, he was a leper, whose words exacerbated the king’s already disturbed 
imagination.  The figure of the leper, who halted the king as he rode past the leper 
                                                 
29 Daniel 4:31-34: “igitur post finem dierum ego Nabuchodonosor oculos meos ad caelum levavi et sensus 
meus redditus est mihi et Altissimo benedixi et viventem in sempiternum laudavi et glorificavi….in ipso 
tempore sensus meus reversus est ad me et ad honorem regni mei decoremque perveni et figura mea reversa 
est ad me et optimates mei et magistratus mei requisierunt me et in regno meo restitutus sum et 
magnificentia amplior addita est mihi.” 
30 Penelope Doob gives a detailed analysis of the commentary on this passage, arguing that 
Nebuchadnezzar is unusual specifically because he is given the opportunity for redemption.  Penelope 
Doob, Nebuchadnezzar’s Children: Conventions in Madness in Middle English Literature (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1974), 54-74. 
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hospital on the outskirts of Le Mans, symbolically demarcated the army’s movement 
from the safe space of the town into the wilderness.  The forest, a wild and untamed 
space, was often imagined as populated by wild men, whose uncontrolled behavior 
paralleled that of the mad.31  Inhabitants of leper hospitals were neither included in the 
community of the realm nor exiled into the wilderness, but lived in a space between the 
two.32  The threat of treason, reiterated by the leper, weighed on the king’s mind as he 
passed from the safety of Le Mans into the forest.  When one of the gens d’armes 
accidentally dropped his sword, the king turned on him, killing him and then attacking 
others.  In this account the king, who continued to attack his men for over an hour, cried, 
“’I am delivered to my enemies,’ attempting to kill allies as well as unknown men.”33  
The king’s fear of betrayal and treason thus acted as a driving force, leading him to strike 
out at all those around him.  According to the monk’s tally, Charles VI killed four men, 
and would have killed more if his sword had not broken, thus allowing his men to restrain 
him.  The disruptive scene of the king’s “fury” (“furor”), introduced as it was with the 
threat of treason and betrayal, highlighted the potential disunity of the realm, which was 
emphasized further as the king attacked all his men, even those who ordinarily were 
“allies.”     
                                                 
31 Indeed, literary and figurative wild men were quite fashionable during Charles VI’s reign, and the king 
and several of his friends performed a dance while dressed as wild men in January of 1393.  See the 
description of the dance by Michel Pintoin, Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, vol.2, 
64-70.  The performance is analyzed in Susan Crane, The Performance of Self: Ritual, Clothing, and 
Identity during the Hundred Years War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 140-174.  
On wild men, see Richard Bernheimer, Wild Men in the Middle Ages: A Study in Art, Sentiment, and 
Demonology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952); Joyce Salisbury, The Beast Within: Animals in 
the Middle Ages (New York: Routledge, 1994). 
32 Françoise Bériac, Histoire des lépreux au moyen âge: Une société d'exclus (Paris: Imago, 1988). 
33 Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, vol. 2, 18: “’Sum ego adversariis tradendus,’ nunc 
amicos, nunc ignotos occidere conabatur.” 
  62 
 Jean Froissart’s narrative concentrated even more on the potential for treason, 
particularly during a campaign against the duke of Brittany, who had sympathizers 
among the French armies.  He imagined the conversations of the men in camp, who 
considered the political situation.  
“See,” said others, “if there is not treason.  Do you think that all those who are 
[here] and ride with the king are truly enemies of the duke of Brittany?  Certainly 
not.  Who dares to say so?  And one can easily see many signs, because they do 
nothing night and day but counsel, and all to break off and shatter this voyage.  
And the king has such marvel of it that he can hardly have good health.”34   
 
Though Froissart was not present for any such conversation, his vision of the disunity in 
the ranks of the king’s armies allows him to suggest that the king’s fear of treason may 
not have been unjustified paranoia, and indeed that his unease about the loyalty of his 
troops in general, and his uncles in particular, contributed to his disease.  If the threat of 
treason was real, should he be blamed for reacting excessively in fear of it in a 
preemptive strike?  The rest of Froissart’s narrative argued that the king’s actions were 
evidence of madness, but his suggestion that the treason the king feared may have been 
real provided an alternative interpretation of the disruption within the realm.  Rather than 
springing from the king’s madness, the power struggles may have contributed to it.  In 
this version, the prophetic figure was described as a man who “showed more of the fool 
than the wise man,”35 not a leper, and thus as a direct parallel to the king’s own madness.  
In fact, Froissart suggested that the king’s followers made a serious error by ignoring the 
fool, rather than stopping to enquire whether he “was naturally foolish or wise, and know 
                                                 
34 Froissart, Les Chroniques de Sire Jean Froissart, 156: “Voire, disoient les autres, s'il n'y a trahison.  
Pensez-vous que tous ceux qui sont et chevauchent avecques le roi soient vrais ennemis au duc de 
Bretagne?  Certes, nennil.  Qui l'oseroit dire?  Et on en peut bien voir aucuns signes, car on ne fait nuit et 
jour que conseiller, et tout pour rompre et briser ce voyage.  Et en a le roi telle merveille que à peine peut-il 
avoir bien et santé.” 
35 Ibid., 159: “montroit mieux que il fût fol que sage.” 
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who made him say such words, or from whence they came to him.”36  Froissart continued 
to refer to the man as “the mad man or the sage,”37 marking the possibility that the king 
really was in danger of being betrayed.   
In suggesting that the beggar might have been a wise fool, Froissart was engaging 
with biblical concepts of the fool and the wise man.  The fool was generally pitted against 
the wise man in order to convey moral and spiritual guidance.  The spiritual fool in the 
Old Testament was dangerously unwise and incapable of faith.  Like Nebuchadnezzar, 
who needed to return to his senses in order to realize that “above the God of Israel there 
is no other God,” this unnamed fool was unable to recognize spiritual truths, and thus 
unable to participate in the community of believers.  Perhaps the most deceptively simple 
expression of this type of fool appears in Psalm 13:1, which is repeated again in Psalm 
52:1: “The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God.”38  All the other points on which 
the fool is mistaken have been summarized here with the simple statement that, whereas 
the wise man understands and seeks God, the fool denies His existence.  From this 
mistake stems the proliferation of errors of which the fool is guilty according to the rest 
of the Old Testament.  Through this willful inversion of faithfulness, the fool can be used 
as a symbol for all those who do not believe.  Indeed, in Psalm 91:7 a lack of sense and 
foolishness are both held up as impediments to faith, since “The senseless man shall not 
know: nor will the fool understand these things.”39  
                                                 
36 Ibid. “étoit naturellement fol ou sage, et sçu qui lui faisoit tels paroles dire, ni dont elles lui venoient.” 
37 Ibid. “le fol homme ou le sage.” 
38 Psalm 52:1: “Dixit insipiens in corde suo non est Deus.”  For this particular subject, see also Muriel 
Laharie’s discussion of the iconography of Psalm 52 in the thirteenth century in Muriel Laharie, La Folie 
au Moyen Âge: XIe-XIIIe siècles (Paris: Le Léopard d'Or, 1991), 105-107. 
39 Psalm 91:7: “vir insipiens non cognoscet et stultus non intelleget haec.” 
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Anselm of Canterbury, writing in the late eleventh century, considered the fool of 
the Psalms in his proof of the existence of God.  According to his reasoning, the fool 
must be able to understand the concept of “something than which nothing greater can be 
thought,”40 by which Anselm defined God.  Once a concept is understood, then it exists 
in the thought, and if it is “something than which nothing greater can be thought,” then it 
must exist in reality, not only in thought, because real existence is greater than thought, 
and therefore even the fool must think that God exists.41  In which case, Anselm deduced, 
the Psalm passage referred to a thought that had no meaning in the understanding of the 
fool.42  Anselm’s use of this particular biblical passage for his proof of the existence of 
God is interesting, because he did not admit the possibility of a flawed understanding, 
arguing instead that the fool must be able to understand, just as a normal person would.   
Gaunilo, a monk at the abbey of Marmoutier and a contemporary of Anselm’s, 
responded to Anselm’s proof of God’s existence by offering a response from the 
perspective of the fool.  Gaunilo also ignored the potentially disruptive possibility that the 
fool lacked an ability to understand things, but suggested that one could “say that all 
kinds of unreal things, not existing in themselves in any way at all, are equally in the 
mind since if anyone speaks about them I understand whatever he says.”43  He adds  
[w]hen, however, it is said that this supreme being cannot be thought not to exist, 
it would perhaps be better to say that it cannot be understood not to exist nor even 
to be able not to exist.  For, strictly speaking, unreal things cannot be understood, 
                                                 
40 Anselm, St. Anselm's Proslogion with A Reply on Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo and The Author's Reply 
to Gaunilo, trans. M. J.  Charlesworth (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965), 116-117: “aliquid quo maius 
nihil cogiari potest.”   
41 Ibid., 116: “Convicitur ergo etiam insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest, 
quia hoc cum audit intelligit, et quidquid intelligitur in intellectu est.”   
42 Ibid., 120: “Nullus quippe intelligens id quod deus est, potest cogitare quia deus non est, licet haec verba 
dicat in corde, aut sine ulla aut cum aliqua extranea significatione.”   
43 Ibid., 156-157: “nonne et quaecumque falsa ac nullo prorsus modo in seipsis existentia in intellectu 
habere similiter dici possem, cum ea dicente aliquo, auecumque ille diceret, ego intelligerem?”   
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though certainly they can be thought of in the same way as the Fool thought that 
God does not exist.44   
 
This distinction between thought and understanding is significant for medieval concepts 
of madness.  Whereas it is possible to think that God does not exist, it is not possible to 
understand that God does not exist.  However, one of the terms for madness in medieval 
French texts was “hors de son entendement” or “outside one’s understanding.”45  Thus, 
the Fool, lacking in understanding, would in fact be capable of thinking “in his heart” that 
God does not exist.  In Anselm’s response to Gaunilo, perhaps in recognition of the 
essential difficulty of building these arguments through the figure of the Fool, he opened 
by saying, “[s]ince it is not the Fool, against whom I spoke in my tract, who takes me up, 
but one who, though speaking on the Fool’s behalf, is an orthodox Christian and no fool, 
it will suffice if I reply to the Christian.”46  A response to the orthodox Christian was far 
more straightforward than a response to the Fool, whose mind was difficult for a wise 
man to comprehend.  What is most significant here for the figure of the prophetic fool in 
Froissart’s chronicle is that a fool’s mind was capable of encompassing things that a wise 
man’s could not.  
The concept of the fool as the antithesis of the wise appeared also in one of Jesus’ 
parables in the Gospel of Luke, 12:20, although here the “foolish” act subverts the 
expectations of the reader.  The “fool” in this parable is a man who thinks to store his 
goods for a later date, which seems at first to be a prudent act.  God speaks to the man 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 164-166: “Cum autem dicitur quod summa res ista non esse nequeat cogitari: melius fortasse 
diceretur, quod non esse aut etiam posse non esse non possit intelligi.  Nam secundum proprietatem verbi 
istius falsa nequeunt intelligi, quae possunt utique eo modo cogitari, quo deum non esse insipiens 
cogitavit.”   
45 See the introduction of this dissertation for more on terminology. 
46 Anselm, St. Anselm's Proslogion, 168-169: “Quoniam non me repreendit in his dictis ille ‘insipiens’ 
contra quem sum locutus in meo opusculo, sed quidam non insipiens et catholicus pro insipiente: sufficere 
mihi potest respondere catholico.”   
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however, reassessing his behavior by calling him a fool and telling him that he will die 
tonight, and all his goods will go to another.  An even stronger alternative reading of the 
fool appears in Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians, 3:18-19, where folly in the world can 
lead to wisdom with God.  The New Testament reevaluated the figure of the fool by 
suggesting that what the corrupt world sees as foolish is actually what God sees as wise.   
The New Testament reinterpretation of the fool was further developed in the 
Middle Ages by those saints, such as Francis of Assisi, who chose to be fools for God, or 
holy fools.47  It also led to an association between fools and prophetic powers.  Nicole 
Oresme was a fourteenth-century philosopher, mathematician, and theologian, 
commissioned by Charles V to translate a number of Aristotle’s works.48  In his De 
causis mirabilium, a work seeking natural and reasoned explanations for miraculous 
phenomena that he composed in the 1340s, before his larger project of Aristotelian 
translation,49 he grappled with the question of whether madmen could prophesy.  He 
imagined madness as an inability to censor oneself, a lack of a control between thought 
and speech, suggesting that mad people were simply saying and doing things that sane 
people prevented themselves from saying and doing, not that they were saying and doing 
things that were completely inexplicable.  There was a method in the kind of madness 
Oresme imagined, even though it would be difficult for a sane person to follow the 
peregrinations of the conversation.  But, he suggested, it would be no more difficult to 
understand a mad person’s conversation than to understand the random and varied 
                                                 
47 See Laharie, La Folie au Moyen Âge, 87-106. 
48 For a biography of Oresme, see Susan M. Babbitt, “Oresme's Livre de Politiques and the France of 
Charles V," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series 75, no. 1 (1985): 1-158, 1-4.  
See also the brief addition to his early biography in William J. Courtenay, “The Early Career of Nicole 
Oresme," Isis 91, no. 3 (2000): 542-548. 
49 Bert Hansen provides an overview of Oresme’s work criticizing astrology and the belief in magic.  See 
Bert Hansen, Nicole Oresme and the Marvels of Nature: A Study of his De causis mirabilium with Critical 
Edition, Translation, and Commentary (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1985), 3-16. 
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thoughts of a sane person.50  This uncensored speech, according to Oresme, could be 
(mis)interpreted as prophesy, since “[t]herefore it can happen by chance that a certain 
maniac who is almost never silent will say something true of the future.”51  Oresme’s 
refutation of the fool’s potential for prophetic statements, interesting in its own right, 
confirms that these beliefs about the prophetic power of fools were current in medieval 
culture.  By drawing on this complex traditional nexus of folly, wisdom, and prophesy, in 
his chronicle Froissart presented an ambiguous figure whose words could have been the 
ravings of a fool or the prophetic pronouncement of a saint. 
In Froissart’s account, the noise that precipitated Charles’ madness was made by 
his pages, at which point the king, believing himself betrayed, drew his sword.  In a much 
more dramatic scene than that described by Michel Pintoin, Froissart explained that  
[t]he Duke of Orléans was not at that time very far from the king.  The king went 
towards him, holding his naked sword; and already the king, from his frenzy and 
the feebleness of his head, lost recognition, and knew neither who was his brother 
nor who his uncle.  When the Duke of Orléans saw him coming towards him with 
a naked sword, he was so afraid, and did not wish to wait (and for a good cause), 
and he spurred his horse quickly with the king following after.  The Duke of 
Burgundy was riding alongside, and by the fear of the horses, and because already 
he had heard the cries of the king’s pages, he glanced over there, and saw the 
king, who had a naked sword, chasing his brother….52
                                                 
50 Ibid., 252-253.  Oresme argued, “these people are not able to be silent or to be still in their other 
members, and just as species of the fantasia occur to them, they express them so, because they do not know 
how to control themselves or how to hold back from what should not be said.  Look inside yourself: if you 
were saying all the things which occur to you now on this, now on that, then no matter what or how much 
you said, people would surely call you a fool.”  And in Latin, “ideo non possunt tacere nec etiam quiescere 
in aliis membris et sicut occurrunt species fantasie sic exprimunt quia nesciunt se corrigere nec abstinere a 
non dicendis.  Vide in te: si loquereris omnia que tibi occurrunt modo de uno modo de alio, que et quot tu 
diceres, certe homines dicerent te fatuum.” 
51 Ibid. “Potest igitur contingere a casu quod talis maniacus qui nunquam quasi tacet dicet aliquod verum 
futurum.” 
52 Froissart, Les Chroniques de Sire Jean Froissart 159: “Le duc d'Orléans, n'étoit pas pour lors trop loin du 
roi.  Le roi adressa devers lui tenant l'épée toute nue; et jà en avoit le roi, par la frénésie et foiblesse de chef, 
perdula connoissance, ni il se savoit qui étoit son frère ni son oncle.  Quand le duc d'Orléans le vit venir 
vers lui l'épée toute nue, si s'effréa, et ne voult pas attendre, et à bonne cause; et poindy le cheval 
hâtivement et le roi après.  Le duc de Bourgogne étoit et chevauchoit de côté, et pour l'effroi des chevaux, 
et que jà il avoit ouï les pages du roi crier, jeta son regard de celle part, et connut le roi qui à l'épée toute 
nue, chassoit son frère.” 
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The rich and personalized image Froissart provided emphasized the deterioration of kin 
bonds, particularly those between the king and his closest relatives.  Rather than attacking 
the anonymous crowd of his men, as Michel Pintoin suggested, Froissart portrayed the 
king attacking his brothers and uncles.  These men were some of the most powerful in the 
realm, and the particular rivalry between Orléans and Burgundy would prove detrimental 
to France as a whole over the years of Charles’ incapacity.  Froissart’s focus on the threat 
of treason and his emphasis on two powerful figures in the king’s family as targets of the 
king’s furious rage combined to suggest that Charles’ disruptive madness was only part 
of the troubles disrupting French royal power. 
 The threat of treason within the realm, and the king’s denial of his identity even to 
the point of attacking his kinsmen, suggests parallels to another biblical narrative, 
although this one was not mentioned by any contemporary chroniclers.  Here the 
interrupted regal power resonated differently.  The event occurred during Saul’s reign, 
after God had chosen David as the new king of Israel and sent an evil spirit to trouble 
Saul, who remained on the throne.  Jealous of David, Saul attempted to have him killed, 
and David was forced into exile in the kingdom of Geth.  In this case David used gestures 
coded as madness to fool his enemies into ignoring him, thus allowing him to escape: 
[a]nd the servants of Achis, when they saw David, said to him: Is not this David 
the king of the land? Did they not sing to him in their dances, saying: Saul hath 
slain his thousands, and David his ten thousands? But David laid up these words 
in his heart, and was exceedingly afraid at the face of Achis the king of Geth. And 
he changed his countenance before them, and slipt down between their hands: and 
he stumbled against the doors of the gate, and his spittle ran down upon his beard. 
And Achis said to his servants: You saw the man was mad: why have you brought 
him to me? Have we need of madmen, that you have brought in this fellow, to 
play the madman in my presence? shall this fellow come into my house?53
                                                 
53 First Book of Kings 21:11-15: “dixeruntque ei servi Achis numquid non iste est David rex terrae nonne 
huic cantabant per choros dicentes percussit Saul mille et David decem milia posuit autem David sermones 
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David’s behavior demonstrates the ease with which madness could be copied.  He merely 
stumbled and drooled on himself, and his enemies immediately interpreted him as 
“insane” and “furious,” to give more accurate translations than the Douay-Rheims Bible 
provides.  The context in which David chose to counterfeit madness is particularly 
interesting for the ways in which it parallels Charles VI’s first mad episode.  David was 
surrounded by his enemies, in a situation fraught with danger, and used mad behavior in 
order to deflect attention from his true identity.  The chroniclers described Charles VI’s 
paranoid fear that he was similarly surrounded by enemies and traitors, despite the fact 
that he was riding with his own men.  The king’s actual denial of his own kingship was a 
literal extension of David’s imitative denial.  In David’s story, madness was a 
smokescreen behind which the king’s power could be protected. 
 The anonymous Chronique des quatre premiers Valois included two separate 
prophet figures, combining the narratives that were presumably both current in 
contemporary rumors.  One prophet, a disfigured man, warned the king that if he entered 
the forest of Mans, it would go badly for him.  The other, a fool (fol), who also had a 
disfigured face, told the king that if he went further he would die.  According to this 
version of the narrative, Charles’ response was immediate, and he attempted to kill the 
fool.  He tried to take his sword from his page, but the page, frightened, ran away.  When 
the king finally managed to get his sword, “from ire and from anger, he marveled or 
despaired, or he was poisoned or ensorcelled or tormented, as it is held.  Because when 
                                                                                                                                                 
istos in corde suo et extimuit valde a facie Achis regis Geth et inmutavit os suum coram eis et conlabebatur 
inter manus eorum et inpingebat in ostia portae defluebantque salivae eius in barbam et ait Achis ad servos 
suos vidistis hominem insanum quare adduxistis eum ad me an desunt nobis furiosi quod introduxistis 
istum ut fureret me praesente hicine ingredietur domum meam.” 
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he had the sword, he turned on those around him, and wounded them greatly.”54  Even 
within one sentence, this chronicler had difficulty deciding how to ascribe a cause to the 
king’s illness, suggesting on the one hand that the king acted from the internal impetus of 
anger or despair, but on the other hand that he might have been targeted by the external 
threats of poison or sorcery.  The Valois chronicler ended his account with the happy 
news that the king’s physician had cured him, news that other chroniclers who continued 
their account into the king’s many relapses were not able to view with so much relief. 
 Regardless of the differences in detail, all three chroniclers recorded the fear 
generated by the king’s attacks on his own men.  This action was particularly egregious 
given the ideological framework within which the French monarchy was expected to 
provide protection in exchange for service.  At that particular moment, when the king was 
in the process of demonstrating his power through the gathering of French forces in an 
effort to castigate the Duke of Brittany, the symbolism inherent in his attack on his own 
forces must have been clear to all observers.  The king’s actions while mad were almost a 
natural extension of his impetuosity as a ruler.  Indeed, Pierre de Fenin used the king’s 
illness to account for all the troubles in the kingdom.  Describing Charles’ death, he 
wrote that throughout his life, Charles had had “an illness that greatly harmed him, and 
sometimes he wanted to fight all those who were with him.”55  This description 
interpreted Charles’ madness as a departure from behavioral norms.  It was the king’s 
                                                 
54 Chronique des quatre premiers Valois, 324: “d'ire et de couroult, se marvoya ou desespera, ou il fut 
empoisonnéz ou ensorceléz ou entaraudéz, comme l'en tenoit.  Car comme il oult l'espée, il couru sus à 
ceulx d'entour lui, et moult en navra.” 
55 Pierre de Fenin, Mémoires de Pierre de Fenin, comprenant le récit des événements qui se sont passés en 
France et en Bourgogne sous les règnes de Charles VI et Charles VII: 1407-1427, ed. L.M.E. Dupont, 
Société de l’histoire de France (Paris: J. Renouard, 1837), 191: “une malladie qui mout luy nuisoit, et par 
fois vouloit férir tous ceulx qui estoient avecquez luy.” 
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desire to attack everyone around him that marked him as insane, but it was also a general 
sense of combativeness that characterized the king’s reign.   
As this analysis of the first episode of the king’s madness demonstrates, the 
chronicles allow for an exploration of the ways in which Charles VI’s madness was 
understood in terms of irrational behavior.  These three accounts described the onset of 
Charles’ madness in detail, but very few of his subsequent episodes were given a similar 
treatment.  The behavior perceived as mad by these chroniclers included a desire to harm 
his friends, denial of his own identity and that of others, and rude gestures and dances 
that were not considered “kingly.”  Yet, when he was not suffering the effects of his 
illness, the chronicles portrayed him as a very kingly figure.  The chroniclers and the 
people whose opinions they recorded interpreted Charles VI’s madness in a variety of 
different ways.  Some saw it as a curse from God, either caused by his dissolute youth or 
by his subjects’ sins.56  Others posited a medical disease caused either by his weak, 
womanly complexion or, again, by his dissolute youth.57  Still others suggested that his 
madness was a bewitchment caused by poison or sorcery.58  Because his madness was 
seen as a temporary illness, there was no reason to consider him a rex inutilis in the 
immediate aftermath of his attack.59  As Bernard Guenée notes, “the useless king was not 
deposed because no one, either outside the realm or within it, had the legal or political 
means to depose him, nor to govern in his place.”60  Instead, perhaps because Charles VI 
                                                 
56 Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, vol. 2, 404-406; Froissart, Les Chroniques de Sire 
Jean Froissart 160. 
57 Froissart, Les Chroniques de Sire Jean Froissart 163. 
58 Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, vol. 2, 25; Froissart, Les Chroniques de Sire Jean 
Froissart 162. 
59 Peters, The shadow king: rex inutilis in medieval law and literature, 751-1327.  
60 Guenée, La folie de Charles VI, 232: “Le roi inutile n’a pas été déposé parce que personne, ni hors du 
royaume ni dans le royaume, n’avait les moyens juridiques ou politiques de le déposer, ni même de 
gouverner à sa place.” 
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had begun his reign as a minor and thus the French realm was comfortable with the 
concept of regency, the king’s uncles immediately reestablished their rule until he 
recovered.  In a sense, they were falling back on French law, which, as shall be explored 
in chapter 3, prescribed guardians for the mad.  During his episodes of madness he was 
treated as a minor and during his episodes of sanity he was allowed full regal 
responsibility.61   
In the chronicles, Charles VI’s multiple recoveries were attributed to the prayers 
of his people, the success of his physicians, or the removal of the bewitchment.  All of 
these possible roads to recovery required the participation of his realm, whether in its 
entirety, as the French people participated in pious processions, or in its noble 
representatives, who sought out physicians or sorcerers who might be able to help the 
king.62  While France was falling into civil war, these chroniclers continued to shore up 
this image of a cooperative, cohesive realm that came together, as a proper body politic, 
in aid of its diseased head.  For Michel Pintoin in particular, the most powerful way to aid 
                                                 
61 It is important to note here that Charles VI’s episodes of sanity occurred regularly and for lengthy periods 
throughout his reign, and that no one figure was able to hold onto the regency alone, since Charles himself 
continually transferred power between his uncles, cousins, brother, wife and sons.  The precedent of the 
Carolingians, who were granted kingship because the pope determined that “it would be better that he who 
actually had the power should be called king,” would not apply here.  See Ibid., 212-213. 
62 In examining Charles’ illness, Penelope Doob uses Froissart’s account to argue that Charles VI’s friends 
viewed his disease as morally neutral and stemming from natural causes whereas his enemies explained it 
through supernatural and moral causes.  Doob, Nebuchadnezzar's Children, 45-49.  Judith Neaman, who 
also depended exclusively on Froissart’s account to describe the king’s madness, gleans from Froissart’s 
account that “kings and beggars might both suffer madness, but that society treated one with care, the 
second with abuse, and that a monarch’s state of intellect was inseparable from the divine plan of history.”  
Judith Neaman, Suggestion of the Devil: The Origins of Madness (New York: Anchor Books, 1975), 122.  
However, the madness of the king was the focus of much more complex and varied beliefs than Doob and 
Neaman discuss.  Froissart was only one of the chroniclers who wrote about the king’s madness, and there 
are also many other sources available for considering the political and social effects of a mad king.  Richard 
Famiglietti’s conscientous study of Charles VI’s reign minutely examines the chronicles and evidence from 
chancery documents to establish the effect of the king’s madness on the political scene.  His brief 
introductory study of the king’s madness itself is focused on providing a twentieth-century diagnosis for the 
king’s fourteenth-century ailment.  Famiglietti, Royal Intrigue, 1-21.  Bernard Guenée’s recent study of 
Charles VI mines all of the available evidence to talk about the social and cultural aspects of the king’s 
madness, and provides a complement to Famiglietti’s focus on politics.  Guenée, La folie de Charles VI . 
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the king was through religious processions throughout the realm, bringing together all 
levels of society in prayer and supplication on behalf of Charles VI.  However, as we 
shall see, these processions were not always peaceful demonstrations of harmony. 
 
II. The Body of the Realm: Processions for the King’s Health 
 In the “affaire Savoisy,” an attack on a University procession escalated into 
violence on consecrated ground.  The case in question occurred in Paris in 1404, where 
the university had arranged a general procession from the church of Saint Mathurin to the 
church of Saint Catherine, intending to pray for the health of the king and the resolution 
of the papal schism.  The resultant “scandal” (“scandalum”) was described by many 
contemporary chroniclers in great detail.63  Processions symbolically represented the 
body politic by enacting and displaying social roles and hierarchies.64  It is important to 
remember that the inhabitants themselves performed these spectacles, inscribing their 
                                                 
63 Nicolas de Baye, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, greffier du Parlement de Paris, 1400-1417, ed. Alexandre 
Tuetey (Paris: Librairie Renouard, V e. H. Laurens, successeur, 1885-1888), 2 vols., vol. 1, 93-95, 100-
114; M. L. Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI de 1380 
à 1422, Éditions du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques (Paris: L'imprimerie de Crapelet, 1842; 
reprint, 1994), 6 vols., vol. 3, 186-191; Gilles le Bouvier, Les Chroniques du roi Charles VII, ed. Henri 
Courteault, Léonce Celier, and Marie-Henriette Jullien de Pommerol (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1979), 14; 
Pierre Cochon, “La chronique normande de Pierre Cochon," in Chronique de la Pucelle; ou, Chronique de 
Cousinot, suivie de La chronique normande de P. Cochon, relatives aux règnes de Charles VI et de Charles 
VII, restituées à leurs auteurs et publiées pour la première fois intégralement à partir de l’an 1403, ed. 
Auguste Vallet de Viriville (Paris: A. Delahays, 1859), 367-368; Jean Gerson, Oeuvres complètes, ed. Mgr 
Glorieux (Paris: Desclée et Cie, 1966), vol. 7, 326-340; Enguerrand de Monstrelet, La chronique 
d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, en deux livres, avec pièces justificatives 1400-1444., ed. L. Douët-d’Arcq, 
Société de l’histoire de France (Paris: Mme ve J. Renouard, 1857-1862), 6 vols., vol. 1, 73-75.  
Interestingly, this was not the first time that the University of Paris had had problems during a solemn 
procession.  The funeral procession for Charles V in 1380 was disturbed by an argument about precedence 
between the University representatives and Hugh Aubriot, the prévost of Paris.  This fracas also resulted in 
the conviction of the University’s enemy.  For a detailed analysis of the case, see Alexander Murray, 
“Beware of Universities.  A Cautionary Tale from Paris, 1380-1381," in Medieval Paradigms: Essays in 
honor of Jeremy duQuesnay Adams, ed. Stephanie Hayes-Healy (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 29-54. 
64 For more on processions during Charles VI’s reign, see Bernard Guenée, “Liturgie et Politique: Les 
processions spéciales à Paris sous Charles VI," in Saint-Denis et la Royauté: Études Offertes à Bernard 
Guenée, ed. Françoise Autrand, Claude Gauvard, and Jean-Marie Moeglin (Paris: Publications de la 
Sorbonne, 1999), 23-49. 
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own location within the community through the act of walking the town in which they 
resided, or through the experience of viewing others moving through space.65  Spectators 
were just as much part of the procession as those who were actively moving.  Even 
smaller processions that involved particular groups within the town or city were 
considered as representative of the larger whole.  Indeed, the symbolism of processions 
was never more apparent than when the peace of the community they were intended to 
represent was ruptured in the middle of the process.     
 Michel Pintoin, in the Chronicle of Saint-Denis, placed the scandalous procession 
in the context of the papal schism, which, he explained, troubled the realm nearly as 
much as the illness of the king.  The university had arranged a general procession to pray 
for the health of both Christendom and the French king, and this reference to the papal 
schism allowed Michel Pintoin to consider Charles VI’s role as Most Christian King and 
the threat of schism within the realm of France.  The disruptive event itself began with an 
accident that pitted the students of the university against the nobility, thus marking 
fissures within the body politic that caused a further conflict.  A retainer of Charles of 
Savoisy, described by Michel Pintoin as “a most stupid youth” (“stolidissimus juvenis”), 
spurred his horse in such a way that it entered into the front ranks of the procession, 
injuring many of the scholars of the lowest classes.  According to Michel Pintoin, many 
of the participants in the procession ran to the scene to reprimand the young man, one 
going so far as to box his ears.  The monk of Saint Denis perhaps sympathized with his 
fellow churchmen.  He certainly presented a more decorous group of scholars than 
Enguerrand de Monstrelet, whose position in the house of the duke of Burgundy may 
                                                 
65 C. Clifford Flanigan, “The Moving Subject: Medieval Liturgical Processions in Semiotic and Cultural 
Perspective," in Moving Subjects: Processional Performance in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, ed. 
Kathleen Ashley and Wim Hüsken (Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 2001), 35-52, 39. 
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have influenced his account.  In describing the same incident, he declared that more than 
one horseman crashed into the procession, and that the scholars threw stones at the riders 
after some of them had been trampled.66   
This accidental and minor fracas did not end there, however, because the young 
retainer complained to his lord, who, according to the chroniclers, was more than willing 
to respond to the perceived insult.  Michel Pintoin explained the temerity of this lord and 
his household:  
[u]nder the orders of the lord of Savoisy, his servants quickly gathered together in 
large numbers.  Transported by the desire for vengeance and moved by a truly 
diabolical fury, they went towards the church with swords, bows, and other arms, 
entered by force, and threatened those whom they found inside with death, 
profaning the holy space.  They dared, during their sacrilegious fury, and without 
respect for the church or for Christ, whose sacred body they saw on the altar, to 
shoot their arrows into the sanctuary, as if it had been a den of brigands.  The 
arrows hit many people, and pierced some paintings consecrated to God and to the 
saints, and also the tunic and the dalmatica of the deacon and the sub-deacon.  
The abbot who officiated and had already performed the consecration, frightened 
by this disorder, abridged the rest of the office and finished in a low voice the 
mass that had been sung until then.67
 
This passionate depiction of disorder and destruction within the sanctified space of the 
church reveals deep fears about the consequences of social dissonance.  The interruption 
of the mass, that sacred symbol of Christian unity, with the body of Christ on the altar 
before them, made the desecration even more troubling.68  That the officiator finished the 
                                                 
66 Enguerrand de Monstrelet, La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, 73. 
67 Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys, vol. 3, 186: “Nam, jubente milite, ejus 
detestabiles ministri magno numero congregati, ad hanc temeritatem ausu dyabolico et spiritu furoris 
concepto, mox cum gladiis, arcubus et armis ad ecclesiam accurrentes, non solum quos extra reperiunt 
metu mortis reintrare coegerunt, sed et sacrilegis manibus ipsam non erubuerunt violare.  Ferali namque 
rabie excitati, in contemptum ecclesie atque Christi, cujus consecratum corpus super altare videbant, a 
valvis velud in speluncam latronum intromittentes sagittas et aliquos vulnerantes, Deo et sanctis dicatas 
ymagines, tunicam quoque ac dalmaticam qui misse ministerio astabant transfixerunt.  Unde territus abbas 
ille, qui divina celebranda susceperat, et qui jam sacrosanctam consecracionem peregerat, opportuit quod 
misse residuum cum silencio compleret et breviter que altissonis vocibus hucusque fuerant decantata.” 
68 See Miri Rubin, Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
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mass merely served to emphasize his own dedication to his holy task in the face of this 
violent interruption. 
For Michel Pintoin in particular, this attack on the sanctuary of the church was 
egregious.  He believed that irreligious behavior had caused not only the king to go mad, 
but others as well.  He explained that the king’s illness was not an isolated case; rather, 
many people suffered from similar episodes of madness during his reign.  He noted that 
the common people mistakenly attributed this epidemic of madness to sorcery, but that he 
and all other knowledgeable people – theologians and physicians – agreed that it was 
caused by bad behavior in their youth.69  Michel Pintoin’s image of a community that 
suffered with the king allowed him to criticize the king’s youthful behavior obliquely.  
He suggested that the entire realm needed to be reformed, and saw these episodes of 
madness as signs of the need for moral reform.  According to the monk, theories of the 
literal body politic and fears about the danger of misbehavior were the foundations for 
behavioral laws that were passed during Charles VI’s reign.  The ordinance against 
blasphemy, in Michel Pintoin’s account, was declared by heralds in the streets of Paris in 
1397 specifically in order to prevent the king’s frequent relapses, which, the monk said, 
wise men attributed to the crimes of his subjects.70  This legislation was part of a larger 
religious project on the part of the king, who, before his madness, had not expressed 
much interest in religion.  Indeed, his father’s chapel at the Chateau of Vincennes, which 
had been in progress at the time of Charles V’s death, had been left unfinished for 
thirteen years.  As soon as Charles VI recovered from his first episode of madness, he 
                                                 
69 Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, vol. 2, 404-406. 
70 Ibid., 532. 
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resumed the project.71  While this was clearly an effort to reform on the part of the king 
as an individual, the law against blasphemy targeted the reformation of the entire realm.72   
A law against blasphemy was recorded in Parlement, not in February when 
Michel Pintoin mentioned it, but in May of 1397, a month after Charles passed another 
ordinance that gave prisoners condemned to death the right to receive the last sacrament, 
a result of a campaign by Jean Gerson, suggesting that the reformation of morals had far-
reaching goals.73  As the monk of Saint-Denis interpreted it, the kingdom of France had 
to come together and cleanse itself on behalf of its mad king.  Indeed, when the king 
reconfirmed the law against blasphemy in 1415, he included language suggesting that he, 
too, believed that the problems of the realm might have their roots in the blasphemy of 
the people, saying “it may be for this cause that many great disgraces and inconveniences 
have come and come every day in diverse ways, to Us and to our said subjects.”74  
Though the king did not specify the particular troubles that had come upon him due to the 
blasphemy of his people, the obvious inconveniences that haunted his reign were his 
episodes of madness. 
Merely eschewing negative behavior was not sufficient, however.  The need for 
positive action on the part of the realm as a whole was most evident in chronicle 
discussions of penitent processions undertaken in order to offer prayers for the king’s 
health.  Indeed, Bernard Guenée posits that “the illness of Charles VI made the special 
                                                 
71 Guenée, La folie de Charles VI, 165-170; Guenée, Un Roi et son historien, 219-275. 
72 See Guenée, La folie de Charles VI, 184-192 for more on the history of blasphemy laws in France. 
73 Henri Stein, Inventaire analytique des ordonnances enregistrées au parlement de Paris jusqu'à la mort 
de Louis XII (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1908), 153-154. 
74 Vilevault and Bréquigny, eds., Ordonnances des Rois de France de la 3e Race: Dixième volume, 
Contenant les ordonnances de Charles VI, données depuis le commencement de l'année 1411 jusqu'à la fin 
de l'année 1418, 243: “puet estre que à ceste cause pluseurs grans esclandres & inconveniens qui sont 
avenuz & aviennent de jour en jour en diverses manieres, sur Nous & nosdiz subgiez.”   
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procession into a familiar reality, almost quotidian.”75  Michel Pintoin described the first 
of these processions, which took place immediately after Charles’ first episode of 
madness, as follows: 
[w]hen the news was spread throughout the realm, all the true French cried as if 
for the death of an only son; so much was the health of France attached to that of 
its king!  The clergy, seeing that human remedies were powerless against this 
strange illness, called on heaven, between tears and sobs, with fervent prayers for 
the conservation of a life so precious.  In all the churches, they added to the divine 
office oraisons specifically for the king.  The bishops, accompanied by their 
clergy, made processions from church to church.  Men and women followed 
them, barefoot, prostrating themselves before the Lord with groans and tears, and 
asked him with one contrite and humble heart for the recovery of the king.76
 
Michel Pintoin was quick to acknowledge that this moving display of unity, with all “true 
French” acting with one heart, touched God’s heart and led to the king’s recovery.  
Clearly, the chronicler of Saint-Denis felt that Charles VI’s suffering needed divine aid, 
which could be sought through the intercession of the people of his realm.  He linked 
“true French” identity and prayers for the king here, “imagining” the French realm in 
terms of the king’s madness.  Michel Pintoin was certain the king’s every recovery was 
due to God’s pity for the prayers of the French people, and he indicated this in the 
language he used.  Even when he was simply making a passing reference to the king’s 
recovery, he referred to Charles’ “incolumitas,” or “safety.”77  This Latin term was 
unusual in Classical Latin, but would have been easily recognizable to the medieval 
                                                 
75 Guenée, La folie de Charles VI, 174: “La maladie de Charles VI fit de la procession spéciale une réalité 
familière, presque quotidienne.” 
76 Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, vol. 2, 22: “Ut autem per regnum divulgatum est, 
omnes veri Francigene tanquam super unigenitorum morte doluerunt.  Equidem omnium regnicolarum 
salus in sua fundata erat.  Ideo viri ecclesiastici attendentes, quod vis morbi humanis subsidiis sublevari 
non poterat, quanto desiderio tunc ipsam affectabant, tanto fervore devocionis et cum mestis singultibus ad 
Deum se converterunt.  Ubique certe facte fuerunt pro ipsa oraciones in celebracione divinorum ab universa 
Ecclesia.  Episcopi cum clero arma de ecclesiis ad ecclesias bajulantes spiritualia, sexu utriusque plebis 
nudis vestigiis subsequente, ante Dominum prostrati, cum gemitu et lacrimis, corde contrito et humiliato, 
orabant pro incolumitate regis.”   
77 Ibid.  
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readers as part of the liturgy.  When masses were said for the king’s recovery, the French 
people asked for his “salus et incolumitas.”78
The vexed question of where the king, in his madness, fit into the larger 
understanding of Christendom was troubling for Charles’ contemporaries.  As the “Most 
Christian King,” the French king had a role to play in the defense of Christendom, but 
madness brought personal salvific potential into question.  The most important logistical 
consideration for theologians was whether or not mad people could be part of the 
communion of the church.  The theological question was what was necessary for 
salvation, and consideration of the mind and human mental capacity often came up in the 
context of faith.  In his De Trinitate, Augustine contemplated the mystery of the Trinity, 
and it was here that he considered human memory in depth.79  Augustine argued that the 
Trinity could be understood through the conjunction of the human mental trinity of 
memory, understanding and will.  He explained that  
this trinity of the mind is God’s image, not because the mind remembers, 
understands and loves itself; but because it has the power also to remember, 
understand and love its Maker.  And it is in so doing that it attains wisdom.  If it 
does not so, the memory, understanding and love of itself is no more than an act 
of folly.  Let the mind then remember its God, in whose image it was made, let it 
understand him and love him.80
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79 See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
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80 Augustine, Later works, ed. John Burnaby, trans. John Burnaby (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955), 
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Thus, for Augustine folly causes humans to understand themselves but not seek to 
understand God.  This passage has even further meaning for medieval understandings of 
madness as a loss of memory and understanding, however, since it is only through these 
aspects of human intelligence that a person can truly love and comprehend God.  For 
Augustine, then, both the foolish and the mad were incapable of understanding the 
Trinity and, through this, of accessing salvation.  Did that mean Charles VI not only was 
incapable of being the Most Christian King during his episodes of madness, but also that 
he could not be considered part of the Christian community at all? 
When Thomas Aquinas considered madness in the thirteenth century, he 
addressed the question of whether mad people were capable of participating in the 
sacraments, and thus of being part of the Christian community.  He agreed with 
Augustine that mad people were not capable of memory and reason, but he imagined this 
lack less as a loss and more as a block.  His beliefs about madness were closely related to 
more general Christian questions about the separation between the soul and the body.  In 
his Summa Theologica he asked whether a mad person was lacking his or her rational 
soul (anima rationalis).  Aquinas responded to the argument that the mad are like beasts 
and therefore should not be given the sacraments by saying that “[m]admen and 
imbeciles lack the use of reason accidentally, i.e. through some impediment in a bodily 
organ; but not like irrational animals through want of a rational soul.”81  Humans who are 
mad still have souls, but their minds are incapable of communicating with their souls 
because of a physical impediment.  Animals, on the other hand, have no souls at all.  
                                                 
81 Translations of Aquinas come from Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, trans. Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province (Westminster, Md: Christian Classics, 1981), 5 vols., vol. 4, 2402.  The Latin text is 
from Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. James J. Cunningham (London: Blackfriars, 1964), 60 
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Thus, unlike beasts, the mad are salvable.  Instead of imagining madness as a true lack of 
soul, Aquinas argued for a bodily blockage that did not negate the potential salvation of 
the mad.  Thus, using a medical explanation, Aquinas saw the irrationality of the mad as 
stemming from an impediment in the body rather than as the lack of a soul.  According to 
this interpretation, Charles VI still had a soul during his episodes of madness. 
However, mad people were still problematic figures for Aquinas and the medieval 
scholastics, because reason was an essential component of faith.  Because the mad were 
seen as lacking reason, or at the very least as having their reason blocked and 
inaccessible, they were not capable of active religious belief.  The question arose as to 
whether or not mad people could be allowed to enter into the communion of the faith if 
they could not believe.  Without belief, was Charles VI still able to hold his position as 
Most Christian King?  Discussing madness allowed Aquinas to consider the question of 
which sacraments required faith and which could be administered despite a lack of fully 
reasoned belief.  To aid in this consideration, Aquinas distinguished between four types 
of mad people: those who were mad from birth with “no lucid moments,” those who had 
fallen from sanity into insanity much like Charles VI, those who were mad from birth but 
had lucid moments, and finally “others who, though not altogether sane, yet can use their 
reason so far as to think about their salvation, and understand the power of the 
sacrament.” 82  Having codified these different levels of madness, he established that all 
“madmen and imbeciles” should be baptized, unless they explicitly refused baptism 
during their “lucid moments”, and should also be allowed to receive the Eucharist, unless 
they had been irrational from birth.  Since an infant, who had not yet developed the 
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ability to reason, could be baptized, mad people were equally able to receive that 
sacrament.  On the other hand, reception of the Eucharist required a slightly higher level 
of belief.  If the person had been capable of that reasoned belief at any point, however, he 
or she was still able to receive the sacrament without necessarily renewing that belief.  In 
contrast, Aquinas believed that mad people should always be denied extreme unction 
because he felt that it “requires a movement of the free-will” and was not (as he argued in 
detail) required for salvation.83  Aquinas was using the concept of madness to develop his 
theories about reasoned belief and the sacraments.  His consideration of madness as a 
blockage between the soul and the body allowed for a more complex discussion of 
legitimate reception of the sacraments than the alternative belief that mad people lacked a 
soul entirely.  According to Aquinas’ reasoning, then, Charles VI was still able to be 
incorporated into the Christian communion through the act of receiving the Eucharist, 
even during his episodes of madness.  Having once entered that community of faith, it 
was always possible to be recognized as a member without a renewal of commitment, 
and even the Most Christian King could retain the necessary position as a member of the 
Eucharistic communion.  
During his periods of sanity, Charles participated fully in the religious 
community, fulfilling expectations of royal religious observance, including listening to 
sermons by learned theologians from the University of Paris.  In November of 1405, Jean 
Gerson read a sermon in front of the king, in which he made suggestions for the recovery 
                                                 
83 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. Peter Caramello (Rome: Marietti, 1956), 3 vols., vol. 3, 96; 
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of the realm, which, he argued, had fallen into serious disarray.  The regency of the 
king’s wife and brother had prompted criticisms, and Gerson’s sermon was responding to 
these complaints without openly blaming anyone.  Gerson recommended four tasks in 
order to help maintain the corporal health of the king.  First, it was necessary to 
encourage the University of Paris’ medical faculty, who could seek remedies for the king.  
The “good friends and loyal subjects” of the king also needed to unite to care for the 
king’s health, essentially repairing the body politic in order to aid the king’s body.84  
Thirdly, everyone should avoid calling on “sorcerers, magicians, charmers, and other 
such foolish and perverse people.”85  Finally, prudent people with good manners should 
surround the king, to prevent him from being “so oppressed, worked, or hurried as we 
have seen him often to his great prejudice.”86  Gerson created an image of circular 
responsibility.  The demands of the realm oppressed the king, which exacerbated his 
illness, which in turn led to the troubles in his realm.  The combination of medical, 
political, and social solutions that Gerson recommended made the king’s illness a 
problem for France as a whole, providing tasks for all those who cared about the king and 
his kingdom, and reprimanding those who chose the inappropriate path of sorcery. 
 The idea that the realm as a whole shared responsibility not only for causing the 
king’s illness but also for restoring his health came up in many different ways, but the 
most interesting elaboration of the concept used the image of the body of the realm.87  
                                                 
84 Jean Gerson, Oeuvres complètes, ed. Mgr Glorieux (Paris: Desclée et Cie, 1968), 10 vols., vol. 7, Part 2, 
1147: “Les bons amys et loyaulz subiectz du roy doibvent querir la sante et vie corporelle du roy.” 
85 Ibid. “sorciers, magiciens, charmeurs et telz fols gens et perversez.” 
86 Ibid. “Il ne deveroit point aussi estre tellement opprime, travaille ou presse comme on l’a veu souvent en 
son grant preiudice.” 
87 The concept of the body of the realm was a popular one in medieval political thought.  John of 
Salisbury’s Policraticus originated this idea, and (for a more contemporary reference) Christine de Pizan 
picked up the concept for her Book of the Body Politic, composed between 1404 and 1407 for Louis of 
Guyenne, Charles VI’s oldest son who did not survive to become king himself.  Christine de Pizan, The 
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Jean le Fevre, composing a chronicle about the reigns of Charles VI and Charles VII in 
the fifteenth century, added the text of a letter he claimed had been written by Louis of 
Orléans and given to the king in 1413, during the period of Armagnac control of the 
government which will be discussed in more detail below.  The letter used John of 
Salisbury’s political theory to describe the body of the realm, explaining that  
[t]he res publica, of which they have the governance, represents a body of which 
they are the heads, and the subjects are the members; in such a manner that, if any 
of the members are wounded, it brings sorrow to the head.  And to come to my 
purpose, I consider the Christian realm of France to be a body of which our 
sovereign lord the king is the head, and the members are his subjects.88
 
This theory gained particular weight when it was applied to the French king, whose 
“douleur au chief” was quite literal.  These images of the realm as a body allowed for the 
elaboration of medical theory, which discussed the dangers of imbalance.  The body’s 
imbalance could threaten the king, and, indeed, the head’s imbalance could threaten the 
body.  The cycle of imbalance together damaged the realm as a whole, since the civil 
wars against which the preachers and chroniclers were arguing, simultaneously were 
caused by and led to the king’s madness.  While the letter referred specifically to the 
murder of Louis of Orléans, it also suggested that the king’s subjects could be the cause 
of his illness by creating imbalances within the realm.    
                                                                                                                                                 
Book of the Body Politic, ed. Kate Langdon Forhan, trans. Kate Langdon Forhan, Cambridge Texts in the 
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These imbalances, struggles, and discords within the realm were highlighted in 
Charles of Savoisy’s servant’s accidental disruption of the university’s procession on 
behalf of the mad king.  Representatives of the university sought justice from Queen 
Isabeau de Bavière, the Duke of Burgundy, and the Duke of Orléans, since the king had 
not recovered from his illness.  The lack of a single authoritative figurehead, which the 
university’s representatives could argue was in part due to the failure of their intercessory 
procession on behalf of the king’s health, was clearly marked here.  Rather than turning 
to the king for justice, the university’s representatives dealt with three people, each of 
whom held some royal prerogative during the king’s “absence.”  Meanwhile, Charles of 
Savoisy, chamberlain of the king, met with some university officials in private, promising 
to reprimand his men personally, and hoping that the affair could be handled with “sweet 
words” as opposed to allowing the university to prosecute his retainers.89  Not content 
with such a quiet punishment, the university officials announced a strike, during which,  
[i]n order to hasten the reparation of the injury, by letters patent, the rector of the 
university restrained the professors of Paris from receiving or elevating any child 
in the schools; he enjoined them at the same time to suspend lecturing in all the 
faculties and producing the word of God in all the churches of Paris.90
 
The university’s work stoppage threatened not only the students, but also the parish 
communities of Paris, who would suffer from the lack of sermons by university-trained 
preachers.  The conflict, which had been limited in scope to the single target of Charles of 
Savoisy, thus escalated throughout the city of Paris, as the university demonstrated its 
own strength in an effort to resolve the conflict in its favor.   
                                                 
89 Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys, vol. 3, 188: “verba lenia.” 
90 Ibid., 190: “Ad quod eciam festinandum Universitatis rector sub patentibus litteris inhibuit pedagogis 
Parisiensibus, ne pueri reciperentur vel erudirentur in scolis, indicens eciam ut in cunctis facultatibus a 
lecturis cessaretur, nec in ecclesiis Parisiensibus seminaretur verbum Dei.” 
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This strike garnered the attention of the Parlement, whose members heard an 
eloquent exposition by a Franciscan who sought to ruin the reputation of Charles of 
Savoisy.  His speech, recorded in the journal of the greffier (secretary) of the Parlement 
of Paris, Nicolas de Baye, highlighted the multiple layers of communal integrity 
threatened in the desecration performed by Savoisy’s men.  The Franciscan explained 
that  
[h]e threw stones at the world, because she [the university] was praying for the 
peace of the Church, so he is not a good Christian, also [the university was 
gathered] in order to pray for the health of the king, which they were doing, so he 
is not loyal to the king, and [the university prayed] for the goods of the earth on 
which the people live, so he is not worthy to be among men, like a troubler of the 
polity.91
   
Though it might appear that Savoisy’s men were guilty of a simple act of aggression 
against the university, the Franciscan argued, in fact they were attacking every value that 
the university members were endeavoring at that moment to espouse.  The university 
procession at that moment represented the Church as a whole, the realm, and the earth, 
because they were praying for those things.  Charles of Savoisy responded by arguing 
that the men who attacked the church were not his retainers, but drunks who had been in 
a nearby tavern when they heard a rumor that he had been attacked, but this was not 
sufficiently convincing to the Parlement.  Michel Pintoin also made the point of 
observing that “the king, who had recovered his health, acquiesced to a request that 
seemed to him so legitimate”92 and ordered Parlement to come to a conclusion on the 
issue.  The king’s health allowed for a swift and, at least from the perspective of the 
                                                 
91 Nicolas de Baye, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, greffier du Parlement de Paris, 1400-1417, 102: “Se il la 
welt lapider, pour ce qu’elle prioit pour la paix de l’Eglise, il n’est pas bon crestien, se pour prier pour la 
santé du Roy, ce que faisoient, il n’est pas loyal au Roy, se pour les biens de terre dont le peuple vit, il n’est 
pas digne d’estre entre gens, comme tourbleur de police.” 
92 Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys, vol. 3, 191: “rex, sana mente recepta, petitum 
annuit velud juri consonum.” 
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university, just completion.  As his illness cast the rest of the realm into disorder, in a 
sense causing the original accident and certainly contributing to the difficulty of finding a 
resolution, so his restored health allowed for the realm to return to its balance.   
The punishment decided upon emphasized those very aspects of community that 
the crime had disturbed.93  The Parlement determined that the lord of Savoisy should be 
made to found a chapel at a location chosen by the university, and that his house should 
be demolished and made into a public space to eternally commemorate the event.94  In 
fact, to bring the event into a full circle, the masons and carpenters who were to perform 
the demolition were to be led to the site by people ringing bells in order to draw attention 
to the act, and those of the lord of Savoisy’s servants who could be found were also 
processed from crossroad to crossroad while being beaten with rods as punishment for 
their desecration.   
The unifying force of a procession allowed chroniclers to reimagine the effect of 
the king’s madness in positive terms, as a point of convergence that reintegrated the 
realm in the shared concern for the head.  The disruption of such a moment of symbolic 
power was perhaps even more serious a transgression than the use of weapons in a 
consecrated space.  The underlying tensions between lay and secular power revealed by 
this particular event highlighted the need for such community building through 
processions and prayers.  This case also indicated the difficulties inherent in the 
uncertainty of the regency for the mad king.  University officials turned to all three of the 
                                                 
93 See Natalie Zemon Davis, “The Rites of Violence," in Society and Culture in Early Modern France: 
Eight Essays (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), 152-188. 
94 In the Chroniques du roi Charles VII, Gilles le Bouvier claimed that Charles of Savoisy was sent into 
exile and went on crusade to atone for his sins against the Church.  The modern editors note that the 
sentence recorded in Parlement did not include banishment, and add that Charles of Savoisy petitioned to 
rebuild his hôtel a few years later.  See Gilles le Bouvier, Les Chroniques du roi Charles VII, 14. 
  88 
powerful figures who controlled the realm during the king’s “absences,” but in the end 
their case was resolved by the recovered monarch.  Indeed, the struggle for power 
between the king’s relatives led to another violent event in his reign, pitting the king’s 
closest relatives against each other. 
 
III. Treason and Madness 
 The third act of violence was the murder of Louis of Orléans at the command of 
Jean of Burgundy in 1407.  In the early years of his reign, during both his minority and 
his madness, Charles VI’s uncles managed the regency without much internal strife.  
However, as the next generation came to replace the previous, the power dynamics 
shifted.  Louis of Orléans, the king’s brother, insisted on playing a larger role in the 
government once he reached his majority.  In 1402, he convinced the king to allow him, 
with the assistance of the queen, to take over the regency during the king’s periods of 
madness.  His policies were not universally approved, and the balance of power 
constantly shifted between Louis and his uncle, Philippe of Burgundy.  After Philippe’s 
death in 1404, his son, Jean of Burgundy, made his own claim for the role of regent.  On 
November 23, 1407, in an extreme effort to resolve the power struggle in his favor, Jean 
of Burgundy had Louis of Orléans murdered on the streets of Paris, as Louis walked 
home from a meal with the queen.  The Saint-Denis monk Michel Pintoin recorded the 
incident in the context of the recent birth and immediate death of a royal prince, focusing 
attention on the tenuous nature of life, even in the royal household.  Despite Michel 
Pintoin’s oft-mentioned disapproval of Louis of Orléans’ methods of government, he 
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expressed horror and outrage at the murder, of which he mourned, “o detestable crime, 
unheard of and execrable example!”95   
Instead of trying to avoid suspicion for this death, Jean of Burgundy openly 
admitted that he had arranged the murder.  He hired Jean Petit, along with several other 
scholars to aid him, to write a treatise exonerating this deed, which they accomplished in 
two parts, drawing on John of Salisbury’s Policraticus.96  The major point sought to 
justify tyrranicide, arguing that covetousness is the root of all evil, but the greatest crime 
is treason, or lèse-majesté.  Treason, according to Petit’s treatise, could be an offense 
against divine or human majesty, and both of these could come in several forms.  Injuries 
against divine majesty could be against God, as in the behavior of heretics and idolaters, 
or against the Church, as in that of schismatics, while injuries against human majesty 
could be against the king or prince, his wife, their children, or the state or commonwealth 
as a whole.  Jean Petit’s minor point then sought to prove that Louis of Orléans was a 
tyrant, and guilty of high treason through offences against God, the king, the queen, the 
dauphin, and the realm of France.   
The charge of treason was a particularly timely one.  During the reign of Charles 
V, the definition of lèse-majesté was broadened to incorporate verbal as well as physical 
                                                 
95 Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys, vol. 3, 730: “o monstrum detestabile necdum 
alias speratum, execrabile exemplar !” 
96 Petit’s treatise is incorporated in Enguerrand de Monstrelet’s chronicle.  See Enguerrand de Monstrelet, 
Les chroniques d'Enguerrand de Monstrelet, ed. J.A. Buchon, Collection des chroniques nationales 
françaises (Paris: Verdière, 1826-1827), vol. 1, 178-235.  For a discussion of Jean Petit’s work, see Alfred 
Coville, Jean Petit: La question du tyrannicide au commencement du XVe siècle (Paris: A. Picard, 1932).  
Jan Veenstra believes that only Charles’ illness, which he refers to as his “feeblemindedness” could have 
made him susceptible to Jean Petit’s thesis.  Veenstra is dismissive of Jean Petit’s work and the larger 
belief in the powers of witchcraft on which Jean Petit and the duke of Burgundy were playing.  Jan R. 
Veenstra, Magic and Divination at the Courts of Burgundy and France: Text and Context of Laurens 
Pignon's Contre les devineurs (1411) (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 36. 
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injuries to the king and to the rest of the royal line.97  Despite the fact that chroniclers 
openly discussed the king’s madness and his first episode was witnessed by his army, it 
was considered treason to call the king fou, especially in the immediate aftermath of the 
aborted military campaign in 1392.98  Three legal cases of treasonous conversations 
demonstrate the perceived dangers of spreading rumors about the king’s mental health.99  
Two of these occurred in 1393, only a year after Charles’ first episode of madness, and 
the third case from 1398 referred to an event that had taken place five years earlier, also 
in 1393.  In a letter of remission, which appeared in August of 1393, Jehan de Gaillon 
claimed to be a “poor, insensible man” who was “frenetic and démoniacle” in an effort to 
excuse his statement that the king was mad.100  Another letter of remission, from 
October, dealt with Jehan Valee, who explained that one night, while he was drinking in 
the tavern,  
hearing as it seemed to him that one of the company spoke of one named Martin 
le Roy, the which Martin had recently married his cousin germain and in thinking 
[this] he said to him that le Roy [the king] was totally mad and that he did not 
believe anything that he said.101
 
This statement garnered some unwanted attention for Jehan Valee, since his enemies, he 
claimed, saw a way to harm him by insisting that he was speaking of the king, not of 
Martin le Roy.  These two letters described relatively innocuous statements about the 
king’s mental state, but nevertheless they were sufficiently damaging as to threaten the 
two men with conviction of treason.   
                                                 
97 See Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau, Dieu et le roi: La répression du blasphème et de l’injure au roi à la fin 
du moyen âge (Limoges: Presses universitaires de Limoges, 2002), 204. 
98 Bernard Guenée argues that the term fol was “le mot impossible” because of its association with demonic 
possession.  See Guenée, La folie de Charles VI, 28-34. 
99 AN JJ 144 fo 270 no 469; AN JJ 145 fo 30v no 64; AN JJ 153 fo 288 no 430. 
100 AN JJ 144 fo 270 no 469:  “povre homme insensible,” “homme frénétique et démoniacle.” 
101 AN JJ 145 fo 30v no 64:  “le dit exposant entendi si comme il lui sambla que un de la compaine parla 
dun nomme martin le roy le quel martin avoit nagarre espouse sa cousine germaine et en pensant a lui dist 
que le roy estoit tout fol et quil ne le creroit de riens quil deist.” 
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A more complicated legal case from 1398 involved Jehan de Charentes, who had 
accused Jehan de Baigneux of uttering treasonous words against the king five years 
earlier. This case revealed both the danger of words and the fear of the disruptive power 
of discussing the king’s madness, particularly so soon after his initial episode of madness 
when the future of the realm was uncertain.  Jehan de Charentes, lieutenant of the 
governor of Orléans, and Jehan de Baigneux, substitute for the procurer of the king, had a 
contentious personal relationship.  Jehan de Charentes accused Jehan de Baigneux of 
remarking during a conversation in 1393 that “we are well set up with enough to do and 
to suffer: the king is not in his good senses and is mad and Monsieur the duke of Orléans 
is young and wishes to play at dice and love whores.”102  The instability of the realm was 
most likely a subject of conversation between concerned villagers, and there was 
certainly general fear in the countryside about the impact the king’s madness might have 
on the realm as a whole, so the conversation as Jehan de Charentes represented it was 
possible.  However, when the case was taken to court Jehan de Baigneux was found 
innocent, and several witnesses were found guilty of false witness.  Hoping to avoid 
punishment, Jehan de Charentes sought a letter of remission, but this effort failed.  He 
received a letter, but it was later overturned by the court, which fined him for bringing a 
false case against his enemy.103  While treason seemed an excellent charge to pin on 
someone in the immediate aftermath of Charles VI’s illness, it was also a dangerous one.  
Although Jehan de Charentes was merely fined for his false testimony, technically the 
                                                 
102 AN JJ 153 fo 288 no 430: “nous sommes bien tailliez dans assez afaire et souffrit le roy nest pas en son 
bon sens et est folz et monsieur le duc dorleans est jeunes et jeue voulentiers aux dez et ayme les putains.” 
103 All the surviving documents from the case can be found reproduced in Louis de Carbonnières, La 
procédure devant la chambre criminelle du Parlement de Paris au XIVe siècle (Paris: Champion, 2004), 
813-824. 
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punishment for falsely bringing a case was to submit to the punishment that fit the crime 
of the falsely accused, which, in a case about treason, was execution. 
In the context of increasing concern about treason, especially against the mad 
king, Jean Petit attempted to establish that Louis of Orléans was a tyrant by showing that 
his crimes were against both the king and God.  He did this by accusing Louis of 
becoming involved with sorcerers, and using their powers to try to take the throne from 
his brother.  In fact, he asserted that Charles VI’s madness had been caused by his 
brother’s interest in sorcery, and that Louis had tried to poison the king.104  Petit claimed 
that Louis had hired a monk who made him a powerful ring and sword by placing them in 
the mouth and body of a corpse, respectively.105  Through this, Petit sought to doubly 
condemn Louis of Orléans, by proving his crime deserved death not only of body but also 
of soul.  The king’s illness had already been a point of convergence for the contemporary 
debate about sorcery.  Many of the king’s most powerful subjects were rumored to be 
attempting to find a remedy for the king in both masses and witchcraft.  According to 
Michel Pintoin’s chronicle, the previous duke of Burgundy, Jean sans Peur’s father, had 
turned to both religious processions and self-proclaimed sorcerers in his efforts to cure 
his nephew the king.106  Thus, the theory that the king’s illness could be cured by or was 
caused by sorcery was familiar to contemporaries. 
Indeed, the connection between Louis of Orléans and sorcery did not originate 
with Jean Petit.  According to Michel Pintoin, rumors were being spread as early as 1392: 
                                                 
104 For more on the fear of poison and the practice of poisoning in this period, see Franck Collard, Le crime 
de poison au Moyen Âge (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2003). 
105 The text of Jean Petit’s treatise was reproduced in Enguerrand de Monstrelet’s chronicle.  See 
Enguerrand de Monstrelet, Les chroniques d'Enguerrand de Monstrelet, 241-324.  Coville also edited a few 
pages of the treatise with this particular story.  See Coville, Jean Petit: La question du tyrannicide au 
commencement du XVe siècle, 314. 
106 Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, vol. 2, 70 and 542. 
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[i]f the assertions of [Pierre de Craon] can be believed, he had incurred the anger 
of the duke of Orléans by accusing him several times of letting himself go too 
easily to his passions, and of according too much favor to sorcerers, who made 
sorceries with the bones of the dead.  The duke had him banished from the 
court.107
 
The monk of Saint Denis proceeded to connect this to the conflict between Pierre de 
Craon and Olivier de Clisson, suggesting that Pierre de Craon blamed Olivier de Clisson 
for his expulsion, and thus set into motion the events leading to the king’s journey 
through the forest of Mans, where he would go mad.  The king’s brother’s rumored 
interest in sorcery did not end with this disaster, however.  During his episodes of 
madness, Michel Pintoin claimed, the king did not know his wife or anyone else except 
the duchess of Orléans, which promulgated rumors also, since “[m]any people interpreted 
this predilection negatively, not however that I consider it probable, but it seemed truth to 
them, alleging that in Lombardy, where the duchess originated, people make poisons and 
sorceries more than in other places.”108  Although Michel Pintoin took pains to note that 
he did not believe these allegations, nevertheless he did record them, and these kinds of 
rumors from fifteen years earlier that must have circulated widely made the refutation of 
Jean Petit’s treatise more difficult. 
The high profile cases of witchcraft in fourteenth-century France were often 
politically expedient.  King Philip IV accused Bishop Guichard of Troyes of sorcery and 
poisoning, which were related crimes.109  The alleged victim of Guichard’s malice was 
Philip’s wife, Queen Jeanne.  The trial took place between 1308 and 1314 and made an 
                                                 
107 Ibid., 2: “Si assercioni ipsius fidem adhibendam dicam, quia ducem sepius increpaverat quod cor facile 
nimis sequens, supersticiosis viris et qui ex mortuorum ossibus sortilegia componebant familiarius justo 
adherebat, ejus indignacionem incurrit, et eum a curia regis expelli procuravit.” 
108 Ibid., 88: “Quod multi in partem interpretabantur pejorem, non tamen dicam probabilem; sed quod eis 
videbatur verissimile, allegantes quod in Lombardia, unde ducebat originem, intoxicaciones et sortilegia 
vigebant plus quam aliis partibus.” 
109 See Bernard Guenée’s discussion of previous politicized sorcery and poisoning accusations in Guenée, 
La folie de Charles VI, 63-72. 
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excellent precedent, demonstrating how an accusation of witchcraft could escalate, and 
how it could incorporate claims of treason and heresy.110  These sorcery trials destroyed 
the public reputations of the accused.  It is likely that Jean sans Peur hoped for a similar 
outcome with his own witchcraft accusations against Louis of Orléans almost a hundred 
years later, although if so, he must have been disappointed.     
There was also a much more recent trial of a sorcerer to serve as a precedent for 
the accusation against Louis of Orléans.  In 1398, one of the king’s physicians, Master 
Jehan de Bar, was accused of and confessed to practicing sorcery.  He was condemned, 
and both he and his books that were allegedly about magic were burned.  His confession 
is preserved in a manuscript including several of Jean Gerson’s works, and, as Jan 
Veenstra has demonstrated, closely follows the articles against magic drawn up by the 
University of Paris in the same month.111  Perhaps the most significant article in the 
confession was item thirteen, in which he confessed, “I have made documents full of 
invocations of devils where I asked to have very great power to bind and unbind the 
words and thoughts of people, the bad fortune of the king and of Monsieur the 
Dauphin.”112  The meaning of Master Jehan de Bar’s confession is unclear here.  Jan 
Veenstra assumes that he admitted to having sought supernatural, as well as natural, cures 
for the king’s illness.  However, the text of the confession says that he sought power to 
bind and unbind the “bad fortune of the king,” suggesting that he may have desired to 
make the king mad, as well as to heal him from his madness.  In the following article, 
                                                 
110 Abel Rigault, Les procès de Guichard, évêque de Troyes (1308-1313) (Paris: A. Picard et fils, 1896). 
111 It is not clear which came first, Jehan de Bar’s confession or the University’s condemnation of magic – 
it is possible that they were drawn up together.  Veenstra, Magic and Divination, 347-349.  Veenstra also 
provides an edition of the confession on pages 351-355. 
112 Ibid., 353: “j’ay fait roles plains d’invocacions de dyables ou je demandoye avoir puissance moult large 
a lier et delier les paroles ou les ensentemens des gens, les mauvaises fortunes du roy et de monsieur le 
delphin.” 
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item fourteen, he confessed to making an image that allowed him to control the duke of 
Burgundy (who would have been Philippe at that time), to make the duke believe him and 
love him, regardless of Jehan de Bar’s actions.113  This is a particularly interesting clause, 
because it suggests that Philippe of Burgundy was implicated in Jehan de Bar’s 
experimentation with sorcery.  Through his confession, Jehan de Bar took full 
responsibility, allowing the duke of Burgundy to evade suspicion because he was acting 
under bewitchment and not from his own desires.   
In the context of Master Jehan de Bar’s confession and the rumors about Louis of 
Orléans and his wife and their interest in sorcery, Jean Petit’s accusations against Louis 
of Orléans become part of a longer tradition that viewed the king’s madness in the 
context of sorcery and treason.  In the end, Jean Petit’s treatise was both a success and a 
failure.  Despite the earnest supplications of his sister-in-law and his nephews, Charles VI 
refused to pursue the duke of Burgundy, choosing instead to pardon his cousin.  
However, the treatise was attacked, not only for the specific claims made about Louis of 
Orléans, but also for the general argument justifying tyrranicide.  The abbé of Cérisy, 
Thomas de Bourg, refuted Petit’s arguments on behalf of Louis’ wife, Valentina of 
Orléans.  Interestingly, his refutation of the accusations that Louis was involved in 
sorcery rested solely on the claim that Louis of Orléans was a good Christian.  Thomas de 
Bourg completely ignored Jean Petit’s claim that Louis’ experimentation with sorcery 
had caused the king’s madness, focusing instead on the assertion that Louis had sought 
Charles’ death.114   
                                                 
113 Ibid., 353-354. 
114 Enguerrand de Monstrelet, Les chroniques d'Enguerrand de Monstrelet, 358-433. 
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With the duke of Burgundy pardoned and acting as regent, it was impossible for 
such challenges to affect policy, and Jean Petit composed a response to the abbé’s 
refutation.  Petit died in 1411, and his arguments were not challenged successfully until 
the Burgundians lost power for a time in 1413 after the Cabochien uprising.115  During 
this brief hiatus in Burgundian control, Jean Gerson joined the debate, delivering a 
sermon in front of the king, in which he countered Petit’s arguments, particularly those 
about tyrranicide.  In response to this sermon, the king asked the bishop of Paris to 
convene a Council of the Faith to debate the treatise.  At the council, all of Petit’s 
arguments were refuted, and copies of the Justification were burned.  A few of his more 
avid opponents suggested that Jean Petit’s bones be disinterred and burned.116
Jean Petit endeavored, through his choice to focus part of his treatise on the issue 
of the king’s madness, to deploy the unifying sentiment the king inspired on behalf of the 
duke of Burgundy.  By casting the duke of Orléans as a villain who had dealt with 
sorcerers in order to cause the king to become mad, Petit created a heroic role for the 
duke of Burgundy, who saved the French realm from Louis of Orléans’ machinations.  In 
this sense, Petit’s treatise entered into the same discourse connecting the king’s madness 
to “national” sentiment that Michel Pintoin employed when discussing the processions 
undertaken on behalf of the king.  The murder of Louis of Orléans did not resolve the 
conflict over the regency; instead, it exacerbated the divisions within the realm.  Louis’ 
children and their supporters came together to form the Armagnac party which opposed 
the Burgundians, led by Jean sans Peur.  Their disagreements escalated into civil war, 
weakening the French realm and leaving it open to attack by the English. 
                                                 
115 For more on this, see Famiglietti, Royal Intrigue, 111-152. 
116 Coville, Jean Petit: La question du tyrannicide au commencement du XVe siècle, 399-402. 
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IV. Politics and Reconsiderations of the King’s Madness     
The fourth and final political crime brings us full circle to set up the Treaty of 
Troyes with a fuller understanding of the deployment of the king’s madness in terms of 
the “imagined” French realm.  In 1419, the murder of the duke of Burgundy at the 
instigation of the dauphin Charles angered the king and exacerbated the civil unrest in 
France.  Charles VI’s son, Charles, was very close to his cousins, the duke of Orléans and 
his siblings, and was thus a member of the Armagnac party.  When he became dauphin 
after the deaths of his older brothers, Charles chose to become involved in the power 
struggle between the Armagnacs and the Burgundians by arranging to meet with Jean, 
duke of Burgundy, on September 10, 1419, to discuss peaceful resolutions to the conflict.  
Instead, Charles had Jean sans Peur killed.  Charles VI, who loved his cousin the duke of 
Burgundy, was persuaded to disinherit his own son in response to this act.  With the 
encouragement of Philippe, the new duke of Burgundy, Charles VI signed a treaty with 
Henry V of England, whose successful attacks on French soil had been increasingly 
troublesome.117   
According to the terms of the treaty, Henry V would marry Katherine, Charles 
VI’s daughter, and would take on the role of regent until Charles’ death, at which point 
Henry V would inherit the throne of France.  The dauphin Charles moved to the Loire 
valley, where he retained the support of the Armagnac party, but northern France was 
governed by the English regent, who was proclaimed heir.  In the event, Henry V died on 
August 31, 1422, and Charles VI outlived him by mere months, dying on October 21, 
                                                 
117 For more on the legal question of disinheritance in relation to medieval treaties, see Theodor Meron, 
“The Authority to Make Treaties in the Late Middle Ages," American Journal of International Law 89, no. 
1 (1995): 1-20. 
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1422.  Henry’s son, Henry VI of England, was not yet a year old.  John, duke of Bedford, 
assumed the role of regent and worked to preserve the French throne for the infant Henry, 
but the difficulties of holding the throne for a child while another, adult, and arguably 
more legitimate heir still lived were clear. 
The struggle for control of the French throne did not only occur on the battlefields 
of France or in besieged cities.  The work of claiming legitimacy was undertaken by 
notaries, who found ways to challenge or uphold the Treaty of Troyes in order to justify 
their chosen ruler.  Indeed, in the period between the death of Jean sans Peur and the 
signing of the Treaty of Troyes, letters from both sides were copied and sent out to civic 
governments in an effort to sway public opinion.118  Royal notaries had been composing 
political treatises as part of their work in the chancery for many years, most of which, as 
Craig Taylor argues persuasively, were intended to be distributed to each other for 
facilitating diplomatic missions and the creation of new treaties, and were probably not 
widely read outside notarial circles.119  Throughout the fifteenth century, these notaries 
were concerned with clarifying and defining the terms of earlier treaties and presenting 
convincing references to the validity or invalidity of them, based on their particular 
political leanings.  Authors seeking to prove that the Treaty of Troyes was not legally 
sound focused on the mental state of Charles VI.  Indeed, the argument that Charles VI’s 
                                                 
118 Guenée, Un Roi et son historien, 455-477.  As Guenée notes, the accounts for the duchy of Burgundy 
for 24 November 1419 mentions payment to notaries for working “day and night” to hastily copy 209 
letters. 
119 Craig Taylor, “War, Propaganda and Diplomacy in Fifteenth-Century France and England," in War, 
Government and Power in Late Medieval France, ed. Christopher Allmand (Liverpool: Liverpool 
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reading these treatises as propaganda pieces intended for a wider audience.  P.S. Lewis, “War Propaganda 
and Historiography in Fifteenth-Century France and England," Transactions of the American Philosophical 
Society, 5th Series 15 (1965): 1-21.  As Craig Taylor argues, the polemical works generally appear in very 
few manuscripts and contain cross-references to treaties contained in the chancery archives in an effort to 
aid those notaries and secretaries of the king sent on diplomatic missions. 
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illness made him incapable of disinheriting his son was deployed before the treaty was 
signed.120   
Letters from Philippe of Burgundy explaining the proposed treaty with the 
English were the culmination of the propaganda letters sent out to the various civic 
governments in France in the wake of his father’s death.  The parlement of Poitiers, the 
Chambre des comptes of Bourges, and the Chambres des comptes of Dijon each recorded 
a response to the proposal that sought to argue that the dauphin could not be disinherited 
and that the agreements were invalid.121  The letter from Philippe of Burgundy 
enumerated the proposed negotiations, including the condition that granted Henry V of 
England the power of regent in France because “his cousin of France is held very often, 
which is grievous to say, and impeded by a contrary illness, in such a way that he cannot 
in his person conveniently understand or attend to arranging the needs of the realm.”122  
This admission that the king was unable to understand the needs of his realm allowed 
objections to the treaty on the same grounds.  The reply to the duke of Burgundy’s letter 
cited the king’s madness as one of many reasons to question the validity of these 
agreements.  There were two versions of this reply, the Super Omnia Vincit Veritas in 
Latin and the Réponse d’un bon et loyal françois in French.  The same objections were 
raised by both texts, and there is some suggestion that the French, which was composed 
                                                 
120 Nicole Pons, “Intellectual Patterns and Affective Reactions in Defence of the Dauphin Charles, 1419-
1422," in War, Government and Power in Late Medieval France, ed. Christopher Allmand (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2000), 54-69, 57-60. 
121 Pons, "L'Honneur de la Couronne de France": Quatre libelles contre les Anglais (vers 1418 - vers 
1429), 84-90.  These three cities are all within 400 kilometers (c. 250 miles) of Troyes.  It is around 450 
kilometers (c. 280 miles) from Dijon to Poitiers, and Bourges is about halfway between the two.  It is 
certainly reasonable to suppose that there was communication between the three towns while they 
considered the text of the treaty.  It is also worth pointing out that Poitiers and Bourges were both within 
the territory that ultimately supported the dauphin, whereas Dijon was the capital of the Burgundian duchy.   
122 Ibid., 136: “son cousin de France est tenu comme le plus souvent, ce que dolentement recite, et 
empeschié de contraire maladie, par tele maniere que convenablement il ne pourra en sa personne entendre 
ou vaquer a disposer les besoignes du royaume.” 
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later, was a translation of the Latin, although the French version is longer and more 
complex.  Both versions must have been composed at some time between the registration 
of the duke’s letter on December 2, 1419, and the conclusion of the treaty of Troyes on 
May 21, 1420, because they clearly refer to the letter, but they raised objections to the 
English demands, rather than to a completed treaty.123  Thus, they were composed at a 
time before the treaty was agreed, when there was still a possibility of preventing the 
English from gaining control of the realm.   
The Latin version was forthright in discussing Charles VI’s impediments.  In 
Super omnia, the author noted that  
it is not possible to have a true assent and consent where there is not true sense, 
that is to say true rational deliberation.  But, sadly, as the king of England himself 
affirmed in the articles…the king of France, when fallen prey to his illness, is in 
such a way that he cannot occupy himself with the affairs of the realm….  It is 
therefore evident that if because of his illness, that is the loss of true judgment and 
reason, the king cannot be free for the affairs of the realm, even less is he able to 
confer them on his enemy and adversary and take them away from his son and 
legitimate heir.124
 
The loophole created by the admission that the king was incapable of government 
allowed opponents of the treaty to assert that he therefore could not make such an 
agreement.  They cited legal precedent, and ignored the cyclical nature of the disease that 
had made it possible for the king to govern during his periods of sanity.  The French 
                                                 
123 Ibid., 92-102. 
124 Ibid., 119-120: “Primo quidem, quia ibi non est verus assensus et consensus, ubi non est verus sensus, id 
est vera deliberatio rationis.  Sed, proch dolor, sicut ponit rex Anglie in suis articulis per dictum dominum 
Philippum juramento firmatis, rex Francie tenetur, ut plurimum, et prepeditur adversa valitudine per talem 
modum quod non comode potest in persona sua intendere disponendis regni negotiis, et idcirco petit quod 
ad vitam regis facultas regendi et disponendi rem publicam dicti regni ad predictum regem Anglie 
remaneat.  Ex quo patet quod, si propter illam adversam valitudinem, id est veri judicii, rationis 
(vacationem), rex non potest vacare regimini regni, multo minus potest illud regimen committere hosti suo 
vel adversario, et aufferre filio suo et heredi legitimo.  Non est ergo verissimile quod in premissis rex 
Francie verum assensum dederit seu consensum.” 
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version, after noting that Henry of England had already established a precedent for 
viewing the king as incapable, also asked  
how any person who does not have sense and prudence can legitimately, 
according to law and reason, dispose of any thing, civil or legitimate; and if he 
responds, as is the truth, that this cannot or should not be, how then can, or could, 
the king so infirmed and ill, validly consent and assent to such a great thing, as is 
the whole realm of France, as is the law of the crown and the honor of the fleurs 
de lis...125
 
Legal impediments for the mad were clearly central to these arguments.  As chapter three 
discusses in greater detail, Roman law, canon law, and French customary law did not 
allow mad people to enter into contracts.  Since a peace treaty was a type of contract, and 
certainly the disinheritance of a child required that one be of sound mind, his actions 
could only be judged valid if he had been sane when undertaking them.  The language of 
the Réponse used the image of the fleurs de lis to instill a patriotic tone in the work, 
attempting to draw upon French sentiment for the realm against the incursion of the 
English king.  Indeed, these texts deployed the king’s madness to the same end as, if in a 
different manner than, the chroniclers and preachers discussed above.  By reminding the 
realm of the king’s illness, they sought to repair the damage they believed his madness 
had caused, reconstructing the French realm by refusing to allow the king to disinherit his 
French son in favor of an English king.  Despite these challenges, the Treaty of Troyes 
was settled on May 21, 1420.  However, these arguments against its validity were not 
forgotten, and were recalled when the dauphin, Charles VII, sought to regain control of 
northern France in the 1430s. 
                                                 
125 Ibid., 127-128: “comment persone quelconque qui n’a sens et prudence puet disposer legitimement, 
selon droit et raison, de quelconque chose civile ou legitime; et s’il respond, comme verité est, que ce ne 
puet ou doit estre, comment donc puet, ou a peu, le roy telement enferme et malade consentir et accorder 
valablement de si grant chose, comme est tout le royaume de France, comme est le droit de la couronne et 
l’onneur des fleurs de lis…” 
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Although he was not himself a notary, Jean Juvenal des Ursins was influenced by 
and in turn influenced the authors of these political treatises.  He began his career as a 
lawyer, became bishop of Beauvais in 1432, bishop of Laon in 1444, and archbishop of 
Reims in 1449.  His rise to power followed the return of Charles VII.  He became bishop 
of Beauvais once Charles’ forces took the town, succeeding Pierre Cauchon, who had 
presided at the trial of Joan of Arc.  Sometime around 1435, Jean Juvenal des Ursins 
wrote Audite celi, defending Charles’ claim to the throne by challenging the validity of 
the Treaty of Troyes.  He indicated that the treaty was clearly invalid, saying that it was  
like an illusory thing and neither legal nor sustainable.  Nevertheless, in order to 
remove the error of some simple people, I will make a brief response.  And 
presupposing that someone for some reason had a fault in his understanding, or 
was ill of an apparent illness from which a person had troubled senses, he could 
not enter into contracts nor tie up himself or his successors in any way.  Alas, it 
upsets me that it is necessary that I speak of the illness of the said very benign and 
Christian king Charles, of whom God has the soul, which was such that there was 
no contract that he could validly make; I will pass over this briefly, because the 
illness is noted by all Christianity, and seen by the whole world.126
 
Here, Jean Juvenal des Ursins, like the authors of the Super Omnia and the Réponse, 
drew on legal discourse that argued that mad people could not enter into contracts to 
establish that the king could not enter into a treaty.  In order to confirm that the king’s 
illness was a recognized fact, he cited common knowledge by “all Christianity” and “the 
whole world,” rather than presenting arguments by physicians, priests, or other potential 
authorities.  Indeed, he argued, the treaty actually invalidated itself, because the seventh 
                                                 
126 Jean Juvénal des Ursins, Écrits politiques de Jean Juvénal des Ursins ed. P.S. Lewis and Anne-Marie 
Hayez (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1978), 3 vols., vol. 1, 184: “comme d’une chose illusoire et non allegable ne 
soustenable.  Toutevoie, pour oster l’erreur d’aucunes simples gens, je t’y feray une briefve responce.  Et 
presupose que de raison personne ayant faulte de entendement, ou malade de maladie apparant dont une 
personne a le sens troublé, ne peut contra’cter’ ne soy lier ne ses successeurs en aucune maniere.  Helas, il 
me fait mal que il fault que je dye la maladie dudit tres begnin et crestien roy Charles, dont Dieu ayt 
l’a’me’, qui estoit telle que il n’estoit contract que il peust faire valaiblement; / je m’en passe en brief, car 
la maladie est notoire par toute crestienté, voire par tout le monde.”   
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article granted Henry V of England the powers of a regent due to Charles VI’s illness, 
thereby admitting that the king was incapacitated.127   
The legal question of whether Charles VI, as an acknowledged mad person, could 
rule his kingdom during periods of sanity was never raised during his lifetime.  Given 
that Richard II of England was deposed in 1399, only six years after the onset of Charles 
VI’s madness, why was the option of deposition apparently never seriously considered in 
France?  As Edward Peters has shown, the idea of the “rex inutilis” was available to 
Charles’ subjects as a perfect excuse for removing him from the throne.128  Yet, Charles 
was never removed from power, and in fact, the only evidence I have found for the use of 
the term “rex inutilis” in reference to him comes from the Chronicle of St. Denis in the 
context of an enemy’s insult.  According to Michel Pintoin, when Charles of Orléans’ 
troops were ravaging the countryside contrary to the king’s orders, the inhabitants of 
Vermandois came to Paris to make an official complaint to the king.  They claimed that 
the troops who attacked them said, “Go find your idiotic, useless [inutilis], and captive 
king.”129  This statement would presumably have increased the king’s anger at the Duke 
of Orléans and his troops, but it is unclear whether the sentiments were in fact Charles of 
Orléans’ or merely placed in the mouths of his troops to convince the king to move 
against him.  It is interesting to note, however, that those chroniclers writing about the 
                                                 
127 Ibid., 193.  For the text of the Treaty of Troyes, which does indeed make this argument, see Pierre 
Chaplais, English Medieval Diplomatic Practice, Part I: Documents and Interpretation (London: Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1982), 2 vols., vol. 2, 629-635.  Item seven states: “Item quod, pro eo quod 
dictus precarissimus pater noster tenetur ut plurimum, quod dolenter referimus, et prepeditur adversa 
valitudine per eum modum quod non commode poterit in persona sua intendere seu vacare disponendis 
regni negociis, quod idcirco ad totam vitam dicti precarissimi patris nostri facultas et excercicium regendi 
et disponendi rem publicam predicti regni Francie cum consilio nobilium et prudentum ejusdem regni 
predicto patri nostro obediencium….”   
128 Peters, The shadow king: rex inutilis in medieval law and literature, 751-1327.  
129 M. L. Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI de 1380 à 
1422, Éditions du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques (Paris: L'imprimerie de Crapelet, 1842; 
reprint, 1994), 6 vols., vol. 4, 452: “Ite ad regem vestrum vesanum, inutilem et captivum.” 
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conflict between Orléans and Burgundy did not call the king “inutilis” even when they 
blamed the king’s illness for the civil war.  It was only after Charles VI’s death that these 
challenges arose.   
The notarial interest in politics and history continued after the immediate 
necessity of resolving the Hundred Years War, as well.  Noël de Fribois, with his 
Mirouer Historial composed in 1451 and the Abregé des chroniques written between 
1453 and 1461, and Louis le Blanc, who has been credited with writing Pour vraye 
cognoissance avoir in 1471, continued the tradition, and both made reference to the 
king’s madness.130  In his Abregé des chroniques, Noël de Fribois argued that it was not 
possible for Charles VII to be disinherited because of  
the pitiable indisposition of the person of the said king his father.  Because such 
privations or disinheritances must be done by people of sane understanding, of 
free will, by sane counsel and for just and legitimate causes and reasons, of which 
the law and the doctors speak more plainly.  But it is certain that the said king 
Charles VI was indisposed in healthy understanding, as it is so well known, and in 
free will, since he was detained by his capital enemies and misled by their fury 
and damnable ambition…131
 
Noël de Fribois clearly revealed his legal training in this careful consideration of the 
impediments to Charles VI’s disinheritance of his son.  He did not attempt to deny that 
the king had the right to disinherit his son if he were to do so under the correct, 
controlled, legal constraints, but rather demonstrated that these conditions had not been 
met.  It is important to note that all these arguments refuting the Treaty of Troyes rested 
                                                 
130 For Noël de Fribois, see Noël de Fribois, Abregé des chroniques de France, ed. Kathleen Daly (Paris: 
Champion, 2006).  For Louis le Blanc, Kathleen Daly, “Mixing Business with Leisure: Some French Royal 
Notaries and Secretaries and their Histories of France, c. 1459-1509," in Power, Culture and Religion in 
France, c. 1350-1550, ed. Christopher Allmand (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1989), 99-105. 
131 Noël de Fribois, Abregé des chroniques de France, 214: “la piteable indisposicion de la personne dudit 
roy son pere.  Car telz privacions ou exheredacions doivent estre faictes par personnes de sain entendement, 
de franc arbitre, par sain conseil et pour justes et legitimes causes et raisons, dont les droiz et les docteurs 
parlent plus a plain. Or, il est certain que ledit roy Charles VIme estoit indisposé en sain entendement, 
comme il est assez notoire, et en franc arbitre, car il estoit detenu par ses ennemis cappitaulx et induit par 
leur fureur et ambicion dannables...” 
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on the mental state of Charles VI at the time.  These authors were deploying the king’s 
madness much as the chroniclers had, in order to (re)construct the French realm.  While 
the chroniclers had imagined the realm coming together in support of its mad king, these 
political treatises imagined the king’s madness as a justification for reconfiguring the 
French realm without an English king on the throne. 
The argument on the English side, defending the validity of the Treaty of Troyes, 
also addressed the question of whether or not the king could enter into contracts if it was 
common knowledge that he was mad.  One of these treatises was composed by Jean de 
Rinel, who had an active career as a royal notary in the early fifteenth century.  He was 
the nephew by marriage of Pierre Cauchon, Bishop of Beauvais, who was also chaplain 
of the Duke of Burgundy.  Perhaps by virtue of these powerful connections, Jean de Rinel 
was part of the delegation sent to negotiate the Treaty of Troyes in 1420.  He was 
probably the notary assigned to copy the text, since his name was attached to it, and thus 
had an intimate knowledge of the text itself as well as of the negotiations leading up to 
it.132   
Jean de Rinel wrote a defense of the Treaty of Troyes in 1435, when his position 
as secretary to the English king was in conflict with the Burgundian party’s desire to seek 
a legal and politic way to reconcile with Charles VII.133  Jean de Rinel chose to come 
                                                 
132 In Jean Juvenal des Ursin’s treatise against the treaty, he noted that it was “fait a Troyes ou moys de 
may l’an ‘M’ IIII ‘C’ et vint, signé par le roy en son conseil, Rinel.”  Jean Juvénal des Ursins, Écrits 
politiques de Jean Juvénal des Ursins 184. 
133  He also recorded Joan of Arc’s trial in 1431, where his uncle by marriage acted as judge.  Pierre 
Champion included a brief biographical sketch of Jean de Rinel in his edition of Joan of Arc’s trial, Pierre 
Champion, ed., Procès de condamnation de Jeanne d’Arc. Texte, traduction et notes. (Paris: E. Champion, 
1920-1921), 338.  For more on his relationship to Pierre Cauchon and his participation in the Treaty of 
Troyes, see François Neveux, L’évêque Pierre Cauchon (Paris: Denoël, 1987), 70.  Neveux also includes a 
genealogy for Cauchon, which lists Jean de Rinel’s children and their professions, including one canon and 
a greffier (following in his father’s footsteps).     
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down on the side of the English, and addressed the arguments of his opponents about the 
king’s illness, insisting that  
the said king was not so indisposed with illness that at any time he was not in fine 
and good understanding to comprehend and occupy himself with his counsels and 
work and that he did not very well know how to discern good from bad….  And if 
one wishes to maintain that that which he did and ordained should not be upheld, 
then it is necessary to say and conclude that those who since the commencement 
of his illness have been granted benefices by him are not selected to the said 
benefices, and the great gifts that he has made to many seigneurs and other people 
must be recovered from those who had had them….134
 
Jean de Rinel, unlike his Armagnac opponents, wanted to prove that the king had not 
been mad all the time, but had been able to retain control of the realm.  In this, his 
argument is similar to that of Charles VI’s counselors, who chose to allow him to govern 
when he was well and only handed over power to his uncles, brother, cousin, the queen or 
the dauphin when the king’s illness manifested itself.135  Even if the king had been mad 
continuously during his reign, choosing to retroactively challenge his ability to make 
contracts would, by extension, apply to every decision the king had made.  In the end 
Jean de Rinel’s arguments failed to make an impact on French politics, but, unlike his 
opponents, he recognized the dangerous implications of assuming the king had been mad 
even on occasions when he was allowed to make decisions about the governing of 
France.   
 
                                                 
134 Chaplais, English Medieval Diplomatic Practice, 650-651: “le dit [roy nestoit pas si indispose de 
maladie que en auscum temps neust bel et] bon entendement dentendre et vacquer a ses conseilz et 
besoignez et quil ne seust tres bien discerner le bien du mal….  Et si on vouloit maintenir que ce quil faisoit 
et ordonnoit ne doit tenir, il fault donc dire et conclurre que ceulx qui depuis le commencement de sa 
maladie ont este par luy pourveuz de benefices sont intriuez es diz benefices, et les grans dons quil a faiz a 
pluseurs seigneurs et aultres personnes doivent estre recouvrez sur ceulx qui les ont euz….”   
135 See the king’s ordinances calling for the powers of regency to be given to his wife or his son: Vilevault 
and Bréquigny, eds., Ordonnances des Rois de France de la 3e Race: Dixième volume, Contenant les 
ordonnances de Charles VI, données depuis le commencement de l'année 1411 jusqu'à la fin de l'année 
1418, 234, 424. 
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In his first and most described episode of madness, Charles VI disrupted the 
orderly march of his army and targeted his own men, rather than his enemies.  Bound up 
in fears about treason and the disintegration of the realm, this one event contained within 
it the same struggles that would haunt the rest of his reign.  However, despite the civil 
wars that plagued his reign, Charles was represented as the “roi bien-aimé” (“the well-
loved king”).136  His illness was used as a touchstone in an effort to gather the realm 
together on multiple levels, from the general population (both men and women, as Michel 
Pintoin emphasized in his chronicle) to the University of Paris to the Princes of the 
Blood.  Prayers and processions on the king’s behalf reminded the people of their 
symbolic role as the community of France.  Morality laws drew a direct correlation 
between the blasphemy of the population and the king’s illness.  Charles VI’s ability to 
act as king during his periods of sanity went unchallenged despite his recurrent madness. 
Attacks on his capabilities did not arise until the negotiations for the Treaty of 
Troyes, when notaries and chroniclers challenged his capacity to make treaties in an 
effort to reinstate his son as heir to the French throne.  Much like the king, the majority of 
the mad people described in remission letters were described as suffering from a cyclical 
disease.  During periods of sanity, they, like Charles VI, were allowed to resume their 
ordinary roles.  The question of which decisions were made while sane and which were 
made while mad was essential to both the validity of political acts and the intentionality 
of criminal acts.  The next chapter will consider the legal constraints placed upon mad 
people, and examine the ways in which medieval communities were legally constructed, 
and madness was imagined as a communal concern. 
                                                 
136 Guenée seems to believe that the people actually loved Charles VI for his madness, rather than 
acknowledging that this sentiment was constructed by the chroniclers.  See Guenée, La folie de Charles VI, 
236. 




Chapter 3:  
Madness, Community and the Law 
 
 As chapter two has shown, Charles VI’s madness raised many different concerns.  
Theologians, medical practitioners, and self-professed sorcerers all weighed in on the 
causes and potential treatments for the king’s illness.  In the absence of any definitive 
cure, however, the king’s relatives sought temporary solutions to the immediate problems 
posed by the king’s madness.  The political dispute about the Treaty of Troyes 
concentrated on the belief that madness interfered with a person’s ability to understand 
and interact appropriately with the world.  The king was acknowledged as mad and 
therefore was incapable of comprehending the act he was asked to sign.  However, as 
proponents of the treaty were quick to recognize, if any of the king’s acts were 
questionable then it opened the possibility that all of the king’s acts were questionable.  
Could the mad king ever be trusted to act, even if he was recognized as having periods of 
sanity?  What kinds of safeguards needed to be put in place to ensure that the realm was 
protected from any inappropriate acts taken by a mad king?  These legal questions were 
important for dealing with Charles VI, but they were also the same questions that arose in 
association with mad people at all levels of society, and they all required legal protocols 
to be put into place.  Madness mattered most when it came into conflict with communal 
norms, and these norms were often established and framed through the law. 
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 The legal landscape of late medieval France was a patchwork of competing and 
cooperating judicial systems.  The canon law of the Church was accepted throughout 
France,1 but the jurisdictions of bishops and archbishops often uneasily competed with 
royal justice.2  In general terms, southern France had adopted the system of Roman law,3 
                                                 
1 Medieval canon law crossed national borders and, theoretically at least, applied equally to all levels of 
society throughout Christendom, from the lowliest peasant to kings and emperors.  In practice, of course, 
this was not the case; but, as James Brundage points out, the theory of a universally applicable law was a 
fascinating development even if it was not practicable.  James Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (London: 
Longman, 1995), 3.  Canon law had its foundations in the early Church, with the earliest surviving 
pamphlet of Church law dating from the first or second century A.D.  Over time, the laws proliferated, with 
many decisions apparently contradicting others.  In the early eleventh century, Burchard of Worms 
proposed that the context of each law be considered in order to resolve these conflicts, but it was not until 
Gratian’s Decretum, composed around 1140, that an attempt was made to provide such resolutions.  For a 
brief exploration of the history of medieval canon law, see Brundage, Medieval Canon Law  For more 
detail, see Stephan Kuttner, Kanonistische Schuldlehre von Gratian bis auf die Dekretalen Gregors IX 
(Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1935); Anders Wintoth, The Making of Gratian's Decretum 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  For more on the practice of canon law, see the essays 
collected in James Brundage, The Profession and Practice of Medieval Canon Law (Aldershot, Hampshire: 
Ashgate, 2004).  Gratian’s project was an effort to synthesize the laws, providing “an authoritative 
guide…that would permit judges and administrators to find their way through the tangled underbrush of the 
law with reasonable certainty and at tolerable speed.”  Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, 43.  It presented 
the legal considerations dialectically, highlighting the disagreements between different decisions, but 
choosing one as the better alternative or determining the circumstances in which each decision had merit.  
As a result, Gratian’s compilation became a favorite teaching text, and was thus familiar to students of law 
throughout Europe. 
2 Nicole Gonthier has shown this in her study of Lyon. Nicole Gonthier, Délinquance, justice et société 
dans le Lyonnais médieval: De la fin du XIIIe siècle au début du XVIe siècle (Paris: Éditions Arguments, 
1993).  See especially 19-44.  This could also be true in individual cities, which were occasionally divided 
between the bishop’s law and the local lord’s law.  For a rich archival study of one of these towns, see 
Anne Wroe, A Fool and his Money: Life in a Partitioned Medieval Town (London: Cape, 1995). 
3 Medieval knowledge of Roman law came mostly from the Corpus iuris civilis, which was composed of 
the Institutes, the Digest, the Code, and the Novels, all of which were compiled during the reign of Emperor 
Justinian in the sixth century A.D.  The Institutes, produced in 533 A.D., consists of an elementary guide to 
Roman law, modeled after an earlier (and surviving) version dating from 160 A.D. The Digest was 
compiled between 530 and 533, and essentially gathered together the opinions of classical Roman jurists 
and organized them according to topics. The different jurists did not always agree with each other on each 
topic, but there was no attempt made on the part of the compilers to provide a single, unified response to 
the question under consideration.  Instead, the goal of the Digest was to provide multiple authoritative 
voices addressing the same questions.  Papinian, Ulpian, Modestinus, and the Laws of the Twelve Tables 
are the sources cited in reference to madness.  The Laws of the Twelve Tables is the earliest known source 
for Roman private law, promulgated around 450 B.C., but only surviving in those fragments collected by 
later compilers.  The Twelve Tables consisted of a list of legal rules, and most of what survives was 
concerned with family law, property, succession, and the rules for legal process. Papinian, Ulpian and 
Modestinus, all jurists in the third century A.D., wrote extensive commentaries on questions directed to 
them.  These commentaries, as excerpted in the Digest, have been removed from their original context and 
placed next to each other.  While this facilitates reference, it also makes it difficult to know whether the 
jurist’s opinion is case-specific or intended to have wider ramifications.  The compilers of the Code, which 
was released in 534 A.D., were specifically instructed to provide a synthesis of laws, unlike those who 
assembled the Digest, and to avoid including repetitious, contradictory, or obsolete laws. The final section 
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while northern France acknowledged customary law,4 which was regionally determined 
and could even vary between urban centers and the countryside.  These law codes reveal 
certain patterns to the treatment of the mad, most of which have their origins in Roman 
and canon law, although many of the French customals adapted the Roman and religious 
opinions to fit their own understanding of what madness was and how the mad should be 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the Corpus, the Novels, comprises a collection of new laws that were created during Justinian’s reign, 
but none of them refers to madness.  For more on Roman law, see David Johnston, Roman Law in Context 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2-3, 12-14, 22-23. 
4 The legacy of both Roman law and canon law is evident in the compilations of French customary law 
when it began to be recorded in the thirteenth century.  Customary law was understood as an oral tradition 
that drew on local memory, and as distinct from Roman and Canon law by virtue of the fact that it was not 
codified.  As Esther Cohen argues, the myth of customary law as “old,” “good,” and “pure,” specifically 
because of its orality, led practitioners to avoid writing down the laws until well into the thirteenth century.  
In 1454, towards the end of the period under consideration here, the French king issued an ordinance 
calling for the redaction of all local customs, and when this process was completed by the middle of the 
sixteenth century they had been standardized to some degree, ensuring that they did not conflict with any 
royal ordinances.  See Esther Cohen, The Crossroads of Justice: Law and Culture in Late Medieval France 
(New York: E.J. Brill, 1993), 28-39.  The earlier redactions of customary law, their authors often attest in 
their prologues, were intended to instruct those who were not knowledgeable about the law.  See especially 
the prologue of Jacques d' Ableiges, Le grand coutumier de France, ed. Rodolphe Dareste and Édouard 
Laboulaye (Paris: Auguste Durand, 1868), 4-6.  The customals considered here are just such instruction 
manuals, and although a few of them were originally written in Latin, all of them have vernacular versions.  
Many customary law books did not mention madness at all, leaving the question about how that region 
legally coped with mad people open.  See, for one example, Michel Marechal and Jacques Poumarede, eds., 
La coutume de Saint-Sever (1380-1480): Édition et commentaire des textes gascon et latin (Paris: Éditions 
du C.T.H.S., 1988).  In those customals that do refer to madness, the influence of Roman law can often be 
detected, but they depart from Justinian’s Corpus in significant ways.  The texts under consideration for 
their reference to madness are mostly from the thirteenth century, although there are two later redactions as 
well.  The earliest is the Très-ancien Coutumier de Normandie, which is found in both Latin and French 
manuscripts from the early thirteenth century. Ernest-Joseph Tardif, ed., Le très ancien coutumier de 
Normandie Coustumiers de Normandie: Textes critiques (Paris: A. Picard et Fils, 1903), vol. 1.  In the later 
thirteenth century, another version of the customs of Normandy was redacted, known as the Ancienne 
Coutumes de Normandie.  William Lawrence de Gruchy, ed., L'ancienne coutume de Normandie (Jersey: 
C. LeFeuvre, 1881).  Philippe de Beaumanoir was heavily influenced by Roman law in his redaction of the 
Coutumes de Beauvaisis composed around 1283.  Philippe de Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, ed. 
Amédée Salmon (Paris: A. Picard et Fils, 1970-1974), 3 vols; Philippe de Beaumanoir, The Coutumes de 
Beauvaisis of Philippe de Beaumanoir, ed. F.R.P. Akehurst, trans. F.R.P. Akehurst (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992).  A final thirteenth century legal compilation is Li livre de jostice 
et de plet from the region of Orléans, which is a compilation of Roman, Canon, and some customary laws. 
Louis Nicholas Rapetti, ed., Li Livres de jostice et de plet, publié pour la première fois d’après le 
manuscrit unique de la Bibliothèque nationale, Collection de documents inédits sur l’histoire de France, 1. 
sér. Histoire politique (Paris: Typographie de Firmin Didot frères, 1850).  Jacques d’Ableiges composed 
his Grand coutumier de France, which was a compilation of customary law from the Île de France, at some 
point in the fourteenth century, Ableiges, Grand coutumier .  And finally there is a mid-fifteenth-century 
customal from Anjou and Maine.  J. Beautemps-Beaupré, ed., Coutumes et institutions de l'Anjou et du 
Maine antérieures au XVIe siècle (Paris: Auguste Durand et Pedone-Lauriel, 1883), vol. 4. 
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treated.  Madness appears in several distinct contexts in legal discourse, often as a side 
point to a larger issue rather than as the focal point of a chapter or section.   
 Legally, madness was defined as an absence of reason which limited the mad 
person’s ability to comprehend the world.  As a result, madness presented particular 
challenges to the judicial processes that governed interpersonal interactions.  Could mad 
people be trusted to act as defendants, prosecutors, and witnesses?  Would they 
understand how to maintain their properties and engage in legal contracts?  What about 
the violent or criminal mad?  How could the community protect its members from people 
who did not understand the results of their own acts?  On the other hand, could a person 
be held responsible for acts that he or she did not comprehend?  What was the 
significance of intent, or lack thereof, in a legal context?  Did mad people deserve to be 
punished for acts of violence? 
 Like their modern counterparts, medieval people were simultaneously members of 
a number of different communities at multiple levels that infringed on their lives in 
particular ways at particular moments.5  They were members of a household, a kin group, 
a parish, often a guild or confraternity.  They lived in a neighborhood that was part of a 
village or town or city that in turn was in a region that was part of the realm.  People were 
conscious of only a few of these community memberships on a daily basis.  Occasionally, 
however, and particularly in times of personal or political crisis, these larger communal 
memberships gained significance.  The madness of a family member or of a neighbor 
raised a number of legal issues, some of which could require resolution in court.  
                                                 
5 For more on the ways in which communal memberships constructed identities, see Caroline Walker 
Bynum, “Did the Twelfth Century Discover the Individual?," in Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality 
of the High Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 82-109.  See also Jacques Heers, 
Family Clans in the Middle Ages: A Study of Political and Social Structures in Urban Areas, trans. Barry 
Herbert (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1977), 1-15. 
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Madness, much like other legal statuses, was generally proven through witness testimony, 
bringing the community together in order to establish the state of one of its members.  A 
legal case, whether civil or criminal, brought people into direct interaction with the 
jurisdictions in which they resided.   
 
I.  Protecting the Community from the Mad: Witnesses and Contracts 
 The question of whether mad people could be witnesses was a particularly 
important one, given the significance of witness testimony for medieval legal procedure.  
Communal opinion was central to legal theory and practice.  The wider community’s 
knowledge of an individual’s character, as represented in common reputation and 
renown, was generally referred to in Latin texts as fama and in French as fame and 
renomee.  Recent scholarship has revealed the multiple ways that an individual’s fama or 
reputation could affect the prosecution and outcome of legal cases, both civil and 
criminal.  According to Roman law, one of the ways to incur infama in its legal sense was 
by being convicted of a crime.6  Indeed, bad fama could be a self-fulfilling prophesy, 
with those considered infamous in their community moving further and further into 
criminal activities, as David Chambers and Trevor Dean note in their discussion of 
criminality in fifteenth-century Italy.7  The maintenance of good reputation was essential 
in an economy based on face to face interactions.  In theory, social reputation translated 
into legal reputation, since reputation and renown were proved in court through the use of 
witnesses who would testify to their own knowledge of the person.  Thomas Kuehn 
                                                 
6 Edward Peters, “Wounded names: The medieval doctrine of infamy," in Law in medieval life and thought, 
ed. Edward B. King (Sewanee, TN: University of the South Press, 1990), 43-89.  See also G. R. Evans, 
Law and Theology in the Middle Ages (London: Routledge, 2002), 123-129. 
7 David S. Chambers and Trevor Dean, Clean Hands and Rough Justice: An Investigating Magistrate in 
Renaissance Italy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 23-24. 
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argues, however, that “there was no simple, direct, or automatic connection” between the 
two.8  Rather, public reputation and common knowledge combined with the judges’ 
knowledge of legal theories and discourse to create a legal category that was related to 
but not solely derived from communal consensus.  Kuehn notes that the professional 
jurists and judges often determined what forms of common knowledge and reputation 
could “count” in a legal setting: “On the one hand, courts and jurists treated reputation 
and gossip as nonprofessional and resisted or limited their scope accordingly.  On the 
other, common talk, properly disciplined, was one basis of proof and status.”9  At a time 
when basic “facts” of identity, such as birth dates, marriages, diseases (including 
madness), and deaths, were not necessarily recorded in written documents, witnesses’ 
testimony about common knowledge was used to establish this information when it was 
pertinent to a case.  Philippe de Beamanoir’s book of customary law provides evidence 
that people’s reputations, common knowledge of facts (notoire) and witness testimony to 
confirm these things were central to legal practice.10   
Professional jurists were not the only ones in a position to manipulate these 
categories, however.  Witnesses could also control what they considered important 
“common knowledge” in an effort to affect the outcome of legal cases, as Daniel Smail 
has demonstrated.  Using civil cases in late medieval Marseille, he examines the ways 
that witnesses established the bad fama of the adverse party, and argues that the 
manipulation of reputations may even have been the ultimate goal of the litigant, which 
                                                 
8 Thomas Kuehn, “Fama as a Legal Status in Renaissance Florence," in Fama: The Politics of Talk and 
Reputation in Medieval Europe, ed. Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2003), 27-46, 27. 
9 Ibid., 29. 
10 F.R.P. Akehurst, “Good Name, Reputation, and Notoriety in French Customary Law," in Fama: The 
Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medieval Europe, ed. Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003), 75-94. 
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might explain the parties’ willingness to undertake expensive and lengthy litigations.  
Sometimes the trials were not resolved at all, and even when they were the litigants often 
won less money than they had spent on the case.11  However, the airing of differences in 
a public forum allowed the litigants to affect public knowledge and reputation through 
the legal case.  The relationship between social fama and legal fama was circular, then, as 
each could affect the other.  
Given the importance of witnesses for medieval legal practice, it is not surprising 
that law codes placed restrictions on who would be considered a reliable witness.  
Justinian’s Institutes listed mad people along with a number of others as incapable of 
witnessing wills:  “neither a woman, nor youths below the age of puberty, nor a slave, nor 
a mute, nor a deaf person, nor a mad man, nor anyone forbidden from having property, 
nor one whom the laws declare worthless and incompetent to witness, can be 
witnesses.”12  The list was included as one passage among many concerning the question 
of who could and who could not witness wills, and how written or oral testaments must 
be made.  Here, the Institutes defined how witnessing was intended to work by 
establishing who was excluded from providing it.  There is no full discussion of the 
specific reasoning behind any of these particular restrictions, but it is clear that each type 
of person was considered to be incapable of witnessing wills for distinct reasons.  
Whereas women, youths, slaves, and those forbidden from holding property (note that it 
was not a blanket statement about all non-property owners, but rather those who were 
                                                 
11 Daniel Lord Smail, The Consumption of Justice: Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in Marseille, 
1264-1423 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 150-152. 
12 Okko Behrends, ed., Corpus Iuris Civilis: Text und Übersetzung (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1995), 3 vols., 
vol. 1, vol. 1, 78-80, Inst. 2.10: “sed neque mulier neque impubes neque servus neque mutus neque surdus 
neque furiosus nec cui bonis interdictum est nec is, quem leges iubent improbum intestabilemque esse, 
possunt in numero testium adhiberi.” 
  115 
officially forbidden from holding property) were not considered appropriate witnesses 
because of their subordinate social position, deaf and mute people were not considered 
appropriate because they would be unable to fulfill the necessary functions of witnesses – 
hearing the will and later providing oral testimony to its content.  Mad people also would 
not be considered capable of fulfilling the functions of witnesses, because they were 
believed to be incapable of comprehending the will or their role as witness.  Madness, 
muteness, deafness, blindness, gender and social status were each perceived as limiting a 
person’s capacity to act in accordance with legal tradition in specific ways.  Legal texts 
established varying limitations based on what was considered necessary to perform a 
particular legal action.  Indeed, since these law codes were composed as part of a process 
aimed at establishing the outer limits of legal performance, they sometimes disagreed 
about what was required.   
The idea that mad people lacked the ability to comprehend the world was the 
underlying assumption behind all legal discussions of madness.  According to Papinian’s 
discussion of bonorum possessio recorded in Justinian’s Digest, deaf, mute, or blind 
people were able to make a claim on the inheritance if they understood the transaction.  
Inheritance claims only required comprehension, not the ability to hear, speak, or read.  
Since mad people were considered incapable of understanding, however, it was necessary 
to make arrangements whereby the time limitations were removed, so that if they 
recovered they would then be able to make a claim.13  Unlike other perceived limitations 
on legal capabilities, which curtailed certain actions, mad people were viewed as unable 
to comprehend the law, and thus they could never act within it unless they recovered their 
                                                 
13 Papinian, Ulpian and Modestinus were all jurists in the third century A.D. who wrote extensive 
commentaries on questions directed to them. Theodor Mommsen and Paul Krueger, eds., The Digest of 
Justinian (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 4 vols., vol. 3, 277-278, Book 37.3. 
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sanity.  However, unlike deafness, muteness, or blindness, madness was not considered a 
permanent condition, and thus the mad person might later be capable of making a claim.   
Roman legal tradition influenced French customary law in delineating legal 
limitations according to the requirements of the legal act.  Marriage in particular posed 
problems for legal theorists considering madness.  Since Roman law required parental 
consent, it focused on the issue of mad parents.  Could a child marry if the father (in this 
case, the parent is clearly gendered as male, since maternal consent was not necessary) 
was unable to consent due to his madness?  Justinian’s Code resolved this by determining 
that, although the mad father could not consent to the marriage, neither could that lack of 
parental consent prevent either a son or a daughter from marrying.14  In medieval law, the 
focus shifted to address the question of whether or not a mad person could enter into a 
marriage contract him or herself.  This shift was a small part of a larger transformation of 
the Christian understanding of marriage towards a focus on the two individuals involved 
and their present-tense speech act as the central requirement for the marriage.15  Canon 
law defined marriage as a contract requiring consent, and Gratian’s Decretals therefore 
determined that mad people could not be married.  However, if they had already been 
married before becoming mad, then the marriage was still binding, and could not be 
annulled on that basis.16  The issue raised was whether or not mad people could 
                                                 
14 Behrends, ed., Corpus Iuris Civilis , Book 1.X, 14-15. 
15 Georges Duby, The Knight, the Lady and the Priest: The Making of Modern Marriage in Medieval 
France, trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Random House, 1983). 
16 "Corpus Juris Canonici, Gratian: Text und Images der Edition Friedbergs (1879)." ed Emil Friedberg and 
Aemilius Ludwig Richter. (Place Published: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, 1999-), http://mdz.bib-
bvb.de/digbib/gratian/text/@Generic__BookView;cs=default;ts=default  (accessed June 16, 2006), Part 
Two, Causa XXII, Question VII, C. XXVI.  Indeed, James Brundage’s magisterial work on canon law 
demonstrates a shift in considerations of divorce and madness.  Under Roman law, divorce was possible if 
one party to the marriage went mad, but under medieval canon law annulment was only an option if the 
person had been mad at the time of the marriage.  The reform movements of the sixteenth century, 
particularly under Zwingli and Bucer, allowed divorce in cases of madness, even if it post-dated the 
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understand the world sufficiently to make important life decisions.17  If they were unable 
to comprehend the speech act required to contract a marriage, then they could not 
perform it, but becoming mad later in life was not grounds for annulling a marriage that 
had been contracted while the participant was capable of comprehending the act.   
French customary law addressed the question of madness alongside other 
perceived disabilities that limited a person’s capacity to engage in speech acts reflecting 
comprehension of the legal event.  The thirteenth-century Livre de jostice from the region 
of Orléans, for example, established that muteness and deafness did not prohibit 
marriage, since “if they can consent, they can do it; thus if a mute cannot speak, he can 
just as well make a sign.”18  However, a mad person could not consent and would not be 
able to understand the arrangement, according to the following case,   
[o]ne gives his daughter as wife to a madman (desvé), and he [the madman] 
knows nothing of it; then he cannot have her, because he cannot consent to it: 
because the father requires that the act be annulled.  The pope mandates that, if it 
happens, they be parted. 
Note that a madman (desvé) cannot get married, because he cannot 
consent.19
 
                                                                                                                                                 
marriage.  See James Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1987), 39, 195, 201, 288, and 559. 
17 It is worth noting here that from the thirteenth century marriage was not only a contract but also a 
sacrament.  As chapter two elaborated, in the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas determined that mad 
people could participate in baptism and the eucharist, but not in marriage, ordination, or extreme unction.  
See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. James J. Cunningham (London: Blackfriars, 1964), 60 vols., 
vol. 57, 118-120. 
18 Li livre de jostice et de plet is a compilation of Roman, Canon, and some customary laws.  Rapetti, ed., 
Li Livres de jostice et de plet, 183, 23: “se tés poent consentir, il le poeent; car se li muz ne pot parler, il pot 
bien fere signe.” 
19 Ibid. , 24: “Un dona sa fille à feme à un desvé, et riens n'en savoit; donc il ne la pot avoir, car il ne s'i pot 
consentir : por quoi li père requiert que le fet fust nul.  La pape mende que, si fut issi, qu'il séent départiz. 
   Note que desvé ne se pot marier, car il ne se pot consentir.”  The term “desvé” is not used in any of the 
other customary law books, but it is similar to the term “dervés” used for a madman in the thirteenth-
century play by Adam d’Arras, the Jeu de la Feuillée.  See Guy Mermier, ed., The Play of Madness: A 
Translation of Jeu de la Feuillée by Adam d'Arras (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1997), 32.  To have 
the “sens desver” or “sens derver” was also a relatively common phrase for madness in twelfth- and 
thirteenth-century literature.  See Adolf Tobler and Erhard Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch: 
Adolf Toblers nachgelassene Materialien bearbeitet und mit Unterstützung der Preussischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (Berlin: Weidmann, 1925-), 11 vols., vol. 2, 1813-1816 and vol. 9, 460. 
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Here the Livre de jostice demonstrates its close relationship to Canon law, as the decision 
listed can be found in Gratian’s Decretals.  Each perceived disability was considered on 
its own, rather than being treated in exactly the same way, and clearly the inability to 
understand legal and social functions gave mad people particularly problematic legal 
identities.   
However, the Livre de jostice was unusual in regarding comprehension, indicated 
through a “sign” instead of words, as sufficient for a binding contract.  When considering 
legal contracts (not specifically marriage), Philippe de Beaumanoir stated that agreements 
made by deaf or mute people were invalid,  
because a mute person cannot make an agreement since he cannot speak, and an 
agreement cannot be made without words; nor can a deaf person, since he cannot 
hear the agreement, but here we understand deaf people who never hear anything, 
because a person who hears when you shout can make an agreement.20  
  
Beauvaisis’ customary tradition did not allow for nonverbal communication in the 
creation of a legally binding contract, although it is important to note that he was 
addressing the question of whether or not a person could sue another on the basis of an 
agreement made by a person perceived as incapable of making verbal agreements.  
Although the text clearly placed limits on the legal capacity of deaf and mute people, it 
did so in the context of protecting them from lawsuits.  Philippe de Beaumanoir added to 
the list, noting that, “one cannot sue on an agreement made by…an insane person, nor a 
natural mad person… for ... neither an insane person nor a natural mad person [can make 
                                                 
20 Philippe de Beaumanoir was heavily influenced by Roman law in his redaction of the Coutumes de 
Beauvaisis composed around 1283.  Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, vol. 2, chapter 34, paragraph 
1061: “car li mus ne puet fere convenance pour ce qu'il ne puet parler, car convenance ne se puet fere sans 
parole; ne li sours pour ce qu'il ne puet oïr la convenance, mes ce entendons nous des sours qui n'oient nule 
goute, car cil qui oit par haut parler puet bien fere convenance.”  Translations are my own, with some 
assistance from the full English translation by F.R.P. Akehurst.  Beaumanoir, The Coutumes de Beauvaisis.   
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an agreement], because they do not know what they are doing.”21  Each type of person on 
the list was considered incapable of making an agreement for specific and particular 
reasons.  In the case of mad people, their inability to understand the meaning of their 
actions precluded them from making an agreement.  Distinctions were made between the 
“naturally mad,” or fous natureus, who were mad from birth, and the “insane,” or 
forsenés, who went mad later in life and might recover their sanity.  Philippe de 
Beaumanoir insisted, however, that neither type of mad person could give testimony or 
enter into contracts.22   
In practice, the question of entering into contracts created serious difficulties that 
left their mark in civil courts.23  Indeed, the political treatises composed in response to 
the Treaty of Troyes cited this law in an effort to challenge Charles VI’s ability to 
disinherit his son.  The challenge created the awkward potential of delegitimizing all the 
king’s acts, however.  The legal pitfalls of contracts undertaken by the mad were 
recognized at all levels.  For example, in 1399 a case was brought before the judges at the 
Châtelet in Paris on the part of Jehan Blanchart against Brother Pierre Lendormi, and 
Jehan Maale.24  Jehan Blanchart had made an agreement to rent an apartment in Paris 
from Nicolas Lendormi.  Brother Pierre and Jehan Maale, the case explained, were 
curators, or guardians, of Nicolas Lendormi, because of “a certain accident of illness and 
                                                 
21 Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, vol. 2, chapter 34, paragraph 1061: “L'en ne puet suir de 
convenance… forsené, ne fol naturel… car ... ne li forsenés, ne li fous natureus pour ce qu'il ne sevent qu'il 
font.” 
22 Ibid., vol. 1, chapter 12, paragraph 411 and vol. 2, chapter 34, paragraph 1061. 
23 Combing the archives of civil courts in France would probably yield excellent sources for thinking about 
the legal application of customary laws concerning the mad.  Unfortunately, such a project is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.  Instead, I have taken advantage of the edition of the sentences at the Paris 
Châtelet to provide a few examples of these laws in practice. 
24 Sentences civiles du Châtelet de Paris (1395-1505), ed. Olivier Martin (Paris: L. Tenin, 1914), 31-33. 
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furiosity that came upon the said Nicolas,”25 which meant that Nicolas could not legally 
enter into this contract with Jehan Blanchart.  Blanchart insisted that he had been ignorant 
of Nicolas’ madness, suggesting that Nicolas may have been capable of arranging his 
own affairs despite the paperwork that Brother Pierre and Jehan Maale were able to 
produce establishing their powers as guardians.  In the end, the case at Châtelet simply 
transferred the contract from Nicolas to his guardians, who determined that the contract 
was beneficial to their ward and thus allowed Blanchart to retain his agreement.  The 
court case provides a tantalizingly brief view of this situation.  The extent to which 
Nicolas’ madness had an adverse effect on his ability to arrange his own business affairs 
is brought into question by his guardians’ willingness to uphold the contract he drew up, 
but the court supported their prior right as guardians, evidenced by paperwork.  
Unfortunately, this particular case was not concerned with questioning the madness of 
Nicolas.  However, clearly the need to reestablish the legitimacy of the contract in court 
created an awkward and troublesome situation for both parties.   
Philippe de Beaumanoir insisted that neither an insane person (forsené) nor a 
natural mad person (fol naturel) could give testimony or enter into contracts.26  In 
discussing witnesses in detail, he was most concerned with protecting others from the 
potential misuse of justice due to a mad person’s inability to understand the law.  He 
insisted that mad people’s testimony should be thrown out regardless of whether the 
adverse party complained.  He explained that 
[n]o underage children, nor natural mad people, nor those out of their senses may 
be called to testify; even if it were to happen such that the person against whom 
they were called was so stupid that he did not challenge them, the judge should 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 32: “pour certain accident de maladie et furieuseté intervenue audit Nicolas.” 
26 Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, vol. 1, chapter 12, paragraph 411 and vol. 2, chapter 34, paragraph 
1061. 
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not receive it.  And if they were received because they were not challenged or 
because the auditors did not know about them at the time of the examination, if 
the matter afterwards came to the knowledge of the jurors, what they had said 
should not be part of the decision.27
 
Interestingly, Philippe de Beaumanoir addressed the question here of mad people who are 
not obviously mad, suggesting that it would be possible for a mad person to give 
testimony in front of the auditors without anyone suspecting that he or she was out of his 
or her senses.  Mad people’s potential ability to “pass” as sane made them particularly 
problematic figures in legal terms, and as we shall see the blurred line between madness 
and sanity was a concern that Philippe de Beaumanoir raised more than once in his 
customal. 
 Customary law also restricted a mad person’s access to legal redress.  The Livre 
de jostice listed mad people among several other groups for whom it was not necessary to 
summon the adverse party to court, noting 
[o]ne should not summon someone for a mad person nor for a minor, without a 
guardian, nor for a woman who complains against her husband, if it is not for the 
cruelty of her husband; or if the woman complains of another, no, if it is not with 
the permission of her husband.  One should not for a serf summon his seigneur, if 
it is not for his cruelty.28
 
Women and serfs, then, were capable of acting only against the cruelty of their husbands 
or lords, whereas minors and mad people were not able to summon at all without a 
guardian to perform the function.  It is important to note that gender and social status did 
not have an effect on a person’s ability to bring a case to court.  Instead, it limited the 
                                                 
27Ibid., vol. 2, chapter 39, paragraph 1183: “Nus enfes sous aage, ne fous de nature, ne hors du sens ne 
doivent estre tret en tesmoignage; tout fust il ainsi que cil contre qui il sont tret fust si nices qu'il ne les 
debatesist point, ne les devroit pas li juges recevoir.  Et s'il estoient receu parce qu'il ne seroient pas debatu 
ne que li auditeur n'en savroient mot ou point de l'examinacion, se la chose venoit après a la connoissance 
des jugeurs, ne devroit pas leur dis estre mis en jugement.”   
28 Rapetti, ed., Li Livres de jostice et de plet, 99, XV.2: “L'en ne doit pas semondre por desvé ne por menor, 
sanz tutor, ne por fame de plainte de son mari, se n'est por la cruauté son mari; ou se feme se pleint d'autre, 
non, se l'en n'en a le congié de son mari.  L'en ne doit pas por serf semondre son seignor, se n'est por sa 
cruauté.” 
  122 
type of case that could be brought.  Interestingly, this text did not include provisions for 
either mad people or minors to bring cases against a guardian who had not fulfilled his 
functions appropriately (or who was “cruel”), suggesting that mad people and minors 
lacked the ability to bring a case to court at all.  Similarly, the Livre de jostice explained 
that mad people were not required to respond to complaints themselves, although it added 
that complaints should be taken to the mad person’s guardian (garde) “because it is not 
necessary that his [the mad person’s] rights disappear.”29  The Livre de jostice was 
clearly concerned not only to prevent someone who lacked understanding from trying to 
fulfill legal functions, but also with protecting those who were considered incapable of 
acting legally on their own by providing a guardian.   
These law codes considered madness a lack of reason and an inability to 
comprehend legal actions.  As a result, they limited the kinds of actions that mad people 
could legally perform, in an effort to protect both the adverse parties and the mad people 
themselves from the repercussions of this lack of comprehension.  It is important to 
recognize, however, that these laws may have been less successful in application.  Given 
the commonly accepted concept that madness was a cyclical disease, with periods of 
sanity interspersed with periods of madness, as in Charles VI’s case, people commonly 
considered mad may very well have been capable of entering into contracts.  The 
question of their legal ability to do so may only have arisen in problematic cases, when 
objections were voiced, as in the case of Nicolas Lendormi, whose guardians had to 
explain that he was not allowed to enter into a contract.  Guardianship was a way to 
protect the community, but also to protect the mad. 
 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 131, XI.1: “car il n'est pas mestiers que ses drois périsse.” 
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II. Protecting the Mad from Themselves: Guardians 
The most common method of protecting a mad person’s goods was through the 
assignation of a guardian.  The practice of guardianship was predicated on the assumption 
that mad people, who could not understand the world, would have no control over their 
belongings.  In Roman law, this assumption led to an association of madness with 
prodigality.  Justinian’s Institutes noted that both mad people and prodigals needed 
curators, even after they reached twenty-five, the age of majority under Roman law.  
Although the Laws of the Twelve Tables had recommended placing them in the care of 
close relatives, the Institutes noted that generally, the guardian was chosen by an officer 
of the government.30  Justinian’s Digest included a number of discussions of the practice 
of putting the mad into the care of a guardian, and it was here that the connection 
between prodigality and madness was most explicitly stated.31  The third-century jurist 
Ulpian noted that prodigals should be given guardians “on the analogy of a mad 
person,”32 which created a correlation between the mad person’s inability to care for his 
or her property and the prodigal’s choice to squander his or her goods.  Both were to be 
released from guardianship automatically, the mad person when “he regains his health of 
mind” and the prodigal when “he returns to his rational behavior.”33  The connection 
                                                 
30 The Laws of the Twelve Tables is the earliest known source for Roman private law, promulgated in 
around 450 B.C., but only surviving in those fragments collected by later compilers.  The Twelve Tables 
consisted of a list of legal rules, and most of what survives was concerned with family law, property, 
succession, and the rules for legal process.  Behrends, ed., Corpus Iuris Civilis, vol. 1, 36-37, Inst. 1.23. 
31 Mommsen and Krueger, eds., The Digest of Justinian, vol. 2, 812-814, Book 27.10.  See also the 
discussion of this legal association between madness and prodigality in Jean-Marie Fritz, Le discours du 
fou au Moyen Age: XIIe-XIIIe siècles (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), 154-160.  He also 
addresses the same in literature, 276-277.  
32 Mommsen and Krueger, eds., The Digest of Justinian, vol. 2, 812-814, Book 27.10: “curatorem ei dare 
exemplo furiosi.”  Mommsen and Krueger translate this as “lunatic,” which I find a problematic translation 
for “furiosus.” 
33 I have replaced Mommsen and Krueger’s translation, “he comes to his senses” with my own here, 
because the concept of “coming to one’s senses” is too closely associated with madness in medieval 
French.  Ibid., vol. 2, 812-814, Book 27.10: “uel furiosus sanitatem uel ille sanos mores receperit.” 
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between prodigality and madness is clearly stated, since mad people also needed to return 
to rational behavior (or come to their senses) in order to prove that they had returned to 
health.  Ulpian’s statement suggests that the distinction between madness and prodigality 
was not in behavior but in cause: madness was viewed as a disease whereas prodigality 
was a deliberate action. 
Whereas the Roman practice gave guardians to all mad people, the customals 
usually assigned guardians only to those insane from birth.  Philippe de Beaumanoir used 
clear language to distinguish between these two different types of mad people, and it was 
only the fous de nature, those mad from birth, who were to be assigned guardians.  The 
Livre de jostice established similar rules for protecting the rights and privileges of the 
mad by placing them in the care of a guardian.  The customals assigned wardship to the 
relatives of the mad in order to deal with the complicated question of inheritance.  
Interestingly, Philippe de Beaumanoir made a distinction between the treatment of mad 
people who could marry and those who could not.  He explained that  
[t]hose who are natural mad people, so mad that they have no discretion through 
which they can understand how to maintain themselves, should not hold property 
if they have brothers or sisters, even though they are the oldest.  Therefore if the 
oldest is naturally mad, the right of firstborn should pass to the oldest after him, 
because it would be a bad thing to leave any important thing in the hands of such 
a man; but always he should be honestly supported out of what would have been 
his if he had been a person who could hold land.  But we understand this to apply 
to those who are so insane that they would not know how to maintain themselves 
if they were married or not; for if a person knew enough, and not any more, to be 
married so that he could have heirs, he and his property should be under 
guardianship until the time of his heirs.34
                                                 
34 Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, vol. 2, chapter 56, paragraph 1624: “Cil qui sont fol de nature, si 
fol qu'il n'ont en eus nule discrecion par quoi il se puissent ne ne sachent maintenir, ne doivent pas tenir 
terre puis qu'il aient freres ne sereurs, tout soit ce qu'il fussent ainsné.  Donques se li ainsnés est fous 
natureus, l'ainsneece doit venir a l'ainsné après lui, car male chose seroit que l'en lessast grant chose en la 
main de tel homme; mes toutes voies il doit estre gardés honestement de ce qui fust sien s'il fust hons qui 
deust terre tenir.  Mes ce entendons nous de ceus qui par sont si fol qu'il ne se savroient maintenir ne en 
mariage ne hors mariage; car s'il se connoissoit en riens en tant sans plus qu'il seust estre en mariage par 
quoi de lui peussent venir oir, il et li siens devroit estre gardés dusques au tans de ses oirs.” 
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Legally, this would effectively remove a mad person who was unable to marry from the 
succession, replacing him or her with a brother or even a sister, instead of following the 
rules of inheritance.  It is significant, however, that Philippe de Beaumanoir recognized 
levels of madness in this case, arguing that mad people should only be entirely removed 
from the succession if they were unable to get married and beget their own heir.  In cases 
where the individual was capable of marriage and procreation, a guardian would be 
assigned to care for the property until the heir came of age.  Much like in Philippe de 
Beaumanoir’s region of Beauvaisis, the Orleannais Livre de jostice was most concerned 
with the heirs of the mad, fearing that mad parents would harm the inheritance of their 
progeny.  The Livre de jostice described multiple possible situations for the heir of a mad 
person, depending on whether the father alone was mad, or both the father and mother 
were mad, in an effort to maintain the inheritance until the heir came of age.35  Thus, 
guardianship was put into place to prevent the mad person from squandering his or her 
property like a prodigal, without concern for the next generation.   
The Coutumes de Beauvaisis expected that even a disinherited mad person would 
be supported “honestement,” and made provisions for cases where abuse happened, 
insisting that the lord should take over the wardship if the guardian was guilty of 
mismanagement.  Significantly, Philippe de Beaumanoir noted that the lord could take 
over guardianship even if no one had brought a suit against the guardian in question, 
                                                 
35 Rapetti, ed., Li Livres de jostice et de plet, 58-59, IX.5: “Se li pères est forsenez et la mère est sage, por 
ce ne remaint pas que li enfes ne soit ou poer son père et sa mère : quar cum droit de poïr est establiz par 
bones mors, il ne puet faillir que aucuns enfens ne soit ou poer son père, si n'an vint en quas qui issent; et 
s'il n'en isent, il i remainent.  Et se li pères et la mère son desvé, li enfant sont en son poer, ensint que li 
enfant; et li desvez et la desvée seront an la mère (main? [sic]) au curator, por le conseau dou juge.  Quar le 
père et la mère devet avoir preu en son enfant, par le droit de la norreture que il ot fet an aus et por ce que li 
enfes lor doit fere solaz.  Et n'est mie reson que en tel quas, nul perde son droit qu'il avoit devant, quar plus 
li a mestier qu'il ne solet.” 
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thereby recognizing the need to protect people without a legal voice from 
mismanagement.36  However, in the French system, the ideal way of caring for the mad 
was to keep them under the control of their families or neighbors, rather than under the 
control of a randomly assigned guardian.  Disinheritance or guardianship and “honest” 
care were considered appropriate for mad people who had been clearly mad from birth 
and never experienced periods of sanity.  In cases where the onset of madness came later 
in life or where the disease was cyclical, however, it was not considered necessary to 
place the mad person under the care of an officially recognized guardian.     
The question of how a need for guardianship was established and who was placed 
in such a role would require considerable examination of the civil law court records 
throughout France.  However, the sentences of the Paris Châtelet provide some hints 
about the process.  On September 10, 1454, the Châtelet entered the case of Raulin 
Damourectes, a merchant living in the rue de la Huchecte in Paris.  Raulin “had become 
insensible and so much debilitated in his memory and understanding that he could no 
longer manage, regulate, nor administer his person, goods, and needs.”37  Because Raulin 
had no relatives “in this country”38 and the king was therefore his heir, the court, having 
“ascertained the insensibility of the said Raulin and that his goods and utensils etc … are 
dissipated and sold day by day,” granted guardianship of Raulin and his goods to Master 
Jehan du Four, described in the text as an examinateur, a functionary of the court.39  
                                                 
36 Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, vol. 2, chapter 51, paragraph 1550. 
37 Sentences civiles du Châtelet, 34: “est devenu insensé et tellement debilité de son memoire et 
entendement qu'il ne pourroit doresnavant conduire, regir ne administrer sa personne, biens et besongnes.” 
38 Ibid. “en cest païs.” 
39 Ibid. “avons esté ascertenez de l'insensibilité dudit Raulin et que ses biens et utenciles etc...dissipeur et 
vendeur de jour en jour.” 
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However, the king’s (and therefore the court’s) direct interest in the preservation of the 
goods of a mad person was unusual.   
Another case, from May 17, 1396, involved the dissolution of the guardianship of 
Jehan Herson, a skinner.  Jehan Herson brought a case before the Châtelet to establish 
that he was now “in good health, sense and convalescence to govern well himself and his 
goods, except that he should refrain from drinking too much.”40  In order to prove his 
recovery, he called Jehan de Gouvieux, Jehan Cliquet, Jehan Meignen, Jehan le Maire, 
Robin de Gouvieux and Jehannin de Gouvieux the younger, all of whom were skinners 
and neighbors of his, and one of whom, Jehan de Gouvieux the elder, had been the court-
appointed guardian of Jehan Herson during his illness.  In this case, the court was merely 
involved in appointing a guardian and revoking the guardianship once it was no longer 
necessary.  Not only were Jehan Herson’s neighbors involved in establishing his sanity, 
but one of their members had undertaken the responsibility of protecting his goods during 
his illness.  Clearly this was a particularly fortunate outcome to a guardianship case: 
everyone, including the guardian himself (and two men who appear from their names to 
be his close relatives), agreed that Jehan Herson had recovered his sanity and his ability 
to manage his goods.  It is possible to imagine other endings that would not be so 
amicable, since the mad person’s ability to bring the case to court rested on the 
cooperation of the guardian, or on being able to prove that the guardian had mismanaged 
the mad person’s affairs. 
 Roman law did not entirely disempower the mad.  Although mad people had to 
have guardians and could not either consent or withhold consent from their child’s 
                                                 
40 Ibid. “en bonne sancté, sens et convalescence pour soy et ses biens gouverner, mais qu'il se gardast de 
trop boire.” 
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marriage, in every other situation, they legally retained their rights of patria potestas over 
their children.41  Justinian’s Digest quoted Ulpian’s relatively lengthy discussion of the 
question, which was built logically step by step, establishing that mad fathers held their 
children in their power even if both parents were out of their senses at the moment of 
conception “as if the last traces of free will remained alive in them when insane.  For 
since the marriage stands when one or the other is mad, it stands when both are.”42  This 
recognition of mad people’s power over their children was significant.  Ulpian explained 
that “[t]he father who is mad does indeed so fully retain his legal power that there still 
accrues to him the beneficial interest in whatever his son has acquired.”43
 While medieval legal practice did not grant that kind of control to mad parents, 
the customals did allow the mad to retain certain rights.  The Livre de jostice, like the 
Coutumes de Beauvaisis, distinguished between those who were mad from birth (here 
using the term desvé) and those who went mad (forcené).  Although the forcené did not 
appear in the context of marriage contracts, they were discussed as married people in 
questions of inheritance and wardship, indicating that madness as an illness, unlike 
madness from birth, was not considered grounds for annulment.  Although mad people 
did not have a legal status, the Livre de jostice noted, “if someone is mad (forsenez), he 
does not lose his dignity [social status] because of it.”44  This is a particularly interesting 
point, since most of the references to mad people in medieval law involved the loss of 
                                                 
41 For more on the patria potestas, see Antti Arjava, “Paternal Power in Late Antiquity," Journal of Roman 
Studies 88 (1998): 147-165; Jane F. Gardner, Family and Familia in Roman Law and Life (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998). 
42 Mommsen and Krueger, eds., The Digest of Justinian, vol. 1, 19, Book 1.6: “quasi uoluntatis reliquiis in 
furiosis manentibus: nam cum consistat matrimonium altero furente, consistet et utroque.” 
43 Ibid., vol. 1, 19, Book 1.6: “Adeo autem retinet ius potestatis pater furiosus, ut et adquiratur illi 
commodum eius, quod filius adquisiuit.” 
44 Rapetti, ed., Li Livres de jostice et de plet, 56, VIII.5: “Se aucuns est forsenez, il ne pert pas por ce sa 
dignité.” 
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legal status, through an inability to witness or enter into contracts and a need for a 
guardian.  The Livre de jostice took pains to note that a loss of legal status did not 
necessarily include a loss of social status.  Thus, as the case of Charles VI demonstrated, 
a mad king was nevertheless still a king. 
Philippe de Beaumanoir distinguished between those who were mad from birth 
(fols naturels) and those who went mad from some illness or impairment (forsené), 
providing each type of madness with a different legal status.  The “natural” mad could 
not make a contract at all, whereas the “ill” mad could make contracts during periods of 
sanity, and therefore needed attorneys and administrators to act for them during periods 
of madness.  The Coutumes de Beauvaisis added a caveat to the list of those who cannot 
make agreements, noting 
[b]ut it is seen that all those who cannot make an agreement for physical 
impairment or illness can be sued if they made an agreement before their malady 
comes to them.  And during their impairment they must have attorneys and 
administrators for their needs who can make agreements for them and answer on 
agreements that they made before their sickness came to them.45
 
Philippe de Beaumanoir considered madness an “impairment” from which a person could 
recover, and created mechanisms whereby the mad person’s interests could be protected 
despite his or her inability to comprehend or perform legal acts.   
Mad people were not considered capable of functioning in the legal landscape 
because they could not understand their rights, responsibilities, or culpabilities.  
However, they still retained their status, particularly if they were not mad from birth but 
had become mad due to some illness or accident.  As a result, the legal discussion of 
                                                 
45 Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, vol. 2, chapter 34, paragraph 1061: “Mes voirs est que de tous 
ceus qui ne pueent fere convenance pour mehaing ou pour maladie, s'il firent convenances avant que li 
maus leur venist, il en pueent estre sui.  Et ou tans du mehaing doivent il avoir procureeurs et aministreeurs 
de leur besoignes qui puissent fere convenances pour aus et qui puissent respondre des convenances qu'il 
firent avant que la maladie leur venist.” 
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madness and its meanings occupied a space between disenfranchisement and the 
protection of the individual’s legal rights.  This effort to protect mad people from 
themselves was echoed in legal requirements intended to protect the larger community 
from the actions of individuals whose lack of comprehension could threaten communal 
welfare.  Because mad people could not be held responsible for legal acts, they also could 
not be held responsible for illegal ones. 
 
III. Punishing Mad Criminals 
Guardianship was not only necessary to protect the mad from themselves, but also 
to protect the larger community from the mad, in physical as well as contractual terms.  
The general fear was that mad people’s lack of understanding could cause them to harm 
others.  In considering the problem of mad criminals and how they should be treated, 
legal theorists were concerned with protecting a person who lacked the capability to 
comprehend what, to his or her contemporaries, were basic truths about how one should 
live in the world.  The texts reveal inconsistencies and uncertainties with regard to 
exactly why mad people should be treated with leniency, and exactly how to define 
madness.  The concept that mad people should not be punished for crime was already 
present in Roman law.  Modestinus, recorded in Justinian’s Digest, indicated that “An 
infant or a madman who kills a man is not liable under the lex Cornelia, the one being 
protected by the innocence of his intent, the other excused by the misfortune of his 
condition.”46  The issue came up again in the context of parricide, which was considered 
a particularly serious crime and therefore worthy of an especially terrible punishment.  
                                                 
46 Mommsen and Krueger, eds., The Digest of Justinian, vol. 4, 821, Book 48.8: “Infans uel furiosus si 
hominem occiderint, lege Cornelia non tenentur, cum alterum innocentia consilii tuetur, alterum fati 
infelicitas excusat.” 
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However, the punishment was not appropriate for the mad: “Truly, if anyone kills a 
parent in a fit of madness, he shall not be punished, as the deified brothers wrote in a 
rescript in the case of a man who had killed his mother in a fit of madness; for it was 
enough for him to be punished by the madness itself.”47  This distinction in Roman law 
between the infant, who is innocent of intent, and the mad person, who is “punished by 
the madness itself” is a significant one, and it is interpolated into medieval customals in 
interesting ways.48   
It was commonly recognized in medieval legal texts that mad people should not 
be punished for committing crimes in the same way as the sane.49  For example, canon 
law considered mad people to be exempt from responsibility for their crimes, so long as 
“the mind is so alienated that the man does not know what he is doing.”50  This statement 
made a clear connection between lack of intent on the part of the mad person, who “does 
not know what he is doing,” and exemption from responsibility.  Similarly, Jacques 
d’Ableiges’ Grand Coutumier de France listed “when any crime is done by any mad or 
drunken person” among a number of other reasons for altering the proscribed sentence, 
                                                 
47 Ibid., vol. 4, 822, Book 48.9: “Sane si per furorem aliquis parentem occiderit, inpunitus erit, ut diui 
fratres rescripserunt super eo, qui per furorem matrem necauerat: nam sufficere furore ipso eum puniri.” 
48 Erik Midelfort observes that “the Digest held that [a mad person] was still punishable, although not by 
the state....  One reason for this peculiarity is perhaps that the ancient Romans did not entirely believe that 
furor, or madness, was merely a state of mental infancy or a purely physical condition.”  Indeed, these laws 
seem to reflect an ambiguity about how madness was defined legally.  H.C. Erik Midelfort, A History of 
Madness in Sixteenth-Century Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 187.  For more on the 
philosophical development of the theory of intentionality, see the essays collected in Dominik Perler, ed., 
Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality (Leiden: Brill, 2001). 
49 Despite Guido Ruggiero’s assertion that Venice in the early Renaissance was unusual in refusing to hold 
mad people responsible for crimes because it was ruled by bankers and merchants who were more practical 
(Guido Ruggiero, “Excusable Murder: Insanity and Reason in Early Renaissance Venice," Journal of 
Social History 16, no. 1 (1982): 109-119), this practice originates in Roman law and was commonly 
recognized everywhere in the Middle Ages.  For England, see Thomas A. Green, “Societal Concepts of 
Criminal Liability for Homicide in Mediaeval England," Speculum 47, no. 4 (1972): 669-694.  For 
Germany, see Midelfort, A History of Madness in Sixteenth-Century Germany, 187-196.  For France, see 
Fritz, Le discours du fou, 153-164.   
50 Kuttner, Kanonistische Schuldlehre von Gratian bis auf die Dekretalen Gregors IX, 107, n. 102.  The 
quotation is from Huguccio.  See also the discussion of canon law and madness in Midelfort, A History of 
Madness in Sixteenth-Century Germany, 190-191. 
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indicating that intent was the significant factor, since drunken people are clearly not 
punished by their drunkenness.51  Closely following Roman law, however, some of the 
customals provided two very different justifications for treating mad criminals 
leniently.52  On the one hand, mad people are punished through their illness, suggesting 
that, although they deserve to be punished for their deeds, that punishment has already 
been effected by a higher power than the local courts.  On the other hand, madness is 
envisaged as a disease that takes away people’s cognitive abilities, thus rendering them 
incapable of understanding that their actions might be wrong, a theory that follows 
logically from the limitations placed on mad people’s participation in other legal actions.  
The Livre de jostice combined these two theories, explaining that, when faced with a mad 
person who had committed a crime, 
if you know certainly that he did it in madness (forsenerie), that he does not know 
what he does every day, and that he understands nothing, nor is there any 
suspicion against him, you can in a way alleviate his sentence, because he is 
tormented enough by his madness (desverie).53   
 
A lack of understanding and knowledge of “what he does every day” suggests a lack of 
intent and therefore of responsibility, but the jurist recommends that the sentence should 
be alleviated, not because of the mad person’s lack of intent, but because his madness is 
sufficient torment.  While this may be merely a rhetorical aside without much impact on 
the legal treatment of mad criminals, it reveals an interesting tension between the 
                                                 
51 Jacques d’Ableiges, Grand coutumier, 649, IV.xii “Des peines”: “quant aucun excès est faict par aucune 
personne folle ou yvre.” 
52 For more on the Insanity Defense according to Roman Law, see Nigel Walker, “The Insanity Defense 
before 1800," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 477 (1985): 25-30. 
53 Rapetti, ed., Li Livres de jostice et de plet, 73, XXI.5: “Et se tu sés certainement que il l'ait fet en 
forsenerie, qu'il ne sache qu'il face toz jorz, et qu'il n'entende riens, n'en i ait point de sopeçon contre lui, tu 
porras en une feintise estramper sa paine, quar il est assez tormentez de sa desverie.” 
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acceptance that mad people should not be held responsible for their crimes and the belief 
that criminal acts deserve punishment regardless of intent.54   
The Ancienne coutume de Normandie made provisions for mad people under the 
heading of “On Suicides.”  Suicides were punished severely under French law.  Their 
goods were confiscate to the crown, their bodies were often “executed,” and they would 
be buried in unconsecrated ground, having forfeited their right to inclusion in the 
community of the faithful.55  However, the Norman customal recommended that 
any mad (forsené), enraged (enragié), or frenetic (frénétique) person is not to be 
driven out of the community of the church, in such a case where at the time when 
he was well ordered in his thoughts, he carried himself as a good Christian; nor 
are the goods of these forfeited [to the king], if by any mischance they have been 
killed; but it belongs to the prelate to organize the goods of these, because they 
[the mad] do not have the understanding to organize them [their goods].56
 
The idea that the suicide of a mad person was accidental (by “mischance”) removes any 
culpability.  Punishment would be inappropriate if the individual in question had been “a 
good Christian” while sane.  This judgment parallels that of Thomas Aquinas, who 
determined that mad people were still able to receive baptism and the Eucharist if, when 
                                                 
54 This may in fact be related to the medieval practice of punishing animals for crimes, despite their lack of 
comprehension.  As Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau points out, “la sanction infligée par le group social à la 
suite d'un acte qui trouble la communauté n'est pas automatiquement liée à la notion de responsabilité au 
sens juridique du terme, c'est-à-dire aux notions de faute, de volonté, de liberté.  Pour répondre à un crime, 
le groupe peut exercer une vengeance sur le coupable, écarter un danger qui le menace en éliminant l'auteur 
ou se purifier de la souillure résultant de l'acte sans pour autant envisager la notion de responsabilité; c'est-
à-dire envisager la répression par rapport à la victime ou au groupe auquel elle appartient et non pas au 
égard au coupable.” Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau, “L'animal devant son juge: Coupable ou victime?," in La 
culpabilité: Actes des XXèmes Journées d'histoire du droit, Limoges, ed. Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau and 
Pascal Texier (Limoges: Presses universitaires de Limoges, 2001), 187-201, 192.  See also Cohen, 
Crossroads of Justice, 101-133. 
55 Cohen, Crossroads of Justice, 141-142. 
56 Gruchy, ed., L'ancienne coutume de Normandie, 56-57, XXI: “Et aulcun forsené, enragié, ou frénétique 
n'est à oster de la communie de l'Eglise, pour tant au temps qu'il estoit bien ordonné de sa pensée, il se 
portast bon Crestien; ne de ceulx n'est pas le chastel forfaict [au Roy], se par aucune malefortune ils ont 
esté occis; mais appartient au prélat à ordonner d'iceulx chastels, puisqu'ils n'ont sentement pour en 
ordonner.” 
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sane, they were believers.57  Reputation, not only as a mad person but also as a Christian, 
played a significant role in determining the treatment of the accused.  Interestingly, the 
Norman customal recommended that the mad person’s goods be organized by the church, 
since clearly a mad person would not have been capable of making a will.  This opens up 
interesting possibilities for clashes between the officers of the crown and local prelates in 
suicide cases, since the crown would benefit from those found sane and the Church 
would benefit from those found mad, although it is not possible here to do more than 
speculate. 
Legal theorists considered it necessary to take measures to prevent mad people 
from committing a crime, or from committing further crimes after a first offense.  They 
wrote this into their legal system by requiring the use of guards and restraints, which 
were sometimes presented as an alternative to capital punishment.  The Roman jurist 
Modestinus argued that a mad person who had committed murder “must be guarded the 
more carefully, or even confined with chains.”58  In Roman law, guard or confinement 
was not considered an aspect of punishment, but a preventative measure to protect others 
from the actions of the mad.  Philippe de Beaumanoir also suggested imprisonment of the 
mad in order to prevent them from committing another crime.  He insisted that if “they 
commit, because of their mad senses, a homicide or any other serious crime, they are not 
punished like others because they do not know what they are doing.”59  Instead of being 
punished “like others,” for example by being executed for committing a capital crime like 
                                                 
57 See the detailed discussion in chapter two.  Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 118-120. 
58 Mommsen and Krueger, eds., The Digest of Justinian, vol. 4, 822, Book 48.9: “diligentiusque 
custodiendum esse aut etiam uinculis coercendum.” 
59 Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, vol. 2, chapter 52, paragraph 1575: “il font par leur fol sens aucun 
homicide ou aucun autre vilain cas, il ne sont pas justicié en la maniere des autres pour ce qu'il ne sevent 
qu'il font.” 
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homicide, Beauvaisis’ customary law called for the imprisonment of the mad person after 
a crime was committed, until he or she recovered from the madness, at which point the 
mad person could be released.  A slightly different attitude is expressed in a mid-
fifteenth-century customal from Anjou and Maine, which explained that “a mad person 
who kills or mutilates a man or a woman should be kept in prison perpetually at his or her 
own expense.  But for theft (possibly rape?) or another small crime, his or her madness 
excuses it.”60  Thus, although madness could be seen as an excuse for a “small crime,” it 
did not excuse murder or mutilation.  Even though the customal provided an alternative 
(and lighter) sentence for mad people, it emphasized that some form of punishment was 
necessary for permanently damaging another person.    
The customal from Anjou and Maine insisted that the perpetual imprisonment of a 
mad person should be paid for by the mad person.61  Other customals indicated who was 
responsible not only for the upkeep of the imprisoned person, but also for the act of 
guarding and restraining him or her.  The Livre de jostice insisted that the mad “can be 
well put in constraints and guarded; and the guard and the punishment of him belongs to 
his family.”62  Philippe de Beaumanoir even recommended that guardians take preventive 
action in the case of a person who “went mad,” rather than waiting until a crime had been 
committed.  He explained that 
[t]hose who are insane should be bound by those who must guard them and 
everyone must help do this to avoid the damages that might come from them, for 
                                                 
60 Beautemps-Beaupré, ed., Coutumes et institutions de l'Anjou et du Maine antérieures au XVIe siècle, 
268: “Le fol qui occist ou mutille homme ou femme doit à ses despens estre tenu en chartre perpetuelle.  
Mais pour embler ou faire autre petit excès, sa folie l'en excuse.”  Embler refers to a kind of violent seizure, 
whether of property or person is unclear.  See Tobler and Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch, vol. 
3, pt. 1, 49-52. 
61 Beautemps-Beaupré, ed., Coutumes et institutions de l'Anjou et du Maine antérieures au XVIe siècle, 
268. 
62 Rapetti, ed., Li Livres de jostice et de plet, 73, XXI.5: “Et se tu vois que bien soit, bien le puet fere lier et 
garder; et la garde et la poine de lui apartient à ses amis.” 
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they could quickly kill themselves and others.... [T]he insane people must be 
placed in such a prison that they can never leave it, and be maintained from their 
own property as long as they are out of their senses.  And if he returns to his 
senses, he should be released from prison, and his goods returned to him.63
 
The focus here is clearly on the need to protect both the mad person and the community 
at large.  Beaumanoir expressed a fear that mad people might commit suicide or murder, 
and that keeping such people bound or locked up would protect them and their 
community from their actions.  In his view, all those who were insane (forsenés) 
contained within them the potential for such disruptive action.  Interestingly, although 
Beaumanoir recommended that mad people be maintained from their own property, he 
also noted that “everyone” must help to guard them, suggesting the need for a communal 
effort.   
The community’s shared responsibility for the surveillance of the mad is a 
concept that appears more explicitly in the Ancienne Coutume de Normandie, which 
explained what to do with mad people who seemed likely to commit crimes, noting that 
[i]f anyone is in such a way mad (forsené), that it is feared that he from his 
madness (forcenerie) might trouble the country, either by fire or by another thing 
that is contrary to the common health, he must be tied, and guarded by those who 
have his things, so that he does not wrong anyone; and if he has nothing, all the 
neighbors must give counsel and aid to his [family], to moderate his madness 
(forcenerie).64
 
The Norman customal was concerned about people who were mad “in such a way” that 
they were considered likely criminals, a slightly different construction from the 
                                                 
63 Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, vol. 2, chapter 52, paragraph 1575: “Cil qui sont forsené doivent 
estre lié par ceus qui les doivent garder et chascuns doit aidier a ce fere pour eschiver les damages qui par 
aus pueent venir, car tost ociroient aus et autrui .... li forsenés doit estre mis en tele prison qu'il n'en isse 
jamès, et soit soutenus du sien tant comme il sera hors du sens.  Et s'il revient bien en son sens, il doit estre 
delivrés de prison, et li siens rendus.” 
64 Gruchy, ed., L'ancienne coutume de Normandie, 184, LXXIX: “De Forcenés ....  Se aulcun est en telle 
manière forsené, que l'en le doye doubter que de sa forcenerie il ne trouble le pays, ou par feu ou par 
aulcune chose qui soit contraire au commun salut, il doibt estre lié, et gardé par ceulx qui ont ses choses, 
qu'il ne mesface à nulluy; et s'il n'a rien, tout le voesiné doibt mettre conseil et aide du sien, à refréner sa 
forcenerie.” 
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Beauvaisis customal, which saw all mad people as potential criminals, but both focused 
on the need for community involvement.  Whereas Philippe de Beaumanoir saw guarding 
the mad as everyone’s responsibility, according to Norman custom, this was only the case 
if the mad person did not have a guardian to take care of his or her property.  
Nevertheless, mad people were clearly considered communal burdens, since they were 
threatening to the “common health.”  In addition to concerns that mad people might kill 
themselves or others, the Norman customal adds the fear that mad people might commit 
arson.  Fire was clearly a major concern in communities made of flammable materials, 
since a blaze begun in one house could quickly spread to the entire neighborhood.  Thus, 
the entire neighborhood was responsible for surveillance of the mad, to prevent potential 
disasters, not only on an individual level, but also for the community at large. 
Norman custom also suggested that the community was responsible for the 
upkeep of a mad person, noting that “[i]f anyone is out of his senses, and he kills or 
injures a man by his madness (forsenerie), he should be put in prison, and be sustained by 
his [goods]; or it should be procured for him from the common alms, if he does not have 
anything with which he can be sustained.”65  In Normandy, then, the community was 
expected to pay for the care of imprisoned mad criminals through their almsgiving, which 
suggests a very complicated attitude towards the mad.  Here they appear as objects of 
pity, appropriate receivers of alms alongside the poor and lepers, but without the type of 
reciprocal relationship that almsgiving usually implied, where the prayers of the receiver 
                                                 
65 Ibid.: “De Forcenés.  Se aulcun est hors du sens, et il occist ou mehaine ung homme par sa forsenerie, il 
doit estre mis en prison, et estre soustenu du sien; ou l'en luy doibt pourveoir des communes omosnes, s'il 
n'a de quoy il puisse estre soustenu.” 
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were exchanged for the temporal support of the giver.66  Not only would mad people be 
incapable of filling the role of grateful bedesmen and women, but also the legal text 
specifically indicates that this money was to be used for the care of a mad person who 
had been imprisoned because he or she had killed or injured another person.  Thus, the 
uncomprehending criminal, who was incapable of prayer and whose inability to function 
normally in the world had injured or killed another person, somehow remained a 
reasonable recipient of community alms.  The Norman customary law created a sense of 
communal responsibility through the figure of the mad criminal.   
 Medieval legal discussions of madness reveal an uncertainty about the appropriate 
treatment of the mad.  Although it was considered necessary to protect the mad, the 
question of what exactly madness was and how precisely to prevent catastrophe in the 
lives of the mad and their relatives remained unclear.  The texts of customary laws 
offered several possible solutions to the problems that they believed madness posed, but 
they held competing and complex views of madness and how to treat the mad.  While 
mad people were considered incapable of comprehending legal acts, and thus could not 
engage in them, the appointment of guardians prevented a mad person from losing all of 
his or her legal rights.  In a similar vein, mad people were not held responsible for crimes.  
However, the law codes differed in discussions of the reasons behind this idea.  Some 
determined that the mad were punished by their madness, suggesting that they were in 
fact guilty of the crime, whereas others argued that, just as they were not capable of 
comprehending legal acts, so they could not comprehend illegal ones.  Regardless, the 
decision not to punish mad people for crimes opened up the fear of fraud.  Just as modern 
                                                 
66 See Michel Mollat, The Poor in the Middle Ages: An Essay in Social History, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Miri Rubin, Charity and Community in Medieval Cambridge 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
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legal systems struggle with the question of the insanity defense, authors of medieval law 
codes sought to prevent people from working the system by faking madness.  Even in 
cases when the madness was substantiated by witnesses from the community, there was 
still the problematic question of how exactly to deal with a mad person who had 
committed a crime. 
 
IV. Establishing Madness: Preventing Abuse of the “Insanity Defense” 
Customal authors were aware of the potential abuse of these clauses allowing mad 
criminals to go unpunished, or at least punished considerably less severely than their sane 
counterparts.  The Livre de jostice, in a departure from the other customals, held the 
family responsible for their mad relatives, suggesting that those who should have been 
guarding the mad be punished for the mad person’s crimes: 
[a]nd if it is so, in the moment when he did the deed, that his family had him in 
guard, such that he should have guarded him, you must call those who should 
have guarded him at the time when he did the deed: and if you find that he had 
been so negligent that by his negligence was the deed done, the law says that he 
must be put in punishment. – Because the guard of a mad person (forsenez) is 
given to his relatives, not only so that he cannot do anything bad to himself, but so 
that he does nothing bad to others. 
And if the mad person (desvé) does something that he should not, the 
culpability should by right fall on those who should have guarded him, because he 
did that deed because of bad guard.67
 
The author of the Livre de jostice was invested in finding a responsible party to be 
blamed and punished for the criminal act.  This potential reassignment of guilt may have 
been a driving force for family members seeking remission for the crimes of mad 
                                                 
67 Rapetti, ed., Li Livres de jostice et de plet, 73, XXI.5: “Et s'il est ensi, en tel point où il fit le fet, que si 
ami l'eussent en garde, qu'il le deussent garder, tu dois apeler cels qui le devient garder en cel tens qu'il fist 
le fet : et se tu trueves qu'il aient esté si négligent que par lor négligence soit li forfez fet, droiz dit que l'en 
les doit metre en poine.  -- Quar la garde est baillie de forsenez à lor amis, non pas solement por aus qu'il 
facent mal, mès qu'il ne facent mal à autres. 
   Et se li desvé font chose qu'il ne doivent, l'en doit par droit metre lor colpes sor cels qui les doivent 
garder, comme il face tel fet par mauvèse garde.” 
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relatives, since they may have feared that they would be called to court for their relative’s 
crime.   
Beyond the possibility of finding other people responsible for the crime due to 
their negligence, the customal authors added clauses intended to prevent people from 
using madness as a “get out of jail free card.”  The author of the Livre de jostice, aware of 
the cyclical nature of some forms of madness, insisted that mad people who committed 
their crimes during a period of sanity should not go unpunished.  According to the book, 
the king says that it is necessary to take care with a mad person (desvé) who kills 
his father, whether he had done it in good sense or in madness (desverie); and if 
he did it in good sense, he must pay for it. – And if you know certainly that he did 
it in madness (forsenerie), that he does not know what he does every day, and that 
he understands nothing, nor is there any suspicion against him, you can in a way 
cut his sentence, because he is tormented enough by his madness (desverie): and 
he must always be well guarded.... And if it happens, as it sometimes does, that 
someone is mad (desvé) at one time and at other times is sane, and was sane at the 
moment when he did the deed, you should enquire diligently; and if you know it, 
you will not pardon him; and if it happens that you know that he did it by felony, 
it is right that he be tormented.68
 
The composer of the Livre de jostice took great care to distinguish between those who 
committed a crime while mad and those who commit a crime in “good sense.”  This 
distinction is particularly troubling, since the text justified leaving mad criminals 
unpunished on the grounds that they were sufficiently punished by their madness.  The 
Livre de jostice was unclear and uncomfortable about the treatment of the mad.  While 
the justification for leniency rested entirely on the nature of madness as a “punishing” 
disease, the need to punish mad people who committed a crime while “sane” suggests 
                                                 
68 Ibid.: “li rois dit que l'en se devoit prendre garde au desvé qui tue son père, s'il l'avet fet en bon sen ou en 
desverie; et s'il l'avet fet en bon sen, il le doit comparer. -- Et se tu sés certainement que il l'ait fet en 
forsenerie, qu'il ne sache qu'il face toz jorz, et qu'il n'entende riens, n'en i ait point de sopeçon contre lui, tu 
porras en une feintise estramper sa paine, quar il est assez tormentez de sa desverie : et totes voies le doit 
l'en bien garder .... Et s'il avient, comme aucunes foiz, que aucuns sunt desvé une foiz et autre foiz sont 
sein, et fust seins en celui point où il fit le fait, tu l'enquerras diligement; et se tu le sés, tu ne li pardonras 
pas; et s'il est issit que tu saches qu'il l'ait fait par félonie, droiz est qu'il soit tormentez.” 
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recognition of madness as a lack of comprehension.  Unfortunately, there is no indication 
of how to “know certainly” nor from whom one should “enquire diligently” in order to 
“know” that the mad person was sane at the moment of the act.  It is likely that the 
question would have been directed to any witnesses of the crime, suggesting that, for the 
author of the Livre de jostice, madness was an externally recognizable state that could be 
judged by any witness.  Knowledge of an individual’s mental state would be difficult to 
prove beyond doubt, but a description of the person’s performance of the criminal act 
could potentially establish sanity or insanity.  
Philippe de Beaumanoir was more concerned about the possibility that the 
accused could pretend to be mad in order to avoid punishment.  As we saw above, 
Philippe de Beaumanoir believed that mad people could “pass” as sane.  If so, why not 
the reverse?  This question would most likely arise, according to Philippe de Beaumanoir, 
when a mad person was perceived to have recovered from his or her madness, in which 
case, 
he should be released from prison, and his goods returned to him.  But in this case 
one should examine considerably whether this was not done maliciously, for 
example if some people, when they had committed offenses, counterfeited being 
out of their senses in order to escape: and one should regard very closely what 
cause motivated the person to commit the misdeed, and by this one will know if 
there was deceit (barat).69
 
This fear of barat, which can be translated as a fraud, a deception, or a ruse, moved 
beyond the concern of the Livre de jostice’s author, who was more interested in whether 
the mad person, who was fully accepted as mad, was mad at the moment of the crime, 
                                                 
69 Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, vol. 2, chapter 52, paragraph 1575: “Et s'il revient bien en son 
sens, il doit estre delivrés de prison, et li siens rendus.  Mes en ce cas se doit l'en mout regarder que ce ne 
soit fet malicieusement, si comme li aucun, quant il avroient fet les mesfès, contreferoient le hors du sens 
pour eschaper: si doit l'en mout regarder quele cause le mut a fere le mesfet et par ce savra l'en s'il i a 
barat.” 
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rather than with questioning the madness itself.  Philippe de Beaumanoir, instead, was 
querying the concept that madness was, in fact, a transparent phenomenon, and posed the 
theory that a person could imitate madness in order to avoid being punished for a real 
criminal act.  For Philippe de Beaumanoir, the proof of madness would come from a 
close examination of what “moved” the criminal, suggesting that a sane criminal would 
have different motivations than a mad criminal.  According to this conception of 
madness, witnesses would not be able to tell from a person’s actions whether or not he or 
she was mad.  Instead, it would be necessary to consider the motives for the act to see 
whether or not the act itself was done due to madness.    
This uncertainty about whether people were in fact mad was exacerbated by the 
methods used to establish madness.  Legal processes generally defined and determined 
mental states based on the consensus of the community, rather than calling in an authority 
figure to determine whether an individual was mad.  It is important to note that the use of 
“expert” testimony had already begun in this period.  Physicians and surgeons would be 
called for prognosis in cases where the damaged individual had not yet died.  They were 
asked to predict whether the wounds were mortal.70  The example of Philippe Testard, a 
merchant whose case was brought before the Parlement of Paris in 1277, provides an 
unusually clear record of the kind of evidence that served to prove madness.  Although in 
this case the question of fraud did not arise, it is clear that the court’s dependence on 
witness testimony, often from people who had a vested interest in proving madness, 
could lead to such fears.  Because Philippe Testard had died in suspicious circumstances, 
and was a wealthy merchant whose goods would be forfeit to the crown if he were found 
                                                 
70 See Registre criminel de la justice de St. Martin des Champs à Paris au XIVe siècle, ed. Louis Tanon 
(Paris: L. Willem, 1877), 18-19. 
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guilty of suicide, the Parlement of Paris held a trial to determine whether or not he had 
intended to kill himself.  Their assembled testimony, reaffirmed by each of the witnesses 
they called, suggested that he had fallen out of the window of his house onto Les Halles.  
After being carried inside, he had poked himself in the stomach a few times with his 
knife.  Where the witnesses elaborated, each in his own way, was in the description of 
Philippe Testard’s state of mind, and the evidence cited as proof that his mind was 
disturbed.71   
The first witness, Estienes Fusée, established that he had known Philippe for 
twenty years, and he had judged Philippe as being of “right understanding and wise.”72  
However, he claimed, about a year earlier Philippe had begun to return to his childhood, 
becoming more and more foolish as time passed until he seemed out of his senses.  As 
evidence of his foolishness, Estienes explained that Philippe, when eating and drinking to 
the point of gluttony with other merchants, had frequently refused to pay his bill, 
suggesting that such antisocial behavior was so unacceptable as to provide proof of 
madness.  Estienne proceeded to describe the events leading to Philippe Testard’s death, 
including the arrival of a doctor (probably a surgeon) who was brought in to provide a 
prognosis while Philippe was still alive.  The doctor determined that Philippe did not 
have any mortal wounds, except those that might have been sustained from the fall that 
Estienne insisted was accidental.  Other witnesses added new terms into their testimony, 
stating that it was Philippe’s madness (“forsenerie”) that caused him to die, or that he 
suffered from lunacy (“lunoisson”) or the mental losses of old age (“vieillece”) or that he 
was frenzied (“frénisieus”).  A few added observations that Estienne had not mentioned, 
                                                 
71 Edgard Boutaric, ed., Actes du Parlement de Paris: 1. série, de l’an 1254 a l’an 1328 (New York: G. 
Olms, 1975), 2 vols., vol. 1, 198-200. 
72 Ibid., 198: “droit entendement et saige.” 
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such as Bérangé Roiche-Fort, who remembered seeing Philippe interrupt the mass in his 
local parish church five years earlier, lifting his joined hands at the moment of the 
elevation of the sacraments and saying, loudly enough for people around him to hear, 
“twenty seven pounds in spite of God.”73  Annie Saunier interprets this outburst as 
further proof of Philippe’s excessive attention to money, to the point of blasphemy.74   
However, the testimony of the witnesses was not consistent in defining madness 
as worldly greed.  Whereas Bérangé argued that Philippe’s madness was proved by his 
excessive attention to money, his son, Estiene Roiche-Fort, mentioned Philippe’s lack of 
concern for his worldly goods, both monetary and corporeal, as confirmation of his 
madness.  He had seen Philippe throw a bag full of money on the floor, disport himself 
naked in front of women, and pull his hair out until the blood ran.  Girarz Boileau was the 
only witness who thought it pertinent to add the possibility of hereditary madness to the 
testimony, explaining that Philippe’s aunt, Ysabiaus la Chicheuse, had also been out of 
her senses and had been tied up as a mad person for three years before her death, and that 
Philippe’s brother’s daughter, Marie, had been out of her senses and memory four years 
previously, and had been taken to Saint Varain to recover.  These past episodes of 
madness in the family, in cases where appropriate actions were taken by the relatives 
either by confining the mad or seeking holy cures, supported the likelihood that Philippe 
himself was mad.  Perhaps even more significantly, the fate of these relatives also 
confirmed the ability of the rest of the family to recognize madness when they saw it.  
                                                 
73 Ibid.: “vinte sept livres maugrez Deu.” 
74 Annie Saunier, “'Hors de sens et de mémoire': une approche de la folie au travers de quelques actes 
judiciaires de la fin du XIIIe à la fin du XIVe siècle," in Commerce, finances et société (XIe-XVIe siècles) : 
recueil de travaux d’histoire médiévale offert à M. le Professeur Henri Dubois, ed. Philippe Contamine, 
Thierry Dutour, and Bertrand Schnerb (Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1993), 489-500, 
193. 
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Thus, the evidence required to prove madness was a history of behavior observable by 
the individual’s friends, relatives, and larger community.  They defined madness in terms 
appropriate for that person, highlighting those aspects of his or her madness that were 
personally transgressive, rather than drawing upon an acknowledged expertise to describe 
madness. 
Establishing through communal consensus that Philippe Testard had been mad 
when he died had clear benefits for his surviving family members.  This testimony of his 
madness encouraged the court to rule that Philippe could not be held responsible for his 
own death.  As noted above, French law had a stringent policy about suicide that 
punished the surviving family members.75  By determining that Philippe was mad, the 
community ensured that his body could be buried in holy ground and his family could 
inherit his goods, rather than having them confiscated by the crown.  This was only one 
possible scenario through which madness became a legal concern for kin and communal 
groups, however.  In other cases, where the individual in question was still alive, 
medieval French law codes placed restrictions on that person’s future actions due to his 
or her madness.  It is important to remember the central role played by members of the 
community, not only in proving madness but also in determining in what circumstances 
to do so.  Law codes provided guidelines, but in the absence of a functioning police force, 
they could only be enforced with communal cooperation.  If madness had to be proven 
through communal agreement, then members of the community also had the power to 
refuse to provide that label. 
                                                 
75 Chapter five has a more detailed discussion of suicide.  See also Alexander Murray, Suicide in the Middle 
Ages Volume I: The Violent against Themselves (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2 vols., vol. 1. 
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Policing existed on a very basic level by this period, and particularly noticeable 
crimes were brought to the attention of the courts through a number of different avenues, 
only one of which was private denunciation.  Laura Stern has shown that criminal cases 
in Florence were more likely to be initiated due to public fama (reputation), denunciation 
by an official, or inquisition ex officio, than by private accusation.  Public reputation was 
not only the cause of the highest percentage of cases but also had the highest rate of 
conviction.76  While the numbers certainly differ from place to place and from legal 
system to legal system, these percentages are suggestive of a larger pattern of accusation 
and conviction where fama was important for determining the outcome of trials.  
Communal knowledge was used to establish the details of a case, not just the reputation 
of the accused.  During a court case, witnesses would be called to explain not only what 
they knew themselves but also what they considered “common knowledge” in the 
community.   
Law codes both reflected and constructed communal rights and responsibilities.  
Community members depended upon one another for survival, but were also constantly 
competing over resources.77  Ideals of neighborliness were a necessary part of life, and 
were policed as such.  If people in the community agreed someone was of bad reputation 
their opinion could be sufficient for conviction in criminal cases, whereas good 
reputation could lead to acquittal, conviction for a lesser offense, or conviction but with a 
lighter punishment.  “Common knowledge” had a role to play in jurisdiction.  
 
                                                 
76 Laura Ikins Stern, The Criminal Law System of Medieval and Renaissance Florence (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1994), 203-205. 
77 David Sabean demonstrates this constant negotiation between neighborliness and conflict in early 
modern Germany.  See David Warren Sabean, Power in the Blood: Popular Culture and Village Discourse 
in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
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V. Pardoning the Mad 
 Following the tradition of Roman law, medieval law codes presented a number of 
different methods of coping with madness through legal means.  The legal perspective on 
madness contained contradictory sentiments towards the mad, simultaneously viewing 
them as needing protection and as threatening.  Even within a single text discussing a 
single question about madness, conflicting opinions of madness appear.  On the one hand, 
mad people should not be held responsible for the crimes they committed because they 
did not understand their actions as crimes.  On the other hand, they should not be 
punished because they were already sufficiently punished by their madness, suggesting 
that they deserved punishment for their actions.  The evidence of family members, 
general fama, or rumor in the community was considered sufficient proof of madness, 
whether in civil or criminal cases.   
Law codes addressed two related legal significations of madness, both of which 
concerned the issues of responsibility and accountability.  It was important to determine 
whether or not mad people could be held accountable for their actions and through this 
whether or not they could enter into legal contracts or be tried for criminal offenses.  
Thus, for the most part, legal discussion of madness is found buried within a more 
general discussion of incapacity.  Mad people (much like minors, married women, and 
slaves) were limited in their possible legal actions in so far as they could not enter into 
contracts or act as witnesses.  However, in order to protect the interests of some of those 
without their own legal voice, French law required guardianship, the appointment of 
another person who would take responsibility for the legal functions of mad people and 
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orphaned minors.78  A related question was how to treat a mad criminal.  Mad people 
were seen as potentially threatening, and their family members or their community as a 
whole were expected to guard or restrain them in order to prevent them from committing 
crimes.  Of course, such restraint was not always possible, particularly since madness was 
seen as a cyclical disease with periods of sanity interspersed with periods of madness, as 
was the case for Charles VI.  Since madness did not allow a person to be legally 
responsible for ordinary actions, a mad person could not be held legally responsible for a 
crime.  Taken together, these law codes constructed a definition of madness as an 
inability to understand the world, and specifically, an inability to understand the law.  In 
all these contexts, the relationship between the mad and their communities was an 
important factor, as the law codes sought to protect members of the community from the 
potentially threatening actions of those who lacked an understanding of the rules that 
governed daily interactions.79
Medieval law codes agreed that mad people could not be held responsible for 
their crimes.  Within this understanding, however, there remained some uncertainty about 
                                                 
78 Married women would automatically be represented by their husbands, minors by their fathers, and 
slaves by their masters, although some law codes included the caveat that married women wishing to bring 
a case against their husbands or slaves against their masters could have recourse to a guardian. 
79 The question of what impact, if any, all of the various written law codes had on actual practice has vexed 
scholars for years.  Several scholars have shown that the prescribed punishments for crime did not match 
up with the reality of the execution of justice. It is also true that, with competing systems of justice, people 
were able to choose where to take their civil suits.  Further, as Daniel Lord Smail has pointed out, merely 
putting these legal systems in place was not sufficient to explain why people used them.  He argues 
persuasively that civil suits were a legally legitimate continuation of the kinds of vengeance and vendetta 
relationships that were discouraged in the late Middle Ages. Smail, Consumption of Justice .  Criminal 
cases were less open to choice, but were still intimately related to questions of communal ties and 
individual reputations.  See Cohen, Crossroads of Justice ; Esther Cohen, “'To Die a Criminal for the 
Public Good': The Execution Ritual in Late Medieval Paris," in Law, Custom, and the Social Fabric in 
Medieval Europe: Essays in Honor of Bryce Lyon, ed. Bernard S. Bachrach and David Nicholas 
(Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1990), 285-304; Claude Gauvard, “Grâce et exécution 
capitale: Les deux visages de la justice royale française à la fin du moyen âge," in La Justice Royale et le 
Parlement de Paris (XIVe-XVIIe siècle) ed. Yves-Marie Bercé and Alfred Soman (Paris: H. Champion, 
1995), 275-290; Nicole Gonthier, Cris de haine et rites d'unité: La violence dans les villes, XIIIe - XVIe 
siècle (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992); Gonthier, Délinquance, justice et société ; Smail, Consumption of Justice  
  149 
where in the legal process such a plea should be entered.  The evidence from letters of 
remission indicates that on several occasions a recognizably mad person was imprisoned 
and the officers of justice in the locality refused to proceed against him or her, 
encouraging the family, and in one case where there was no family the entire village, to 
write to the king requesting remission.80  Remission letters were a way to release a mad 
person from blame without having to act outside the normal legal apparatus.  It has been 
argued that the fourteenth century saw an increased effort on the part of the king to 
demonstrate his power through the legal system.81  It is clear from even a superficial 
survey of remission letters that these pardons were sent to all varieties of courts in 
regions owing direct allegiance to the French crown, from bishops’ and archbishops’ 
courts to those of counts and other nobles.  Royal pardons, as part of the mechanisms of 
power, were supposed to trump any law court in France, with the exception of religious 
who had plead the benefit of the clergy to be tried in ecclesiastical instead of secular 
courts.  Medieval French justice did not always operate strictly according to the rules.  
Esther Cohen argues that “[i]mplicit in the actual execution of justice was the perception 
of law as a vehicle for human relations rather than a behavior-control mechanism.”82  As 
a result, although the mechanisms were in place for spectacular executions as punishment 
for crime and were used to demonstrate that justice functioned, there were many more 
cases that did not lead to the gallows or the executioner’s block.  She traces this through 
crimes with more than one perpetrator, where one or more were executed and others were 
                                                 
80 See AN JJ 188 fo 81 no 160 (in 1459) and AN JJ 188 fo 10 no 15 (in 1458), edited in Paul Guérin, 
Recueil des documents concernant le Poitou contenus dans les registres de la chancellerie de France, 
Archives historiques du Poitou (Poitiers: Société française d'imprimerie et de librairie, 1909), vol. 10, 92-
94. 
81 Y.-B. Brissaud, "Le droit de grâce à la fin du moyen-âge (XIVeme siècle - XVeme siècle): Contribution à 
l'étude de la restauration de la souveraineté monarchique" (PhD dissertation, Université de Poitiers, 1971), 
552-556; Cohen, Crossroads of Justice, 51. 
82 Cohen, “"To Die a Criminal for the Public Good"," 268-269. 
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granted remission.  The king’s pardon was available even for crimes that had already 
been visibly, publicly punished.  Similarly, in looking at the claims made by many towns 
that they had not had an execution for so long that their equipment was old or missing, 
Claude Gauvard theorizes that although many crimes were punishable by death, in 
practice capital punishment was exceptional, and when it was used it was intended as an 
example to deter others from committing the same crime.83  Remission letters were a 
useful method for resolving the difficulty of a crime committed by a mad person, without 
the need to establish the appropriate punishment.  Chapter four examines the ways 
composers of remission letters narrated mad crimes.  The royal notaries who helped 
construct these narratives were intimately aware of the legal understandings of madness, 
and their representations of the mad drew on the theories present in medieval law codes.  
In order to establish madness, the composers sought proof in terms of community 
interactions, and indeed through the process of narrative.  These letters about madness 
incorporated the entire life stories of mad people, much like the witness testimony in 




                                                 
83 Gauvard, “Grâce et exécution capitale," 283-284. 




Chapter 4:  
Narrating Madness: Textual Communities of Remission 
 
In October of 1380, one month after Jehan de Moustier murdered his father, his 
“close family”1 sought a letter of remission for him.  Jehan himself was unable to join 
them.  He was in prison in the nearby town of Saint Denis, from which the family 
traveled the short distance of twelve and a half kilometers2 to the royal capital, where 
Louis of Anjou was serving as regent for the eleven-year-old Charles VI.  Once in Paris, 
Jehan’s family met with a royal notary, who may have been the same P. de Disery who 
recorded the letter in the chancery archives.  With the help of the notary, the family 
composed a letter explaining Jehan’s crime and asking that he be pardoned.  It is 
impossible to be certain whether the de Moustier family arrived in Paris with the 
intention of centering their petition on Jehan’s madness or whether a royal notary, 
experienced in the construction of petitions, put the idea in their heads.  In this particular 
case it seems likely that the family had the possibility in mind.  The remission letter 
suggests that Jehan’s condition had been recognized as madness by the local authorities, 
referring to a previous intervention by the Marshall of Pontoise, who provided the family 
                                                 
1 AN JJ 118 fo 18v no 18: “amis charnelx.”  For a discussion of the meaning of “parens et amis charnels,” 
see Claude Gauvard, "De Grace Especial": Crime, état et société en France à la fin du Moyen Age (Paris: 
Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991), 2 vols., vol. 1, 643-651.  
2 About a half day’s walk.  For an estimate of travel time I used Maryjane Dunn and Linda Davidson, 
“Pilgrimage Sites, Spanish," in Trade, Travel, and Exploration in the Middle Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. 
John Block Friedman, et al. (New York: Garland, 2000), 484-488, 487. 
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with chains to help them control Jehan.3  Regardless of when the decision to describe 
Jehan’s crime in terms of madness was made, the supplicants and the notary then had to 
reconsider the events of his life in order to highlight evidence of madness and construct a 
convincing narrative of his patricide that would then be read out in the local courts.  Such 
a narrative had to be sufficiently compelling to be accepted and confirmed by both the 
king’s council and the adverse party, who was given the opportunity to challenge the 
letter when it was read aloud by the local judge.4   
Most remission letters sought to construct a coherent narrative of a particular 
crime.  Letters composed on behalf of the mad, in contrast, generally sought to establish 
that the individual was indeed mad, and thus provided a narrative of a life.  These 
biographies in miniature either involved evidence of an ongoing struggle with madness 
over the course of the individual’s life or attempted to demonstrate the way madness 
caused the person to behave in unexpected ways, rupturing a recognizable identity that 
was constructed in part through kin and communal ties.  This chapter explores the 
narrative structures of these letters, looking particularly at the ways in which the 
composers of these letters sought originary moments of madness and how they tried to 
explain the incomprehensible actions of the mad.   
 
                                                 
3 AN JJ 118 fo 18v no 18. 
4 Pascal Texier, "La rémission au XIVeme siècle: Genèse et développement" (PhD dissertation, Université 
de Limoges, 1984), 9, 263 and 324-338.  Texier notes that this right to challenge did not negate royal 
authority.  Although the victim could appeal the remission letter, it had to be done in front of a royal judge, 
thereby reaffirming royal judiciary power. 
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I.  The Letters 
 The first letters of remission appeared in the records of the French king’s 
chancery at the beginning of the fourteenth century.5  The earliest of these letters were 
mostly granted to people who claimed to have been falsely accused or to forgive 
members of the nobility who had been engaged in warfare that was not sanctioned by the 
king.6  Over time, letters were also granted to non-nobles as a pardon for crimes that they 
had committed.  Through this development, the French king made a number of 
interrelated claims about his power and authority.  With these letters, the king was 
exercising his powers of grace and mercy by choosing to grant life instead of death to his 
erring subjects.  His mercy did not reflect justice, but, like God’s mercy established in the 
promise of the New Testament, it acted above human perceptions of punishment as a 
direct correlation to crime.7  Indeed, this understanding of remission is written into the 
framing text that surrounded the individual stories about crimes.  The letter was written in 
the king’s voice, and the act of remission was a recorded speech act, where the king said, 
“We, preferring mercy to the rigor of justice, grant remission.”8  On a lower plane, 
remission letters demonstrated the king’s power to override the execution of justice in his 
                                                 
5 The first remission letter appeared in May of 1304.  See Gauvard, "De Grace Especial", vol. 1, 64. 
6 Some of these early letters can be found edited at numbers 3759, 3914, 3986, 4054, 4177, 4231, 4322, 
4357, 4603, 4767, 4788, 4841, and 5101 in Henri Jassemin and Aline Vallée, eds., Registres du Trésor des 
Chartes (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1999), vol. 2: Règnes des fils de Philippe le Bel, deuxième partie: 
règne de Charles IV le Bel.  See also Justine Firnhaber-Baker’s work on the subject of private warfare 
through the examination of remission letters.  Justine Firnhaber-Baker, “From God’s Peace to the King’s 
Order: Late Medieval Limitations on Non-Royal Warfare," Essays in Medieval Studies 23 (2006): 19-30; 
Justine Firnhaber-Baker, "'Guerram publice et palam faciendo': Local War and Royal Authority in Late 
Medieval Southern France" (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2007). 
7 Thus, Alexander Murray is mistaken when he argues that “A Letter of Remission, by definition, declared 
its beneficiary not guilty.”  Rather, a letter of remission, like the remission granted by a priest to whom a 
person confessed, pardoned the beneficiary whether or not the beneficiary had committed the crime of 
which he or she was accused.  Alexander Murray, Suicide in the Middle Ages Volume I: The Violent 
against Themselves (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2 vols., vol. 1, 207. 
8 “voulans misericorde preferer a rigueur de justice anous…quicte remis et pardonne.”  This exact phrasing 
may not appear in all letters, but it is a common choice to represent this sentiment, which is certainly 
present in all of them. 
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realm, thus making him the equal of the Emperor.9  As these related concepts of mercy 
and authority demonstrate, remission was not about justice but about power.  The king 
could and did act above the law in granting pardons, and there was no need for petitioners 
to establish their innocence.  Most of the petitioners admitted their guilt, much as they 
might in a confession to a man of God, but they were careful to establish that the crime 
was unusual, and not part of a criminal lifestyle.  The king was gracious in his mercy, 
granting remission for treason, and even in some cases pardoning an individual for a 
crime for which his or her partner had already been executed.10    
The development of remission letters as an outlet for royal authority made them 
an increasingly central occupation of the king’s chancery over time.  While they began as 
a very small percentage of the chancery output (between 0 and 2 percent from 1304 to 
1338), in the 1340s there was a sudden increase in production such that they made up 
fully a quarter of the chancery records.  In the 1350s the percentage rose to about half, 
then again to around three-quarters in the 1370s.  The percentage held relatively steady at 
75, with a few spikes every ten years or so, when some books record 90 percent or more 
remission letters.  The percentage of output did not fall until the 1480s, when it began 
averaging half of chancery production again.11  Remission was limited to capital crimes, 
                                                 
9 Pascal Texier, “Rémissions et ëvolutions institutionnelles," in Le pardon, ed. Jacqueline Hoareau-
Dodinau, Xavier Rousseaux, and Pascal Texier, Cahiers de l'Institut d'Anthropologie Juridique No 3 
(Limoges: Presses universitaires de Limoges, 1999), 348.  For more on the development of the legal 
concept of the king as emperor in his realm in the thirteenth century, see Eric Voegelin, The Collected 
Works of Eric Voegelin Volume 21: History of Political Ideas, ed. David Walsh (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 1997), vol. III: The Later Middle Ages, 60. 
10 Esther Cohen, “'To Die a Criminal for the Public Good': The Execution Ritual in Late Medieval Paris," in 
Law, Custom, and the Social Fabric in Medieval Europe: Essays in Honor of Bryce Lyon, ed. Bernard S. 
Bachrach and David Nicholas (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1990), 285-304, 285-286. 
11 The rest of the chancery documents are made up of ordonnances, letters of anoblissement, letters of 
naturalité, amortissements, concession or confirmation of privileges, and letters of abolition.  For a table 
with the numbers of remission letters and the numbers of total acts, see Michel François, “Note sur les 
lettres de rémission transcrites dans les registres du Trésor des Chartes," Bibliothèque de l'École des 
Chartes 103 (1942): 317-324, 321-324.  Although I found some of his counting to be questionable 
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but during the height of the popularity of the letters they were granted for a wide range of 
criminal acts including counterfeiting currency, suicide, bestiality, theft, and rape, all of 
which could carry a death penalty but did not necessarily do so.  There were attempts to 
limit the range of crimes for which remission could be granted, but apart from the 
exclusion of suicide from the mid-fifteenth century, these reforming efforts were largely 
unsuccessful until the sixteenth century, which is outside the range of this study.12
 Several scholars have shown that, from the perspective of the king, remission 
letters demonstrated his jurisdictional power.  Through granting mercy, the king 
exercised his ability to override the local legal traditions and the jurisdictional powers of 
both secular and religious lords.13  As a result, the letter itself was embedded within a 
language of royal power.  Each letter began with the name of the king, “by the grace of 
God, king of France,” and ended with formulaic language that reiterated the letter’s 
function as a speech act that granted remission through the king’s sovereign power.  The 
letters operated as both written and oral acts of power, since they had to be carried back 
and read aloud in the local courts in order to be fully legitimized, thus transferring this 
notion of royal power from the center to the periphery.  The letter was framed within an 
expression of the king’s power, so that it simultaneously fulfilled the functions of 
                                                                                                                                                 
(particularly for AN JJ 189 and AN JJ 204, where the number of remission letters exceeds the number of 
total acts), my own counting resulted in numbers close enough to his to allow these percentages to stand.  
Note that Claude Gauvard uses these same numbers to argue that the granting of remission letters decreased 
due to criticism in 1400.  See the table in Gauvard, "De Grace Especial", vol. 1, 65.  Although numerically 
it is true that there were fewer remission letters granted, I think this can be traced rather to lower chancery 
work during a time when France was suffering from civil war and English invasion.  Remission letters 
remain a high percentage of chancery output during this time.  In fact, the only true gap in the granting of 
remission appears between 1434 and 1441 (the gap occurs between AN JJ 175 and AN JJ 176), when 
Charles VII was in the process of taking Paris from the English. 
12 Davis notes that in the sixteenth century the vast majority of letters of remission were for murder.  
Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in Sixteenth-century France 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 7. 
13 Gauvard, "De Grace Especial" ; Pascal Texier, “'Doulant et courroucié': Les avatars de la culpabilité 
dans les lettres de rémission du XIVème siècle," in La culpabilité ed. Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau and 
Pascal Texier (Limoges: 2001), 481-494; Texier, “Rémissions et ëvolutions institutionnelles." 
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pardoning a particular individual and, through the particular rhetoric of the letter, using 
that pardon to reinforce the king’s sovereignty.  For example, in a letter from 1387 
composed on behalf of Robert Layné, a poor man whose madness caused him to say that 
he would fight anyone, including the king, Charles VI granted him remission by saying,  
wishing to extend to him Our grace and mercy, We have assuredly considered 
these things.  Desiring mercy to be… preferred to the rigor of justice, to this 
supplicant in the case above said we have acquitted, remitted, and pardoned all 
punishment and offense, criminal, corporal and civil that he has or could have 
justly incurred for the act and occasion of the said words, by him thus said, and 
through this present [letter] by special grace, full power and royal authority we do 
acquit, remit and pardon and restore him to his good reputation and renown in the 
country, and to his goods non-confiscated, and we impose on this [topic] 
perpetual silence in the present and in the future by Our procurer and by all our 
other officers.14
 
This coda, which is repeated in variations in every letter, expressed the power of the king 
to erase the criminal act committed by the pardoned individual.  The irony of this 
reinforcement of kingly power embedded within a generous gesture of pardon for 
treasonous speech only increases its force.  The king demonstrated his grace and mercy, 
which extended directly from his particular role as king of France by the grace of God.  
Perhaps the strongest evidence that remission letters were seen as a way of advertising 
power is the continuity of the granting of pardons.  During the English “occupation” of 
France, the chancery continued to grant remission on behalf of Henry, “by the grace of 
                                                 
14 Annie Saunier, “'Hors de sens et de mémoire': une approche de la folie au travers de quelques actes 
judiciaires de la fin du XIIIe à la fin du XIVe siècle," in Commerce, finances et société (XIe-XVIe siècles) : 
recueil de travaux d’histoire médiévale offert à M. le Professeur Henri Dubois, ed. Philippe Contamine, 
Thierry Dutour, and Bertrand Schnerb (Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1993), 489-500, 
498: “nous lui vueillons eslargir Notre grâce et miséricorde Nous a de certes ses choses considérées 
voulans miséricorde estre miséricorde estre (sic) préférée à rigeur de justice à ycellui suppliant ou cas 
dessus dit toute peine offense criminele corporelle et civile qu'il a ou peut avoir encouru envers justice pour 
le fait et occasion des dictes paroles par lui ainsi dictes avons quitté, remis et pardonné et par ces présentes 
de grâce espécial pleine puissance et auctorité royal quittons, remettons et pardonnons et le restituons à sa 
bonne fame renommée au pays et à ses biens non confisquez et imposons sur ce silence perpétuel par Notre 
procureur présent et à venir et à touz autres noz officiers.” 
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God, king of France and England.”15  The dukes of Burgundy, further proving that the 
ability to grant pardon was seen as a significant part of the power of government, wielded 
this power in their own territories.16  Enclosed within this rhetorical expression of the 
king’s sovereign power and majesty was the story of the particular crime the king had 
pardoned.   
 The path to any remission letter began with a crime.  From this starting point, 
there were many possible peregrinations that would lead to the ultimate decision to seek 
the king’s pardon.  Sometimes the accused would have been imprisoned, and would 
either choose to send a letter before the trial took place or after having been found guilty.  
In other cases, the accused might have left town, essentially going into self-imposed 
exile, since medieval courts considered flight as proof of guilt.17  A third possible route 
was preventive pardon, where the accused had neither been arrested nor fled the scene, 
but wanted to have the reassurance of pardon on the chance that the case might be 
pursued.  Although some letters insisted on the innocence of the supplicant, most 
supplicants admitted to their guilt.  The process of receiving the king’s pardon was both 
time-consuming and expensive.  First a petitioner had to travel to the king’s council, 
which could be difficult, particularly for people who did not live in or around Paris, a fact 
that is reflected in the general geographic scope of the letters copied by the king’s 
                                                 
15 See the letters collected in Auguste Longnon, ed., Paris pendant la domination anglaise (1420-1436): 
Documents extraits des registres de la Chancellerie de France (Paris: H. Champion, 1878): “par la grace 
de Dieu roy de France et d'Angleterre.”  See also those collected in Paul Le Cacheux, ed., Actes de la 
chancellerie d’Henri VI concernant la Normandie sous la domination anglaise (1422-1435), extraits des 
registres du Trésor des chartes aux Archives nationales (Rouen: A. Lestringant, 1907-1908), vol. 1. 
16 See the letters collected in Charles Edmond Petit-Dutaillis, ed., Documents nouveaux sur les mœurs 
populaires et le droit de vengeance dans les Pays-Bas au XVe siècle (Paris: H. Champion, 1908). 
17 Indeed, in this sense, remission letters act as a kind of “passport,” allowing the recipient to return.  Much 
like medieval passports, the power was in the king’s seal.  For more on the development of the paperwork 
of identity, see Valentin Groebner, Who Are You?: Identification, Deception, and Surveillance in Early 
Modern Europe, trans. Mark Kyburz and John Peck (New York: Zone Books, 2007). 
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chancery.  Indeed, the king’s own travel impacted the letters received and ratified, since 
some letters relating to crimes committed many years before were recorded when the 
king happened to pass through the area.18  The king, or more likely an officer of the 
chancery, would then command a royal notary, together with the accused or the family 
members of the accused, to compose a letter explaining the circumstances leading up to 
the crime and telling the story of the crime itself.  To be ratified, the letter had to be read 
before the king’s council, who, assuming the letter was satisfactory, would then provide 
the remission seeker with a seal.  For an extra fee, the letter would also be recorded in the 
official record by the chancery scribes, so that there was an external source proving the 
existence of the pardon.19  The price of the whole process was officially set at thirty-two 
Parisian sous in the fourteenth century: six for the redaction, six for the seal, and twenty 
for the registration in the chancery’s books.20  This was more than a week’s wages for 
most artisans,21 and although the king tried to control the price by passing ordinances, the 
ultimate tally could be much higher, particularly when the cost of a journey to Paris and 
accommodation while seeking pardon are added to the consideration.  This was not the 
                                                 
18 One of these, in AN JJ 99 fo 25 (in 1367), is a remission for a crime committed forty years earlier.  The 
existence of these letters raises interesting questions about administration of the law in this period.  If in 
some cases a person could commit a crime and then wait thirty years before deciding to seek remission 
when the king was handily in the area, then what conditions were necessary for someone to be legally 
pursued? 
19 Christian Gut provides a diplomatic study of the documents themselves in Christian Gut, “Autour des 
registres de la chancellerie française de Henri VI, roi de France et d'Angleterre," in Pouvoir, Justice et 
Société ed. Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau and Pascal Texier (Limoges: Presses universitaires de Limoges, 
2000), 81-99. 
20 Gauvard, "De Grace Especial", vol. 1, 68. 
21 Bronislaw Geremek, Le salariat dans l’artisanat parisien aux XIIIe-XVe siècles; étude sur le marché de 
la main-d’oeuvre au Moyen Age, trans. Anna Posner and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber (Paris: Mouton, 1968), 
90-94.  Geremek provides the day wages of masons, carpenters, and their assistants as an example, noting 
in one case from the early fourteenth century that masons and carpenters were paid 4 sous a day, while their 
assistants were paid 2 sous.  He also notes that the day wages were seasonal, since the combined earnings 
of one carpenter and his valet in the late fourteenth century were 5 sous a day during summer, but only 4 
sous a day during winter, presumably reflecting the change in available working hours as the days got 
shorter. 
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end of the process, however, since the petitioner had to return to the jurisdiction in which 
the crime had been committed and give the letter to the local administrator of justice.  
The letter would then be read aloud in the presence of the adverse party, who could be the 
bereaved family of a murder victim or the neighbors who brought the case to the attention 
of the court.  If someone raised an objection the remission could be annulled, taking the 
accused back to the beginning.22
In theory, remission from crime was available to any criminal who had committed 
a capital crime, was able to bring his or her case before the king’s council, and whose 
case appealed to the king’s desire to practice lenient justice.  In practice, remission letters 
had a number of overlapping goals which affected the rhetoric of the letter.  The letter 
reflected the agendas of both the king and the individual seeking remission, each of 
which was refracted through the interpretive framework of the royal notaries who wrote 
the letter down.23  Thus, there was no single author for a remission letter: it was a 
cooperative process.  This was particularly true for remission letters for mad people, 
which were generally sought not by the accused but by their relatives and close family 
members.  The letters for the mad therefore reflect the multiple perspectives of the mad 
person’s relatives and the scribe.  It is more appropriate to think of these letters as 
“composed” rather than “authored.” 
 It is possible to speculate on what content was contributed by which 
“composer.”24  Clearly the royal notary who recorded the letters in the chancery archive 
                                                 
22 Some letters demonstrate this practice, since they appear in multiple versions in the chancery archive. 
23 Our knowledge of the royal notaries becomes significantly more complete in the seventeenth century, but 
for some details about them in the fifteenth century, see André Lapeyre and Rémy Scheurer, Les notaires et 
secrétaires du roi sous les règnes de Louis XI, Charles VIII et Louis XII (1461-1515) (Paris: Bibliothèque 
Nationale, 1978), vol. 1, especially the introduction by Robert-Henri Bautier, ix-xxxix. 
24 Davis, Fiction in the Archives, 15-19; Gauvard, "De Grace Especial", vol. 1, 66. 
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was responsible for the formulaic language invoking the king’s grace and mercy.  The 
narrative of the crime and the life of the accused were at least in part supplied by the 
supplicants, who may have been responding to appropriate questions posed by the notary.  
While some letters for mad people who had recovered their sanity follow the more 
general pattern of remission letters sought by the individual who committed the crime, 
the majority was sought through the cooperative effort of the family, while the mad 
person languished in prison awaiting trial or was detained due to the disease.  The 
supplicants may even have consulted with a legal expert before coming to Paris in order 
to establish whether the case was eligible for remission.  Once a letter of remission was 
received it had to be read aloud in the presence of the adverse party.  Since the other side 
was granted the opportunity to dispute the narrative contained in the letter, it is 
conceivable that they also were involved in the composition.  The supplicants may have 
come to an agreement with their adversaries before deciding to invest time and money in 
a trip to Paris to seek the king’s pardon.  Thus, many different minds were involved in 
defining and indicating madness within these letters.   
This group, made up of legally-trained notaries, legal experts, supplicants seeking 
remission, and in some cases the adverse party, can be imagined in terms of a “textual 
community,” formed around a text, where one or more literate individuals provided 
access to that text for the larger, illiterate component.25  The literate and knowledgeable 
experts provided a framework within which the information supplied by the supplicants 
could be given shape and meaning.  The invocation of madness was not common.  
                                                 
25 Brian Stock coined this term as a way of describing heretical communities in Europe, that centered 
around an interpreter who read aloud from texts.  I have altered his use of the term: whereas the textual 
communities he describes were centered around pre-existing texts, the textual communities I am imagining 
are centered around the creation of a new text.  See Brian Stock, Listening for the Text: On the Uses of the 
Past (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 13.  
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Indeed, claims of madness appear in the archives rarely, but consistently, over the one 
hundred fifty year period under examination.26  There is little likelihood that the notaries 
developed a standard form for writing about madness, the way they appear to have for 
writing about tavern brawls.  Nevertheless, the notaries’ knowledge about law codes gave 
them an awareness of the benefits and the hazards of establishing that a person was mad 
when he or she committed a crime,27 as well as a general concept of what kind of 
evidence was necessary to demonstrate madness.  Together with the supplicants, the 
notaries were able to construct a narrative that reflected on the life of the individual, 
providing convincing evidence of madness and building to the moment of the criminal 
act.   
Most of the letters give no indication of the social status of those who sought 
remission; however, those that do exhibit a broad social range, from beggars and manual 
laborers to merchants and nobles.28  Many of those identified according to profession in 
letters about the mad were skilled artisans, including butchers, bakers, barrel makers, and 
carpenters.  There were six merchants and six people who appear to be from noble 
lineage, but most supplicants were identified simply as laborers.  With the exception of 
one man identified as a clerk and another who was a notary, it is unlikely that these 
remission seekers, whether the accused or the supplicants on their behalf, would have 
                                                 
26 On average, letters about madness appear in one percent of the total remission letters, and in the books 
that were fully examined they never exceeded three percent.  On the other hand, only two of the thirty-five 
books searched yielded no references to madness. 
27 As noted in chapter three, Roman law had established that mad people should not be held responsible for 
committing crimes.  However, a number of French customals called for the mad to be restrained so as to 
prevent them from committing crimes.  Some remission letters reflect these laws.  See, for example, AN JJ 
118 fo 18v no 18 (in 1380) and AN JJ 173 fo 33v no 63 (in 1425), edited in Le Cacheux, ed., Actes de la 
chancellerie d’Henri VI, 181-183.   
28 Forty-three percent of the letters about madness provide some indication of status, and these are 
randomly scattered throughout the 150 year period covered by this study, with no suggestion of change 
over time in terms of the frequency with which social status was mentioned nor in terms of the status of 
remission seekers. 
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been educated, and very few would even have been literate.  The supplicants would have 
been familiar with a number of methods of constructing a narrative, however.  The 
tradition of storytelling, the requirement of yearly confession, and the sermons and saints’ 
lives read to them by their priests all provided exempla for creating a coherent tale. 
The notaries who wrote the letters down and helped compose them were not only 
literate but Latinate.29  Since the royal notaries were often trained in law and remission 
letters were part of the greater legal system in France, legal questions about madness, 
such as those discussed in chapter three, were central to their construction.30  Some 
notaries were officially licencie en lois, many were ennobled by the king for their service 
as royal notaries, and a few rank among the famous French humanists of the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries, including Gontier Col and Jean de Montreuil, famous for their 
debate with Christine de Pizan on the subject of the Roman de la Rose.31  Often the 
positions were passed down from father to son or through other family connections, as 
genealogical studies of the notaries from later periods show.32  The fifteenth century saw 
                                                 
29 Many were university-trained, and some were canons before their career in the royal chancery.  
Information about the careers of fifty-one royal secretaries and twenty-four royal notaries under Charles VI, 
fifteen of whom overlap, can be found in the online database, "Opération Charles VI,"  (Laboratoire de 
Médiévistique occidentale de Paris).  Ten out of the sixty men listed were canons, and many of these held 
multiple ecclesiastical positions.   
30 Mireille Desjardins, in a discussion of royal notaries in the fifteenth century, notes that “Outre la langue 
et l’écriture latine et française, ils doivent connaître les droits coutumiers et romain, les ordonnances 
royales et la jurisprudence qui s’appliquent au royaume afin de comprendre les consequences légales des 
documents qu’ils rédigent.” Mireille Desjardins, “Les savoirs des notaires et secrétaires du roi et la 
géographie de la france d'après le manuel d'Odart Morchesne et un index de chancellerie," in Écrit et 
pouvoir dans les chancelleries médiévales: Espace français, espace anglais, ed. Kouky Fianu and DeLloyd 
J. Guth (Louvain-la-neuve: Collège Cardinal Mercier, 1997), 87-97, 88.  See also Lapeyre and Scheurer, 
Les notaires et secrétaires du roi sous les règnes de Louis XI, Charles VIII et Louis XII (1461-1515) . 
31 See Claude Gauvard, “Les clercs de la chancellerie royale française et l'écriture des lettres de rémission 
aux XIVe et XVe siècles," in Écrit et pouvoir dans les chancelleries médiévales: Espace français, espace 
anglais, ed. Kouky Fianu and DeLloyd J. Guth (Louvain-la-neuve: Collège Cardinal Mercier, 1997), 281-
292, 288.  For the documents from the debate between these notaries and Christine de Pizan, see Christine 
McWebb, ed., Debating the Roman de la Rose: A Critical Anthology (London: Routledge, 2006). 
32 Unfortunately, the most extensive studies of the identities of the royal notaries begin in the reign of Louis 
XI in 1461, towards the end of the period studied here.  See Lapeyre and Scheurer, Les notaires et 
secrétaires du roi sous les règnes de Louis XI, Charles VIII et Louis XII (1461-1515) .   
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a particularly important flowering of notarial writing outside the chancery, in both 
literary and political arenas.  The literary debate about the Roman de la Rose provides a 
vivid snapshot of the larger intellectual community in which the royal notaries took part.  
The Roman de la Rose survives in over 300 manuscripts and has been called one of the 
most read works of the Middle Ages.33  Certainly it was one of the most contentious.  
Those involved in the debate drew on an extensive knowledge of philosophy, law, 
theology, literature, and especially classical authors.  The participants, many of whom 
have been seen as France’s earliest humanists, included important fifteenth-century 
theologians from the University of Paris, such as Pierre d’Ailly and Jean Gerson; literary 
figures at court, particularly Christine de Pizan; and the royal notaries Jean de Montreuil 
and Gontier and Pierre Col.34  Claude Gauvard, in an article about the royal notaries, 
notes that “the letters signed by Gontier Col or Jean de Montreuil do not stand out from 
the quality of the rest.  These humanists reserved their genius for epistolary relations that 
were less constraining!”35  While this is certainly the case, and, indeed, one would not 
expect otherwise in terms of rhetorical exuberance, the notaries’ intellectual bonds 
nevertheless had an impact on their knowledge of and interest in particular subjects.   
Jean de Meun expanded Guillaume de Lorris’ brief Roman de la Rose between 
1270 and 1280, around forty years after the original author’s death, as Jean de Meun 
                                                 
33 Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun, Le Roman de la Rose: Édition d'après les manuscrits BN 12786 
et BN 378, ed. Armand Strubel (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 1992), 5. 
34 There is a vast literature on the relationships between these participants.  See André Combes, Jean de 
Montreuil et le Chancelier Gerson: Contribution à l'histoire des rapports de l'humanisme et de la théologie 
en France au début du xve siècle, Second ed., Études de Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Librairie 
Philosophique J. Vrin, 1973); Alfred Coville, Gontier et Pierre Col et l'humanisme en France au temps de 
Charles VI (Paris: Librairie E. Droz, 1934).  More recent work has been concerned with Christine de Pizan 
in addition to the men, particularly Sylvia Huot, The Romance of the Rose and its Medieval Readers: 
Interpretation, Reception, Manuscript Transmission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
35 Gauvard, “Les clercs de la chancellerie royale française," 288: “des lettres signées Gontier Col ou Jean 
de Montreuil ne tranchent pas sur la qualité de l’ensemble.  Ces humanistes réservent leur génie à des 
relations épistolaires moins contraignantes!”   
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claimed.  He turned the text into a philosophical allegory, where personifications of 
virtues and vices sought to instruct the Foolish Lover (Fol Amoureux) towards his goal of 
capturing the Rose, symbol of a woman’s maidenhead.  The Roman’s Foolish Lover 
wandered through a landscape filled with allegorical figures spouting classical authorities 
and examples before finally possessing his Rose.  Two of these figures, the Jealous 
Husband and the Duenna, proved particularly troubling to Jean de Meun’s critics.  The 
Jealous Husband claimed that no woman was pure and cursed the whole sex, while the 
Duenna proved these words by offering her services as a go-between for the Lover and 
Fair Welcome, whom he wished to woo into giving him access to his Rose.  The Roman 
raised philosophical questions of whether words were inherently bad and whether it was 
legitimate for an author to write from the perspective of a morally questionable person.   
The response to it began with the political question of French supremacy, since it 
filled the role of representative of the French language in humanist circles.  Petrarch, for 
example, argued that “orators and poets were not to be sought outside of Italy.”36  In 
1401, Christine de Pizan shifted attention to women’s social and political roles, a 
particularly potent area of debate at a time when the Hundred Years War made Salic Law 
central to Valois legitimacy.  The debate about language, focused both on the relationship 
between signifier and signified and the question of voice (i.e. whether a moral person 
should write immoral things if they are written in the character of an immoral person), 
was especially pertinent since Charles VI had passed a law making blasphemy a crime 
punishable by death.37  Language mattered, and the questions of who was speaking in a 
                                                 
36 Petrarch, Seniles 9.1: “oratores et poete extra Italiam non querantur.”  Quoted in McWebb, ed., Debating 
the Roman de la Rose: A Critical Anthology, 2. 
37 Henri Stein, Inventaire analytique des ordonnances enregistrées au parlement de Paris jusqu'à la mort 
de Louis XII (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1908), 153-154; Louis-Guillaume de Vilevault and Louis George 
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text, the author or a character, and of whether a word could be morally bad of itself or 
whether words were naturally good and only the object could be morally bad, held 
philosophical weight.  Indeed, this question may have seemed particularly compelling to 
the royal notaries, who engaged daily in the composition of narratives from the 
perspective of self-confessed criminals.  Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that these 
notaries were so firm in their defense of Jean de Meun’s Roman. 
While Jean de Montreuil and Gontier Col both wrote private letters in praise of 
Jean de Meun and in response to his critics, neither chose to directly enter into the public 
debate with Christine de Pizan, instead placing that challenge on the shoulders of Pierre 
Col, Gontier’s brother.  Jean de Montreuil sent a letter to Gontier Col in late July or early 
August 1401, calling upon Gontier to aid his defense of Jean de Meun and saying,  
it will be up to you as the leader, prince, and director of this undertaking to defend 
such a praiseworthy and beloved imitator, and to tread underfoot these sick and 
mad (malesanos et deliros) [critics] and to strengthen, arrange in order, and 
overlay my half-baked reasonings with the sharpness of your eloquence, 
inasmuch as I, relying on the confidence of your help and the wealth of your 
genius, have entered this battlefield, something I would otherwise not have 
done.38
 
Since Gontier Col had been responsible for introducing Jean de Montreuil to the Roman 
de la Rose, Jean argued that he was justified in seeking his friend’s aid in defending the 
work.  The imputation of a type of madness to the critics of the Roman is telling, 
particularly since Jean de Montreuil uses the word delirus, with its connection to 
delirious and raving madness.  Clearly these notaries were aware of and comfortable with 
                                                                                                                                                 
Oudard Feudrix de Bréquigny, eds., Ordonnances des Rois de France de la 3e Race: Dixième volume, 
Contenant les ordonnances de Charles VI, données depuis le commencement de l'année 1411 jusqu'à la fin 
de l'année 1418 (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1763), vol. 10, 243. 
38 McWebb, ed., Debating the Roman de la Rose: A Critical Anthology, 208-209: “Tuum ergo erit, dux, 
princeps rectorque huius cepti, laudatissimum et amatissimum imitatorem tuum defensare, et hos 
malesanos et // deliros conculcare ac ratiunculas meas indigestas disertie tue acumine validare, comere et 
linire, quatenus ego, qui auxilii tui confidentia ac ingenii ope fretus, campus hunc duelli introii, alias non 
facturus.”   
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the use of the literary and symbolic languages of madness and lovesickness.  When 
composing letters of remission, they certainly did not display their literary abilities, but 
nevertheless, the larger intellectual communities to which they belonged clearly 
influenced their concepts of narrative structure and their concerns about language. 
It is important to remember that letters of remission were joint efforts, co-
authored by the supplicants and the royal notaries who wrote the letter down.  Beyond the 
formulaic language surrounding the content of the letters, which was clearly composed 
by the royal notaries, it is not possible to say for certain which parts of the narrative were 
contributed by whom.  These narratives provide only one side of the story, although it is 
possible that the adverse party agreed to the pardon beforehand and thus had some 
control over the content of the letter.  Nevertheless, remission letters conceal multiple 
alternative narratives that cannot be recovered, at the same time as they reveal a complex 
and compelling story.  Bearing in mind that these letters were carefully constructed by a 
group of composers, and the resulting narrative had to be acceptable to all parties 
involved, how was Jehan de Moustier’s particular narrative constructed?  What 
mechanisms did his close family and the notary use to establish his madness and 
demonstrate that he could not be held responsible for the death of his father? 
 
II. Reconstructing a Life Narrative 
Jehan de Moustier’s letter of remission states that during the month of May, 1379, 
he began to exhibit behaviors that his family interpreted as madness.  The composers of 
his letter claimed that he “was utterly mad as is apparent by his crimes.”39  First, he “took 
himself to the woods and the fields, whistling to the birds and running.  He remained 
                                                 
39 AN JJ 118 fo 18v no 18: “soit pur fol comme il est apparu par ses crimes.” 
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there for two or three days such that he should perish from hunger, and the good people 
who found him brought him back.”40  After Jehan had repeated this behavior a few times, 
his father, Perrim, decided to take him to the shrine of Saint Titenerd at Gournay, north of 
Saint-Denis.41  At the saint’s shrine, he was chained up and left to await God’s mercy.  
Escaping from those chains, he was recaptured and held with two sets of chains, but he 
escaped from those as well, demonstrating an abnormal strength.   
When Jehan returned from the shrine, he was better for a time, but at the 
beginning of Lent in 1380 he began again to exhibit mad behavior, and the Marshal of 
Pontoise provided a particularly heavy set of chains to his father so that he could be 
controlled.42  When he broke out of that set, “a thing that did not seem possible for a man 
to do,” his father refused to rechain him.43  Once freed, Jehan proceeded to kill a heifer 
during the first week of Lent, which his family referenced as further proof of his 
madness.  His final and most serious crime also centered on food production: during a 
particularly hot week in September of the same year, the town mandated that anyone 
wanting to make bread needed to allow it to rise on Wednesday night and knead it on 
Thursday.  However, Jehan decided to begin making the bread at nones (around 3 p.m.) 
instead of waiting until the late evening, because he wanted to knead the bread that night, 
not the next day.  Perrim prevented him from doing so on Wednesday, but the next 
morning asked him if he was going to knead the bread.  Jehan, in a fit of rage brought on, 
according to the composers of his letter, partly by his madness and partly by anger that he 
                                                 
40 AN JJ 118 fo 18v no 18: “sen aloit par bois et par champs sifflant aus oiseaux coursent en demourant 
deux ou trois jours tant que il perissoix de faim et le ramenoient les bonnes genz qui le trouvoient.” 
41 Neither I nor anyone with whom I have discussed this letter have ever heard of a Saint Titenerd.  Indeed, 
the parish church in Gournay-sur-Marne is dedicated to Saint Arnoult. 
42 In this case, the mareschal was most likely “an officer of a court of law responsible for the custody of 
prisoners and for the keeping of order, and frequently entrusted with the keeping of a prison” as defined by 
the Oxford English Dictionary, which cites the earliest reference around 1300. 
43 AN JJ 118 fo 18v no 18: “qui ne sembloit pas possible chose afaire a homme.” 
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had not been allowed to knead the bread the night before, picked up “a stick called a 
‘basuche’ with which one trims the vines”44 and hit his father with it until he died.  When 
the local justice arrived and told him “you have killed your father” Jehan responded “he 
was only my father according to whispers.”45  The composers of Jehan’s letter explained 
that they did not merely fear for his life, but also for his immortal soul, since “if he were 
to suffer death for this, he does not have the memory or sense to recognize his creator.”46
The composers of this letter did not specify a primary cause of Jehan de 
Moustier’s madness, but it is clear that they made connections between the events that 
they noticed as unusual and the ultimate crime he committed.  In beginning to describe 
his madness, the letter composers emphasized that it was apparent from his “crimes.”  
Although his final “crime” was the murder of his father, his earlier acts appear less 
serious than that, particularly to a modern eye, but the composers of Jehan’s remission 
letter viewed these other events as “crimes” as well.  In this letter, criminal acts were 
caused by madness, and simultaneously provided proof that the criminal was mad, 
creating a circular logic that went uncontested.  While there is an intimate connection 
between crime and madness in these remission letters, there was no single definition of 
what constituted a mad crime, which makes these texts so interesting.  In Jehan de 
Moustier’s case, his mad behavior followed a particular and distinct pattern that centered 
on food production and consumption. 
                                                 
44 AN JJ 118 fo 18v no 18: “un baston appelle basuche dont on prongue les vignes.” 
45 AN JJ 118 fo 18v no 18: “tu as tue ton pere il dist que il nestoit son pere que dans oreille.”  I have chosen 
to translate “dans oreille” here as “according to whispers” because it resonates better than “in the ear.”  I 
have not been able to find proof that this is, in fact, a good colloquial translation, despite searching for a 
similar usage elsewhere, so I have chosen not to fully pursue this particular episode in Jehan de Moustier’s 
letter, although the inability to recognize familial relationships does seem to be an important facet of 
medieval conceptions of madness. 
46 AN JJ 118 fo 18v no 18: “se pour ce il souffroit mort il navroit memoire ne senz de recognoistre son 
createur.” 
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From Jehan’s letter it is possible to extract a compelling narrative of escalating 
mad behavior.  Jehan’s first episode of madness involved an inability to care for himself, 
as he ran through the fields and woods and did not eat anything for several days.  The 
trope of the mad person running in the fields would have been familiar from the biblical 
story of Nebuchadnezzar and literary figures such as the Arthurian heroes Yvain and 
Lancelot.  Running in the fields was in fact used as a proof of madness in some other 
remission letters,47 but the mention of a lack of sustenance was unusual.  Where the 
biblical figure Nebuchadnezzar ate grass48 and Chrétien de Troyes’ Arthurian knight 
Yvain ate raw meat,49 Jehan de Moustier engaged in “unholy anorexia.”50  Indeed, when 
he was finally captured and returned to the village, his family asserted that he was nearly 
dead from hunger.  Jehan’s starvation to the point of death strongly suggested that his 
inability to feed and care for himself threatened his own life.   
This reference to Jehan’s excessive starvation is particularly interesting in light of 
Jean Gerson’s contemporary attempts to limit what he saw as the excessive fasting that 
                                                 
47 For example, a sorcerer made people run through the fields because of madness in AN JJ 187 fo 89v no 
173 (in 1457) and AN JJ 208 fo 11 no 20 (in 1480).  A young boy who was guilty of theft was similarly 
known to run through the fields due to his madness in AN JJ 196 fo 192 no 307 (in 1470), as was a man 
who later committed murder in AN JJ 229 fo 22v no 44 (in 1497).  
48 Daniel 4:30. 
49 The consumption of uncooked food is held up as a proof of madness in Chretien de Troyes’ tale.  See 
Chrétien de Troyes, Le Chevalier au Lion; ou le Roman d'Yvain: Édition critique d'après le manuscrit B.N. 
fr. 1433, ed. David F. Hult, trans. David F. Hult (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 1994), 274. 
50 Here I am playing on Rudolph Bell’s concept of “holy anorexia.”  See Rudolph M. Bell, Holy Anorexia 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).  Bell’s work is controversial, and Carolyn Walker Bynum’s 
work has done much to challenge his perspective, arguing that control of food was a way in which women 
empowered themselves.  See Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious 
Significance of Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).  It is also 
necessary to note the more recent contribution to this debate by Nancy Caciola, Discerning Spirits: Divine 
and Demonic Possession in the Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).  Caciola argues that 
Bynum and others have overemphasized the hagiographical views of the confessors who wrote these 
women’s lives.  She contends that any examination of these women’s actions has to take into account the 
fact that they were seldom sanctioned by the church, and that the larger population viewed them with 
serious suspicion.  However, Caciola focuses solely on Gerson’s distinction between divine and demonic 
inspiration.  While this was admittedly Gerson’s main focus, his acknowledgement of mental disturbance is 
also significant. 
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many female mystics were practicing.51  Although Gerson’s main concern was with the 
possibility that actions that might appear holy could be inspired by the devil, he also 
noted the likelihood that they were signs of mental disturbance.  In his description of a 
woman who was admired for fasting, he explained his fear that she was not divinely 
inspired to do so by noting that she would binge whenever she stopped fasting.  After 
questioning her, he established that she did not follow the guidelines of a confessor in her 
decision to fast, but instead fasted because “she was unworthy to eat food.”  This 
sentiment, he explained to her, meant “that she was dangerously close to insanity.”52  The 
linkage Gerson perceived between madness and fasting was actually cyclical.  Madness 
could lead to fasting, but equally fasting could lead to madness.  He expounded on this 
idea at length, arguing that: 
[e]xcessive abstinence and drunken overeating both lead to a similar end, except 
that excessive abstinence is harder to remedy, for it brings incurable illness from 
brain damage and mental disorder.  It happens then through mania or rage or other 
melancholy passions that phantasms become so deeply rooted and buried in the 
brain that they are thought to be true objects that appear outside the mind.  A 
person believes that he or she can see or touch that which the external senses in no 
way perceive.  This passion becomes stronger until sometimes in this insanity a 
person will judge himself to be something else than he or she is.53
                                                 
51 Jean Gerson, “On Distinguishing True from False Revelations," in Jean Gerson: Early Works, ed. Brian 
Patrick McGuire (New York: Paulist Press, 1998), 334-364.  Although there is no direct evidence that royal 
notaries were interested in Gerson’s theological works, some of them were involved in epistolary 
communication with him in the debate over the Roman de la Rose, and may have been aware of his other 
projects.  Certainly the notaries, as educated men living in Paris, can be credited with an awareness of the 
larger discourse around discernment in this period. 
52 Jean Gerson, Oeuvres complètes, ed. Mgr Glorieux (Paris: Desclée & Cie, 1962), 10 vols., vol. 3: 
L'oeuvre magistrale, 43; Gerson, “On Distinguishing True from False Revelations," 344: “indignam quae 
pane vesceretur” and “periculo insaniae vicinam esse.” 
53 Gerson, Oeuvres complètes, 44; Gerson, “On Distinguishing True from False Revelations," 345: “Itaque 
ad par exitium vergunt abstinentia nimia et crapulosa voracitas; nisi quod irremediabilior est excessus in 
abstinentia; quia morbos affert incurabiles ex laesione cerebri et rationis perturbatione, quo fit ut per 
maniam aut furiam vel caeteras passiones melancolicas sic profundantur et intime radicantur phantasmata 
interius reservata in cerebro, quod esse reputantur verae res extrinsecus apparentes, et audire se putat homo, 
videre vel tangere quod nullo modo sensu exteriori percipitur.  Invalescit autem haec passio usque ad hanc 
aliquando insaniam ut judicet se homo aliud esse quam est; quemadmodum repertus est qui se murilegum, 
alius qui se gallum, alius qui se asinum, alius qui se mortuum reputaret.  Unde fuerunt nonnulli doctorum 
qui hac aegritudine percussum arbitrati sunt fuisse ipsum Nabuchodonosor, ut brutum animal se esse 
crederet et non veraciter induerit corpus belluinum.  Pleni sunt medicorum libri de portentuosis hujusmodi 
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The dangers of excessive fasting, according to Gerson, are physiological.  Starvation can 
cause mania, rage, or melancholy to such an extent that visions occur, and create a false 
image of reality.  Gerson’s theory connecting food consumption to madness may have 
been influenced by a wider social belief.  The composers of Jehan de Moustier’s letter 
seemed to believe that his madness caused him to starve himself, thereby exacerbating his 
madness and forming a dangerous cycle. 
In a second episode, after a period of sanity, Jehan de Moustier killed a heifer 
during Lent.  This was doubly problematic, and simultaneously violated both implicit and 
explicit rules governing animal slaughter in a medieval village.  A heifer is a cow that has 
not yet calved and Lent was a time when no one was supposed to eat it and the 
slaughtered cow would be wasted.  A cow, but especially a cow that could be expected to 
produce other cows, was a valuable commodity for a household.  There is evidence from 
the records of medieval estates, as well as archaeological evidence from the waste 
deposits of both estates and cities, suggesting that young, female animals that had not yet 
reproduced were not slaughtered, even by the wealthy.54  Similarly, although the major 
period for slaughter, especially of pigs but also of cows, was in late fall and early winter, 
animals were generally killed and taken to market in towns and cities throughout the 
                                                                                                                                                 
apparitionibus et judicorum corruptionibus ex laesione virium interiorum nascentibus.  De his ait 
Hieronymus quod magis indigent fomento Hypocratis quam aliorum consilio.” 
54 Kathleen Biddick, The Other Economy: Pastoral Husbandry on a Medieval Estate (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1989) used records from Peterborough Abbey in England and found, as might be 
expected, that female cows were not slaughtered until after they had reproduced, although males might be 
slaughtered young.  See also Monika Doll, Haustierhaltung und Schlachtsitten des Mittelalters und der 
Neuzeit: Ein Synthese aus Archäozoologischen, Bildlichen und Schriftlichen Quellen Mitteleuropas 
(Rahden: Internationale Archäologie, 2003), 283.  Doll looked at digs from towns, castles, monasteries, and 
sewers in Germany from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries, and found that seventy to ninety 
percent of slaughtered animals were two years old or more. 
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year, except during Lent.55  The slaughter of this particular animal at this particular time, 
according to the composers of the letter, provided proof of the return of Jehan de 
Moustier’s madness, which in this case was characterized as prodigality.  His wasteful 
behavior threatened his family’s food store, since he killed the cow before it had 
produced a new generation and when it could not be consumed.   
In the final episode recorded in the letter, he killed his father over a dispute about 
when to knead bread.  In this case, Jehan de Moustier’s desire to knead the bread early 
was a threat to the community as a whole.  The heat of the summer had caused fevers and 
illness in the town, and the decision to bake bread in the communal oven on a certain day 
and at a certain time was intended to protect the community from the excessive heat of 
baking.56  Jehan’s attempt to knead the bread early would have ruined the family’s bread, 
but the further implications of his desire to bake the bread at an inappropriate time would 
have been even more serious in the eyes of his neighbors.  Clearly, Jehan’s inability to 
comprehend both the simple and the complex relationships to food that were apparent to 
everyone else in his village led to serious problems, for his own health and that of others.  
The narrative of food production and consumption builds as the “crimes” build, to a 
climax where Jehan de Moustier threatened the community’s welfare and ultimately 
killed his father. 
                                                 
55 In a study of butchery records in two Italian towns, Gillian Clarke found that no animal’s meat was sold 
during Lent.  Gillian Clarke, “Town and Countryside in Medieval Italy: A Critical Evaluation of the 
Sources for Understanding the Mechanisms of Supply and Demand," Anthropozoologica 16 (1992): 75-82.  
See especially the tables on pages 78-79.  December was the month of slaughter in medieval calendars, and 
the butchers’ records studied by Clarke suggest that there was an increase in late fall and early winter, but 
there does not seem to be a single month for slaughter.  For the calendars, see Bridget Ann Henisch, The 
Medieval Calendar Year (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 127.  Interestingly, 
she sees a shift in the late fifteenth century towards images of buying meat in town, instead of images of 
slaughtering, but nevertheless the image of the “animal ‘harvest’” is generally in December. 
56 For more on communal ovens, see Marc Bloch, Land and Work in Mediaeval Europe (New York: 
Routledge, 1967), 153. 
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In attempting to comprehend a crime that appears inexplicable, the composers of 
remission letters for the mad reinterpreted the past of the individual, seeking a point of 
rupture where the person moved from sanity to madness.  This approach is similar to that 
used in hagiographical writings, where the saint’s later sanctity is allowed to bleed back 
into their childhood.57  It is clear in the letter for Jehan de Moustier that madness was 
inscribed through a certain pattern of behaviors that was recalled as constituting a rupture 
between expected and actual acts.  The retrospective consideration of Jehan’s actions in 
terms of his final crime allowed the composers of his remission letter to find a rationale 
for his behavior.  The ways in which madness is described and determined is embedded 
within the rhythm of medieval village culture, where food production and consumption 
were central to everyday life.  The composers of Jehan de Moustier’s remission letter did 
not concern themselves with medical or psychological causes of madness; rather their 
description of his inexplicable behavior sought a source for madness in terms of social 
interactions.  By “making sense” of the “insensible” through the development of a clear 
pattern only visible in retrospect, the composers created a narrative whereby Jehan’s final 
crime was comprehensible. 
 
III. Building the Story 
 Historians have recognized the value of remission letters for a long time, but until 
recently, most have mined the letters for anecdotal evidence, deconstructing the 
narratives in order to use them to construct other narratives.  Natalie Zemon Davis’ book 
about remission letters, Fiction in the Archives, focused scholarly attention on the ways 
                                                 
57 Many of the saints in Jacobus de Voragine’s Golden Legend, for example, are described as having 
exemplarily holy childhoods.  Jacobus de Voragine, The Golden Legend: Readings on the Saints, trans. 
William Granger Ryan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 2 vols.. 
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that these narratives about crime were constructed.58  Unlike the title of the work, which 
unfortunately has been misinterpreted by some scholars to mean that these sources cannot 
be used by historians,59 the book itself does not seek to destroy the value of the texts but 
to focus historians’ attention on their narratives, rather than on searching them for data.  
Like all historical sources, remission letters are not reflections of a factual reality that can 
be uncovered, but were constructed with a particular goal and include such information as 
is pertinent to that goal, formed into a coherent narrative thread.  Although Davis never 
insists on the letters’ fictionality as opposed to a possible “true” event, she shows the 
ways in which these letters were written using familiar narrative devices that, to her, 
sprang from a shared knowledge of storytelling techniques.60  Brian Stock observes that 
“stories do not convince us by their arguments but by their lifelikeness….  They may be 
verifiable, if we can get at the ‘facts’; but mainly they are believable.”61  The composers 
of remission letters would have been familiar with the process of creating a personal 
narrative of an event from storytelling and confession, which remission letters closely 
resemble.  Where confession creates a moralized story within the context of an 
omniscient God, remission moralizes within the context of a king who provides justice, 
but could, like God, be convinced to temper it with mercy.62  It is essential to recognize 
and explore the ways in which these letters were constructed, who was involved in their 
                                                 
58 Davis, Fiction in the Archives . 
59 This became clear to me in the question and answer sessions of a number of conference panels in which I 
participated, when members of the audience were “surprised” to learn that remission letters were not 
merely “fiction in the archives.” 
60 Davis, Fiction in the Archives . 
61 Stock, Listening for the Text: On the Uses of the Past 11. 
62 Hayden White sees historical narrative as intimately attached to moralizing.  See Hayden White, “The 
Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," Critical Inquiry 7, no. 1 (1980): 5-27.  While others 
have challenged his assertion that moralism is the only grounds on which a narrative can be given a 
conclusion, notably Louis O. Mink, “Everyman His or Her own Annalist," Critical Inquiry 7, no. 4 (1981): 
777-783, it is certainly true that the personal narratives in remission letters are intimately connected to a 
legal sensibility and a moralizing perspective. 
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redaction, and what kinds of discourses these composers pulled from to create their 
narratives.   
 More recent work on remission letters, particularly in France, has been influenced 
by Davis’ focus on narratives, and has tried to understand these texts on their own 
terms.63  Claude Gauvard’s study of letters from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
focuses on the way that these narratives reflect social perceptions of crime and criminal 
behavior.  Through statistical analysis of the letters, she demonstrates the relationship 
between particular social roles and types of crimes.64  Her evidence shows that madness 
was only used in one percent of remission letters.65  Gauvard notes that the actions of the 
mad as reported in remission letters “contrasts sharply with normality,”66 causing the 
close family and relatives involved in the remission letter to express astonishment; in her 
extensive study of crime she does not have space to analyze this astonishment or the 
behavior that elicited it, however.  In looking at the treatment of madness in medieval 
English courts, Barbara Hanawalt similarly argues that “[a]ll the cases of mental disorder 
described in the rolls seem to have been the sort that would be readily recognizable to the 
average person: abnormalities as obvious as attempted suicide, bizarre behavior, and 
motiveless violence.”67  While I cannot speak for the English legal documents Hanawalt 
                                                 
63 See especially Gauvard, "De Grace Especial" ; Claude Gauvard, “Grâce et exécution capitale: Les deux 
visages de la justice royale française à la fin du moyen âge," in La Justice Royale et le Parlement de Paris 
(XIVe-XVIIe siècle) ed. Yves-Marie Bercé and Alfred Soman (Paris: H. Champion, 1995), 275-290; 
Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau, “La jeune fille, le roi et le pendu: À propos de la grâce par mariage," in Le 
Pardon, ed. Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau, Xavier Rousseaux, and Pascal Texier, Cahiers de l'Institut 
d'Anthropologie Juridique No 3 (Limoges: Presses universitaires de Limoges, 1999); Saunier, “’Hors de 
sens et de mémoire’,"  ; Texier, “Rémissions et ëvolutions institutionnelles." 
64 Gauvard, "De Grace Especial" . 
65 Ibid., 436.  My own research has confirmed this number.  While Davis notes that madness was one of the 
eleven cases in which murder was pardonable by the king, she does not discuss how madness was 
elaborated in the letters of remission.  Davis, Fiction in the Archives, 12n. 
66 Gauvard, "De Grace Especial", vol. 1, 437: “tranchent sur la normalité.” 
67 Barbara Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict in English Communities, 1300-1348 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1979), 148. 
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refers to, in the French remission letters I have examined, the violence is not always 
“motiveless.”  Indeed, a woman who attacks or even kills her husband because she 
believes that he was unfaithful, however wrong she may have been, does not seem 
motiveless to a modern reader.68  If the family of such a woman in the Middle Ages 
believed this kind of violent behavior had to be explained by the onset of madness, then it 
is interesting for the very fact that it would not be recognizable to the “average person” 
today, but would have been to the “average person” of the fourteenth century.   
Annie Saunier’s essay on madness in the remission letters does an excellent job of 
examining two particular letters, but her small sample size limited the kinds of 
observations she was able to make.69  The two letters she focuses on are both unusual 
cases.  The first letter described a man who had gone mad from old age, recovered his 
sanity, and then had a relapse during which he murdered his wife.  The letter is unusual in 
its brevity, disposing of the details of the case in seven lines of the manuscript, filling the 
rest of the letter with the rhetoric of the king’s pardon.70  In the second letter, the mad 
man was rescued by local nobles who called in a physician to help him,71 providing the 
only case out of the 145 letters I have examined where a physician’s aid was sought for a 
mad person.   
Remission letters were detailed stories, carefully constructed in order to gain 
pardon without changing the perceived truth too much.  Pascal Texier argues that 
remission letters, despite the royal notary’s influence, express the “subjectivity” and 
                                                 
68 There are several letters that revolve around spousal jealousy and madness, as I discuss in more detail 
below.  See especially AN JJ 173 fo 33v no 63 (in 1425) (edited in Le Cacheux, ed., Actes de la 
chancellerie d’Henri VI, 181-183); AN JJ 146 fo 83v  no 162 (in 1394); AN JJ 173 fo 188v no 392 (in 
1426) (edited mistakenly as JJ 175 no 392 in Longnon, ed., Paris pendant la domination anglaise, 208); 
and AN JJ 173 fo 168 no 349 (in 1425). 
69 Saunier, “’Hors de sens et de mémoire.’"   
70 AN JJ 130 fo 118v no 217 (in 1387), edited in Ibid., 497-498. 
71 AN JJ 131 fo 103 no 166 (in 1387), edited in Ibid., 498-499. 
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“manner of speaking” of the supplicant.72  It is important to recognize, however, that, as 
with all legal records, these are not unmediated voices.  Although the words of the 
supplicant are, indeed, present, they have been redacted to an appropriate form through a 
cooperative effort with the notary, who knew what kinds of questions to ask and what 
kind of information was necessary to the letter.  Texier’s hopeful reading of the letters 
does not allow for the complexity of the interactions involved in the creation of these 
documents.   
 The narratives of remission letters each follow their own pattern to describe the 
individual’s life.  The terms used to describe madness and some of the themes of the 
narratives often follow familiar lines, but the letters are not formulae into which details 
are placed.  Rather, each narrative was specific to the person about whom the letter was 
written, and created constructs of normal and transgressive behavior around which to 
describe the case.  Composers of remission letters sought to create narrative coherence 
within the story of a particular person’s life.  While letters for sane criminals generally 
focused on the single day of the crime, letters for the mad often returned to earlier 
evidence of madness, describing the first remembered incidence of mad behavior and any 
others recalled in the intervening years. 
The pattern of the genre of remission letters began to develop in the mid-
fourteenth century.  Certain information was considered necessary to the genre, while 
other structural elements were added over time.  For example, only fifty-two of the one 
                                                 
72 Texier elaborates “à travers la mise en forme écrite par un clerc, c'est en tout premier lieu le point de vue 
du rémissionnaire qui est exprimé: ce sont donc sa subjectivité et sa manière de dire qui nous sont restitués 
pour l'essentiel.  L'objet de la présente communication est donc d'analyser comment le rémissionnaire joue 
avec les concepts de responsabilité ou de culpabilité, et quelles stratégies il est amené à développer pour 
obtenir sa grâce.” Texier, “'Doulant et courroucié': Les avatars de la culpabilité dans les lettres de rémission 
du XIVème siècle," 482. 
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hundred forty-five letters examined for this study included the age of the supplicant.  By 
the mid-fifteenth century, although many of the letters still lacked the age, in some letters 
the royal notaries left a blank space where the age would normally appear in the 
composition.73  In her examination of nineteenth-century settlement examinations under 
the English Poor Laws, Carolyn Steedman argues that from their inception in the 
seventeenth century, these “enforced narratives” developed a formulaic pattern based on 
what was considered necessary information in describing the life of a poor servant for the 
purposes of determining whether or not he or she was eligible for poor relief in a certain 
village.74  The narratives produced conceal the process of question and answer that 
provided the necessary information, much as remission letters conceal the collaboration 
between notary and supplicant that together created the final product, in which certain 
information is considered necessary and other details are left out. 
Because the letters enacted the king’s mercy, some of the personal information 
about the supplicants was clearly intended to demonstrate their status as worthy recipients 
of that mercy.  Many of them fit a particular mold of deserving supplicants described as 
“poor” people, often “laborers with their arms,” who were responsible for their spouses, 
children, and sometimes aged parents.  It was, of course, not always possible to fit each 
supplicant into this particular pattern, but all of them were described as being of “bonne 
fame et renomée,” or “good reputation and renown,” before the singular occurrence of the 
                                                 
73 The earliest ones I found came from Charles VII’s reign, in AN JJ 182-188.  During the same period, 
other details also became part of the expected formula.  AN JJ 187 fo 138v no 252 (in 1455) leaves a blank 
for the town in which the supplicant lived, AN JJ 182 fo 51v no 86 (in 1453) leaves a blank for the day on 
which the events occurred, and AN JJ 199 fo 134v no 129 (in 1463), interestingly, leaves a blank space for 
the name of the man who was murdered. 
74 Carolyn Steedman, Dust: The Archive and Cultural History (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
2002).  Thank you to Kali Israel for pointing out how Steedman’s work could be useful for my own.  For a 
similar kind of construction of proof in the medieval period, see Joel T. Rosenthal, Telling Tales: Sources 
and Narration in Late Medieval England (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003). 
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criminal act for which they sought remission.  If the supplicant was not of good 
reputation before the particular crime, any other crime or infraction he or she was 
accused of had to be listed within the letter that then would note that the supplicant was 
of good reputation with the exception of those cases.75
The moment of crime acts as the climax of a narrative that humbly requests 
(although, because only successful letters were recorded in the chancery archives, in all 
the letters examined here this request has already been granted) the action of the king in a 
future moment outside the bounds of the narration.  While the granting of remission is the 
intended end of the story within the text, it is not the only possible ending presented by 
the narrator, who envisions the likelihood of death in prison while awaiting trial, a trial 
that leads to execution, or a permanent, self-imposed exile.  The moral thrust of the 
narrative is that the king’s law is just but also merciful, and that, unlike his anonymously 
bureaucratic courts, he himself is willing to consider cases on an individual, personal 
level.  In fact, this distinction is purely rhetorical, which must have been eminently clear 
to the king’s subjects during periods of regency, particularly the regency for Henry, the 
English king, who was a baby at his coronation.  Instead of indicating a personal 
acquaintance with the woes of his subject, the French king’s granting of remission was in 
fact the bureaucratic royal system functioning in full force.76   
Although there was no single required pattern for telling a narrative of mad crime, 
certain types of information were included in most of these letters.   The kinds of 
                                                 
75 This most often occurred within letters written for soldiers, who sought remission for a long list of 
campaign-related crimes, such as looting, pillaging, and raping.  This is true in several of the earliest letters 
of remission, which can be found edited in Jassemin and Vallée, eds., Registres du Trésor des Chartes . 
76 Bernard Guenée has argued that Charles VI’s madness cemented the administrative powers of the 
government, which was forced to find a way to represent the king’s majesty without the king himself.  He 
notes that “[l]a maladie de Charles VI a appris au royaume à vivre, ou plutôt à survivre, tant bien que mal, 
sans le roi, en exultant la royauté.”  Bernard Guenée, La folie de Charles VI: Roi Bien-Aimé (Paris: Perrin, 
2004), 262. 
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narrative arcs used in the letters inscribed a number of shared beliefs about madness.  
Remission letters about the mad reflected the same kinds of conflicting images of 
madness that appeared in the legal discourse examined in chapter three.  Mad people 
were simultaneously feared for the threat that they represented (and most often, in the 
letters, had already carried out) and considered in need of protection from the 
repercussions of their actions.  The most common fear that remission letters revealed was 
that mad people would attack family members or themselves.  The crimes of the mad 
were focused inside the household, rather than outside, which distinguished them from 
the usual crimes for which remission was sought.  This may reflect a cultural perception 
of intrafamilial crime as more serious than interfamilial crime.  Indeed, one of the few 
crimes that were theoretically considered “irremissible” was parricide, showing 
continuity with the Roman perspective that saw the murder of a family member as 
particularly troublesome.77  Not all remission letters for parricide referred to madness as 
a mitigating factor,78 but there is a suggestive pattern to the types of crime viewed as 
outside the realm of reason. 
Many of the letters composed for mad people began from the rhetorical premise 
that they were not written from the perspective of the mad criminal.  Instead, in most 
cases, letters for mad people came from their “parens et amis charnels,” which can be 
translated as their “relatives and immediate family,” according to Claude Gauvard’s 
                                                 
77 Esther Cohen argues, on the basis of rhetoric about remission letters in royal charters rather than on the 
basis of the content of remission letters themselves, that “genuinely heinous crimes (such as parricide) 
neither deserved nor received pardon.”  Esther Cohen, The Crossroads of Justice: Law and Culture in Late 
Medieval France (New York: E.J. Brill, 1993), 50.  Clearly, the ideal did not match up to the real regarding 
parricide. 
78 See the tables in Claude Gauvard, "De Grace Especial": Crime, état et société en France à la fin du 
Moyen Age (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991), 2 vols., vol. 2, 614-620. 
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examination of the terms.79  Even in those cases where criminals seeking remission 
claimed to have been mad at the time of the act but sane when applying for the king’s 
mercy, they used the language of madness to emphasize the difference between their 
“normal” behavior and their behavior while out of their senses.  Letters for the mad, then, 
were at a rhetorical level even further removed from the event they purported to describe 
than the majority of remission letters, which were written from the perspective of the 
sane criminal.   
The choice to seek remission for a mad family member was not necessarily based 
entirely on sympathy or a desire to protect the mad person.  Gaining remission involved a 
large investment of money and travel by the family.  In addition, the family of the mad, in 
asking for the release of a mad person without punishment, was agreeing to take 
responsibility for controlling him or her in the future.  In thinking about the motivations 
for the family to seek remission for their mad relatives, it is important to remember that 
in most remission letters, the criminal’s feelings of shame came, not from having 
committed the criminal act, but from having been apprehended and imprisoned.80  The 
shame of having a family member in prison or executed may have been more damaging 
to the reputation than caring for a mad relative in the household.  Once a criminal case 
was brought to the attention of the local administrators of justice, the suspected 
perpetrator would be arrested and put in prison to await his or her trial.  Often suspects 
would flee, essentially initiating a self-imposed exile since a decision to leave was taken 
as irrefutable proof of guilt.  The concept of imprisonment as punishment was developing 
in this period, and it was occasionally cited as an alternative penalty if the culprit was 
                                                 
79 Ibid., 643-651. 
80 Texier, “'Doulant et courroucié': Les avatars de la culpabilité dans les lettres de rémission du XIVème 
siècle," 485. 
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incapable of paying the allotted fine.81  Letters of remission reveal a strong fear of 
prisons and a recognition of time spent in prison as punishing, even if it was not officially 
used for that purpose in the context of the letter.  Trials could be lengthy, and only the 
noble or wealthy could buy special treatment in prisons,82 so some remission letters, 
highlighting the unpleasant conditions there, implied that punishment had already been 
meted out through a particularly long imprisonment.  Remission letters often indicated 
further that the individual was likely to die before the completion of the trial, suggesting 
that prison could be a de facto capital punishment.   
 Remission rhetorically erased the crime, not only on the level of government 
officials, who could no longer pursue the pardoned criminal for that crime, but also on 
the level of the community, since the letter restored the criminal to his or her “good 
reputation and renown.”  As chapter three discussed, “fame,” or “good reputation,” was a 
legal category that could affect a person and his or her family’s standing in civil cases, 
ability to make contracts, and likelihood of conviction in criminal cases.83  At the same 
time, “good reputation” was also a social category, determined by and affecting one’s 
standing in the community.84  Threats to an individual’s reputation could threaten the 
                                                 
81 Jean Dunbabin, Captivity and Imprisonment in Medieval Europe, 1000-1300, ed. Miri Rubin, Medieval 
Culture and Society (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 112-113.  Dunbabin traces the development 
of the punitive function of prisons to the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  Prisons were still mainly 
intended to confine people who were awaiting trial, however.  See also Trevor Dean, Crime in Medieval 
Europe: 1200-1500 (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 120-124. 
82 Dunbabin, Captivity and Imprisonment, 125.  She notes, however, that the “drawback to affluence” was 
that, regardless of the results of a trial, the wealthy were often forced to pay higher charges for release. 
83 For an exploration of the development of the legal concept of infama, see Edward Peters, “Wounded 
names: The medieval doctrine of infamy," in Law in medieval life and thought, ed. Edward B. King 
(Sewanee, TN: University of the South Press, 1990), 43-89.  For an analysis focused more directly on 
France, particularly on the question of reputation in French customals, see F.R.P. Akehurst, “Good Name, 
Reputation, and Notoriety in French Customary Law," in Fama: The Politics of Talk and Reputation in 
Medieval Europe, ed. Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 75-
94. 
84 Barbara Hanawalt, "Of Good and Ill Repute": Gender and Social Control in Medieval England (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1-14.  Daniel Smail has shown how reputation played a large role in 
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reputation of the entire family, so the decision to seek remission for a mad family 
member may have been driven by a perceived need to restore the family’s good standing 
in the community.  
 Remission letters mediated between popular beliefs about madness held by the 
family telling the story and elite knowledge held by the notary writing the letter.  In a 
process of cooperative composition, the letter was written both for the king’s council, 
who had to ratify it, and for the adverse party, who had to approve its content in front of 
the judge.85  Thus, the information contained had to be comprehensible on many levels.  
Family members advocated for the mad by attempting to understand and explain 
madness, both as it existed inside the body and as it was externally performed.86  In an 
effort to describe behavior that they perceived as a sign of madness, the composers of 
remission letters wrote life histories of the mad, explaining actions in light of or in 
extreme contrast to the actions of madness.   
 
IV. Finding Evidence of Madness 
 Madness is often seen as the rupture of an identity, constructed through kin and 
communal ties, that can be perceived through certain actions signaling a shift between the 
                                                                                                                                                 
both civil and criminal legal cases in Marseille, looking particularly at the ways in which witnesses’ 
reputations could be challenged in order to erase their testimony.  Daniel Lord Smail, The Consumption of 
Justice: Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in Marseille, 1264-1423 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2003), 120-132. 
85 Gauvard, "De Grace Especial", vol. 1, 67. 
86 In talking about the performance of madness I am not trying to suggest that these people were falsely 
claiming to be insane, but rather highlighting the fact that the interiority of madness as a disease can never 
be accessed, leaving only the external signs of madness as an indicator of the internal state.  Thus, madness 
is performed and interpreted.  See Nancy Caciola, “Mystics, Demoniacs, and the Physiology of Spirit 
Possession in Medieval Europe," Comparative Studies in Society and History 42, no. 2 (2000): 268-306, 
268-306 for a discussion of these ideas as they relate to spirit possession. 
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person’s sane behavior and mad behavior.  Sylvia Huot, in discussing madness in 
medieval French literature, argues that  
[s]anity is the perfect concordance of a symbolically constituted identity, the 
performance through which that identity is staged, and the body that gives it 
material form; and madness can be understood as the dissolution of that construct.  
The onset of madness results in an incoherent relationship between body, 
performance, and social identity.87   
 
These “incoherent relationships” are defined and explored in remission letters as they are 
in the literary texts Huot references.  The causes of madness and the resultant behavior of 
the mad were both interpreted in terms that the family members composing the letter 
could access, and these terms described an individual who acted in a way that was no 
longer recognizable as part of the social identity the mad person had previously enacted.  
Madness was an observable phenomenon, defined through social interactions and 
perceptions.  As is clear from Jehan de Moustier’s letter, which revolved around food 
consumption and production, the specific patterns of individual cases were focused 
within their particular narrative.   
Remission letters give us a window into some of the methods the letter composers 
used to understand the crimes committed by the mad.  One of the ways in which 
medieval families coped with these crimes was by seeking to explain them.  While the 
actions of the mad could appear inappropriate and inexplicable to an external observer, 
within the context of the remission letter the composers justified the crime based on the 
mad person’s flawed perception of reality.  In contrast to the philosophy of the first-
century Greek physician Aretaeus, who believed that mad people saw as other people did 
                                                 
87 Sylvia Huot, Madness in Medieval French Literature: Identities Found and Lost (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 182. 
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but interpreted what they saw incorrectly,88 remission letters seem to suggest that mad 
people actually experienced a different reality.  From the rhetorical frame of the relatives 
and immediate family, the composers of these letters ultimately discussed the event from 
the perspective of the primary actor involved, resulting in complicated attempts to 
comprehend the motivations of a person perceived as mad.  Thus, some letters 
superimposed explicable motives onto the narrative of a mad crime in an effort to force 
the crime to be comprehensible.  Through these attempts an image of the internal 
viewpoint of a mad mind emerged.   
Unlike the more common murders in remission letters, which took place in 
taverns or on the street, generally after drinking and various forms of gambling, the 
crimes of the mad were much more likely to take place inside the home, and often the 
victim was a family member.  Therefore the violence of the mad was disquieting and 
difficult to explain.  Rather than describe it as motiveless and unexpected, however, 
remission letters cited common troubles, such as poverty, jealousy and guilt, either as 
direct causes of madness or as the results of a mad person’s flawed perception of reality.  
For example, in the case of Jehannette Voidié, who dropped her legitimate baby son in a 
well in 1423, the composers of her letter explained that during her pregnancy she had 
been concerned about whether the family could support another child, and that she had 
often spoken of herself as a bad mother.89  These concerns, according to the composers of 
the letter, were completely groundless, since her husband could support another child, but 
                                                 
88 George Rosen, Madness in Society: Chapters in the Historical Sociology of Mental Illness (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1968), 97. 
89 Madness was often linked to infanticide cases where the child was legitimate, since there was no 
culturally recognized reason to get rid of or hide a legitimate birth.  
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Jehannette’s understanding of reality was skewed.90  Instead of suggesting that she threw 
her child in the well for no discernable reason, the composers of the letter tried to 
understand the crime.  The problem was in Jehannette’s flawed perception of reality, not 
only in terms of her inability to recognize that her family could support another child, but 
also in her belief that killing the child was a reasonable response to the crisis she 
supposedly perceived. 
Some kind of proof of madness was necessary for these letters.  Both religious 
and legal discourse expressed concern about the possibility of abusing the insanity 
defense, as is clear both from the biblical story of David’s imitation of madness and the 
fears expressed by Philippe de Beaumanoir in his customary law book.91  The idea that 
mad behavior was believed to be instantly recognizable and, indeed, easily replicable by 
the sane, is significant for thinking about the meaning of madness in criminal cases.  
There were many ways to describe madness, but each one sought to provide proof, not 
only that the individual was unquestionably behaving as a mad person would, but also 
that this madness was a long-standing issue in his or her life and not merely enacted at 
the moment of the crime.  Because madness was acknowledged as imitable behavior, 
many of the letters provide case histories demonstrating that this was not a case of 
simulation.  When constructing these narratives of madness, some composers mentioned 
concrete causes that could serve as the origin for mad behavior.  Much like a 
hagiographer seeking an originary moment of holiness, the supplicants sifted through 
their memories in search of a particular, transformative event.  These ranged from the 
simple to the extremely complex.     
                                                 
90 AN JJ 172 fo 239 no 430, edited in Longnon, ed., Paris pendant la domination anglaise, 130-133. 
91 See First Book of Kings 21:11-15 and Philippe de Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, ed. Amédée 
Salmon (Paris: A. Picard et Fils, 1970-1974), 3 vols., vol. 2, chapter 52, paragraph 1575 
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Illness and External Causes of Madness   
 Not all remission letters posited a cause of the madness they describe, and some 
simply refer to madness that seems to have been a permanent state from birth.92  
However, some composers chose to describe a moment of origin in an effort to provide a 
narrative arc of madness in the person’s life.  Those that did so discussed many different 
possible catalysts for madness.  One common perceived cause of madness was illness, 
often a fever that made the person act in unexpected and inexplicable ways.93  This 
explanation usually occurred in cases of suicide, where a recent illness was cited as a 
trigger for the eventual self-murder perpetrated while mad and therefore not culpable.  It 
was also understood that a blow to the head could cause temporary or permanent damage 
to a person’s brain.  Bewitchment by a sorcerer was mentioned as a source of madness 
increasingly from the middle of the fifteenth century.94  The earliest reference to sorcery 
appeared in 1404, when a mad man chased a woman and beat her to death with a rock, 
screaming, “old whore, you have bewitched me,”95 but it was not until the 1450s that 
sorcerers appeared in the remission letters as directly causing madness.96  Another 
perceived external catalyst for madness was the depredations of war, which robbed a 
                                                 
92 See particularly AN JJ 114 fo 70v no 147 (in 1378); AN JJ 158 fo 165 no 303 (in 1404); AN JJ 174 fo 7 
no 17 (in 1427); AN JJ 175 fo 133 no 369 (in 1434); AN JJ 188 fo 10 no 15 (in 1458); and AN JJ 221 fo 32 
no 39 (in 1490). 
93 This is also apparently true in records of medieval English law courts dealing with criminal cases.  Sara 
Butler, "Frenzied, Feverish, and Possessed: Homicidal Insanity and the Medieval English Courts," in 
International Congress on Medieval Studies (Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan: 
Unpublished Conference Paper, 2007). 
94 This fits the chronology of witchcraft literature.  See especially Norman Cohn, Europe’s Inner Demons: 
An Enquiry Inspired by the Great Witch-hunt (London: Sussex University Press, 1975); Karen Jolly, 
Catharina Raudvere, and Edward Peters, Witchcraft and Magic in Europe Volume 3: The Middle Ages, ed. 
Bengt Ankarloo and Stuart Clark (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002); Jeffrey Burton 
Russell, Witchcraft in the Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972) 
95 AN JJ 158 fo 168 no 360, edited in Paul Guérin, Recueil des documents concernant le Poitou contenus 
dans les registres de la chancellerie de France, Archives historiques du Poitou (Poitiers: Société française 
d'imprimerie et de librairie, 1909), vol. 8, vol. XII, 38-41: “Pute veille, tu m'as encaraté.”   
96 See AN JJ 181 fo 67v no 123 (in 1452); AN JJ 182 fo 51 no 85 (in 1453); AN JJ 182 fo 53 no 88 (in 
1453); and AN JJ 182 fo 53v no 90 (in 1453) for the earliest cases I found. 
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person of his or her livelihood and stability, usually driving him or her to commit suicide 
in despair and melancholy. 
The mental repercussions of being hit on the head were well understood in the 
Middle Ages, and in fact often the temporary results of being “stunned” were used as an 
explanation for questionable actions in tavern brawls.97  It was also understood that 
getting hit over the head hard enough could cause lasting damage, as was the case for 
Guillaume Audoyn who had fallen off a ladder in 1403 and hit his head.  Guillaume was 
considered an idiot, out of his senses and memory, for two years before anything serious 
occurred.  Indeed, he was capable of continuing to perform manual labor, since disaster 
struck while he and his wife were loading manure onto a cart.  He believed that she was 
mocking him with her movements, and “because he was stupid and idiotic through lack 
of sense, angered and incensed” he knocked her over with his pitchfork and hit her 
several times, then drove away with the cart.98  When he returned and found his wife 
dead, he was surprised and angry, believing that someone else had done it.  Indeed, this 
description of his actions after murdering his wife further indicated his disturbed mind, 
since he did not remember killing her and therefore did not flee the scene.  The 
composers of Guillaume Audoyn’s letter constructed a logical narrative to explain why 
he would murder his wife and why he did not react to her death in a “normal” way.  His 
type of permanent stupidity caused by an accident was not considered particularly serious 
until he committed this crime, since he was still capable of working and had managed to 
                                                 
97 See the references to becoming “estourdie” after a blow to the head in AN JJ 220 fo 227v  no 380 (in 
1489); AN JJ 209 fo 55 no 93 (in 1480); AN JJ 199 fo 317v  no 502 (in 1465); AN JJ 131 fo 39v no 69 (in 
1387); AN JJ 172 fo 113v  no 221 (in 1422); and AN JJ 173 fo 250v no 524 (in 1426). 
98 AN JJ 160 fo 70v no 91, edited in Paul Guérin, Recueil des documents concernant le Poitou contenus 
dans les registres de la chancellerie de France, Archives historiques du Poitou (Poitiers: Société française 
d'imprimerie et de librairie, 1909), vol. 7, 80-82: “pour ce qu'il estoit sourt et ydiot par non sens, yré et 
courroucé de ce.” 
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do so for two years without any adverse affects.  Nevertheless, his lack of comprehension 
was dangerous, because he misinterpreted his wife’s actions as mocking.  His general 
lack of sense had much more serious repercussions, due to his inability to recognize his 
wife’s actions as those of a woman lifting manure into a cart. 
A fever or other disease was often mentioned as the source of a temporary 
madness that led in many cases to suicide.  Interestingly, illness could even be seen as a 
legitimate catalyst for suicide without the addition of madness, as it was in the case of 
Jehan du Puy, who was purportedly on his deathbed due to illness in 1420.  He had made 
his will, confessed, and received extreme unction before cutting his own throat.  The 
composers of his letter explained his actions by suggesting that he committed suicide 
because of “temptation of the enemy, because of the oppression of his illness, or from 
some other cause,”99 but they did not suggest madness as an excuse.  Other letters, in 
contrast, focused particularly on the ways in which illness could lead to a frenetic or 
melancholic state that made the person in question no longer responsible for any action.   
The medical knowledge available to the average person in the Middle Ages was 
not particularly complex, but it is clear from the remission letters that some general ideas 
of illness and health were shared commonly.100  The royal notaries were not likely to be 
trained in medicine, but their understandings of the body would have been more informed 
by medical theory than those of the people seeking remission.  Certainly, they would 
have been aware of the medical terms available to speak about madness.  Madness was 
                                                 
99 AN JJ 171 fo 94v no 156: “pour ce que par temptacion de lennemj pour cause de loppression de maladie 
ou autrement il sest coppes la gorge en commectant homicide de lui mesme.” 
100 See Marie-Christine Pouchelle, The Body and Surgery in the Middle Ages, trans. Rosemary Morris (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990).  Pouchelle examines Henri de Mondeville’s fourteenth-
century Chirurgie as a central piece from which to extrapolate about the metaphorical world of the body in 
the Middle Ages.  See especially her discussion of methodology on pages 95-100. 
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believed to spring from an imbalance of the humors, and could follow a serious case of 
another disease.  Some remission letters built on this theory, describing a previous illness 
such as a fever as a cause of madness.101  Medical texts described four distinct types: 
frenzy, mania, melancholy, and lethargy, each of which corresponded to an excess in one 
of the humors.  Avicenna’s work on melancholy made it the source for all types of 
madness, breaking down the separation of the humors and explaining that all four 
humors, when burnt, could turn into melancholy.  Each type of burnt humor created a 
particular type of madness, however, with blood creating joy and laughter, phlegm 
creating sloth, yellow bile creating frenzied violence, and black bile creating “great 
thoughtfulness and less agitation and frenzy except when the patient is provoked and 
quarrels, or nourishes a hatred which he cannot forget.”102  Of these four categories, only 
frenzy and melancholy appear in the remission letters.   
 Jehan Massetirer, for example, suffered from melancholy in 1394.  The 
composers of his letter recounted the extreme lengths to which he went to kill himself.  
Having fallen ill from a “natural sickness” and even having had a candle placed in his 
hand, indicating that he was on his deathbed and receiving extreme unction, Jehan 
Massetirer’s natural illness progressed into a state of madness.  The madness acted as an 
extension of the illness, increasing the severity of it and causing him “because of 
melancholy of the head” to get up from his sickbed and leave the house.103  He walked 
down to the river, planning to drown himself.  However, his wife, who was instrumental 
                                                 
101 Thirty of the one hundred forty-five letters examined mention a “maladie,” either as the original source 
of the madness or as an integral part of the madness. 
102 Avicenna, Liber canonis, quoted in Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, Saturn and 
Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art (London: Nelson, 1964), 88-
89.  
103 AN JJ 146 fo 65rv no 129: “maladie naturele”; “cathandelle en la main cuidant que il deust trespassee vi 
depuis le lendemain”; “par merancolie de teste.” 
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in seeking the letter of remission, which responded to the supplication of Jehan 
Massetirer’s “wife and close family,”104 followed him.  With the help of two passersby, 
she pulled him out of the water and asked why he had allowed himself to fall into the 
river.  Jehan Massetirer, “full of fatuity or of sickness,” responded “that they had sinned 
greatly in taking him out and that he needed to die.”105  Although they were able to get 
Jehan Massetirer back to his house and into his bed, he merely waited until he had been 
left alone with a neighbor before hitting her over the head and throwing himself into the 
well to drown.  Illness, then, could instigate a desire for death that was interpreted by the 
family as madness.  Jehan Massetirer’s madness is evocative of an extreme literalism.  He 
“needed to die,” perhaps because he had already received extreme unction.  While the 
assurance that a suicide had been reconciled with God before going mad and seeking 
death could have been intended merely as a mitigating factor in his or her favor, in this 
letter it is given an unexpected weight through Jehan Massetirer’s speech.  The 
composers of his remission letter opened the possibility that it was the sacrament itself 
that ultimately led to his death. 
 Other cases provide a clearer idea of the kinds of sickness that were seen as 
potential catalysts for madness than simply “natural sickness.”  In one case from 1421, 
Denisot Sensigaut fell into an “illness of heat” that turned into “frenzy,” like Jehan 
Massetirer, only after he had been given extreme unction.106  In another from 1404, 
André Guibretea suffered from “caduc,” or falling sickness, vulgarly known as the 
                                                 
104 AN JJ 146 fo 65rv no 129: “humble supplicacion de la femme et amis charnelz de feu Jehan 
Massetirer.” 
105 AN JJ 146 fo 65rv no 129: “le qel plain de fatuite ou de maladie quel avion respondi quils avoient fait 
grant pechie de lentue hors et que il ydeuoit mourir.”  
106 AN JJ 171 fo 244v no 429, edited in Longnon, ed., Paris pendant la domination anglaise, 19-21: 
“maladie des chaleurs”; “il est cheu en frenoisie.” 
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“beaumal.”  Whenever he suffered from it, it caused him to become furious and mad, one 
day leading him to kill an old woman with a rock, yelling at her “Old whore, you have 
bewitched me.”107  As referenced above, this particular case is significant because it is 
the earliest letter that mentions sorcery.  However, despite recording André’s words that 
accused the woman of sorcery, the composers of the letter of remission explicitly 
connected his frenzied behavior to his falling sickness, not to sorcery.  It would take 
another fifty years before other letters would connect madness directly to sorcery.  Here, 
arguably, the illness was the source of his madness, and no reference is made to the 
possibility that the woman killed deserved to die due to her reputation as a sorcerer. 
Beginning in the 1450s remission letters appeared that blamed sorcerers directly 
for having caused mad or possessed behavior.  The remission letters were generally not 
intended for the mad person, who usually had not committed any crime, but for the mad 
person’s family and neighbors who had sought out a renowned sorcerer and killed him or 
her in an attempt to break the spell.  Chapter five will consider in more detail the 
significance of this vigilante justice for the communities involved.  The questions at hand 
here are the kinds of popular and elite concepts of sorcery upon which these letter 
composers drew.  Sorcery led one girl in 1457 to “run crazily around the fields 
completely naked”108 and a man in 1480 to become “out of his senses and memories” and 
impotent.109  In another case, a man imprisoned in 1496 for having killed a sorcerer 
explained that the sorcerer in question had caused his sister to “fall into a great 
inconvenience of illness such that she was greatly troubled in her sense and 
                                                 
107 AN JJ 158 fo 168 no 360, edited in Guérin, Recueil des documents concernant le Poitou, 38-41: “cheu 
du mal caduc, appellé vulgalment le beaumal (sic), dont il est coustumier à souvent cheoir et estre malade, 
et d'estre furieux et fol à l'yssue d'icelle maladie”; “Pute veille, tu m'as encaraté.” 
108 AN JJ 187 fo 89v no 173: “courroit folle parmy les champs toute nue.” 
109 AN JJ 208 fo 11 no 20: “hors du sens et memoire.” 
  193 
understanding and was completely incensed and in danger each day of precipitating 
herself and the fruit with which she was at the time pregnant.”110  The idea that witchcraft 
could be used to make other people mad was current in court circles in the late fourteenth 
and early fifteenth century, when the French nobility was seeking an explanation for 
Charles VI’s madness.111  Indeed, as discussed in chapter two, when Jean sans Peur, duke 
of Burgundy, arranged for the murder of Louis, duke of Orléans and brother of the king, 
he justified the act by accusing Louis of causing Charles VI’s madness with the aid of 
sorcerers.112  Many scholars have addressed the burgeoning interest in sorcery that can be 
seen in the mid-fifteenth century, suggesting that popular belief and elite concern were 
coming together at this time.113  The belief that sorcery could cause illness and 
particularly madness was developed further in fifteenth-century treatises by Johannes 
Nider and Heinrich Institoris.114  It is possible that the supplicants seeking remission 
were aware of these shifting attitudes in religious and intellectual circles from sermons, 
                                                 
110 AN JJ 227 fo 32 no 62: “cheult en grant inconvenant de maladie tellement quelle fut fort troublee de son 
sens et entendement et estoit toute incensee et en dangier de chacun jour precipiter elle et le fruit dont pour 
lors estoit ensaincte.” 
111 M. L. Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, contenant le règne de Charles VI, de 1380 
à 1422, Éditions du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques (Paris: L'imprimerie de Crapelet, 1842; 
reprint, 1994), 6 vols., vol. 2, 24-25. 
112 Alfred Coville, Jean Petit: La question du tyrannicide au commencement du XVe siècle (Paris: A. 
Picard, 1932) published an excerpt from Jean Petit’s Justification on pages 314ff.  See also Jan R. Veenstra, 
Magic and Divination at the Courts of Burgundy and France: Text and Context of Laurens Pignon's Contre 
les devineurs (1411) (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 36-67 for a discussion of Petit’s work in the context of the 
Dukes of Burgundy and their interest in sorcery.   
113 See the articles in Jolly, Raudvere, and Peters, Witchcraft and Magic in Europe Volume 3: The Middle 
Ages ; Pierrette Paravy, “À propos de la genèse médiévale des chasses aux sorcières: Le traité de Claude 
Tholosan, juge dauphinois (vers 1436)," Mélanges de l'École française de Rome 91 (1979): 333-379, and of 
course the seminal studies from the 1970s, Russell, Witchcraft in the Middle Ages  and Cohn, Europe's 
Inner Demons. 
114 Henricus Institoris and Jacobus Sprenger, Malleus Maleficarum, ed. Christopher Mackay, trans. 
Christopher Mackay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2 vols., vol. 1: The Latin Text; Jean 
Nider, “Formicarius Livre II, chapitre 4, et Livre V, chapitre 3, 4, 7," ed. Catherine Chène, in L'imaginaire 
du sabbat: Édition dritique des textes les plus anciens (1430 c. - 1440 c.), ed. Martine Ostorero, Agostino 
Paravicini Bagliani, and Kathrin Utz Tremp (Lausanne: Section d’histoire, Faculté des lettres, Université de 
Lausanne, 1999).  These texts and the lynchings of witches are discussed in more detail in chapter five. 
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and certainly the royal notaries would have been familiar with the treatises and their 
impact on legal discourse. 
In the case of sorcery, the fears of madness were directed outwards, towards a 
source that could be located and punished, rather than inwards, towards a disease.  
Through a similar linkage of madness to an external cause, war was viewed as a potential 
catalyst.  In this case the fault was external, but it was also inevitable and irreparable.  
These letters were not about an attempt to empower oneself by seeking vigilante justice, 
but the despairing cry of a population affected by wars that they were unable to avoid.  
The period under study includes some of the most serious fighting of the Hundred Years 
War in France, and letters about peasants who, according to their families, were driven 
mad by the destruction of their livelihood at the hands of the soldiers indicate that war 
was viewed as a traumatic event for the population at large.   
It is clearly beyond the scope of this study to enter into the continuing debate over 
whether the French peasants were the greatest sufferers in the Hundred Years War, and 
whether their sufferings contributed to the peasant uprisings of the period, but it is worth 
noting the ways remission letters have been used in support of this argument and what 
that means for any reading of these particular narratives.  Jules Michelet’s Histoire de 
France was the first book to posit the thesis, and there have been many other proponents 
and opponents since.115  Christopher Allmand has carried on Michelet’s argument, 
although he focuses on peasant suffering, making use of the term “non-combatants” to 
refer to the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century peasants, and relying on sermon literature 
                                                 
115 Jules Michelet, Histoire de France: Nouvelle édition, revue et augmentée (Paris: Librairie Abel Pilon, 
1876), 19 vols., vol. 4, 287: “Les souffrances du paysan avaient passé la mesure; tous avaient frappé 
dessus, comme une bête tombée sous la charge; la bête se releva enragée, et elle mordit…. Dans cette 
guerre chevaleresque que se faisaient à armes courtoises les nobles de France et d’Angleterre, il n’y avait 
au fond qu’un ennemi, une victime des maux de la guerre; c’était le paysan.”       
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and supplications to the papal court by French churches to show that these peasants’ 
livelihoods were affected by the war.116  Nicholas Wright, though he does not deny that 
peasants did indeed suffer, insists that the combatants suffered as well.  He also notes that 
the wholesale destruction of peasant property would not have been in the best interest of 
the nobility, which depended on peasant land cultivation for food, and points out the 
acknowledged differences between the noble armies and the brigands and pillagers that 
took advantage of the war to wreak havoc in the countryside.  He also suggests that the 
peasants were willing and able to fight back, using remission letters as evidence of 
brigandage and peasant resistance.117  Regardless of whether the peasants suffered more 
from the war than the gens de guerre who were fighting it, it is clear that the French 
countryside provided provisions for the armies that moved through their lands, whether 
those provisions were sought under the guise of payment for protection or as more direct 
looting.  France was often in a state of turmoil and, in the imaginations of the general 
public, the pillaging and brigandage surrounding the war with England and the civil wars 
among the French nobility was detrimental to the livelihoods as well as to the mental 
stability of the people.   
                                                 
116 Allmand first proposed this terminology, which he took from contemporary discussion of the Vietnam 
War, in Christopher Allmand, “The War and the Non-combatant," in The Hundred Years War, ed. Kenneth 
Fowler (London: MacMillan Press, 1971), 163-183, but it can also be found in Christopher Allmand, The 
Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300-c.1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988) and Christopher Allmand, “War and the Non-Combatant in the Middle Ages," in Medieval 
Warfare: A History, ed. Maurice Keen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 253-272.   
117 See Nicholas Wright, “French Peasants in the Hundred Years War," History Today 33, no. 6 (1983): 38-
42; Nicholas Wright, Knights and Peasants: The Hundred Years War in the French Countryside 
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1998); Nicholas Wright, “'Pillagers' and 'Brigands' in the Hundred Years 
War," Journal of Medieval History 9 (1983): 15-24; Nicholas Wright, “Ransoms of Non-combatants during 
the Hundred Years War," Journal of Medieval History 17 (1991): 323-332. 
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Letters mentioning madness as a result of pillaging appeared most regularly 
during the period of English rule and civil war,118 and most were written to explain 
suicides.  In the summer months of 1424, in fact, three different women were granted 
remission for committing suicide because of madness brought on by the wars being 
fought in their neighborhood.  Although some men committed suicide due to losses 
caused by war, in these cases madness was not mentioned as an ancillary reason.119  
While suicide does not seem to have been considered a gendered response to war, 
madness leading to suicide appears to have been.120  Indeed, the only references to the 
madness of men related to war was to the “youthful folly” of those men seeking 
remission for fighting for the “enemy” or becoming a brigand, and the “lack of sense” 
that caused a man who had lost his livelihood during the war to violate trade sanctions by 
selling food to the enemy, or in enemy-occupied territory.121   
                                                 
118 France’s political situation was particularly messy during and after Charles VI’s reign.  Through the 
Treaty of Troyes, arranged in 1420, Charles VI disinherited his son, Charles, in favor of the English king, 
Henry V, who married Charles VI’s daughter Catherine.  Henry V became regent of France until Charles 
VI’s death, but Henry died in 1422, mere months before Charles, who left his newborn grandson, Henry VI 
of England, as king of France.  Charles VII set himself up as an alternative monarch in the Loire valley, but 
was unable to retake Paris and the north until Joan of Arc came to his aid in 1429.  Indeed, even with her 
help, it was not until 1438 that Charles VII finally replaced the English rule.  For more on all of this, see 
chapter two of this dissertation; Allmand, The Hundred Years War ; Françoise Autrand, Charles VI: La 
folie du roi (Paris: Fayard, 1986); R.C. Famiglietti, Royal Intrigue: Crisis at the Court of Charles VI, 1392-
1420 (New York: AMS Press, 1986); Guenée, La folie de Charles VI . 
119 See AN JJ 130 fo 152v no 269 (in 1387) and AN JJ 166 fo 213 no 317 (in 1412). 
120 Despite the concentration on the tangible negative effects of war on peasants in the French countryside, 
none of the many articles and books on the topic have considered psychological aspects.  One recent study 
on women’s roles during the Hundred Years’ War uses chronicle accounts and some letters to valorise the 
women in question, without addressing the ways in which these narratives of strong women or of entire 
communities, including women, joining in to help with the defense of a town may reflect the desires and 
goals of the chronicler or letter-writer.James E. Gilbert, “A Medieval 'Rosie the Riveter'?  Women in 
France and Southern England during the Hundred Years War," in Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus, ed. 
L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagey, History of Warfare (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 333-361. 
121 For the “folie et jeunesse” leading to joining the enemy’s army or brigandage, see AN JJ 172 fo 66 no 
131 (in 1422); AN JJ 174 fo 101 no 228 (in 1428).  For the “non sens” or “folie et ignorance” that caused 
people to sell flour or other foods to the enemy or in enemy-occupied lands, see AN JJ 172 fo 261 no 465 
(in 1424); AN JJ 172 fo 310 no 558 (in 1423); AN JJ 175 fo 133 no 369 (in 1434). 
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One war-related case appeared in a letter from May of 1424, when Henriette, wife 
of Jehan Charnel, committed suicide in the town of Montagny-Sainte-Félicité near Senlis.  
According to her family and relatives, a company of soldiers had come to Montagny 
looking for provisions while Jehan Charnel was away in Picardy selling apples.  The 
soldiers found Jehan Charnel’s mare and appropriated it and two robes from Charnel’s 
house.  Henriette attempted to prevent them, but was so badly beaten for her pains that 
she lay bedridden for fifteen days afterwards.  Eight days later, the soldiers returned and 
found their second horse.  This time Jehan Charnel, who had returned home, tried to 
prevent them, but he was no more successful than his wife had been.  When the 
bedridden Henriette was told that their second horse was gone, as well, she was so 
angered and displeased that she became “troubled in her good sense and memory,” saying 
several times each day that they had lost everything by losing their horses.122  This 
narrative suggested that Henriette’s anger at losing everything provided sufficient cause 
for her to go out of her mind and hang herself.  The idea that the loss of goods could lead 
to madness appears in several letters.  Perrote de Courcelles, another woman who went 
mad due to the depredations of war had, according to the letter composed by her family 
and relatives, “lost her family and goods such that from anger and displeasure about it she 
was made to fall into a sickness which held her for the space of four or five months from 
which she was totally idiotic without having true understanding.”123  Here the loss 
described included not only goods but also people, without whom Perrote fell into an 
illness that led her to become mad and finally use a knife to cut her own throat.  Thus 
                                                 
122 AN JJ 172 fo 266 no 474: “troublee en son bon sens et memoire.” 
123 AN JJ 172 fo 340 no 614: “perdu ses amis et biens dont par courrouz et desplaisir de ce elle feust cheute 
en maladie laquelle la tenue par lespace de iiij a v mois dont elle estoit tout ediotte sans avoir vray 
entendement.” 
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remission letters demonstrate the psychological as well as the material devastation of 
war. 
Emotional Causes of Madness 
 In complicated ways, madness was seen as potentially caused by powerful 
emotions.  As the letters about loss of property during the war indicate, grief about loss 
was a powerful emotion that could cause people to act in unexpected ways.  Some 
remission letter composers went even further, providing explanations that explored the 
inner workings of a person’s mind, focusing on a perceived inability to fulfill familial and 
household roles, guilt, or familial conflicts as catalysts for madness.  While some of these 
emotions, such as jealousy, anger, and despair, are actually named (jalousie, courroucie, 
and desespere), others are described in great detail, without being given a specific term to 
define them.  Extremes of emotion were described as moments of inner conflict that 
could lead to madness.   
Barbara Rosenwein contends that historians should “worry” about emotions in 
history, particularly in the Middle Ages, and offers the term “emotional communities” to 
help  
uncover systems of feeling: what these communities (and the individuals within 
them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to them; the evaluations that they 
make about others’ emotions; the nature of the affective bonds between people 
that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that they expect, 
encourage, tolerate, and deplore.124  
 
The question of emotions and of enacting emotional responses has been “worrying” 
medievalists partly in response to Johan Huizinga’s image of a Middle Ages filled with 
“childish emotions” and Norbert Elias’ suggestion that the sixteenth century saw the 
                                                 
124 Barbara H. Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions in History," The American Historical Review 107, 
no. 3 (2002): 821-845. 
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development of the “civilizing process” that caused people to repress and restrain their 
emotions.125  Stephen Jaeger’s response to Elias moved the civilizing moment back to the 
tenth century,126 but more recent work on emotions in the Middle Ages have shifted 
focus from the “civilizing process” to the ways that medieval people used emotional 
displays for particular goals.  Stephen White claims that eleventh-, twelfth-, and 
thirteenth-century emotions, particularly of anger, were “highly conventionalized and 
socially generated,” and were enacted for specific political strategies.127  Daniel Smail 
similarly notes that “men and women in Marseille and elsewhere in medieval Europe 
found it useful to have or autosuggest states of anger and hatred and, perhaps, learned 
how to perform fictive emotional states if the subcortex refused to cooperate.”128  
Remission letters suggest, however, that while certain emotional displays were 
considered appropriate and even politically expedient, an excessive display of emotion 
could be perceived as irrational madness.129
                                                 
125 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Urizen Books, 1978); Johan 
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126 C. Stephen Jaeger, The Origins of Courtliness: Civilizing Trends and the Formation of Courtly Ideals, 
939-1210 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985). 
127Stephen D. White, “The Politics of Anger," in Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the 
Middle Ages, ed. Barbara H. Rosenwein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 127-152. 
128 Smail, Consumption of Justice . 
129 It is, of course, necessary to be cautious when discussing the connections between emotions and 
rationality in the Middle Ages.  After all, the Cartesian separation between the emotional and the rational, 
and thus the body and the mind, had not yet been formulated.  However, perturbation of the “passions” was 
one of Galen’s six non-naturals, which he understood as causing disruptions in the ideal humoral balance of 
the individual, and thus as potentially damaging to the senses.  See Nancy Siraisi, Medieval and Early 
Renaissance Medicine: An Introduction to Knowledge and Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1990), 101.  In addition, medieval legal treatises, such as Albertanus of Brescia’s Liber consolationis et 
consilii, composed in 1246, believed that extreme emotion could lead to madness (here called furiosus), 
and sought to temper such emotional excess in the quest to prevent impulsive vengeance.  Albertanus of 
Brescia, Albertani Brixiensis Liber Consolationis et Consilii, ex quo hausta est fabula gallica de Melibeo et 
Prudentia, quam, anglice redditam et ‘The Tale of Melibe’ inscriptam, Galfridus  Chaucer inter 
‘Canterbury Tales’ recepit (N. Trübner & Co,  1873 [cited 5/8/2007 2007]); available from 
http://freespace.virgin.net/angus.graham/Albertano.htm.  Jacqueline Van Leeuwen discusses the translation 
of Albertanus’ treatise into Dutch in Jacqueline Van Leeuwen, “Emotions on Trial: Attitudes towards the 
Sensitivity of Victims and Judges in Medieval Flanders," in Emotions in the Heart of the City (14th-16th 
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In 1460, Guillaume Sunoneau, at the age of thirty-five, composed a letter to the 
king asking for remission for a crime committed in his youth, some seventeen or eighteen 
years before.  Guillaume explained that at that time “from temptation of the enemy or 
otherwise” he had had carnal relations, “once with a mare and five or six times with a 
cow.”130  It is worth pointing out that, if Guillaume was correct about his chronology, he 
would have been twelve or thirteen when he committed this crime, and thus not of an age 
where he could have been held legally responsible for his actions.131  Guillaume gives no 
excuse for his actions other than the temptation of the devil, and madness does not appear 
in his life until long afterwards, when he finds himself unable to forget his “sin.”132  His 
feelings of displeasure and anger towards himself for having committed crimes, 
“knowing that these were enormous and detestable,”133 served as a catalyst for madness.  
While these particular sentiments only appear in this letter, they are worth analyzing 
because this is also the only letter that deals with the connection between sin and 
madness.  None of the letters of remission suggest that sin was a direct cause of madness.  
Although religious ideas are present in these letters, it is clear that the concept that 
madness only happened to the sinful did not loom large in the minds of the composers of 
remission letters.134  The linkage of sin and madness would have been familiar to a 
                                                                                                                                                 
centuries) ed. Elodie Lecuppre-Desjardin and Anne-Laure Van Bruaene (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 
2005), 157-175.  For an interesting exploration of the development of the study of emotions, see Jeroen 
Deploige, “Studying Emotions.  The Medievalist as Human Scientist?," in Emotions in the Heart of the 
City (14th - 16th century), ed. Elodie Lecuppre-Desjardin and Anne-Laure Van Bruaene, Studies in 
European Urban History (1100-1800) 5 (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2005), 3-24. 
130 AN JJ 190 fo 33 no 64: “par temptacion de lennemy ou autrement habita par une foiz avec une jument et 
par cinq ou six foiz avec une vache.” 
131 The age of responsibility, and of consent (which is clearly relevant here), was twelve for girls and 
fourteen for boys. 
132 AN JJ 190 fo 33 no 64: “pechir.” 
133 AN JJ 190 fo 33 no 64 : “sachant iceulx estre enormes et detestables.” 
134 See Penelope Doob, Nebuchadnezzar’s Children: Conventions in Madness in Middle English Literature 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Jean-Marie Fritz, Le discours du fou au Moyen Age: XIIe-XIIIe 
siècles (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), 165-191 for a discussion of the sermon literature 
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medieval audience from the Biblical story of Nebuchadnezzar, discussed in detail in 
chapter two, whose hubris led God to punish him with madness.  However, in 
Guillaume’s letter he explained that his sin caused guilt which led to madness.  He did 
not perceive his madness as a direct punishment from God for his sinful behavior.   
Although Guillaume confessed and received absolution from the church, he was 
never pursued by the king’s justice, and therefore he believed he had not sufficiently paid 
for his crime.135  In his remission letter, he explained that 
for the grand displeasure and anger that he had towards himself for the horror and 
infamy of this and also for the great sin that he felt he had committed in this case 
towards God our creator, [he] entered into such a melancholy and displeasure that 
he was alienated and troubled in his good sense and understanding such that he 
had two or three times despaired and wanted to kill and drown himself, and 
afterwards he, thus troubled and altered, went before the eyes of the justice of 
Osain and of his own movement, without being constrained nor accused but 
liberally and of his frank will told and confessed having committed the said acts 
in the manner in which it is here above declared and for this cause was taken and 
constituted prisoner.136
 
Guillaume was driven into a melancholy madness because of his feelings of horror and 
anger against himself about the sin he had committed in his youth.  He was unable to 
assuage his self-directed anger through the mechanisms offered by the church, and so he 
                                                                                                                                                 
and theoretical literature that presents this argument.  It is interesting that sermons did not make much of an 
impact in this case. 
135 See Mary Mansfield, The Humiliation of Sinners: Public Penance in Thirteenth-Century France (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995) for a discussion of guilt and confession, particularly pages 35-36, where 
she talks about cases where guilt prompted confession, and page 81 where she notes a sermon exemplum in 
which a woman commits suicide because of her inability to confess to having consented to her mother’s 
murder.  Note also Texier, “'Doulant et courroucié': Les avatars de la culpabilité dans les lettres de 
rémission du XIVème siècle," 490, where he links the narrative frame of remission letters to the system of 
religious confession in terms of temptation and repentance.  
136 AN JJ 190 fo 33 no 64: “pour le grant desplaisir et courroux quil en avoit en soy mesmes pour horreur et 
infame diceulx et aussi pour le grant pechir quil sentoit a ceste cause avoir commis envers dieu notre 
createur est entre en une telle merancolie et desplaisance quil sen est aliene et trouble en son bon sens et 
entendement et tellement quil a este par deux ou trois foiz en voye de desespoir et de fait sest voulu occire 
et noyer et apres lui estant ainsi trouble et altere sen est ale devant les yeus de la justice du lieu de osain et 
de son propre mouvement sans contraincte ne accusacion leut a liberalment et de sa franche voulente dit et 
confesse avoir commis lesdis cas en la maniere quil est cy dessus declare et a ceste cause fut mis et 
constitue prisonnier.” 
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turned himself in to the secular law, taking himself “before the eyes of the justice of 
Osain” in order to confess publicly to the government’s representatives.  His decision to 
turn himself in to the officers of the law was described in the letter as part of his madness.  
The idea that a desire to be punished for committing a crime was evidence of a lack of 
reason appeared in at least two other letters,137 suggesting that it was considered rational 
to try to avoid punishment.  Guillaume’s troubling and suicidal desire to “kill and drown 
himself” was transferred into a desire for an equally suicidal but more public expurgation 
of his crime through the mechanisms of secular law.  Indeed, it seems that Guillaume, or 
the notary who helped him compose his letter, had internalized the discourse of the 
execution of convicted criminals as public spectacle.  Ultimately, however, since 
Guillaume himself sought this remission, he must have changed his mind about his desire 
for full punishment under the law.138  Perhaps the reading of his confessional letter of 
remission by the local justice was a sufficiently public ritual to expiate his guilt, or 
perhaps Guillaume had recovered his “sanity” while in prison. 
Jealousy appeared quite often in the remission letters, as a catalyst for despair and 
suicide and sometimes as a cause for murder.  Jealousy was generally directed at spouses 
who had been unfaithful or who were suspected of such behavior.  These jealous people 
acted on their emotions in ways that were considered excessive and unacceptable, but by 
attempting to comprehend these cases in terms of madness, the family and relatives could 
reconcile these actions and reintegrate those who survived these moments of rupture into 
                                                 
137 AN JJ 188 fo 10 no 15 (in 1458) and AN JJ 188 fo 81 no 160 (in 1459).  The former is edited in Paul 
Guérin, Recueil des documents concernant le Poitou contenus dans les registres de la chancellerie de 
France, Archives historiques du Poitou (Poitiers: Société française d'imprimerie et de librairie, 1909), vol. 
10, 92-94. 
138 Since all remission letters are for crimes punishable by death, a desire to receive remission indicates that 
Guillaume Sunoneau was no longer feeling suicidal. 
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the community.  Symonnet de la Dert, called Bridalet, fell into jealousy in 1394 because 
of “false reports of women or other people” which had accused his wife of infidelity and 
his daughter (of marriageable age) of fornication.139  As a result of his great jealousy he 
“became thus as if completely furious and insensible and stopped doing his work and 
became idle and for hours was in such a state that he did not know what he said nor what 
he did.”140  Symonnet de la Dert’s entire household and community suffered, since he 
was incapable of working as a result of his jealousy, which (according to the letter 
composed on behalf of the wife and daughter) was entirely unfounded.  He beat his wife 
and daughter, and then ran away to the woods for two days.  After returning to his home, 
he still refused to work, forcing his wife and daughter to seek employment outside the 
house and leave him alone, when “being in his said fury, by temptation of the enemy, he 
hanged himself.”141   
In a similar case from 1426, Jehannette Maillart committed suicide because she 
was “often weakened in her understanding, and as if furious, as much from drinking too 
much, in which she felt herself drowning, as from suspicion of jealousy that she had 
against her said husband without cause.”142  In this case, Jehannette Maillart’s madness 
was attributable either to her drinking143 or to her jealousy of her husband.  Neither her 
husband, who was seeking a letter of remission for her, nor the royal notary, who helped 
                                                 
139 AN JJ 146 fo 83v  no 162: “faulx rappors de femmes ou autres personnes.”  It is not entirely clear who 
the “other people” described might be – men, one hazards. 
140 AN JJ 146 fo 83v  no 162: “devint ainsi comme tout furieux et insensible et delaissoit afaire son labour 
et estoit oiseux et par heures estoit en cel estoit que il ne savoit quil disoit ne quil faisoit.” 
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142 AN JJ 173 fo 188v no 392, edited mistakenly as JJ 175 no 392 in Longnon, ed., Paris pendant la 
domination anglaise, 208: “souvent ebetée de son entendement, et comme furieuse, tant par trop boire dont 
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143 Karla Taylor, in a personal communication in February 2006, pointed out that this description seems to 
fit the illness of hydromania, an excessive need for water.  The text is ambiguous, and may refer to drinking 
too much water or could refer to becoming drunk, but either way her madness appeared connected to her 
drinking according to the composers of the letter. 
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compose the letter, considered it necessary to determine which was the ultimate source.  
The important point from the perspective of the letter composers was her lack of 
understanding, either due to her illness or to her jealousy, which made her lack 
culpability for any action she might take.  In both these cases, the surviving family 
members insisted that the jealousy was unwarranted, establishing their own innocence in 
the sordid suicides.  Rather, the suicide victims became the active party, causing their 
own deaths, both through their incapacity to understand the truth (that their spouses were 
faithful) and through the crimes that their jealousy and madness drove them to commit.  
In Symonnett’s case, he would not have been given the opportunity to kill himself if his 
madness had not caused him to become idle and forced his wife and daughter to leave 
him alone in the house.  Similarly, Jehannette’s illness might have had as large a role in 
her ultimate death as her suspicion of her husband. 
A third narrative of jealousy played out to a very different ending.  It began with 
the same basic storyline.  In 1425, Simon Rogate became jealous of his wife, who, he 
believed, was having an affair with Huguenin Baulion, the son of their neighbor, to 
whom it had been rumored that she might get married before her marriage to Simon.  
However, from that point the narrative departed from the familiar tale of mistaken 
jealousy.  Rather, Simon Rogate actually caught his wife and Huguenin together in 
suspicious circumstances and confronted her.  According to the letter, their confrontation 
turned into an argument, during which Simon’s wife informed him that she “would have 
preferred to marry [Huguenin] than [Simon]” and admitted that she had had carnal 
relations with Huguenin.144  This news “placed [Simon] in even greater suspicion, anger 
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and melancholy,” emotions that ultimately led him, several days later, to beat his wife.145  
Though he explained in the letter that he had intended the beating merely as a corrective, 
his wife died from it, and he was forced to seek remission for murder.  Jealousy could 
drive people to a violent madness that was directed outwards, as well as towards 
themselves. 
Moments of emotional upheaval in these letters often centered on conflicts 
between family members that caused one of them to become mad.  Discord generally 
arose around questions of power dynamics within the family.  The narratives built on 
points of tension between the familial hierarchy on the one hand and the desires of the 
family members to create space for their own autonomy on the other.  While the 
disruptive response of the family member who struck out against the hierarchy was 
clearly considered unacceptable by the rest of the family, the label of madness opened up 
the possibility of resistance to the hierarchy while nevertheless forcing that resistance, 
ultimately, to be controlled and defused.  These narratives described moments of rupture, 
where the accepted familial hierarchy was overturned, but only momentarily.  By 
understanding these ruptures as moments of madness, the texts allowed for reconciliation 
and the reintegration of the recovered mad person into his or her expected position. 
Marguerite Bouchart was around forty years old in 1489 when her husband 
decided (against Marguerite’s will) that they would move away from the village they had 
lived in for most of their married life.  Marguerite explained that because “it was such a 
strange thing for her to make a new household, she became as if completely out of her 
good sense and understanding, and being in this grief and displeasure” she tried to 
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prevent people from moving her things out of her house.146  In what at first seems to be a 
rather petty act of defiance, Marguerite took a container of onions from the cart of 
moveable goods, threw most of them in the water, and cut up some others to eat right 
away.  Marguerite’s husband responded by yelling at her, and then began to beat her.  
She, “not knowing what she was doing” stabbed him with the knife she had been using to 
cut the onions, giving him a wound that proved fatal.147   
In many respects, Marguerite’s remission letter reads like those of other domestic 
disputes that do not mention madness as a possible reason for a wife to kill her husband.  
Her husband was beating her while she was holding a knife in her hand for legitimate 
purposes, and before her husband died, he had forgiven her for the act.148  Nevertheless, 
the decision to explain her actions as rooted in a temporary lack of sense and 
understanding, such that she “did not know what she was doing”149 granted a 
particularity to her crime.  Marguerite’s actions were not merely those of a woman upset 
at leaving her home, but the actions of a woman whose distress at a situation she could 
not control had driven her out of her mind.  The discourse of madness in this remission 
letter, in a sense, provided a space within which Marguerite could act upon her emotions, 
of sorrow and frustration, in a violent way.  Her momentary experience of being “out of 
her senses” was considerably more transitory than the madness of other people who 
appear in remission letters.  However, the way that the discourse of madness could be 
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Interestingly, the percentage is much higher within cases citing madness as a reason for the crime.   
149 AN JJ 220 fo 52v no 90: “quelle ne savoit quelle faisoit.” 
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deployed even in such a weak case suggests the strength of the conceptual connection 
between family strife, emotion and madness. 
 Madness was often seen as caused by family situations that could not be 
controlled.  Phote, probably short for Philippote, Brumel, the widow of a knight, had a 
young daughter named Marguerite for whom she had arranged an advantageous marriage 
in 1379.  Unfortunately, Marguerite had been impregnated by Phot, most likely a 
diminutive of Philippot, le Roy, their carter.  When Phote discovered that her daughter 
was pregnant, and by an employee, she “was much marvelously grieved and astonished 
because she had believed that her said daughter was a good girl.”150  According to the 
letter, the birth of the baby caused Phote to lose her reason, and 
then the said Phote as if entirely despairing and angered by this event, still 
remembering how her said daughter was promised by marriage to a knight of the 
country, said to the said Phot, tempted by the enemy and as if out of her senses, 
that he should take the said infant and that he should carry it with her and that he 
should never talk about it.  So the said Phot took the infant and carried it with the 
said Phote up to the place called the Lodges near the said town of Mareygny and 
they found a well nearby into the which well the said Phote, thus angered and 
insane (forsenée) as has been said, said to the said Phot that he should throw the 
said infant and forthwith the said Phot threw this infant into the said well.151
 
The narrative presented a mother who was thwarted in her plans to support her daughter 
through an advantageous marriage, and who was driven mad by despair and anger.  Her 
accomplice, Phot, moved to another town, where he was found and brought to justice, at 
which point Phote feared that she had been implicated in the crime.  Indeed, Phote herself 
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seemed to believe that her decision to kill the baby was wrong, since she and her 
daughter immediately went into self-imposed exile before seeking a letter of remission to 
exonerate her.  She explained that the decision to commit infanticide arose from her 
despair that led her to become mad and take actions that, in a less stressful situation, she 
would never have considered. 
 Domestic problems had to be relatively excessive to believably provoke madness 
in response.  For example, in a letter from 1490, Laurens de Pre explained that he had 
lived in a household with his wife’s parents, which made for an uncomfortable domestic 
situation.  After Laurens’ wife gave birth to their first child, his mother-in-law, 
Marguerite Collard, conceived “such a great hatred” for him that she decided to keep her 
daughter away from him, and would not allow them to sleep together.152  This caused 
“great sorrow” for Laurens.153  When Laurens tried one night to sneak into the bed that 
his wife was sharing with her mother, Marguerite Collard woke up and hit him on the 
head with a big stick.  Temporarily out of his senses, he took out the knife he used to cut 
bread, and killed her.  In this case, both an untenable situation that continued over time 
and a blow to the head at the moment of the crime were required to make Laurens de Pre 
so stunned “that he did not know what he was doing or where he was.”154     
Family conflicts could also become the source of a form of temporary insanity 
with much milder results.  For example, Gernaye Pillot moved to a new town, where in 
1459 he became engaged without the counsel of his father or any of his family.  When he 
came to ask his father to help him pay for his wedding, his father refused.  “Troubled in 
his understanding” because of his father’s refusal, Gernaye stole some cows to use to pay 
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for his wedding.155  Because Gernaye was not the head of a household, he was subject to 
his father’s will.  Having broken that will by becoming engaged without seeking advice, 
Gernaye was punished, which caused him to resort to theft, further alienating himself 
from his family.  The letter of remission, which he sought for himself, developed the 
theme of a prodigal son who was spurned, rather than fêted, on his return.   
 Conflicts were often instigated when the mad person, like Symonnett de la Dert 
described above, could no longer fulfill expected household roles.  For example, during 
her pregnancy in 1423, Jehannette Voidié believed that her husband’s income would not 
allow them to support a third child, despite his reassurance.156  Her family later 
interpreted Jehannette’s feelings of insecurity as a direct cause of her madness.  When 
she gave birth to a son, she lost her milk because of an argument she had with the lying-
in maid over some linens,157 and the baby had to be sent to a wet-nurse.158  This sent 
Jehannette even further into a melancholy, during which she did not interact with her 
husband or her other children, telling them that “they had in her a bad mother.”159  Jehan 
Lambert, her husband, repeatedly assured her that he made enough money to support 
their family, and then threatened to beat her if she continued to repine.  She responded 
                                                 
155 AN JJ 188 fo 82v no 163. 
156 AN JJ 172 fo 239 no 430, edited in Longnon, ed., Paris pendant la domination anglaise, 130-133.  
157 The period immediately following childbirth was a dangerous time, and conflicts between lying-in 
maids and mothers, resulting in a loss of milk or other problems with the baby, were not unusual.  Indeed, a 
century later such conflicts were likely to result in witchcraft accusations against the lying-in maid.  For 
more on these relationships, see Lyndal Roper, “Witchcraft and Fantasy in Early Modern Germany," in 
Oedipus and the Devil: Witchcraft, Sexuality and Religion in Early Modern Europe (London: Routledge, 
1994), 199-225. 
158 It clear from the text that Jehannecte Voidié was expected to nurse her own child, but that the family had 
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Christiane Klapisch-Zuber., “Blood Parents and Milk Parents: Wet Nursing in Florence, 1300-1500," in 
Women, Family, and Ritual in Renaissance Italy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 132-164.  
159 AN JJ 172 fo 239 no 430, edited in Longnon, ed., Paris pendant la domination anglaise, 130-133:  
“qu'ilz avoient en elle une mauvaise mere.” 
  210 
that she wished he would beat her to death, and proceeded to attempt to commit suicide.  
When her child returned from the wet-nurse, he was very sickly, and Jehannette Voidié 
decided to take him on a pilgrimage.  On the way, she stopped for her sister, and while 
she was waiting, Jehannette, upset about her child’s weakness, “entered into her said 
melancholies and furor or lack of sense, as it is to be believed and presumed, and by 
temptation of the enemy threw this her infant into the well.”160  Her sister, hearing the 
splash, ran back.  When she told Jehannette Voidié that she was a bad mother and had 
drowned her baby, Jehannette denied it, insisting that the baby was fine, and joining 
enthusiastically in the attempts to fish him out.  Eventually, however, she left the scene 
and ran away.  The letter thus describes a drastic change in behavior during this recent 
pregnancy that made Jehannette unrecognizable.  Although the letter does not give much 
detail about her life before, it is clear that Jehannette’s husband found her behavior 
baffling. 
Unlike Jehannette, who was portrayed as mistaken about her husband’s income, 
Gouyn Cluchat faced a real family crisis in 1459.161  When the plague arrived in their 
village, he moved himself, his wife, and their four young children to a neighboring town 
to escape from the danger.  A few months later, Cluchat’s wife fell ill with a fever, and he 
realized that they were running out of provisions.  Although they had left behind some 
flour and some wine in their village, he did not dare to return for them because of the 
plague.  Instead, he went into a nearby city to borrow some flour or some money to 
support his sick wife and his children, but no one was willing to help him.  After escaping 
from the plague, he and his family seemed likely to starve instead.  This crisis made 
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Cluchat so upset that he went to a fountain in the town, thinking in his despair to drown 
himself, but a woman who happened to be passing stopped to ask him what he was doing, 
and he was so embarrassed he left.  Arriving at his house, “as if he was out of his senses” 
Cluchat took an axe used for chopping wood, and hit his wife on the head with it and 
killed her. 162  Here the composers of the remission letter described a more evident 
rupture of selfhood.  Gouyn Cluchat was described through most of the letter as a man 
who cared for his family’s safety and wellbeing.  He took them to a new town to escape 
from the plague, and went out to beg in order to prevent them from starving.  It was only 
after his failure to provide for them that his identity cracked.  Had his suicide attempt 
succeeded, he would have left his children and his sick wife to fend for themselves, 
which clearly does not fit his behavior pattern up to this point.  His ultimate crime of 
killing his wife with an axe, therefore, was connected to this pattern of unacceptable 
behavior in the narrative. 
In these cases, feelings of insecurity and a perceived inability (on the part of 
themselves or others) to care for their families led these people to madness and 
sometimes suicide attempts.  Although neither Jehannette’s nor Gouyn’s story ended with 
self-murder, it is clear that their families saw a connection between their ultimate crime 
and their previous desire to turn their anger and fears against themselves.  Family 
conflicts often arose due to the mad person’s inability to fulfill certain expected roles.  
Not all the remission letters about madness set up such clear patterns of usual and 
unusual behaviors in the lives of the individuals they described.  Some relied on 
behaviors universally acknowledged to be unacceptable to create a pattern of madness 
that would be easily recognizable as inappropriate without elucidating the individual’s 
                                                 
162 AN JJ 188 fo 81 no 160: “come hors du sens et debilite de son entendement.” 
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patterns of behavior before becoming mad.  Attempted suicide is one of the most 
commonly used referents in these cases.  Nakedness and running through the fields was 
also a general behavioral sign of madness.  Beyond these patterns of mad behavior, 
however, the letters actually attempted to enter into the mad person’s perception of reality 
in order to understand how the particular mad person understood the world and why he or 
she might therefore have committed a criminal act.  Even in cases where the fears of the 
mad are unfounded, they are based on recognizable problems.   
 
V. (Re)considering the Past 
There was no single way to reconstruct the past in remission letters, and no 
particular narrative that acted as proof of a history of madness.  Each story reconstructed 
the past of the individual in a way that highlighted those moments that seemed mad to the 
composers.  In the case of Jehan de Moustier with which this chapter began, his mad 
behavior was centered on food.  The narrative of his letter confirmed his madness, 
arguing that it was clear from his actions and also providing a clear history of behavior 
that led up to the murder of his father.163  While on the one hand this exculpated Jehan de 
Moustier completely, on the other it confirmed his madness to such an extent that he was 
only released into the care of his family on condition that he be kept chained.  Jehannette 
Voidié’s actions were described much more cautiously, whether by the choice of her 
relatives and close family or because of the recommendation of the royal notary.  While 
her suicide attempts were certainly attributed to her melancholy, the language used in the 
remission letter suggests some doubt about what caused her to throw her child into the 
well.  It was “presumed” that she entered into her melancholy and frenzy, but it was not 
                                                 
163 AN JJ 118 fo 18v no 18. 
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certain.164  In the end, Jehannette Voidié was given remission on condition that she be 
kept in prison for fifteen days on bread and water, and that she pay for fifty masses to be 
sung for her dead child, a punishment that seems more appropriate for someone who was 
in fact guilty of committing a crime, rather than someone who was not considered 
responsible for her own actions. 
Jehan Lambert could support another child, but there were people whose fears 
were not so imaginary.  Gouyn Cluchat, stuck between plague and starvation, was unable 
to support his family.165  The composers of his remission letter emphasized the fact that 
Gouyn Cluchat was unable to find help in the region, and that the murder of his wife was 
caused by extreme provocation.  Unlike Jehannette, Cluchat was fully aware of what he 
had done, and went out of the house to find some neighbors so that he could tell them that 
he had just killed his wife.  Indeed, he went even further, traveling to the nearby city of 
Combronde and demanding that they put him to death for his crime.  To the family 
members composing his letter of remission and even to the officers in Combronde, his 
desire to be hanged was further proof of his madness.  However, the composers of his 
letter explained, since the officers did not dare to proceed against him he was likely to 
remain in prison indefinitely, unless the king stepped in to pardon him.  This letter, like 
many others, leaves us with no clear picture of the ultimate fate of the madman.  He was 
released from prison on the authority of the king, and with no conditions such as keeping 
him chained up or under guard.  His family seemed to believe that his release would 
prevent his children from becoming beggars, but they provided no hint about what would 
be done to cope with his extreme melancholy and his desire to be punished for his crime. 
                                                 
164 AN JJ 172 fo 239 no 430, edited in Longnon, ed., Paris pendant la domination anglaise, 130-133: 
“comme il est à croire et presumer.” 
165 AN JJ 188 fo 81 no 160. 
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In these three cases alone, there are distinct understandings of madness at work.  
With Jehannette, her lack of knowledge of having committed the crime demonstrated to 
her family that she was not in her right mind when she did it.166  In this case, her inability 
to recognize the results of her actions while mad meant that she did not act with intent, 
although the fact that she was required to pay for masses for her baby’s soul suggests that 
there was some question about whether she nevertheless deserved to be punished.  Jehan 
de Moustier was also unable to recognize his crime.  When he was told that he had killed 
his father, he responded that “he was only my father according to whispers,” which 
suggests that he was denying his own identity.167  In contrast, Gouyn Cluchat’s admission 
of guilt and, further, his active desire to be punished for his crime, was cited by his family 
and by the officers at Combronde as a clear indication of his insanity.168  In his insistence 
on guilt and punishment, the composers of his remission letter dealt with the concept of 
irrational behavior.  Unlike the crime itself, which could be comprehended due to his 
flawed perception of reality, the decision to seek punishment for that crime was seen as 
irrational. 
 
The significance of the crimes committed by people who were believed to be mad 
lay not in the actual act but in the victims of those acts.  Even when mad people caused a 
crime to occur, they were implicated in that crime specifically because of their inability 
to conform to expected patterns of behavior and because that inability threatened their 
family and community.  These crimes were troubling because they disrupted accepted 
                                                 
166 Guillaume Audoyn was also unable to remember that he had beaten his wife in AN JJ 160 fo 70v no 91, 
edited in Guérin, Recueil des documents concernant le Poitou, 80-82. 
167 AN JJ 118 fo 18v no 18: “il dist que il nestoit son pere que dans oreille.” 
168 This is also the case for Guillaume Sunoneau, who committed bestiality and chose to turn himself in to 
the local officials because of his guilt.  See AN JJ 190 fo 33 no 64 (in 1460). 
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social codes, not because of the nature of the crime itself but because the victim of that 
crime was someone or something that should not be targeted by the mad person.  These 
remission letters sought to tell a story that embedded the particular moment of the crime 
in a narrative structure that could explain these ruptures as part of a general pattern of 
mad behavior.  It is precisely through attempts to comprehend these misconceptions of 
the mad that these narratives can begin to allow a reconciliation between the mad person, 
or the mad person’s family, and the community.  By trying to explain the transgressions 
of the mad in comprehensible terms, the narratives provided a bridge to reconnect the kin 
and community ties that were ruptured through the particularities of the mad person’s 
crime.  The family’s choice to seek a remission letter in order to advocate for the mad 
person was a particularly resonant act on his or her behalf.  The next chapter will 
consider the way that the acts of the mad threatened kin and communal ties, and how 









Chapter 5:   
Intimate Disasters: Madness in the Community 
 
 Remission letters performed a particular legal function, by allowing stringent laws 
to be overturned in particular cases.  Perhaps most significantly from the perspective of 
the supplicant, remission called for the reintegration of the criminal into his or her former 
position within society.  The formula of the letters included a clause releasing the 
criminal from all corporal or civil punishment pertinent to the case, adding “and we have 
restored and we restore him to his good reputation and renown in the country.”1  The 
crime was to be erased on the level of local justice, and it was to have no effect on the 
criminal’s reputation.  As chapter three discussed, “fame,” or “reputation,” was both an 
important legal category2 and at the same time a social category, determined by and 
                                                 
1 AN JJ 130 fo 118v no 217, edited in Annie Saunier, “'Hors de sens et de mémoire': une approche de la 
folie au travers de quelques actes judiciaires de la fin du XIIIe à la fin du XIVe siècle," in Commerce, 
finances et société (XIe-XVIe siècles) : recueil de travaux d’histoire médiévale offert à M. le Professeur 
Henri Dubois, ed. Philippe Contamine, Thierry Dutour, and Bertrand Schnerb (Paris: Presses de 
l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1993), 489-500, 497: “Et l'avons restitué et restituons à sa bonne fame et 
renommée ou pays.” 
2 Fama could affect a person and his or her family’s standing in civil cases, ability to make contracts, and 
likelihood of conviction in criminal cases.  For an exploration of the development of the legal concept of 
infama, see Edward Peters, “Wounded names: The medieval doctrine of infamy," in Law in medieval life 
and thought, ed. Edward B. King (Sewanee, TN: University of the South Press, 1990), 43-89.  For an 
analysis focused more directly on France, particularly on the question of reputation in French customals, 
see F.R.P. Akehurst, “Good Name, Reputation, and Notoriety in French Customary Law," in Fama: The 
Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medieval Europe, ed. Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003), 75-94.  Daniel Smail has shown how reputation played a large role in both 
civil and criminal legal cases in Marseille, looking particularly at the ways in which witnesses’ reputations 
could be challenged in order to erase their testimony.  Daniel Lord Smail, The Consumption of Justice: 
Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in Marseille, 1264-1423 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
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affecting one’s standing in the community.3  Clearly the crime could not be erased in 
reality.  In cases of murder, the victim would still be dead, and in cases of theft, even if 
stolen goods were returned, the crime would remain in the memories of the neighbors of 
the criminal.  A royal decree could not truly affect communal memory.  Nevertheless, 
this legal erasure allowed people to return to their communities, either released from 
prison or returned from self-imposed exile.  Indeed, the fact that remission was sought by 
individuals who had chosen to go into exile to escape from their crimes suggests the 
importance of the bonds of family and community.  These supplicants implied in their 
letters that self-imposed exile was as much of a punishment as official banishment by the 
system of justice would have been. 
 Muriel Laharie, in her book on madness in the eleventh through thirteenth 
centuries, notes that the law allowed mad people to be released from prison if they 
recovered.  She suggests, however, that most families would have preferred to leave their 
mad relatives in prison, paying for their upkeep, but otherwise free of the burden of 
caring for them, particularly since a recovery was no guarantee that the madness would 
not resurface later.4  But the evidence from remission letters of the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries shows that many families preferred to have their relatives released into 
their care.  Indeed, in most cases the mad people were still suffering from illness when 
the family asked for them to be released from prison.  While the composers of the letters 
generally did not mention the methods put in place for caring for the mad after their 
release from prison, they often described the situation of the mad person before the crime 
was committed.     
                                                 
3 Barbara Hanawalt, "Of Good and Ill Repute": Gender and Social Control in Medieval England (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1-14. 
4 Muriel Laharie, La Folie au Moyen Âge: XIe-XIIIe siècles (Paris: Le Léopard d'Or, 1991), 253-255. 
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 The composers of remission letters for the mad drew on idealized visions of 
communal responsibility in their texts.  They inscribed an image of a cohesive 
community ruptured by the madness of the individual.  Despite or perhaps because of this 
rupture, the communities envisioned by the letter composers worked towards resolution 
and restructuring.  King Charles VI in his madness simultaneously threatened the 
community of the realm and acted as a figure around which French sentiment could 
gather.5  The composers of narratives about mad people on a more local level mirrored 
the king’s madness.  They reimagined the past by exploring options for preventing the 
crimes of the mad before they occurred, and suggested hopes for the future by 
reintegrating the mad into their families and communities.  When the madness was 
purportedly of long standing, these letters included details about attempts made to cure 
the mad by taking them on pilgrimages or, in one case, seeking a physician’s aid.  The 
letters also described methods of restraining the mad, by keeping them in chains, or 
locking them in a small room or outbuilding.  Some were kept under surveillance, 
guarded by their family or by helpful neighbors.  These recollections of seeking cures for 
the mad or attempting to guard them placed the concerns of the mad at the center of the 
families’ prayers and daily lives.  Later letters introduced a new external threat: sorcerers 
who could represent the root of madness in their communities, and provide a cathartic 
release of the tensions madness created.   
 
                                                 
5 See the further discussion of Charles VI in chapter two. 
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I.  Moments of Rupture: Crimes against the family and the community  
 Every letter of remission began with the implicit acknowledgement that a crime 
had been committed, but the revelation of the crime was delayed until the culmination of 
the narration.  That said, some letters foreshadowed the nature of the crime through 
particular phrases.  For example, often an individual was introduced as “the late”6 so-
and-so, generally (although not always) indicating that that person would lose his or her 
life in the course of the narrated events.  Indeed, often a clear indication of suicide was 
the linkage of “the late” with the name of the individual on behalf of whom the remission 
was being sought.  The particular types of crimes committed by mad perpetrators 
signaled a departure from expected behavior, much like the kinds of details recalled from 
the past that established the onset and development of the perpetrator’s madness.  All 
remission narratives were constructed around the moment of a crime.  Although the 
accused perpetrator did not admit his or her guilt in every case, nevertheless a description 
of the crime of which the supplicant was accused appeared in every letter.  Every type of 
crime committed by a person labeled as mad in remission letters also appeared in other 
letters committed by a sane person.  However, there are patterns to the crimes associated 
with madness that go beyond the surface of the act committed.  These were acts that were 
particularly damaging to the family or the community of the mad person.  The association 
of madness with crimes targeting people or things that should be protected has also been 
shown by Michael MacDonald in his study of seventeenth-century England.7  These 
crimes were not described as random, but rather as disruptive of important social and 
familial ties due to the mad person’s lack of understanding.  In the remission letters, 
                                                 
6 Feu or feue. 
7 Michael MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam: Madness, Anxiety, and Healing in Seventeenth-century England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
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families tried to make sense of the targets of mad people’s crimes in terms of their own 
altered reality.  The letters’ composers entered into the mind of the mad to try to 
comprehend these incomprehensible crimes from the mad person’s perspective. 
In addition to attempting to comprehend the crime, the families of the mad who 
wrote remission letters tended, like most people seeking remission, to be concerned with 
issues of reputation and family unity.  The existence of these remission letters for the mad 
suggest that having a criminal in the family, or a family member in prison, was more 
damaging to the reputation than admitting a family member was mad and caring for that 
mad person in the household.  Crimes against the community, particularly such crimes as 
arson or theft, required a careful explanation that allowed the mad person and his or her 
family to be exculpated in the eyes of the community as a whole.  In cases of crime 
within the family, the choice to seek a pardon from the king may have been an effort to 
reaffirm the familial and communal ties which had been ruptured through the criminal 
act.  The letters attempted to reunify the family fractured by the mad person’s criminal 
frenzy.   
Perceptions of madness both affected and were affected by the particular crimes 
associated with mad criminals.  No crimes were considered exclusively “mad crimes.”8  
However, while the basic crime is the same, the details in the letters reveal particular 
ways in which crimes committed by the mad were distinctive.  The majority of these 
crimes acted against the mad person’s own identity or against his or her family.9  These 
                                                 
8 Indeed, it is worth pointing out that many of these crimes were those Gauvard refers to as “stereotypes of 
serious crimes.”  See Claude Gauvard, “Fear of Crime in Late Medieval France," in Medieval Crime and 
Social Control, ed. Barbara Hanawalt and David Wallace (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1999), 1-48. 
9 Identity is being constructed through these letters in terms of the individuals’ relationship to others, 
particularly their participation in groups, specifically family and community.  I am basing this partly on 
Carolyn Walker Bynum’s description of identity construction in the twelfth century, Caroline Walker 
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types of crimes were troubling to the family and the royal notary who worked together to 
compose these letters, and this discomfort translated itself into the description of the mad 
person and the crime committed.   
 
Crime Number Percentage of Total Male Female 
Arson 8 5.5% 5 3 
Bestiality 3 2% 3 0 
Blasphemy10 5 3% 5 0 
Cause of Murder 8 5.5% 1 7 
Infanticide 5 3% 0 5 
Murder 32 22% 27 5 
Rape11 3 2% 3 0 
Suicide 18 12% 8 10 
Theft 26 18% 19 7 
Treason12 11 7.5% 11 0 
Victim of Crime 17 12% 11 6 
Other 9 6% 6 3 
Total 145  99 46 
Table 2: Crimes of the Mad 
 
Murders of Family and Neighbors   
 The crime of murder was disruptive to a community, regardless of the mental 
state of the perpetrator.  Murder had the potential to spiral into a feud with an extended 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bynum, “Did the Twelfth Century Discover the Individual?," in Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality 
of the High Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 82-109. 
10 I discuss the crime of blasphemy and the increasing of penalties during Charles VI’s reign in chapter 2. 
11 There are very few rape cases that mention madness, though there are considerably more rape cases in 
letters of remission as a whole.  For more, see Claude Gauvard, "De Grace Especial": Crime, état et société 
en France à la fin du Moyen Age (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991), 2 vols., vol. 1, 330-339; 
Walter Prevenier, “Violence against Women in a Medieval Metropolis: Paris around 1400," in Law, 
Custom, and the Social Fabric in Medieval Europe: Essays in Honor of Bryce Lyon, ed. Bernard S. 
Bachrach and David Nicholas, Studies in Medieval Culture, XXVIII (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan 
University Press, 1990), 263-284; Walter Prevenier, “Violence against Women in Fifteenth-Century France 
and the Burgundian State," in Medieval Crime and Social Control, ed. Barbara Hanawalt and David 
Wallace (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 186-203. 
12 See the detailed discussion of these letters about treason in chapter 2. 
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kin network and sometimes the entire neighborhood taking sides.13  Remission letters, 
read out loud in front of the adverse party and open to objection, could play a role of 
mediation between the two sides, clarifying the case from the perspective of the criminal 
and attempting to temper the anger of the surviving family.  Indeed, murder was the most 
common crime for which to seek remission in general.  Claude Gauvard, in her study of 
remission letters, argues that when an attempt was made in 1400 to curb the number of 
remissions being granted, the letters became more focused on homicide as the particular 
crime for which remission should be granted.14  Whereas my own numerical study of 
remission letters suggests that Gauvard is mistaken in her assessment of the impact of this 
regulation,15 homicides certainly did account for a large percentage of the letters from the 
time when they were first instituted, and the percentage increased over time.  Of the 145 
letters about mad people examined for this dissertation, 32 provided remission for 
murder, making up the highest percentage.  The narratives of murder cases involving mad 
people were different from the more common passionate, drunken murders, however.  In 
most cases, mad people murdered friends or family members.  While these types of 
murders could be committed by sane people, the pattern is still suggestive of a larger 
concept of the relationship between madness and crime.  As noted in chapter three, 
Roman law established that mad people should not be held responsible for parricide, 
                                                 
13 See for example, Mark D. Meyerson, “The Murder of Pau de Saint Martí: Jews, Conversos, and the Feud 
in Fifteenth-Century Valencia," in "A Great Effusion of Blood"? Interpreting Medieval Violence, ed. Mark 
D. Meyerson, Daniel Thiery, and Oren Falk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); Robert 
Muchembled, La Violence au village: Sociabilité et comportements populaires en Artois du XVe au XVIIe 
siècle (Turnhout: Brepols, 1989); Edward Muir, Mad Blood Stirring: Vendetta and Factions in Friuli 
during the Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). 
14Gauvard, "De Grace Especial", vol. 1, 64. 
15 Gauvard uses the numerical decrease to make her argument, but remission letters remain as the same 
percentage of total chancery business, suggesting that it is not a decrease in the granting of remission that is 
being marked but a decrease in the use of the chancery.  Given that this decrease occurs during a period of 
civil war and governmental instability due to Charles VI’s madness, it seems more likely that this general 
upheaval, rather than a targeted effort to limit remissable crimes, caused the numerical decrease in 
remissions granted. 
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creating a direct link between madness and intrafamilial murder.16  Indeed, in these 
remission letters mad people seldom appeared lashing out at complete strangers, and 
when they did it was usually in the context of the stranger seeking remission for having 
killed the mad person.17  The murder of close companions and family members was seen 
as a particularly disturbing act, and, in cases where there were other recognizable factors 
that contributed (if only in retrospect) to the medieval image of madness, such a murderer 
could be viewed as mentally disturbed.18
 In sixteen of the cases of murder by a mad person, the victim was a member of the 
murderer’s family.   Most of these involved the murder of a spouse, although there were 
also several cases of murder across generations, where the victim was the father, mother-
in-law (but never the mother), father-in-law, or uncle.19  These murders most often 
occurred in the household, combining both relationships and spaces where murder was 
jarringly unexpected.  Unlike the public tavern, where drunken arguments could lead to 
accidental murder with the daggers and knives carried by most people,20 murders in the 
household were seen as disruptive.  Even the weapons chosen carried added significance.  
Household murderers picked up whatever weapon happened to be lying around, often an 
axe used to chop wood or a stick with iron on the end of it, such as a utensil used to trim 
                                                 
16 Theodor Mommsen and Paul Krueger, eds., The Digest of Justinian (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 4 vols., vol. 4, 822, Book 48.9 
17 For example, AN JJ 89 fo 142v no 340 (in 1357); AN JJ 172 fo 113v no 221 (in 1422); and AN JJ 219 fo 
132 no 216 (in 1488). 
18 Both Claude Gauvard and Barbara Hanawalt have looked at murders between relatives in France and 
England, respectively.  See Claude Gauvard, "De Grace Especial": Crime, état et société en France à la fin 
du Moyen Age (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991), 2 vols., vol. 2, 573 for her discussion of violence 
between married couples, which she found to compose only 2% of cases.  Hanawalt notes that “[a]bout a 
third of the intra-familial homicide cases tried in gaol delivery were committed by the insane.”  Barbara 
Hanawalt, “The Peasant Family and Crime in Fourteenth-Century England," The Journal of British Studies 
13, no. 2 (1974): 1-18, 11.  
19 Those cases where the victim is the mad person’s child will be treated separately, under infanticide, since 
such cases were categorized separately under medieval legal traditions.   
20 Nicole Gonthier, Cris de haine et rites d'unité: La violence dans les villes, XIIIe - XVIe siècle (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1992), 113-115. 
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vines or a hoe.  The letters always specified the quotidian use of these household items, 
clearly indicating that the crime was not premeditated and that the murder weapon was 
easily at hand, and not a weapon, such as a sword, intended for use only in violence 
approved by the king.21   
 Several of the murder cases took place in the middle of the night, a common time 
for murder according to other studies of medieval crime.22  However, these murders did 
not follow the usual pattern of nighttime homicides.  Rather, most took place in the 
household, and often between people sleeping in the same bed.  In 1392, for example, 
Pierre le Bagnaudel, who “was often furious, lunatic and out of his memory”23 went to 
bed one Sunday night, and woke up again in the early hours of Monday morning in a 
state of madness.  He beat his wife with a hoe, then got back into bed beside her and slept 
until morning, still holding the murder weapon.  Pierre le Bagnaudel’s lack of recognition 
of his actions and the fact that he remained beside the mortally wounded body of his 
wife, holding the murder weapon in his hand, rather than running away, were pointed out 
by his family as a further indications of madness.24  A similar story from 1425 described 
the actions of Jehannecte Troppé, who woke up in the middle of the night seeing visions 
that led her to beat her husband.  When she went back to bed, her husband woke her 
again and she was shocked when she lit a candle and saw his wounds.  The letter 
specifies that she cared for her husband’s wounds “not knowing she had done the said 
                                                 
21 The letters feel rather like a game of Clue as a result.  “It was Jehan de Moustier in the kitchen with the 
stick used to trim the vines.” 
22 Nicole Gonthier notes that curfews were instated because night was seen as a time that “peut cacher les 
criminels et favoriser leurs intentions perverses.”  Nicole Gonthier, Le châtiment du crime au Moyen Âge 
(Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1998), 53-55. 
23 AN JJ 143 fo 207 (number illegible): “souventeffoiz est fureur lunatiques et hors de son memoire.” 
24 Voluntary exile after committing a crime was an accepted, and in some cases even expected, response. 
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deed.”25  The marriage bed, unlike the public street, was a location in which violence was 
unexpected and disturbing, and this type of violent attack on a spouse who was sleeping 
ruptured the safe haven of the household.   
 Remission letters construed mad crimes as acts that disrupted a person’s social 
identity, which was defined through kin and communal bonds.  One letter in particular 
focused attention on the multiple levels on which the murder did not fit into the expected 
behavior of the perpetrator.  Jehannecte de la Forge, a widow living in Saint Germain la 
Ville, had been “often mad and deprived of reasonable understanding and of all sense.”26  
She was taken to Notre Dame de Tanovay in 1403, presumably seeking a cure, though 
the letter does not specify that, and was walking down the street when she came across a 
young girl about eighteen months old, “whom she loved as much as she could when she 
was in her good senses.”27  In her madness, however, she threw the child to the ground 
and cut her throat with a “scipe” (perhaps a scissor) and killed her.  The letter emphasized 
that Jehannecte de la Forge “had never had any hatred for her or for any family of 
hers.”28  Clearly, the actions of Jehannecte de la Forge when mad were a departure from 
her identity when sane.  The murder of a young child whom she loved when she was sane 
was only explicable in the context of her lack of sense.  The composers of her letter of 
remission fulfilled a dual purpose in commenting that she had no quarrel with the girl or 
with her family.  This statement simultaneously denied the possibility that the murder 
might have been motivated by some familial rivalry and insisted on the disconnection 
                                                 
25 AN JJ 173 fo 33v no 63.  Edited in Paul Le Cacheux, ed., Actes de la chancellerie d’Henri VI concernant 
la Normandie sous la domination anglaise (1422-1435), extraits des registres du Trésor des chartes aux 
Archives nationales (Rouen: A. Lestringant, 1907-1908), vol. 1, 181-183: “non sachant avoir fait ledit fait.” 
26 AN JJ 158 fo 11 no 20: “souvent forcenee et desmuee dentendement raisonnable et de tout sens.” 
27 AN JJ 158 fo 11 no 20: “laquelle elle aymoit tant que plus ne povoit quant elle estoit en bon sens.” 
28 AN JJ 158 fo 11 no 20: “navoit aucunne hayne aycelle ne aux amis delle.” 
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between Jehannecte de la Forge’s status as a widow in the community and her actions 
while mad.   
 In each of these cases of murder, the mad perpetrator violated expectations of 
safety that were in place due to kin relationships or neighborliness.  Pierre le Bagnaudel’s 
wife and Jehannecte Troppé’s husband were both sleeping, trusting that their spouses 
would care for them.  Neither relationship was described as unusually tense, except that 
both Pierre and Jehannecte were known to have had episodes of madness previously.  
However, much as Charles VI was allowed to govern the realm during his periods of 
sanity, Pierre and Jehannecte were incorporated into their usual roles as loving spouses.  
Jehannecte de la Forge, similarly, killed a child whom she loved, violating the 
expectations of the girl’s family, that she would be safe in the neighborhood, where she 
was known and loved. 
Theft in Inappropriate Circumstances 
 The second most common crime in letters for the mad was theft.29  The 
invocation of madness tended to appear in letters where people had chosen inappropriate 
targets for their thefts, again disrupting expectations of safety, this time of goods.  The 
narratives also described thefts that provided no material benefit for the perpetrator, who 
either threw away the stolen goods or had no knowledge of where they had hidden them.  
In these letters, the use of the rhetoric of madness was a more subtle indication of popular 
considerations of folly and, compared to murder cases, a less dangerous lack of sense.30  
However, some of these letters did represent the thief as threatening, shifting the 
                                                 
29 This also follows the general pattern for remission letters as a whole.  Theft made up 16% of total crimes 
in Gauvard’s study.  Gauvard, "De Grace Especial", vol. 1, 242  See table 8. 
30 See for example AN JJ 99 fo 173v no 567 (in 1368); AN JJ 106 fo 173 no 318 (in 1374); and AN JJ 106 
fo 184v no 352 (in 1374). 
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terminology of madness from “foolish” to “furious,” “without good sense and 
understanding,” and “melancholy”.31   
 In some cases, the thief’s madness was constructed through an understanding of 
the inadvisability of the particular crime committed.  For example, a letter from 1428 
described the actions of Marion Hodee, who stole from her master, the local captain of 
the guard.  The relationship between the thief and her victim was a hierarchical one, and 
in addition his role as captain of the guard made him a dangerous target for any theft.  As 
the letter composers explained, Marion had “little understanding and was as if an idiot or 
insensible” and she acted “without thinking she was doing wrong,”32 a characterization 
that in part sprang from her actions, which were clearly perceived as idiotic.  The choice 
to steal from her employer was not well-considered.  In addition to the attempt to justify 
Marion’s actions in terms of her lack of understanding, the letter explained that she was 
driven to steal from her master because her relative, Jehan Baptiste, wanted revenge on 
the captain for having dishonest relations with Jehan’s wife.  The complex social 
relationships involved in this narrative highlighted the difficulty of the situation for 
Marion.  Her kinship with Jehan, a horizontal tie, led her to act against her master, with 
whom she had vertical ties.  The whole situation arose because Marion’s master had 
taken Jehan’s wife as a mistress.  Marion was exonerated, then, both because it was her 
kinsman’s idea and because, being a simple and insensible woman, she did not know that 
what she was doing was wrong.  Indeed, as the letter explained, Marion was caught 
because she was witnessed throwing the goods she had stolen into the castle moat.  The 
                                                 
31 See AN JJ 107 fo 193v no 377 (in 1375); AN JJ 115 fo 52 no 114 (in 1379); AN JJ 188 fo 82v no 163 (in 
1459); and AN JJ 196 fo 192 no 307 (in 1470). 
32 AN JJ 174 fo 68v no 163: “poy sachant et qui est comme ydiote ou insensee”; “non cuidant mesprendre.” 
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portrayal of Marion as mad held power because her crime could be recognized as ill-
considered and lacking any personal benefit. 
 Many cases involving mad thieves present hierarchical relationships between the 
thief and his or her victim, suggesting that these crimes were viewed as especially 
problematic.  In a letter composed in 1387, Guillorz de la Cayroze humbly requested the 
release of his son, Perym.  The young man, who was only fifteen at the time, had been 
arrested under suspicion of theft from a merchant staying in the inn that Guillorz de la 
Cayroze maintained in Angiers.  The letter began as a straightforward tale about a 
merchant who left his well-filled purse in a sack in his room.  During his absence, the 
purse was stolen, and he accused the innkeeper’s son of theft.  At this point, the letter’s 
narrative became more complicated.  Perym, after undergoing torture in prison, confessed 
that he had taken the purse.  First he claimed it was in the bed in the chamber where the 
merchants were staying, but when the authorities looked for it there, their search was 
fruitless.  Perym then denied having taken the purse until they began to torture him again, 
at which point he again confessed, providing them with a new hiding spot that again 
turned out to be empty.  According to the letter, this wild goose chase continued for some 
time, and the money was never found.  Guillorz used the remission letter to insist that his 
son should be released, “considering the youth of the said Perym who is as if completely 
idiotic and does not have a good natural sense.”33  
 In Perym de la Cayroze’s case, the composers of the remission letter constructed a 
complex narrative to explain why he should be released from prison.  Unlike other letters 
that established the subject’s madness from the beginning, here it was not raised until 
                                                 
33 AN JJ 130 fo 159 no 282: “considerant aussi la jeuneses du dit pym qui est comme tout ydiot et na pas 
bon senz naturel.” 
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near the end of the letter.  Instead, the letter began with a straightforward crime that only 
became troubling when the boy confessed.  Through the structure of the narrative, it was 
Perym’s many false confessions under torture that made his status as an idiot without 
good common sense believable.  Aside from descriptions of Perym’s own confessions, 
each of which was retracted after the torture was removed, nowhere does the letter admit 
that Perym was guilty of stealing the money.  In this way, the letter excused Perym on 
multiple levels.  Other than his retracted confessions, there was no proof that he had 
taken the money, and even if he had stolen it, his youth made such actions excusable, and 
his lack of sense made him immune to punishment.  
 Clearly sane thieves could and did also steal from their social superiors.  
However, as both of these cases indicate, the particularity of the relationships between 
thief and victim and therefore the potential damage to the thief’s own livelihood or that of 
his or her kin due to the theft made these cases troubling.  Both Marion Hodee’s and 
Perym de la Cayroze’s alleged victims had the power to pursue them.  Both were suspects 
because they had access to the victims’ belongings, but they also had much to lose by 
committing the theft.  The crime itself could be construed as an act that violated Marion 
Hodee’s and Perym de la Cayroze’s position in the community, as well as threatening 
their own or their family’s livelihood.  Perym’s case simultaneously indicated the folly of 
the crime, which had already had an adverse effect on his father’s business, and the 
foolishness of Perym, who confessed under torture to a crime that, his father insisted, he 
had not committed. 
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Homicide Against Themselves 
Letters about murder indicate the ways in which medieval concepts of madness 
could help people understand and reconcile different types of homicides in particular 
locations.  Perhaps one of the most problematic targets of mad violence was the self.  
Indeed, some of the letters about murder cited previous suicide attempts as proof of the 
person’s madness.  With eighteen of the 145 letters, suicide was the third most common 
crime for which families mentioned madness as an explanation, which shifts away from 
the pattern for remission letters in general.  Gauvard lists suicide as a mere 0.4% of the 
crimes committed in remission letters during Charles VI’s reign,34 whereas suicide makes 
up 12% of the crimes committed by mad people.  Again, these letters highlighted 
problems of identity, family, and community.   
In his study of suicide in the Middle Ages, Alexander Murray found that “a 
suicide, or suicidal thought or act, follows an event of social dislocation, whether from 
crime, disgrace, or financial ruin.”35  Many remission letters followed this pattern, 
describing a particular despair or an illness that brought on the decision to die.  Suicide 
was considered both a religious sin and a civil crime in the Middle Ages.  The Christian 
church, through the figure of Judas, informed people that suicides were damned for 
eternity.  In medieval art, suicides were associated with the vice of Despair, usually 
paired with the virtue of Hope, first through the figure of Judas, and later with general 
suicidal figures, depicted either hanging from a rope like Judas or stabbing themselves 
                                                 
34 Gauvard, "De Grace Especial", vol. 1, 242  See table 8. 
35 Alexander Murray, Suicide in the Middle Ages Volume I: The Violent against Themselves (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 2 vols., vol. 1, 317. 
  231  
with a knife.36  Theologians took up this concept and further developed it.  Augustine, for 
example, in The City of God, argued that suicide was a violation of the commandment 
“thou shalt not kill.”37  Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa Theologica, agreed that suicide 
was a sin.  He expanded Augustine’s evaluation of why, building on the idea that suicide 
violated this commandment, and arguing that suicide further violated natural love and 
charity, according to which man should love himself.  Perhaps most significantly, 
Aquinas stated that “every man is part of the community, so that he belongs to the 
community in virtue of what he is.  Suicide therefore involves damaging the 
community….”38  The concept that suicide injured the community as a whole by harming 
one member provides an interesting perspective on medieval laws against it.  The secular 
government helped the church to regulate suicides by confiscating the body and the 
goods of suspected suicides.  The body would not only be buried in unconsecrated 
ground, but would also be symbolically executed by being hanged as a murderer.  The 
suicide’s goods were confiscated by the crown, often leaving the remaining family 
destitute as well as destroying their reputation and standing in the community.39  As a 
result, suicide was a crime not only against the self and the community, but also against 
the surviving family.   
Some remission letters focused solely on the dire situation of the innocent family 
members.  In these letters, the suicide him- or herself played a small role, whereas the 
                                                 
36 See Moshe Barasch, “Despair in the Medieval Imagination," Social Research 66, no. 2 (1999): 565-576 
for an exploration of this phenomenon in art. 
37 Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, ed. George E. McCracken, trans. George E. McCracken 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 7 vols., vol. 1, 90-95, Book I.20. 
38 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. James J. Cunningham (London: Blackfriars, 1964), 60 vols., 
vol. 38, 32-33, 2.2.64 Art. 5.  “homo est communitatis: et ita id quod est, est communitatis; unde in hoc 
quod seipsum interficit, injuriam communitati facit….” 
39 Esther Cohen, The Crossroads of Justice: Law and Culture in Late Medieval France (New York: E.J. 
Brill, 1993), 141-142. 
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remaining family’s size, economic needs, and innocence were highlighted.40  While this 
focus worked, in the sense that it provided families with remission letters and a return of 
the confiscated goods, it did not exculpate the suicide completely.  In an attempt to fully 
remove the stigma of suicide, many letter composers tried to establish that the suicide 
was not in his or her right mind when he or she died.  Others went even further, arguing 
that the person had been under the watchful gaze of family members or neighbors, and 
that it was through cunning that he or she escaped from notice long enough to perform 
the suicidal act.  For example, in 1421 Denis Sensigaut, a baker living in Saint-Marcel les 
Paris, had been ill for fifteen days of a “sickness of heat.”  According to the letter 
composed on behalf of his widow, Jehannette, he had received last rites before falling 
into a “frenzy.”  One day, when Denis had asked Jehannette to go to Paris to take his 
urine to a physician, he sent his nephew off to find him some milk and told the woman 
taking care of him to eat something.  Having disposed of all his guards, Denis “either by 
temptation of the enemy or as a result of the said frenzy and malady hung himself” by a 
cord he had tied to a stair in his house.41
As with murder, suicidal actions taken by mad people were not considered to be 
characteristic.  Thus, madness could be imagined as a second level of exoneration.  
Remission rhetorically erased the crime in the eyes of the government and, at least in 
theory, in the eyes of the community.  Remission for an action during an episode of 
madness might further exonerate the individual in question, since the disease in addition 
to the letter erased the crime from the identity.  This type of erasure was easier with a 
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41 AN JJ 171 fo 244v no 429, edited in Auguste Longnon, ed., Paris pendant la domination anglaise (1420-
1436): Documents extraits des registres de la Chancellerie de France (Paris: H. Champion, 1878), 19: 
“maladie des chaleurs”; “se soit tant par temptacion de l'ennemi comme à l'ocasion de ladite frenoisie et 
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suicide than with a person who was still living, since there could be no serious 
repercussions to making a false claim of madness in the case of suicides.42  Indeed, there 
may have been a tacit agreement within local communities that surviving relatives should 
not be punished for these crimes.  However, the question of whether or not the individual 
was “really” mad is not pertinent.  Rather, the fact that composers chose to understand 
these crimes in terms of madness means that it was a plausible narrative and that people 
could accept the label in the context in which it was presented.  Indeed, because suicide 
was thought of as murder of oneself, the act was directly related to those murders of 
family members that were equally difficult to comprehend in normal terms.43
Infanticide of Legitimate Children 
 The excuse of madness was not required as an explanation for an infanticide case 
to be pardoned.  However, some women’s families claimed that they were mad when 
they killed their babies.44  Generally such letters, like the letters about murder, were for 
                                                 
42 Alexander Murray, who also examined remission letters for suicides, has suggested that these claims of 
madness might be questionable in such cases.  Murray seems to miss the point of letters of remission.  He 
claims that a “Letter of Remission, by definition, declared its beneficiary not guilty.  Issued on a suicide's 
behalf it must prove he was not a suicide.  So these letters should, in principle, be no exception to the 
obscurity intrinsic to suicide in French legal documents.”  The trouble with his analysis lies in his 
insistence that remission letters were for people who were “not guilty.”  This was certainly not the case, 
since remission letters were in fact precisely for people who were guilty, but could be forgiven for their 
crime through the overarching grace of the French king.  See Murray, Suicide in the Middle Ages Volume I: 
The Violent against Themselves, 207-218. 
43 By 1450, remission for suicide had been phased out, regardless of whether the suicide was mad, 
suggesting either a more stringent attitude towards suicides on the part of the crown or less legal 
intervention on a local level.  Diane Owen Hughes suggested that this change in attitude might be due to 
humanism, which (as noted in Chapter 4) had a large contingent among the royal notaries and others in the 
legal profession.  The humanist reading of the suicide of Lucretia was far more sympathetic than earlier 
Christian readings.  If so, this would suggest that the persecution of suicides fell off, rather than that it 
became more difficult to receive remission for such an act, but it would require considerably more research 
to make any such assertion. 
44 Remission for infanticide makes up 0.3% of Gauvard’s study of crime in all remission letters, but as with 
suicide, it was more common as a crime committed by the mad, making up 3% of the total. Gauvard, "De 
Grace Especial", vol. 1, 242.  See table 8.  For more on infanticide, see also Y.-B. Brissaud, “L’infanticide 
à la fin du moyen âge, ses motivations pyschologiques et sa répression," Revue historique de droit français 
et étrange 50 (1962): 240-242.  John Boswell suggests that people were more likely to abandon children 
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particularly unusual types of infanticide, suggesting that these were more difficult cases 
to accept and integrate into a comprehendible narrative.  There was a pattern of 
apparently acceptable and understandable infanticide.  In these cases, women who were 
unmarried and generally poor became pregnant and had the baby, often while alone in 
their houses.  These letters emphasized a number of fears that the new mother 
experienced, including the anger of parents, an inability to care for the child, and the 
shame of being an unwed mother.  Often the woman narrated her lack of knowledge of 
what to do with a newborn infant as the cause of the baby’s death.  These narratives are 
fascinating for the glimpse they provide of a certain level of understanding of and 
compassion for these women that was not recorded in the law codes.  Infanticide was 
viewed as a capital crime, but clearly there were exceptions to this stringent rule that took 
into account the economic and social problems of poor young women.45
 The women described as mad in letters about infanticide do not fit neatly into this 
category of poor, unmarried or widowed women.  Rather, these were often married 
women with other children whose decision to kill their baby appeared inexplicable to 
their family and relatives.  In addition, in most cases attributed to madness the child was 
not a newborn.  The letter for Jehannette Voidié, discussed in detail in chapter four, 
represented her as a married woman with several children, who feared that her husband 
could not support another child.  She killed the baby while taking him on a pilgrimage, 
                                                                                                                                                 
than to kill them.  See John Boswell, The Kindness of Strangers: The Abandonment of Children in Western 
Europe from Late Antiquity to the Renaissance (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). 
45 I have traced the development of an “acceptable” narrative of infanticide in this period, which I intend to 
make the focus of further study.  For more on this development, and on a parallel shift in the thinking of the 
theologian Jean Gerson, who called for a more mild penitence in cases of accidental infanticide, see Claude 
Gauvard and Gilbert Ouy, “Gerson et l'infanticide: Défense des femmes et critique de la pénitence 
publique," in "Riens ne m'est seur que la chose incertaine": Études sur l'art d'écrire au Moyen Âge offertes 
à Eric Hicks par ses élèves, collègues, amies et amis, ed. Jean-Claude Mühlethaler, et al. (Genève: Éditions 
Slatkine, 2001), 45-66. 
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when he was already several months old.46  The disparity between this case and that of a 
young, unmarried mother, whose baby died within hours of birth, is clear.   
These two narrative models of the poor unmarried woman and the mad woman 
were not mutually exclusive.  It was possible to imagine poverty and the shame of an 
illegitimate child combining to drive a woman out of her senses.  A letter composed for 
Michelle Galande explained that her father died when she was eight, leaving Michelle 
and her mother destitute.  In order to support herself and her mother, Michelle Galande 
sought alms, but ten years later, as an eighteen-year-old woman, she began to be solicited 
by “some” to abandon herself, which “because of her simplicity, ignorance, and the 
poverty and misery in which she lived”47 she did, and ended up pregnant.  In the end, the 
composers of her letter explained, it was through her fear of dishonor and shame that she 
“was therefore deprived of sense and understanding”48 and chose to bury the baby alive 
rather than admit that she had given birth. 
Infanticide was an especially disruptive crime.  Women’s roles were often bound 
up in expectations of wifehood and motherhood, confirmed through the idealized figure 
of the Virgin Mary.49  The murder of a helpless baby ruptured expectations of safety and 
comfort, and the mother’s role as murderer, rather than protector, highlighted the 
enormity of the act.  Infanticide can be seen as an extreme version of the larger pattern of 
mad murders that violated the idealized image of the peaceful interior of familial 
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relationships.  While some forms of infanticide by poor, young, and unmarried girls, 
might be comprehensible, the killing of a legitimate baby was not. 
Bestiality: Sexual Crime 
 Whereas infanticide was a crime that was gendered female, bestiality was a crime 
that was gendered male.50  Like the other crimes examined here, it was possible to gain 
remission for bestiality without claiming to have been mad, but occasionally the letters 
include madness as an explanatory device.  Bestiality was another crime against the self, 
the family and the community, since it was a sexual act removed from the appropriate 
venue of the marriage bed.  Much like infanticide, bestiality appears to have a 
conventional narrative, even though it appeared much less frequently in the remission 
letters.  This narrative focused on the youth and unmarried status of the perpetrator, in 
much the same way as letters for infanticide.  Generally the young man was described as 
a teenager, and the crime usually took place alone, most often with the mare that was 
pulling his cart, a sheep he was guarding, or a cow in the stables.   
 Estienne Perdereau’s remission letter from 1481 told a fascinating tale of how 
youthful mistakes could come back to haunt a person later in life.  According to his 
narrative, when he was thirteen or fourteen (around sixteen or seventeen years previously, 
as he was about thirty when he sought remission, and the perfect age to commit a crime, 
since he was on the border of adulthood and could not be held legally responsible51), he 
had taken a cart into the woods, pulled by a mare.  While there, he was tempted by the 
“enemy from hell” into trying to have “carnal company” with the mare, since he had not 
                                                 
50 Strangely, although the first bestiality case I found dates from 1406, well within the range of Gauvard’s 
study, she does not mention it in her own analysis of the letters. 
51 The age of adulthood was fourteen for boys and twelve for girls.  
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yet had “carnal company” with a woman.52  However, before he could achieve his “evil 
desire,” he saw Guillot Baillif, a neighbor of his master’s, and “as soon as he saw the said 
Guillot he returned to his good memory.”53  Thus, Estienne had been out of his “good 
memory,” and therefore was associating his mental state with madness, when he 
attempted to have sex with the mare.  Not only did Estienne never consummate his bestial 
temptation, as he explained, but he immediately went to the church of Notre Dame de 
Clery and confessed his sinful desire to a priest, who absolved him and gave him a 
penance that he completed “as well as he could.”54  Estienne proceeded to get married 
and live an exemplary life until one day, as he explained, he refused to give a pair of 
shoes to Guillot Baillif, who conceived such a great hatred for Estienne that he accused 
Estienne of bestiality to the local justice and had him thrown in prison.  As Estienne took 
pains to demonstrate, his actions were not, in the end, damaging to himself, to the mare, 
or to the community.  He “returned to his good memory” before taking the ultimate step, 
and immediately reconciled himself with the church and a few years later, married and 
became a respectable member of the community.  Guillot Baillif, rather, appeared 
unsavory in Estienne’s narrative, waiting for seventeen years before bringing the case to 
the attention of the local justice due to a grudge. 
The question of who would be harmed by bestiality was addressed obliquely in 
another case.  In 1406, the seventeen-year-old Piot le Pele had been living for a year as a 
servant of the family of Piot Pichon, during which time he slept in the stable with the 
cows.  Note that, at seventeen, Piot le Pele was too old to be considered a child, and 
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therefore would be held accountable for his actions.  Instead, the letter noted immediately 
that Piot le Pele was “mad and out of all memory.”55  He “was tempted by the enemy 
combined with his insensibility such that he had carnal company and habitation with this 
cow.”56  Significantly, it was his mistress and her daughters who saw him do this and 
spread the gossip around the community, highlighting the dangers of bestiality as a crime 
against the community.  The unmarried daughters of Piot Pichon were troubled by the 
actions of Piot le Pele.  Indeed, perhaps it would have been more easily reconciled had he 
sought sexual release from one of them.  After all, confession manuals saw fornication as 
a less problematic sexual sin, and some city governments in Italy explained their decision 
to allow prostitution by justifying it as an alternative to other types of sexual deviance.57
In both of these cases, the men were young and had not yet had “carnal company” 
with a woman.  Their status as unmarried youths made their sexual crime less dangerous, 
but they were still threatening the morality of the community.  The narratives of their 
remission letters turned attention to the questionable actions of their accusers.  Guillot 
Baillif did not register a complaint until he had another reason to be angry with Estienne 
Perdereau.  Indeed, Estienne, whose madness was temporary and did not even lead to the 
consummation of his misplaced desire, had confessed to his sinful thoughts immediately, 
going through the appropriate channel of the parish priest.  Similarly, Piot le Pele, who 
was known to be “fol,” was witnessed by the women of the household, who chose to 
gossip about him in the community, thus spreading the problem further.  Unlike Estienne, 
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Piot did not seek out confession, and he had carried through with his desire. However, 
Piot’s madness was not described as a temporary state, but as a long-term problem. 
Arson: Burning Down the House 
 As noted in chapter three, according to the customary law books of Normandy, 
mad people must be kept chained up or under guard specifically in order to prevent them 
from setting fires.58  Interestingly, although this seems to be a perceived danger in 
general terms, it appears in only eight remission letters as a crime committed by mad 
people.  Sometimes the letters merely described the arsonist in question as “simple” or 
out of their senses due to excessive drunkenness, but occasionally fires were set by 
people who are described as emphatically out of their minds.  Again, the crime appeared 
particularly troublesome because it attacked the community that the mad person ought to 
defend.  Indeed, some of the narratives were about people setting fire to their own homes 
or barns.  This particular crime highlighted the fear of mad people as disruptive members 
of the community, since fires in medieval villages (especially in regions where wood and 
wattle were used as building materials) would have been highly damaging and 
uncontrollable. 
 In 1379, for example, Guille de la Barre, a wealthy man, began to suffer a reversal 
of fortune.  He lost so much that he “had displeasure in his life and wanted very much to 
be dead.”59  However, it was at the moment when a court case was decided against him 
that Guille “entered into a sickness such that he became completely altered and 
completely thus as if completely out of his senses” and began to say that God did not love 
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him, since He allowed such terrible things to happen to him.60  In his despair, Guille lit 
two of the beds in his own home on fire.  Fortunately, the local officers of justice were 
apprised of the situation before too much damage was done.  The extremity of Guille’s 
actions were highlighted by his statement blaming God for his misfortune.  His wanton 
destruction that threatened the entire town stemmed from his altered state, in which he 
could not be held responsible for his actions. 
Mad Victims of Crime 
 Mad people did not only appear in remission letters as the central figure of the 
criminal.  Indeed, often they appeared as the cause of a crime, either as an incentive to 
seek out and murder a sorcerer or as the victim of murder, who had to be killed because 
his or her madness threatened the lives of others.  In the former case, mad people were 
described as pitiful victims of bewitchment by an evil sorcerer who refused to lift the 
curse.  In the latter, they were dangerously and frighteningly uncontrollable potential 
criminals.  These two particular subgenres of remission letters involving mad people each 
developed a focus on one of the conflicting images of madness.  What is most fascinating 
about these letters, however, is how often the discussion of madness in them began to 
take on aspects of the other, conflicting view.  Although the mad people who were 
bewitched are figures of pity and compassion, they were also threatening to the life and 
happiness of their family members.  While the mad people who were killed to protect the 
family and the community of their murderers were described as dangerous and 
threatening, sometimes (especially when they were related to their killers) they were 
described as unfortunate victims of their madness. 
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 The descriptions of behavior of those driven mad through sorcery could be 
distinctively different from that of those whose madness was attributed to other causes.  
Some victims of sorcery are depicted unthreateningly, as “madly running naked through 
the fields,”61 and one letter connected the bewitched man’s impotence to his madness,62 
but often the letters voiced a fear that this madness caused by bewitchment would lead 
the victim to take his or her own life.63  These letters had a very different focus from 
those composed for mad criminals.  Although there are a few exceptions where the mad 
person lashed out at the accused sorcerer, most letters seek forgiveness for family 
members who sought to remove the bewitchment through actions that “accidentally” 
resulted in the accused sorcerer’s death.  Therefore, the mad were incidental to the crime, 
and these bewitched mad people appeared as much more sympathetic figures than the 
mad who committed crimes themselves.  These narratives inverted the typical themes of 
madness, where a family member was the victim of a criminal attack by the mad, into a 
story of the family member as the active participant in an act of violence focused outside 
the family circle on a “renowned” sorcerer.   
In a letter composed in 1496, Petit Jehan Secretani described the events that led 
him to kill Estienne Mollet.64  Petit Jehan’s sister, Jehanne, had married three years 
before and immediately “fallen into a great misfortune of sickness such that she was 
strongly troubled in her sense and understanding and was completely senseless and in 
danger each day of harming herself and the fruit with which at that time she was 
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62 AN JJ 208 fo 11 no 20 (in 1480). 
63 See AN JJ 199 fo 276 no 441 (in 1464); AN JJ 227 fo 32 no 62 (in 1496). 
64 AN JJ 227 fo 32 no 62 (in 1496). 
  242  
pregnant.”65  According to the letter, this illness meant that her family could have no joy 
together.  Petit Jehan saw the source of her madness outside the immediate family, but 
nevertheless linked to her through fellowship.  Estienne Mollet, known by the community 
as a sorcerer who was able to cure a number of diseases, was often in the company of 
their father, Estienne Secretani, and with access to Jehanne’s food, which Petit Jehan 
Secretani believed he had poisoned.  The simultaneous rupturing and cementing of 
familial and community ties were stressed throughout this letter, as Petit Jehan joined 
Jehanne’s brother-in-law, Laurens Grenault, in beating up Estienne Mollet while 
demanding that he give them information about the bewitchment of their sister.   
 The mad also appeared in letters as dangerous criminals who had to be killed in 
order to protect the innocent, or in self-defense.  Several of these letters follow a typical 
pattern of describing a bar brawl, explaining that the people involved had been drinking 
and eating before the violence broke out.  Drunkenness was seen as exacerbating or even 
causing madness in these cases, and the letters describe a fight that was forced to turn 
deadly because of the victim’s lack of sense or understanding.66  According to these 
narratives, the mad were generally unpleasant people whose moments of madness were 
merely another negative aspect of their personality.   
 Even the murdered mad could appear as victims when they were family members 
rather than strangers, however.  Just as mad people murdered family members because of 
their uncontrollable actions, so they could drive their family to kill them with the same 
behaviors.  Around the year 1362, Margueroy la Marchande moved into the home of her 
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nephew, Jehan Langlois because she could not take care of herself.  It appears that she 
may have disagreed with that assessment, since according to the letter composed on 
behalf of Jehan Langlois, she tried to run away several times but he always brought her 
back.  The letter explains that she ran away due to her “foolish and simple desire and 
without any cause.”67  Finally, when she got up at two in the morning and left the house, 
Jehan followed her, reportedly because he feared she would commit suicide by drowning 
herself in a fosse (a ditch or moat generally filled with water) or a well.  He caught up 
with her next to a large fosse full of water and tried to take her home, but when she 
refused, he angrily hit her with a little stick four or five times, “without blood and without 
wound and without doing anything else to her from which she might become ill nor have 
death come to her.”68  Regardless of how minor a reprimand he gave her, Jehan’s aunt 
died about fifteen days later, and five years after that he and his wife and children sought 
remission for this act.  Margueroy was not actively threatening anyone but herself, but 
her actions were inexplicable to her nephew and he explained that it was her mad 
behavior that caused him to beat her. 
 
 The types of crimes committed by people described as mad, as well as the roles 
played by mad people as causes of crime or victims of crime, provided an image of 
madness as a disruption of kin and communal values and norms.  The victims of mad 
crimes were often family members or neighbors with whom the mad person and his or 
her family had previously lived in harmony.  The crimes of the mad, as narrated in 
remission letters, departed so radically from accepted norms of behavior that they made 
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the reintegration of the guilty especially difficult.  Nevertheless, as we shall see, 
remission letters sought in their narratives to reconstruct the very bonds that were 
ruptured through these crimes, not only in their hopes for the future, but also in their 
depictions of the past.   
 
II. Visions of Community Involvement and Responsibility 
 As chapter three demonstrated, French customary law considered mad people 
potentially threatening to themselves and others.  They recommended that the mad be 
guarded by their families and even by the community at large.  Unlike Foucault’s image 
of the wandering, isolated mad,69 the law codes created an image of the mad as a central 
focus of communal concern.70  The need to protect both the mad person and the 
community at large from the prospective damaging effects of madness underlay the 
recommendation that “everyone” join together in a communal effort to guard the mad.71  
Mad people were considered communal burdens.  Much like the customary law books, 
remission letters were written within the context of an “imagined community” on the 
scale of the neighborhood and of the realm.  These remission letters constructed images 
of communal involvement with madness.  Notions of fama played a large role again, as 
neighbors’ awareness of each others’ lives invaded the home to consider the gouvernance 
of each member of the community.  One of the explanations remission letters provided 
for why people who had been recognized as mad were able to commit crimes was 
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because of “mal gouvernance”: the failure of their immediate family to care for them 
sufficiently.  “Mal gouvernance” carried a wealth of censure in its connotations.  It was 
used to describe women and men who did not care for their own children or who carried 
on adulterous affairs.72  It also indicated a criminal negligence on the part of the 
household that would allow a man or woman who was only slightly wounded to die of 
those wounds.73
 A number of studies have established the significance of the household in the 
Middle Ages.74  Households have been described as the basic economic unit of the 
Middle Ages, involving all members in the farming, craft, or trade of the whole.75  Each 
member of the household, which was composed not only of a nuclear family but also 
included a variety of other members, such as extended family, servants and apprentices, 
played a role in the smooth and efficient running of the business.  These households were 
linked to each other through kinship, guilds, parishes, location in a town or city, and a 
jurisdiction.  Since, as David Herlihy has argued, society was ultimately made up of 
households,76 the larger communities expressed concern about and attempted to impose 
controls on the households.  Social interactions were based on fama, the rumored 
information that became common knowledge, regardless of factual truth, about each 
person and, often, spread to include his or her household.  Composers of remission letters 
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sought to establish the community’s shared knowledge of the person who had committed 
a crime.  In most cases, the reputation of the individual was established to be “good.”  
However, in remission letters for mad criminals, often their mental state was confirmed 
by reference to common renown.  This communal memory was sometimes evoked by 
reference to communal awareness of, concern about, and protection for the mad person’s 
victims, or, in some situations, the mad person him- or herself. 
Remission 
 Remission letters themselves provide the strongest evidence of the reconstruction 
of kin and communal bonds around the disruptive figure of the mad.  These letters, 
composed by the family on behalf of the mad person, carried within their narratives a 
resolution that sought to restore the equilibrium of the local community.  Because 
remission letters had to be read aloud by a local judge, the reconciliation was a public 
one.  Despite, or indeed perhaps because of, the admission of guilt embedded within 
these letters that echoed public confession of sin, remission claimed to exonerate the 
criminal in the eyes of the community as a whole.   
 Jacques Mignon’s remission letter, composed in 1458, described an unusual case, 
with a high level of community involvement.  According to the letter, Jacques Mignon 
was known to be “perturbed and altered in his senses,”77 but was well-loved by his 
neighbors in the small town of Richardère, near Bressuire in Poitou, because he would 
entertain them by doing cartwheels.  When his wife, who was described as “completely 
stupid, of simple and very small comportment, in such a manner that she does not know 
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how to govern herself any better than a small child,”78 stopped riding into town with him 
in 1457, the townspeople brought her disappearance to the attention of the local 
officials.79  Jacques was taken into custody and questioned, at which point he freely 
confessed that he had killed her.   Jacques explained that she had asked to be taken to see 
her parents.  They had begun the journey one night, leaving their five children asleep.  
Halfway there, he claimed, he had stopped the cart next to a river with a watermill and 
thrown her in the water, where she drowned.  He had returned home alone and gone to 
sleep.   
Jacques Mignon’s free confession, without the use of torture, was considered 
suspect by the officers of the law.  Since they had no other proof in addition to the mad 
man’s confession, which was not considered legally valid testimony,80 the local 
authorities could not proceed.  They could not find a body, despite sending enquiries to 
the watermill to see if one had been discovered, and no one brought a case against 
Jacques Mignon for the death of his wife.  The authorities were faced with a serious 
quandary as they tried to reconcile a need to protect the community against the possibly 
violent actions of a mad man and the need to protect the mad man from his own inability 
to comprehend reality.  In the end, as the remission letter attests, they chose to protect the 
mad man, and the community banded together to seek a royal pardon for their 
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cartwheeling friend, despite their awareness that he might have killed his wife.81  The 
remission letter was presented as a way to avoid dealing with a difficult legal situation.  
Jacques Mignon remembered killing his wife, and was fully capable of narrating the 
murder when questioned about it.  In his case, the local officers doubted whether his wife 
was actually dead, despite his belief that he had killed her.  Jacques Mignon’s willingness 
to confess to murder, apparently unaware of the penalties involved in such a confession, 
made the officers, who already knew from local repute that he was mad, unwilling to 
prosecute him for the crime without any further proof that his wife was dead.   
Community Concern: Chains, Cures, Recoveries and Relapses 
 Community fears about the potentially dangerous actions of the mad occasionally 
translated into action in remission narratives.  According to the remission letter 
Guillaume le Racif sought for his wife, Jehanne, she had been “for a long time and on 
many occasions lunatic, frenzied, and insensible in such a way that she did not know her 
government (maintenance).”82  Her madness was not constant, however, and she was 
considered capable of taking care of herself and her family during periods of sanity.  One 
day in early April, 1379, Jehanne le Racif was reportedly alone in the house with her four 
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young children, when she was “surprised by her said sickness.”83  She picked up the 
youngest child, who was a baby girl aged six months, whom Jehanne had been 
breastfeeding, and hit the child on the stomach and sides until the baby died.  Her other 
three children ran out of the house and cried out in the streets until a good neighbor 
woman heard them.  She entered the house and found Jehanne “completely enraged and 
insensible and supposed that from the said sickness she might do the same thing to her 
other children.”84  The neighbor, clearly aware of the general fama about Jehanne’s 
illness, acted to protect the family of the mad woman by intervening in the household and 
causing Jehanne to be arrested.  She was put into prison in Orléans, where, because of her 
sickness, she had no idea where she was and insisted that she had done nothing wrong.   
Community networks were created as much by exclusion as by inclusion.  In 
some cases a community’s lack of care and concern for outsiders was cited as a cause of 
madness.  Gouyn Cluchat’s letter of 1459, discussed in detail in chapter four, 
demonstrated the possibility of failure in seeking help outside your own community.85  
When his family moved to a neighboring town to escape the plague, they ran out of 
provisions before it was safe to return.  He decided to go into a nearby city to beg for 
food, but despite all his efforts, no one in this new town was willing to help him care for 
his family.  As strangers and outsiders, Gouyn Cluchat’s family had no recognized right 
to receive aid from their new neighbors.  Indeed, community aid only arrived once the 
crisis reached its peak, and even then it did not alleviate the original problem.  Cluchat 
became suicidal, attempting to drown himself in a fountain in the town.  A woman 
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passing by stopped to ask him what he was doing, expressing concern, but too late to help 
Cluchat, who fled.  Instead of killing himself, he returned home and, “as if he was out of 
his senses,” killed his wife with an axe.86   
His neighbors did not offer support, and even after he killed his wife, they refused 
to act for or against him.  Cluchat told them that he had just killed his wife and asked 
them to have him arrested.  Indeed, when they refused, he went even further, traveling to 
the nearby city of Combronde and demanding that they put him to death for his crime.  At 
this moment, when it was no longer possible to save Cluchat’s wife, his extended family, 
who for reasons unmentioned in the letter had not been available to give him provisions, 
proffered aid by seeking remission on his behalf.  Given the price of a remission letter, 
this generosity was too much too late.  His letter, like many others, leaves us with no 
clear picture of the ultimate fate of the person.  He was released from prison on the 
authority of the king, and with no conditions such as keeping him chained up or under 
guard.  His family seemed to believe that his release would prevent his children from 
becoming beggars, but they provided no hint about what would be done to cope with his 
extreme depression and his desire to be punished for his crime.  Cluchat’s decision to 
leave his local network and seek aid elsewhere was the source of his difficulties.   
Despite these difficulties in seeking communal aid outside one’s home village, the 
narratives in the remission letters suggest that local neighborly aid was generally 
expected to be forthcoming.  The responsibility of guarding mad people, particularly 
those who were suspected of suicidal tendencies, rested with the immediate household, 
but there is ample evidence that the assistance of neighbors was sought and, very often, 
provided.  Generally this neighborly aid arose in the context of a tale about a failed 
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attempt at preventing suicide, as the mad person escaped and died.  Usually this guardian 
duty fell on the local women, perhaps as an extension of their work as nurses.  
Symonnette aux Beufs came to watch over the sickbed of Jehan Massetirer in 1394.  
Earlier in the day, Jehan had left the house and attempted to drown himself in the river, 
but he was saved by his wife and two men passing by.  Left alone with Symonnette, 
Jehan got out of bed, completely naked (a detail that seems intended to reinforce his 
madness, since he was willing to walk around naked in front of a neighbor woman), and 
hit her over the head, knocking her down.  He ran out of the house, and jumped into a 
well nearby, and was drowned before anyone could pull him out.87  Another case 
described a number of controls put in place by his wife and close family to prevent 
Robert Senuminem from harming himself or others.  In this case, the guards came from 
within the household.  Robert, “during his life by intervals and some times for a very long 
time was furious.”88  As a result, his close family placed people in his household to “keep 
him company so as to guard him.”89  Nevertheless, after hearing the mass on Tuesday, 
the 28th of April 1404, his family explained that he returned home, convincing the 
chamber maid that he wanted to sleep.  When she left him in bed, he got up and hanged 
himself, despite the valiant attempts made to prevent him from achieving his aim. 
 Although setting guards over sickbeds was a common practice, the remission 
letters suggest that some family members were reluctant to go so far as to chain the mad 
before they exhibited extreme violent behavior.  The need to keep mad people in chains 
was written into the customary laws of a number of regions of France.  Indeed, a few 
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remission letters mention chains provided by the local representative of justice or by the 
family for people who were known to be mad for a long period of time before their crime.  
Perrim de Moustier was given chains by the marshal of Pontoise in order to chain his 
son.90  However, after Jehan de Moustier broke out of those chains, Perrim refused to 
continue to restrain him.  Similarly, the remission letter for Jehannecte Troppé stated that 
her husband refused to chain her, hoping that she would return to her “bon sens” and that 
life in their household would go back to normal.  Both of these men were ultimately 
victims of violent, frenzied attacks by their son and wife, respectively, and the composers 
of the remission letters, with knowledge of the ultimate outcome, blamed the victim to 
some extent for refusing to ensure that the mad person could not become so violent.   
Chaining the mad could backfire, however, especially since some cases of 
madness were seen as cyclical.  Guille Crieusch’s wife was out of her senses such that, he 
claimed, he feared she would do something bad.  In 1411, he applied to the duke of 
Burgundy, who had jurisdiction over Guille’s town of Houlle near Amiens, requesting 
and receiving a license to constrain his wife.  He kept her locked up for six weeks, after 
which she appeared to return to her good senses, and even “sometimes went to church 
and did her work as other women do.”91  She seemed so well recovered, Guille 
explained, that he left her alone one evening with their children.  After he left, she picked 
up an ax or “another utensil with a sharp point”92 and killed one of their children and 
chased the others, who cried loudly enough to bring the neighbors to the house.  
Interestingly, perhaps because Guille’s wife was registered as mad and he was supposed 
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to be responsible for preventing her from doing anything wrong, it was Guille who was 
brought before the justice to account for the crime, and was, he claimed, in danger of 
being banished for not taking sufficient care of his mad wife, and forcing the neighbors to 
intervene to save his children.   
The cyclical nature of some forms of madness made any sort of guard a difficult 
prospect.  During their periods of sanity, mad people were allowed to return to their 
normal life, and many remission letters established that the person had suffered from 
bouts of insanity, but was considered recovered, and therefore was unguarded, when the 
madness returned and the crime was committed.  Cases of suicide described elaborate 
ruses that the mad person set up in order to send everyone away from the house so that he 
or she was no longer being guarded.  Keeping the mad from harming themselves or 
others through restraints or surveillance was not easy, then, but seeking a cure could be 
even more difficult. 
 Attempts to cure madness most often involved visits to saints’ shrines.93  Often, 
the mad would be taken to several shrines when a cure was not forthcoming.  Just as 
shrine records sometimes included stories of failed medical cures that were triumphed 
over by the successful spiritual cure,94 remission letters tell us about ultimately 
unsuccessful pilgrimages.  Although there were saints who were considered particularly 
good at curing madness, most of the pilgrimages recorded in remission letters were 
focused locally, at shrines close to home.  This is unsurprising, particularly when one 
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considers the potential difficulties of traveling with a mad person.  Foucault’s image of 
solitary mad people wandering the roads and waterways of Europe on their way to 
shrines is not supported by the evidence in these letters, which suggests rather that 
pilgrimages would be undertaken in groups of at least two, including one healthy 
individual, generally a member of the family.  Indeed, as Irina Metzler notes in her study 
of disability in medieval Europe, many miracle seekers traveled with the aid of others.95    
 Several of the saints known for curing madness were French saints, so they were 
ideally located for more local pilgrimages.  Saint Mathurin of Larchant’s shrine is 
seventy-eight kilometers (forty-nine miles) south of Paris.  Charles VI’s queen, Isabeau 
de Bavière, stopped there in 1416 on a lengthier pilgrimage, possibly to pray for her 
husband’s health.96  One remission letter from 1422 described a pilgrimage to St. 
Mathurin undertaken by a mad man and his relatives.97  Guille Cliquet lived in Talon-
Judas near Saint-Pere-le-Moustier, about 157 kilometers (ninety-eight miles) from St. 
Mathurin de Larchant and 228 kilometers (142 miles) from Paris.  In the letter written on 
his behalf, his relatives and close family explained that he  
had been furious and out of his senses for some time and for diverse intervals.  
Because of these things he was put in irons, chained, and taken to Saint Mathurin 
of Larchant and on other pilgrimages and sometimes he came to convalescence 
and afterwards he fell back into his lunacy.  The which Cliquet, when he is in 
health, is a very good, diligent laborer and a man of great care.98
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Guille Cliquet’s illness was considered cyclical, and related to the phases of the moon.  
While his family tried to find a resolution to the problem by taking him on multiple 
pilgrimages, even the saints could only aid him for a time before he would again fall into 
madness.   
However, despite the failure of holy remedies, Guille Cliquet was a diligent 
worker during his periods of sanity.  The letter further revealed that Guille lived in a 
household with his brothers, who held their beasts in common, providing an environment 
in which Guille could work when he was able, and presumably supporting him, along 
with his wife and children, when he was not.  Indeed, the crime that led his relatives to 
seek remission for him was intimately involved in the household arrangements.  A group 
of soldiers came through town, appropriating the local beasts and destroying 
outbuildings.  While they were at Guille Cliquet’s home, they tore down the household’s 
stone well.  According to the letter, Cliquet was at this time “in his senses,” but he was 
naturally very angry, and set about repairing the well the evening the soldiers left town, 
with his son holding a candle to provide light for the task.  Fortunately, many of their 
cattle had been saved because their valet, Guille Talart, had taken them into the hills to 
hide, and he also returned to the household that night.  As Cliquet’s relatives described 
the scene in his letter of remission, Talart insisted on taking the light Cliquet was using, 
going so far as to wrest it from Cliquet’s son’s hands.  Cliquet, who was already angered 
by the actions of the soldiers, entered into his fury and attacked Talart, giving him a 
wound from which he eventually died.  The healing powers of the saint were not 
sufficient to prevent Cliquet from acting out of proportion to the situation. 
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 Jehan de Moustier, whose story is detailed in chapter four, was also taken to a 
saint’s shrine and was disruptive while there.99  His father, Perrim, took him to the shrine 
of Saint Titenerd at Gournay, north of their home in Saint-Denis.  At the saint’s shrine, 
Jehan de Moustier was chained up and left to await God’s mercy, but he escaped from 
those chains and ran away.  When he was recaptured, his family returned him to the 
shrine where they applied two sets of chains, but even this was not enough to hold Jehan, 
who had strength enough to escape from those as well.  Clearly, the saint was not able to 
provide a cure at this time, and Perrim de Moustier took him back home.   
The Chronicle of Saint Denis described the successful cure of a disruptive 
madman at Saint Denis’ shrine.  It is worth contrasting the successful community healing 
ritual described by a monk with the unsuccessful rituals seen in remission letters.  Again, 
the pilgrimage was a local one, so it was the man’s neighbors who brought him to the 
shrine and witnessed the cure:   
[f]or a certain baker of the city of St. Denis had lost his inner sense, and captured 
by a demon, foaming and crying with a terrible voice, any who wanted to 
approach him or come to him, like an ungoverned savage beast, he tried to tear 
into morsels with great ferocity.  So his relatives and neighbors led him, bound 
with iron chains, to the church of the holy martyr, and placed him before the 
image of the crucifix.  They said prayers and his mad fury calmed a little.  Then 
they guided him before the altar of the martyr, where for a little while he lay 
down on the ground, as if separated from his bodily senses.  Suddenly from his 
mouth a fetid breath exited, and then getting up with hilarity, on bended knees, he 
gave thanks to God and to the glorious martyr, affirming publicly to all that he 
through invocation of the saint recovered his whole health.100
                                                 
99 Finucane also describes the disruptive behavior of mad people at saint’s shrines, which seems to have 
been a common theme in miracle records as well as in remission letters.  See Finucane, Miracles and 
Pilgrims, 107-109. 
100 M. L. Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI de 1380 à 
1422, Éditions du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques (Paris: L'imprimerie de Crapelet, 1842; 
reprint, 1994), 6 vols., vol. 1, 314-316: “Quidam namque panificus de villa beati Dyonisii sensum penitus 
amiserat, et arreptus a demone, spumans ac terribilibus vocibus clamans, volentes ad ipsum accedere vel 
eidem occurrentes, velud effrenis belua, ferocissimis morsibus conabatur discindere.  Quem cum cathena 
ferrea ligatum amici et vicini ad ecclesiam beati martiris attulissent, coram ymagine crucifixi, oracionibus 
factis, aliquantulum vesanum impetum deposuit.  Deinde eum ante altare martiris perducentes, cum super 
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His family and neighbors brought him to the shrine in hopes of recovery, perhaps 
especially because the baker held an important economic position within the local 
community.  The image of communal involvement that the chronicler paints here is 
compelling.  These “family and neighbors” were actively involved in helping him to get 
to the shrine, binding him and dragging him along with them.  Together, the mad man 
and the saint helped to initiate and confirm communal unity. 
 Just because other people aided in the pilgrimage does not mean that everyone 
was supportive, caring, and understanding of mad pilgrims.  Indeed, just as remission 
letters reveal failed pilgrimages, they also uncover failed attempts at cementing civic 
unity.  One case in particular provides evidence that not all miracle seekers were 
fortunate enough to have a considerate network of family and neighbors.  Instead, a 
stranger verbally and physically abused Margot, who was suffering from the malady of 
Saint John, often called Saint John’s Dance.101  According to a letter written in 1379 on 
behalf of Jehan Dargilles, a bystander who came to her defense, Margot arrived at the 
church of Saint John the Baptist in Sens on the saint’s feast day (24 June) with a group of 
others suffering from the dancing sickness.  Standing in front of the shrine of Saint John, 
Margot “burdened and much aggrieved by the said illness, took the candles placed before 
                                                                                                                                                 
pavimentum aliquandiu jacuisset, velud a corporeis sensibus segregatus, subito ex ore ejus anhelitus 
fetidissimus exivit, et tunc hylariter surgens, flexis genibus, gracias Deo egit et glorioso martiri, publice 
cunctis affirmans quod ejus precibus receperat integram sanitatem.” 
101 There were several outbreaks of the dancing sickness in the Middle Ages and into the early modern 
period.  E. Louis Backman discusses them all in detail in E. Louis Backman, Religious Dances in the 
Christian Church and in Popular Medicine, trans. E. Classen (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977), 
170-258.  On pages 190-216 he discusses an epidemic in 1374 in Flanders, Germany, and France, and 
argues on pages 303-327 that the dancers in all these epidemics actually suffered from ergot poisoning.  He 
does not mention any outbreaks in 1379, and in fact tends to argue that any chronicles providing alternative 
dates to the dates of the larger outbreaks were mistaken, perhaps in order to strengthen his argument about 
ergotism.  Erik Midelfort also discusses Saint Vitus’ Dance, which is a later incarnation of the dancing 
sickness (the name St. Vitus’ Dance does not appear until the sixteenth century), in H.C. Erik Midelfort, A 
History of Madness in Sixteenth-Century Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 32-49. 
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the image of the said Saint John and broke them, destroyed them, and threw them to the 
ground like an insensible person without reason.”102  Another resident of Sens, Huguenin 
Vice Serviter, took offense at Margot’s actions and verbally abused her, saying that if he 
met her outside the church he would hit her.  Jehan Dargilles “moved by pity for the said 
Margot, for consideration and compassion of her said illness, strongly blamed the said 
Serviter for the words and threats that he had said and made to the said Margot.”103  
Although the two men left the church peaceably enough, they met later in the street and 
began a brawl that led to Huguenin Vice Serviter’s death at Jehan Dargilles’ hands. 
In their attempts to cure the mad the community preferred religious to medical 
aid.  Though madness was certainly seen as a malady, and even described in humoral 
terms, remission letters rarely mention active medical intervention.  Only one letter out of 
the 145 examined mentioned medicine as instrumental in curing a mad person, and even 
in this case the reference is ambiguous.  In his madness, Robert Layne would go out into 
the woods naked with rocks in his hands and threaten to kill anyone who came near him, 
so that  
no one dared to approach him except the Seigneur and Dame de Campergny who 
thus brought him to live in their hostel.  He took him or had him taken and tied 
him or had him tied such that by medicine or otherwise in the custody of God he 
came back to himself and had cognizance.104   
 
Once he was brought home, he decided to go on a pilgrimage to Saint Acorée.  In the 
end, however, neither the medical nor the religious cure was sufficient, since, according 
                                                 
102 AN JJ 115 fo 73 no 154: “chargee et mout agreuse du dit mal prenent les chandelle mises devant lymage 
du dit saint jehan et les cussart desrompoit et gectoit aterre comme personne insensee et sans raison.” 
103 AN JJ 115 fo 73 no 154: “meu de pitie envers la dite margot pour consideracion et compassion de sa 
dite maladie blasma fortement le dit serviter de parolles et menaces quil avoit dites et faites ala dite 
margot.” 
104 AN JJ 131 fo 103 no 166: “par ce nul ne l'osoit aprouchier se ne fust le Seigneur et Dame de Campergny 
qui ainsi comme il se vint bouter en leur hostel ilz le poindrent ou firent prendre et le lièrent ou firent lier 
tant que par médicine ou aultrement que à la garde de Dieu il se revint et ot cognoissance.”  Edited in 
Saunier, “’Hors de sens et de mémoire’," 498. 
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to his remission letter from 1387, any time he was angered he would become 
uncontrollable and frenetic.  Physicians were never called in as experts to provide proof 
of madness, although they were being called in as witnesses to other physical illnesses,105 
and in the fourteenth century physicians were brought into the court to provide testimony 
in the form of prognosis for the injured party, determining whether or not the wounds 
were likely to prove fatal.106
Family care was clearly considered a better option than prison, where (at least 
according to the rhetoric of the remission letters) the prisoner was likely to die, whether 
or not he or she was ultimately convicted.  Although care within the household could 
involve chains and cells, it could also involve pilgrimages or treatments to seek a cure 
that would have been unavailable in prison.  In addition, a mad person who recovered 
could be returned to his or her previous position.  Because medieval people believed that 
madness was a disease from which people could and did recover, and because most of 
these remission letters were written for people who had contributed to the support of their 
immediate family before they became mad, it is likely that they were closely observed in 
the hopes that they would recover.    
However, even if caring for the mad within the household was preferable, it was 
certainly not without its own pitfalls.  Indeed, sometimes the stress of caring for the mad 
was enough to bring a household to a point of crisis.  Jacquet Morniet’s sister-in-law 
became so annoyed about having to care for him while he was bed-ridden with 
melancholy in 1459 that she made the mistake of berating him, calling him worthless and 
                                                 
105 AN JJ 171 no 411.  Edited in Longnon, ed., Paris pendant la domination anglaise, 17.  Note that 
Longnon does not provide folio references. 
106 Registre criminel de la justice de St. Martin des Champs à Paris au XIVe siècle, ed. Louis Tanon (Paris: 
L. Willem, 1877), 18-19.   
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lazy.107  Enraged, Jacquet hit her with a stick and killed her.  This remission letter is an 
excellent example of the optimism of the composers of remission letters.  Jacquet's 
family asked for his release so he could help care for his wife and children.  Yet before 
his crime, he was unable to support himself and was relying on his brother's charity.  This 
fraternal care would presumably not be forthcoming after his release, however, since his 
brother was instrumental in his arrest.  Jacquet's family must have been hoping (or 
expecting) that he would recover from his illness and become a useful member of the 
community once more, despite the unpleasant results of his dependence on his brother.   
This negative response of household members to caring for the mad was not 
unusual.  A letter composed in 1482 on behalf of Regnaulde des Vieulx, twenty-four or 
twenty-five year old widow of Pierre Pelletier, explained that she had been living in the 
household of her husband’s parents after his death.  In addition to Regnaulde and her 
child, the household included her father-in-law, his daughter, Begnoiste, and her husband, 
Odile Deleslang.  Begnoiste, who was only fourteen years old, was described in the letter 
as “foolish and insensible, and not pleasing to the said Odile,”108 who was more 
interested in the older widow.  Odile and Regnaulde began to have an affair, and Odile 
suggested that he should kill Begnoiste so that they could marry.  In the remission letter 
written on her behalf, Regnaulde claimed to have protested against this plan, but agreed 
that if by chance Begnoiste were to die, she would be happy to be Odile’s wife.  When 
Begnoiste was discovered drowned in a nearby fountain, Odile left town, thereby 
confirming his culpability, since the choice of voluntary exile was equivalent to an 
                                                 
107 AN JJ 188 fo 102 no 203. 
108 AN JJ 209 fo 61 no 104: “folle et incensee et nestoit pas ala plaisance dudit odile.” 
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admission of guilt.  When the officers of Neuilly came to question Regnaulde, the private 
lives of the Pelletier household became public knowledge. 
The remission letters narrated the discomforts of dealing with mad people, along 
with the attempts made to help them.  These awkward figures threatened their communal 
and kinship ties, but at the same time they could be used as symbols of and cement for 
those same bonds.  Mad people were expected to recover and reaffirm their identities as 
integral parts of the larger community.  The attempts made to hasten that recovery 
through pilgrimage or to guard the mad in order to prevent them from harming 
themselves or others placed the mad person at the center of communal concern.  This 
communal concern was perhaps most clear in a particular type of crime narrative that 
began to appear in the middle of the fifteenth century, in which the mad person became 
an impetus for vigilante justice, not as its victim, but as its cause. 
Acts of Communal Justice: Sorcerers and Remission 
 Towards the middle of the fifteenth century, a new narrative phenomenon began 
to appear in the remission letters.  These letters were written on behalf of individuals and, 
often, large groups of people guilty of murder, who insisted that their victims were 
“renowned” sorcerers.  These accusations of sorcery and bewitchment, nonexistent in the 
earlier letters, included references to proofs of the sorcerer’s power in the community, 
describing cases of impotence, infertility, and madness.109  The supplicants generally 
sought remission for what they presented as a cooperative effort to interrogate the 
accused sorcerer, leading to the sorcerer’s death from exposure or other “natural” causes.   
                                                 
109 For more on the connection between impotence magic and witchcraft, see Catherine Rider, Magic and 
Impotence in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), especially 186-207. 
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 Studies of witchcraft accusations in diverse locations have noted that, while the 
educated inquisitors and judges were most concerned with the question of worship of the 
devil, most accusers were focused on the details of the evil deeds performed through 
magic.110  The social aspects of magical acts, rather than a theological insistence on 
heretical beliefs, were important to those who brought cases against their neighbors.  
While the dangers of heresy in the community were certainly clear to the inquisitors, 
since heretics were believed to seek converts and could thus corrupt their neighbors, the 
dangers of sorcery were obvious to all, since they actively worked to attack their 
neighbors.  Norman Cohn argues that the lack of witchcraft accusations in the Middle 
Ages was due not to a lack of belief in popular culture, but rather to the legal system of 
“talion,” whereby the accuser, if unable to convince the judge of the guilt of the accused, 
would suffer as heavy a penalty as fit the crime.  He cites the evidence of lynchings from 
the ninth century into the eleventh to prove that there was a widespread belief in 
witchcraft before the trials.111  What is particularly interesting about the evidence of the 
remission letters is that the lynching of sorcerers (or even the accidental death of people 
rumored to be sorcerers) does not appear in the archive until 1450, after witchcraft trials 
had already begun in parts of Switzerland and eastern France.112   
                                                 
110 Edward Peters notes for the fourteenth century that “In secular courts generally, jurists looked for 
damage actually caused by sorcery; in ecclesiastical courts canonists looked for indications that sorcery 
was practised by means that clearly savoured of heresy, especially the homage paid to demons in return for 
magical powers.”  See Edward Peters, “The Medieval Church and State on Superstition, Magic, and 
Witchcraft From Augustine to the Sixteenth Century," in Witchcraft and Magic in Europe Volume 3: The 
Middle Ages, ed. Bengt Ankarloo and Stuart Clark (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 
173-245, 218.  See also Robin Briggs, Communities of Belief: Cultural and Social Tension in Early Modern 
France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Robin Briggs, Witches and Neighbors: The Social and Cultural 
Context of European Witchcraft (London: Harper Collins, 1996); Norman Cohn, Europe’s Inner Demons: 
An Enquiry Inspired by the Great Witch-hunt (London: Sussex University Press, 1975); Carol Karlsen, The 
Devil in the Shape of a Woman: Witchcraft in Colonial New England (New York: Norton, 1987). 
111 Cohn, Europe's Inner Demons, 160-163. 
112 Pierrette Paravy, “À propos de la genèse médiévale des chasses aux sorcières: Le traité de Claude 
Tholosan, juge dauphinois (vers 1436)," Mélanges de l'École française de Rome 91 (1979): 333-379.  
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 The devil had a strong presence in letters of remission at least from Charles V’s 
reign, which marks the beginning of this study.  The “temptation of the enemy” did not 
excuse an action, but it did provide a reasonable motivational force for the crime.  Natalie 
Zemon Davis, in her study of later remission letters, notes that the phrase was no longer 
in use in the sixteenth century.113  The coincidence of an increasing interest in the 
connection of the devil with sorcery and witchcraft in this period suggests that the 
“temptation of the enemy” may have become a more troubling claim in the sixteenth 
century than it had been in the fifteenth.  It was still occasionally used in oral depositions 
at trials, but the more composed format of the remission letters perhaps edited out such 
references.   
 Jean Gerson and other fourteenth-century theologians who were interested in the 
discernment of spirits believed that possession, whether by God or by the devil, 
manifested itself in behavior that was very similar to madness.114  The concern of these 
theologians was to determine which of the three possibilities was in fact occurring in a 
particular case and to act accordingly, whether to beatify, exorcise, or call a physician.115  
                                                                                                                                                 
Bernard Gui’s inquisitorial manual in the early fourteenth century mentions witchcraft, but he never 
convicted any witches.  See Cohn, Europe's Inner Demons, 131.  Nicolas Eymerich wrote his Directorium 
Inquisitorum in 1376.  His manual for inquisitors discussed witchcraft, but only as one among many 
heresies.  His focus was on the distinction between dulie and latrie of the devil, or worship (which is due 
only to God) and veneration (which is applicable to the saints).  These two different levels of heretical 
behavior in the practice of sorcery determined the appropriate punishment for the sorcerer.  Jean Gerson’s 
treatise written in 1402, De erroribus circa artem magicam, circulated with the appended articles 
condemning magic by the University of Paris in 1398. 
113 Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in Sixteenth-century 
France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 37.  See also the corresponding endnote number 6 
on pages 169-170. 
114 Jean Gerson, Oeuvres complètes, ed. Mgr Glorieux (Paris: Desclée & Cie, 1962), 10 vols., vol. 3: 
L'oeuvre magistrale. 
115 Most modern work on this topic has been more interested in the first two possibilities.  See Nancy 
Caciola, Discerning Spirits: Divine and Demonic Possession in the Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2003); Nancy Caciola, “Mystics, Demoniacs, and the Physiology of Spirit Possession in Medieval 
Europe," Comparative Studies in Society and History 42, no. 2 (2000): 268-306; Barbara Newman, 
“Possessed by the Spirit: Devout Women, Demoniacs, and the Apostolic Life in the Thirteenth Century," 
Speculum 73, no. 3 (1998): 733-770.  However, madness was also a viable diagnosis.  Friar Felix Fabri 
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Fifteenth-century scholars shifted attention to the capabilities of sorcerers, rather than the 
direct actions of the devil.  Sorcerers were believed capable not only of channeling 
demonic possession, but also of causing physical illnesses, including madness, through 
potions and spells.  Johan Nider wrote his Formicarius sometime around 1437.  In this 
treatise, he explained miraculous and marvelous events, introduced with brief allegorical 
interpretations of the behavior of ants.116  In book 5, chapter 3, the Theologian presented 
to his interrogator, the Lazy One, the kinds of damages that sorcerers can inflict through 
their demons.  He explained: 
[t]hen, the first manner works to create in a man an illicit love for a woman or in 
the contrary sense, in a woman for a man.  Another serves to provoke hatred or 
jealousy in someone.  The third is found in those who are called ensorcelled, 
because the men and women cannot use their generative force.  The fourth 
manner is to make a man suffer in one of his members.  The fifth deprives him of 
his life.  The sixth deprives him of the use of his reason.  The seventh is to harm 
him by attacking his goods or his animals….117
 
This list of harmful acts reflects an intense concern about reproduction, relationships, and 
household resources, as well as a fear of attacks on the individual.  Unlike the general run 
                                                                                                                                                 
wrote of a visit to a small town in Germany: “In the village of Jedensheim, or Iheidemsheim, at the foot of 
the hill on which the castle stands, there was a maiden bereft of her reason, whom many declared to be 
possessed of a devil; he showed me this maiden for me to look at and examine, that I might decide what 
was to be done with her; whether she ought to be exorcised or not. My decision was that she was out of her 
mind, and therefore fitter to be entrusted to the care of physicians than to that of theologians.”  Felix Fabri, 
The Book of the Wanderings of Felix Fabri (Circa 1480-1483 A.D.), ed. Aubrey Stewart, trans. Aubrey 
Stewart (London: Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society, 1896), 2 vols., vol. 1, 56. 
116 Catherine Chène, “Introduction," in L'imaginaire du sabbat: Édition critique des textes les plus anciens 
(1430 c. - 1440 c.), ed. Martine Ostorero, Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, and Kathrin Utz Tremp (Lausanne: 
Section d’histoire, Faculté des lettres, Université de Lausanne, 1999), 101-120, 106.  The titles of the five 
books are Libellus primus principaliter erit de raris bonorum hominum exemplis et operacionibus, 
Secundus de verisimilibus bonis revelacionibus, Tercius de falsis et illusoriis visionibus, Quartus de 
virtuosis perfectorum operacionibus, Quintus de maleficis et eorum decepcionibus. 
117 Jean Nider, “Formicarius Livre II, chapitre 4, et Livre V, chapitre 3, 4, 7," ed. Catherine Chène, in 
L'imaginaire du sabbat: Édition dritique des textes les plus anciens (1430 c. - 1440 c.), ed. Martine 
Ostorero, Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, and Kathrin Utz Tremp (Lausanne: Section d’histoire, Faculté des 
lettres, Université de Lausanne, 1999), 148-149: “Unus igitur modus est quo amorem malum ingerunt viro 
alicui ad mulierem aliquam, vel mulieri ad virum.  Alius est cum odium vel invidiam in aliquo seminare 
procurant.  Tercius est in his qui maleficiati dicintur, ne vi generativa uti valeant ad feminam vel viceversa 
femelle ad virum.  Quartus est cum in membro aliquo hominem egrotare faciunt.  Quintus cum vita privant.  
Sextus quando usu racionis aliquem privant.  Septimus cum quocumque predictorum modorum aliquem in 
suis rebus vel animalibus….” 
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of heretics, sorcerers were visibly damaging to the community, regardless of whether 
they were actively recruiting.  Nider listed deeply threatening powers over people’s 
relationships with others, since sorcerers could control love, hatred, or jealousy, all of 
which could be instilled in another person without cause or reference to the ordinary 
balance of the community.  Equally, an inability to reproduce threatened the continuity of 
a household, and through that household of the community as a whole, just as the 
destruction of property and household resources did.  Similarly, loss of reason was a 
serious threat to the cohesiveness of the community, since mad people were perceived as 
likely to attack ties of community and kinship, thus furthering the larger goal of the 
sorcerer.  In the end, attacking an individual’s life or body parts seems the least disruptive 
possibility.   
It may be theologically significant that Nider chose to say that sorcerers could 
deprive a person of the “use of his reason,” not actually deprive him of his reason.  
Although the sorcerer was able to create an impediment to using reason, they were not 
able to actively threaten a person’s reason.  Indeed, Nider provided an exemplum about 
the judge Pierre in Berne, who was injured by means of sorcery.  Pierre was generally 
quite careful about protecting himself with his faith and constant signing of the cross, but 
one night he woke up in the middle of the night and left himself open to the devil.  
Believing that it was morning due to some “fictive light,” he went downstairs and found 
the front door locked.  Angered at his attendants, he returned up the stairs cursing, saying 
“In the name of the devil.”  Immediately, Pierre fell back down the stairs onto his head.  
He was found “deprived of the use of his reason, wounded everywhere and bleeding 
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profusely.”118  This story was used by Nider to demonstrate that even holy men, despite 
their best efforts, can slip up occasionally, allowing sorcerers and the devil access to 
them.  However, perhaps the most interesting aspect is that Pierre’s wounds and loss of 
reason were by-products of the sorcerer’s act, which was to make him trip on the stairs.  
Although sorcerers had the power to wound people remotely, they were also capable of 
taking advantage of dangerous situations.  Pierre eventually regained the use of his reason 
through God’s grace, and recovered from his other wounds. 
 Heinrich Institoris, who wrote the Malleus Maleficarum in 1484, was heavily 
influenced by Nider’s work.119  He also explained that witches were capable of inflicting 
illness on their victims.  Institoris, however, was particularly intent on proving that 
witches could cause epilepsy and leprosy, because, as he pointed out, physicians claimed 
that these diseases generally arose from longstanding preconditions, and therefore were 
unlikely to be contracted through supernatural means.120  Interestingly, in his discussion 
of how sorcerers could cause illnesses, he devoted relatively little space to madness, 
merely stating “[t]he situation with harming the use of reason and harassing the internal 
senses is made clear through the case of the possessed and ‘stricken,’ as well as by 
                                                 
118 Ibid., 190-193: “luce deceptus ficticia”; “In nomine dyaboli”; “privatum racionis usu iacentem et 
collisum per omnia membra, sanguinem plurimum e corpore emittentem.” 
119 For more on the Malleus and its wider influence, see Hans Peter Broedel, The Malleus Maleficarum and 
the Construction of Witchcraft: Theology and Popular Belief (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2003).  Although earlier scholarship credited Jacobus Sprenger with coauthoring the Malleus, Institoris is 
now accepted as the sole author.  See P.G. Maxwell-Stuart, “Introduction," in The Malleus Maleficarum, 
ed. P.G. Maxwell-Stuart (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 30-31. 
120 Henricus Institoris and Jacobus Sprenger, Malleus Maleficarum, ed. Christopher Mackay, trans. 
Christopher Mackay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2 vols., vol. 2: The English 
Translation, 311. 
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Gospel stories.”121  Thus, sorcery could cause madness, since it was clear that the devil 
could cause cases of possession by targeting a person’s “use of reason.” 
 The narratives in letters of remission about witchcraft revolved around issues of 
trust, threat, and reputation in the community.  They revealed and simultaneously sought 
to mend deep fissures in the ideals of communal support.  The mad person, along with 
other perceived victims of malefaction, became the central figures of a narrative of 
communal reconstruction at the expense of the reputed sorcerer.  However, the letters 
also illuminate the roles that sorcerers were expected and even, occasionally, required to 
play in the neighborhood.  Generally, these sorcerers were sought out originally on the 
pretext of desiring magical healing, not because they were immediately presumed to be 
the cause of the illness.  It was only after the sorcerer’s attempts failed, or he or she122 
refused to help, that the narratives escalated into violence.123  Like the mad person in 
narratives of mad crime, the sorcerer had a role to play that was acceptable in certain 
prescribed ways. 
                                                 
121 Ibid., 307; Henricus Institoris and Jacobus Sprenger, Malleus Maleficarum, ed. Christopher Mackay, 
trans. Christopher Mackay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2 vols., vol. 1: The Latin Text, 
457: “Item de nocumento vsus rationis et vexatione interiorum sensuum probatur ex possessis et arrepticijs, 
per euangelicas etiam historias.” 
122 Despite the preponderance of female witches elsewhere, in France, at least in the early period, the ratio 
seems to be less skewed.  Alfred Soman also found this to be the case in the écrous of the Conciergerie du 
Palais, the prison of the Parlement of Paris.  He also found that very few accused sorcerers were killed.  See 
Alfred Soman, Sorcellerie et Justice Criminelle: Le Parlement de Paris (16e - 18e siècles) (Hampshire: 
Variorum, 1992), x.  
123 The sorcerers’ social position appears in some ways similar to that of the Jews studied by David 
Nirenberg.  He argues that outbreaks of violence against Jews were deeply embedded in specific social, 
political, and ideological conflicts that were locally based.  In fact, Nirenberg suggests that coexistence was 
predicated on just such occasional outbreaks of violence, which could dissolve the tensions of everyday 
life.  This argument casts new light onto considerations of “othering”, violence, and community, suggesting 
that persecution did not intend to purify, but to enable cohabitation.  See David Nirenberg, Communities of 
Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).  It is 
also worth noting, as Miri Rubin points out, that violent episodes against the Jews were not only localized 
and particular, but also manipulated and comprehended through narrative constructions.  Miri Rubin, 
Gentile Tales: The Narrative Assault on Late Medieval Jews (New Haven: Princeton University Press, 
1999). 
  268  
 In 1464, Jehan Sommet, a notary living in the town of Thiart in Auvergne, sought 
remission for the crime of murder.  He described his troubling night on the twelfth or 
thirteenth of June, when his wife “was greatly troubled in her sense and understanding, 
crying with a loud voice as if insensible, and wishing to throw herself out the windows 
into the street.”124  Jehan Sommet explained that he called his neighbors to aid him in 
guarding his wife and preventing her from doing herself harm.  He claimed that he made 
a number of vows, to both male and female saints, on his wife’s behalf, but they did not 
help her.  Upset about his wife’s continued frenzy, Jehan Sommet began asking his 
“neighbors and other people”125 where this illness could come from, and if they knew of 
any possible remedy.  The response, which was presented as universal, rather than being 
attributed to one particular source, was that his wife had been poisoned by an old, 90-
year-old woman in the town, named either Guillaume or Guillemete de Pigeules called 
Turlateuse, “held and reputed to be a great sorcerer and a bad woman.”126  The helpful, 
but anonymous, voices of Jehan Sommet’s “neighbors and other people” further informed 
him that only Turlateuse could provide a remedy for her poisons, and that he would have 
to ask the sorcerer “nicely” (doulcement) to heal his wife.  If Turlateuse refused, Jehan’s 
advisors continued, he should “warm the soles of her feet,” because on other occasions, 
she had healed people of similar poisons and illnesses because of threats and beatings.127   
Armed with this helpful advice, Jehan Sommet and two of his wife’s brother, 
Hugues Vachon and Jehan Cavart, went to the home of Turlateuse on the ninth of 
August, two months after his wife had first begun to exhibit these symptoms.  The three 
                                                 
124 AN JJ 199 fo 276 no 441: “fut fort trouble de son sens et entendement criant a haulte voix comme 
incensee soy voulant gecter par les fenestres en la rue.” 
125 AN JJ 199 fo 276 no 441: “a ses voisins et a autres personnes.” 
126 AN JJ 199 fo 276 no 441: “tenus et repputee estre grant sorciere et mauvaise femme.” 
127 AN JJ 199 fo 276 no 441: “luy chauffast les solles des piez.” 
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men asked Turlateuse to help Jehan Sommet’s wife by healing her or providing an 
antidote to the poisons, but, according to the letter, she refused to do so.  Naturally, they 
proceeded to apply a hot iron to her feet in an effort to force her to help them, adding in a 
few beatings around her neck with a stick.  When Turlateuse remained obstinate in her 
refusal to help them, they departed, each one back to his own home.   However, two days 
later, Jehan Sommet’s wife worsened, becoming more frenzied than before.  In his anger, 
Jehan Sommet called together his four closest friends, the same two brothers of his wife 
and two other men, Jehan Grasser and Pierre Jobert, and informed them that, in order to 
heal his wife, they were going to take Turlateuse out of her home that night and burn her 
feet.  When one of his henchmen protested that perhaps Turlateuse’s neighbors would 
bring them to justice for breaking into her house, Jehan Sommet replied that all her 
neighbors knew she was a bad woman, and would not meddle with them.  He returned 
home to his sick wife, who was being watched by several neighbors, but his friends went 
to Turlateuse’s home, where they found her “naked” in her bed.  They took her to a 
nearby churchyard, where they beat her with sticks so hard that she fell on the ground, 
and kept beating her until she told them that Jehan Sommet’s wife had recovered.  One of 
the perpetrators went to Jehan Sommet’s house to verify Turlateuse’s statement, where he 
found the woman’s health improved.  Jehan went to the churchyard and found Turlateuse 
lying still on the ground.  He claimed later that he was very angry to find that his friends 
had beaten the sorcerer so badly, and he insisted that she be carried back to her home.  
One of his friends did so, but, finding the door locked, left her, still naked, on the 
doorstep, where she was found the next morning, dead. 
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 In some cases, mad people themselves, rather than only their relatives, were 
involved in gathering together a posse of like-minded individuals to “interrogate” a 
renowned sorcerer.  Guille Moler, in his letter of remission from 1452, claimed that he 
was pulled out of bed one Saturday evening at eight o’clock by Jaures Menefevre, who 
asked Guille to join him and Thogny de la Villate, who was waiting for them with 
Beguite Clote.  There is no indication in the letter of any kin relationship between these 
three men.  Beguite “as it is said, had ensorcelled the said Thogny and made him languish 
in a certain illness by virtue of certain evil arts such that he had lost his good, natural 
senses and that he was out of good memory.”128  Interestingly, Thogny, despite believing 
that Beguite had been the cause of his illness, had asked her to heal him, which she 
promised to do but never managed.  When the three men confronted her with rigorous 
words, she refused to help Thogny, so they beat her with “little” sticks until she finally 
agreed to heal him.  According to Guille’s letter, the three men then left her alone, and 
she decided to sleep under a tree, where she may have taken cold, or possibly been more 
severely injured than they had thought, because she died the same night and her body was 
found under the tree the next morning. 
 Guitiere des Ganes’ letter of remission demonstrates the general fear of sorcerers.  
Guitiere was eighteen years old in 1469, when she became involved in what reads as a 
complicated and fraught household arrangement.  It is unclear from the letter exactly how 
Guitiere was involved in the household of Remond Robin, but it seems likely that she 
was a servant.  Remond Robin was married to Michelle Peronne, and the couple lived 
with their daughter, Jehanne Robine, and her husband, Roger Colmet, who had come into 
                                                 
128 AN JJ 181 fo 67v no 123: “come len disoit avoit ensorcele ledit thogny et le fait languer en certaine 
maladie par vertu de certain mauvais art tellement quil en avoit perdu son bon sens naturel et quil en estoit 
hors de bonne memoire.” 
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the household originally as a servant.  Remond Robin became aware that his wife did not 
take good care of her children, and became so angry about it that he ended up bedridden 
from illness.  Michelle Peronne moved out of their communal home.  At this point in the 
narrative, Guitiere was reintroduced, arguing that she did not dare to do anything to anger 
Michelle Peronne because she believed that Michelle had caused her brother to become 
mad by making him eat the brains of a cat.  The narrative suggests some intervention by a 
notary questioning this statement, because the letter’s flow was interrupted to explain that 
“the said supplicant presumed this because this Michelle had, around the feast of Easter 
last, treated the brain of a cat and given it to her daughter to give to the said Roger to 
bring him so that he would become mad.”129  The madness of her brother worked as an 
insurance of her cooperation, according to Guitiere, so that she had no choice but to join 
Michelle Peronne and Jehanne Robine when they went to Roger Colmet’s house and 
murdered him in his bed.  According to the letter, Michelle Peronne had already 
confessed to all of her own crimes, and had exonerated Guitiere and Jehanne.   
 
 These cases involving sorcery, much like those that mention failed pilgrimages, 
demonstrate the desire for action on the part of the family and relatives of the mad.  They 
were not willing to merely accept madness as a just punishment from God or as a natural 
illness that had to be endured.  Their search for a solution to the problem that madness 
posed reached outwards, to things that were in their control.  Many scholars writing about 
witchcraft have considered the cathartic value of the witch as a scapegoat for larger 
                                                 
129 AN JJ 196 fo 72 no 127: “ce presupposist ladite suppliant par ce que icelle michelle environ la feste de 
pasques dernier ladite michelle avoit trait la cervelle dun chat et baille a sa fille pour bailler donner audit 
roger amena affin quil devensist fol.” 
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problems in the community.130  This chapter has shown how mad people had the 
potential to disrupt and disorder familial and communal bonds.  However, rather than 
target the mad in order to prevent such problematic crimes, these communities chose to 
protect them, reintegrating mad people and, in the process, sometimes channeling that 
potential towards recognized and “renowned” outsiders. 
 
 The brief life narratives encapsulated within remission letters conceal much about 
their protagonists.  These crimes are told from only one perspective, that of the criminal, 
or in some cases of those taking the criminal’s part.  It is not possible to trace these 
crimes to their source and discover more about the community where they were 
committed, or find dissenting voices that could clarify the details of the case or shed light 
on alternative narratives about the crimes or about those who committed them.  The mad 
people described in these letters disappeared from the public record after remission was 
granted.  What did the family and community actually do once the mad person was 
released from prison?  What was the long-term effect of the admission of guilt and 
madness on the individuals and on their communities?  Answers to these questions, and 
many others, remain tantalizingly out of reach.   
 Nevertheless, these letters reveal important details about how madness was 
understood and what kinds of actions were taken on behalf of those considered mad.  
Madness, conceived as an inability to understand the world and particularly the rules, 
explicit and implicit, that governed human interactions, revealed the instability of 
                                                 
130 Briggs, Communities of Belief: Cultural and Social Tension in Early Modern France ; Briggs, Witches 
and Neighbors ; Lyndal Roper, Witch Craze: Terror and Fantasy in Baroque Germany (New Haven Yale 
University Press, 2004); Lyndal Roper, “Witchcraft and Fantasy in Early Modern Germany," in Oedipus 
and the Devil: Witchcraft, Sexuality and Religion in Early Modern Europe (London: Routledge, 1994), 
199-225. 
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communities on all levels.  However, despite the medieval “persecuting society,”131 mad 
people were not exiled from their communities as a result of the threat that they posed.  
Rather, even after committing crimes, they could be reintegrated into their families and 
communities.  The very ties that they had ruptured were reconstructed through the 
narratives of these remission letters, as the letter composers sought to place mad people at 
the center of communal responsibility and concern. 
 
 
                                                 
131 R. I. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950-
1250 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). 




Chapter 6:  
Conclusions 
 
 All of the mad people examined in this dissertation were embedded within 
networks of kin and community, whether they included the Princes of the Blood or 
manual laborers.  These networks were complex, and while a mad person’s place within 
them had to be negotiated, none were not expelled from the community.  In part, the texts 
used allowed for the tracing of such communal involvement.  The king of France was 
clearly an unusual case, and those mad people whose families were willing to seek 
remission for them were also fortunate in their position.  As demonstrated by the law 
codes, in theory mad people were to be protected from themselves, just as the community 
was to be protected from their potentially harmful, but presumably unintended, acts.  
Madness was an intimate disaster, often rupturing social bonds and constructs of identity 
in startling and sometimes violent ways.  Yet, as this dissertation has shown, legal and 
social mechanisms were put in place to reintegrate the mad into community structures. 
 In conclusion, I would like to consider a case that approaches many of the themes 
that have been considered in this dissertation from a new angle.  A set of four remission 
letters all dealing with the same crime appear in the chancery records for 1424 and 1425.1  
It is not a story about madness itself, but one that offers insight into how the discourse of 
                                                 
1 AN JJ 173 fo 22v no 44, AN JJ 173 fo 88 no 170, AN JJ 173 fo 88v no 171, and AN JJ 173 fo 89v no 
172. 
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madness was deployed and how multiple levels of community were constructed.  In these 
four letters sent to the king, a number of residents of a town in the diocese of Bayeux 
explained to the English government of France how it came to pass that they had banded 
together to attack two English men in November of 1417, shortly after Henry V’s army 
had overtaken Caen.  No one could understand these strangers, who had decided to lodge 
at Guillaume le Paumier’s hôtel.  When the two men started to gather together the 
Paumiers’ goods, Alips, Guillaume le Paumier’s wife, left the hôtel seeking help, and a 
group of townspeople returned with her and killed the two men.   
 Their requests for remission were written against the background of national 
events.  In the seven years between 1417, when the act was committed, and 1424, when 
remission was sought, the political landscape in France had shifted, in part due to 
repercussions from the king’s madness.  Charles VI had died in 1422, leaving political 
confusion and civil war dividing the realm.  The dead king’s son, Charles, had been 
officially disinherited, and controlled only southern France.  His grandson, Henry, the 
heir according to the Treaty of Troyes, was just a baby, and with the aid of an English 
regent and the duke of Burgundy, held Paris and northern France.  In such a divisive 
moment, fundamental questions about the very constitution of the French realm, French 
identity, and the relationship between the French and the English were at stake.  The 
political situation was so complex in part because of the king’s madness, which had left 
his legacy, shaped through the Treaty of Troyes, open to question.   
As these four remission letters demonstrate, this confusion of loyalties on the 
level of the realm had repercussions in local communities.  With an English king on the 
throne, actions that might in other contexts have appeared simply as a commendable and 
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heroic defense of the village against enemies of the realm, were suddenly construed as 
the murder of loyal soldiers and subjects of the king.  These conflicts over changing 
identities and shifting boundaries between enemy and friend were relatively common in 
this period, and a number of remission letters reflect discomfort and uncertainty on a 
local level, caused by political events.2  This series of letters moves beyond the general 
acknowledgement of alternating loyalties, however, considering problems of linguistic 
differences, communal defense, and the long-term fears that such shifts engender.   
Robert le Panomer’s letter was recorded in the chancery in December of 1424, 
and was the first remission letter sought by members of this community in reference to 
the death of the two strangers.3  The three other letters relating to this crime were all 
recorded consecutively in June of 1425, and appear to have been composed in 
consultation with each other.  Indeed, these three letters are practically word for word 
exact replicas of each other.  The first of these was composed on behalf of Guillaume and 
Alips le Paumier,4 who were pardoned together as a married couple.  The two others 
were for Robin Germain5 and Jehan Germain,6 perhaps brothers or a father and son, 
though their relationship to each other was not specified in the letters.  These three 
identical letters with slight alterations in reference to the particular supplicant involved 
reveal the careful construction that went into these crime narratives.  In the essentials 
they do not diverge significantly from Robert le Panomer’s earlier version, but their 
narrative is more cautious and considered.   
                                                 
2 See the discussion in chapter four of brigandage during wartime.   
3 AN JJ 173 fo 22v no 44. 
4 AN JJ 173 fo 88 no 170. 
5 AN JJ 173 fo 88v no 171. 
6 AN JJ 173 fo 89v no 172. 
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It is tempting to speculate about the exchange of information once Robert le 
Panomer returned to Normandy with his letter of remission.  Guillaume and Alips le 
Paumier and Robin and Jehan Germain all claimed that they had been hiding “secretly,” 
supported by their neighbors and relatives in the area, for the past seven years.  Two 
possibilities can be imagined.  One is that, with Robert le Panomer’s letter of remission, 
the horizon opened for these four fugitives.  Here was proof that the English occupiers 
would not execute them for their crime, but that Henry, like the King of France he 
claimed to be, would, of his grace and mercy, pardon them.  Alternatively, Robert le 
Panomer’s return with a royal pardon might have initiated a legal case against his 
accomplices, since remission for one participant in a crime did not guarantee remission 
for the others.7  Regardless, it is likely that Robert le Panomer’s remission letter for this 
case spurred the others to seek their own.  The distance from Paris to the diocese of 
Bayeux, where their village was located, is around 260 kilometers (160 miles).  There 
was plenty of time between Robert le Panomer’s return, probably some time in late 
December or early January, and the trip to Paris in May or June by the other four 
remission seekers.  They could get the story straight, ensure that the details matched and 
that nothing they said had the potential to backfire once they acquired remission.   
The first letter, written on behalf of Robert le Panomer, claimed that two strangers 
arrived in town, “speaking a strange language that they had never heard and they did not 
know whether they were Bretons, English, Scottish or other peoples.”8  The letter is a 
narrative constructing Robert le Panomer’s innocence.  The men were speaking an 
                                                 
7 Esther Cohen notes this, although the case she discusses involves people who received remission for 
crimes for which their accomplices had already been executed.  Esther Cohen, The Crossroads of Justice: 
Law and Culture in Late Medieval France (New York: E.J. Brill, 1993).   
8 AN JJ 173 fo 22v no 44: “parlans langage estrange que on ne entendoit point et ne savoit ou se cestoient 
bretons anglois escocoys ou autres gens.” 
  278  
incomprehensible language, so no one knew they were English, and, perhaps more 
significantly, no one knew what they were doing.  They were the first aggressors.  
According to Robert le Panomer’s letter, the strangers had threatened the Paumiers by 
hitting them both several times with the flat of their swords, and gathered all the 
Paumier’s goods together, planning to steal them in the morning.  As if that was not 
enough to exonerate him, even Alips’ decision to call on her neighbors for aid was not 
done with the intention of attacking the two strangers, but only in a state of temporary 
madness brought on by fear, loss, and possibly pain, since she had already been beaten by 
the strangers’ swords.  According to Robert le Panomer’s version of events, Alips “was 
as if completely out of her good sense and memory because she saw that they wanted to 
take away their said goods.”9  Thus, her decision to round up the locals to help her 
prevent these two strangers from stealing from her was not premeditated, but was the 
result of a temporary insanity brought on by her fear of the loss of their property.   
In the version agreed upon by Guillaume and Alips le Paumier, Robin Germain, 
and Jehan Germain, the supplicants declared that they “had no memory” of the exact 
date, just that it was around Saint Martin’s day and after the conquest of Caen by the 
English.10  By declaring their uncertainty about the date, the composers of these three 
letters established the uncertain nature of memory.  Despite four witnesses who were able 
to agree on the details to the extent that they presented their cases in almost identical 
ways, no one could recall the exact date on which these events took place.  This reminder 
of the fragility of human memories, particularly after the passage of time, could have 
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been an effort to legitimize their own version of events as opposed to Robert le 
Panomer’s.   
The composers of the new narrative of events, unlike Robert, did not choose to 
provide a list of possible languages that the two men might have been speaking, instead 
stating it was “English or another language.”11  This version of events also avoided 
representing the two men with drawn swords during their early interactions with 
Guillaume and Alips le Paumier.  Instead, their threatening actions were directed towards 
the couple’s goods, which they gathered together and seemed to plan to carry away.  
Indeed, it was because they could not understand these strangers, not because the 
strangers threatened them with bodily harm, that Guillaume and Alips became frightened 
and angry.  According to their letter, Guillaume went to bed and Alips (without 
consulting her husband) left the house to complain to the neighbors about these two 
strangers.  Significantly, these three letters did not mention temporary madness as a 
mitigating factor for Alips’ actions.12  Madness could be a complicated claim to make, 
since it could lead to a mandate in the letter of remission forcing the family to keep the 
mad person locked up or under guard.13  This was particularly true in Normandy where, 
as we saw in chapter three, the law codes called for the restraint of the mad to prevent 
them from causing fires.14  Clearly, Robert le Panomer did not find it problematic to refer 
to the temporary madness of his neighbor who called for his aid, whereas Guillaume and 
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Alips le Paumier were hesitant to ascribe her behavior to madness.  Instead, they 
presented her call for help as an understandable response to the threat of theft that the two 
strangers represented. 
Robert le Panomer, the Paumiers, and the Germains were caught in an awkward 
moment of transition between political rivals, where alliances shifted and enemies 
became putative friends.  On the ground, in local villages, these shifts engendered 
confusion, anger, and fear.  Caen had fallen to the English forces, but residents of small 
towns in the countryside could not know in that moment how changes in policies at the 
level of kings and princes would color their own actions, reframing them in unexpected 
ways.  From their perspective they had banded together as neighbors to defend their 
community from strangers with whom they were unable to communicate.  Within three 
years, those strangers had, through the Treaty of Troyes, become allies.  Within five 
years, the kingdoms of France and England were joined under a single king.  As the first 
remission seeker, Robert le Panomer sought to emphasize the fear and confusion brought 
on by the unexplained actions of these two strangers, explaining that the men had drawn 
their swords and beaten the Palmiers.  He described Alips le Palmier as out of her senses 
in an attempt to recapture the emotional tenor of the moment and explain why her 
neighbors were so quick to come to her aid.  The later letters were more balanced in their 
portrayal of the two strangers and in their depiction of Alips’ actions.   
 This dissertation has sought to explore the multiple levels on which medieval 
conceptions of madness interacted with constructions of kinship and community.  When 
the king of France began exhibiting signs of madness, the chroniclers, political writers, 
and preachers of the time had to grapple with questions of royal authority, regal dignity, 
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and the instability of the realm under an occasionally incapacitated monarch.  They often 
saw his madness as a threat to the coherence of the French realm, which was in danger of 
disintegrating into civil war as his relatives fought for control of the monarch during his 
periods of illness.  However, they also deployed it in an effort to reimagine the French 
people coming together and affirming their identity in prayers and processions on his 
behalf.  The macrocosm of the realm was mirrored to some degree in the microcosm of 
local towns and villages.  Much like the king’s madness, the madness of ordinary people 
was imagined as a threat to the community as a result of their inability to understand 
basic human interactions, and sometimes because of their unintended violent actions 
against themselves or others.  Nevertheless, the narratives written around these figures 
sought to reconstruct the kin and communal ties that had been fractured by these mad 
people, reimagining local communities just as chroniclers reimagined the realm.  
Communities are constantly in the process of being constructed through the creation of 
boundaries and the affirmation of ties.  Rather than being expelled, the mad were 
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